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Partnership at Work
The partnership arrangements established between the Irish Airports’
Authority, Aer Rianta, and its trade unions in the mid 1990s were amongst
the most far-reaching of their kind in promoting union and staff involve-
ment in all aspects of company decision-making from work groups and
departments to the making of corporate strategy. Radical organizational
change was envisaged in this path-breaking partnership. Significant achieve-
ments were recorded. Major commercial challenges were addressed and
partnership effectively came to displace traditional industrial relations
arrangements and postures in key areas. A decade later, however, the
partnership had broken down.
This book presents the story of the Aer Rianta partnership, charting its
origins, progress, achievements, obstacles and eventual demise. Partnership at
Work is based on access to parties, documents, observation on how the
partnership functioned and three surveys of the company’s workforce. As
detailed, in-depth studies of workplace partnership are rare in the inter-
national literature, the analysis provided in this book makes an important
contribution to the understanding of employment relations. The account
given by William K. Roche and John F. Geary is balanced and instructive
and allows for a comprehensive understanding of the functioning and out-
comes of partnership.
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Preface
The partnership arrangements agreed between the Irish Airports’ Authority,
Aer Rianta and its unions in the mid 1990s, were among the most radical of
their kind in making provision for employee involvement and union partici-
pation at multiple levels in the affairs of the company. Nothing short of
radical organizational change was envisaged in this path-breaking partner-
ship. Less than a decade later, the Aer Rianta partnership had broken down,
despite having recorded a number of significant achievements. This book
presents the story of the Aer Rianta partnership, charting its antecedents,
operation, outcomes and eventual demise.
We were originally invited to examine the Aer Rianta partnership by the
Irish Department of Public Enterprise. We have enjoyed an unusual level of
access to the parties involved in the Aer Rianta partnership during the
course of our research. All meetings and documents were accessible over a
period of four years that extended to the high tide of co-operative joint
activity. All the main parties were accessible over an even longer period,
extending to the breakdown of the partnership. We enjoyed access to
surveys that had been conducted as part of the preparations for the introduc-
tion of partnership. We conducted our own survey during the high tide of
the partnership. We sat for several years on the Joint Union Company
Group that oversaw the operation of partnership activities, and on several
strategic partnership groups. We were asked to participate in the activities
of these bodies not as researchers alone but as ordinary members. When the
partnership had broken down, we were asked by management and unions to
assess the lessons to be learned and to provide guidance as to a possible
future modus of working through partnership. As a result of our work on
the Aer Rianta partnership, we joined with some of the main parties
involved, as well as with other companies and union officials active in oper-
ating partnerships, to create the Partnership Learning Network. The
network is committed to exploring the lessons that can be learned from
earnest and practical initiatives in partnership in Ireland.
In all these ways, the Aer Rianta partnership has provided an important
focus for our professional lives as academics and researchers over a number of
years, and we hope the level of access we enjoyed and the opportunity this
provided to explore the dynamics of partnership in depth make for a bal-
anced and instructive book that adds to the international literature on the
pursuit of radical organizational change through involvement and participa-
tion. It seemed clear to us that such a study is necessary given the paucity of
detailed studies of partnership in the literature. With the exception of Saul
Rubinstein and Tom Kochan’s excellent Learning from Saturn (2001), there
have been few detailed case studies of the functioning and outcomes of
partnership.
The book is organized in the following way. Chapters 1 and 2 outline the
theoretical and methodological background to the study. Chapters 3 to 9
examine in depth the evolution of the Aer Rianta partnership up to what we
have referred to as its high-water mark in the late 1990s. Chapter 3 exam-
ines the antecedents and ‘architecture’ of ‘constructive participation’, the
term coined by the parties to describe their joint initiative, and outlines the
operation of the joint initiative up to the point where it engaged with
significant commercial challenges faced by the company and its unions.
Chapters 4 to 9 explore the core themes that have focused the international
literature on partnership arrangements. Chapter 4 examines the relationship
between partnership, commercial strategy and governance. Chapters 5 and 6
look at the role of senior and middle managers in the operation of partner-
ship. Chapter 7 focuses on the role of union officials and activists. Chapters 8
and 9 examine the effects of partnership on employees’ attitudes and behavi-
our. Chapter 10 develops the story into a detailed examination of the break-
down of partnership, when – extending the metaphor of tides introduced
above – the tide ebbed fast on constructive participation. Chapter 11 pre-
sents the study’s main conclusions and links these to major issues of debate
in the partnership literature.
Since the completion of our fieldwork, and as anticipated in Chapter 10,
Aer Rianta has been reorganized. In late 2004 the new state-owned Dublin
Airport Authority assumed responsibility for the former company’s assets
and liabilities. Significant responsibility for day-to-day operations was dele-
gated to the Cork and Shannon Airport Authorities. In due course these
authorities may assume full responsiblity for the management, development
and assets of Cork and Shannon airports.
We have incurred significant debts and have been able to work with some
remarkable people during the course of this study. We would like to thank
Brendan Tuohy, currently Secretary General of the Department of Commu-
nications, Marine and Natural Resources, for inviting us to undertake a
study of partnership in Aer Rianta and for providing financial support to the
study. Michael McDaid liaised effectively between the Department and the
research team in the project’s early years. Martin Brennan also acted as a
helpful link between the Department, the company and the University
College Dublin (UCD) research team. We owe a particular debt of gratitude
to George O’Connor, Bernard Brown and Dan Miller, whose vision, tenacity
and professionalism were responsible, in large measure, for constructive
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participation. They continuously dialogued with us on the issues involved to
a degree that has been for us both unique and uniquely instructive. We are
also grateful to other senior figures in Aer Rianta, especially John Burke, the
company’s former CEO, Margaret Sweeney, the last Aer Rianta CEO, Oliver
Cussen, Deputy CEO, Brendan Daly, Frank O’Connell, Damian Lenagh and
Hugh Duggan. Among the union officials and activists interviewed, we
would like in particular to thank John Flannery, Carmel Hogan, Tony
Kenny, Linda Tanham, Kay Kearns, Peter Tobin, Eddie O’Grady and Tom
Kenny. We would also like to express our gratitude to worker directors,
Peter Dunne, Pat Fitzgerald and Rita Bergin. We are grateful as well to
many other managers, at a variety of levels, to trade union activists, facilita-
tors and employees who consented to be interviewed for the study. Presenta-
tions on the principal research findings were made to the Aer Rianta senior
management group and to the Joint Union Company Group, and we would
like to acknowledge the helpful comments made at both presentations.
Alastair McPherson worked as a senior research officer on the project
during the first intensive phase of fieldwork and contributed to the design
and management of the survey. He also supplied background documentation
to Chapter 3 and contributed to the drafting of Chapter 6, where his contri-
bution to authorship is acknowledged. Teresa Brannick provided very
helpful advice and excellent technical assistance with respect to the manage-
ment of the survey, especially in the area of sampling, and we would like to
acknowledge her expertise with gratitude. The Survey Unit of the Economic
and Social Research Institute, Dublin processed the survey data. We would
also like to acknowledge the access allowed by ESRI, and, in particular, by
Professor Chris Whelan, to the two earlier surveys conducted by the ESRI
for the Joint Union Company Group in Aer Rianta. At UCD, Claire Kenny,
Tony Dobbins, Enda Hannon and Alison Carey also provided valuable
research assistance at various stages during the course of the project. Tony
Kerr, Geraldine O’Brien and Tom Murphy gave helpful feedback on drafts
of several chapters. John Benson also contributed constructive advice on the
study as a whole. Geraldine McEvoy supplied superb technical support,
particularly through her work on the composition of data tables, and Joy
O’Hora and Vera Bolger also assisted with some of the graphs contained in
the text.
We are indebted to Ed Heery for his encouragement for our work on
the book and for his support as series editor. We would also like to thank
four anonymous academic reviewers for their constructive and incisive
comments on the proposal for the current manuscript. We would like to
acknowledge the encouragement and forbearance of Joe Whiting, Annabel
Watson, Yeliz Ali and Terry Clague at Routledge. Some of the material
contained in Chapter 8 appeared in ‘Advocates, Critics and Union Involve-
ment in Workplace Partnership: Irish Airports’, British Journal of Indus-
trial Relations, 2002, 40(4): 659–89 and in ‘Workplace Partnership and
the Displaced Activist Thesis’, Industrial Relations Journal, 2003, 34(1):
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32–51. We would like to thank the editors of the BJIR, Ed Heery, and of
the IRJ, Brian Towers, for permission to incorporate this material into the
book. Some of the material in Chapter 9 appears in ‘Workplace Partner-
ship and the Search for Dual Commitment’, in Mark Stuart and Miguel
Martinez-Lucio, eds, Partnership and the Modernization of Employment Rela-
tions, Routledge. We would like to thank the editors for permission to use
this material in the book.
Last but by no means least, we are indebted to our families, Mary and
Kevin and Ber, Muireann and Aoife for their love, support and forbearance.






The subject of this book is the functioning and effects of voluntary partner-
ship arrangements between management, unions and employees. The book
draws on a significant case study of voluntary partnership in the Irish Air-
ports’ Authority, Aer Rianta. This chapter sets the scene for the detailed
examination of the Aer Rianta partnership throughout the book. It examines
the concept of voluntary partnership and outlines the main themes and
questions that have focused the study of voluntary partnership arrangements
in general.
Approaches and features
The emergence on a widespread basis of various forms of co-operative
employment relations arrangements in workplaces and enterprises is an
important feature of the past two decades. Initiatives to foster co-operative
employment relations have emerged in unionized and non-union workplaces
and in the public and private sectors of the advanced economies (US Depart-
ment of Labor 1996; EPOC 1997; Gill and Krieger 2000; Roche 2000;
2002). In Anglo-Saxon countries neither legislation nor collective agree-
ments mandate works councils as a standard vehicle for employee or union
representation in workplace or company decision-making. In these coun-
tries, especially the UK, Ireland, the United States, Canada, New Zealand
and Australia, the incidence of voluntary co-operative arrangements has been
significant, and these arrangements have provided an important channel for
employee and union voice in organizational decision-making. Voluntary co-
operative arrangements have attracted academic attention in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, either directly or as features of broader programmes of
innovation in work organization and employment relations (Cooke 1990;
Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994; Kochan
and Osterman 1994; Ichniowski et al. 1996; Boxall and Haynes 1997; Guest
and Peccei 1998; Knell 1999; Verma and Chaykowski 1999; Roche and
Geary 2000; 2004; Osterman et al. 2001; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001;
Geary and Roche 2003; Terry 2003a and b; Kelly 2004).
The involvement of trade unions in the design and operation of new
forms of shared decision-making in firms and workplaces is widely viewed as
the critical factor differentiating the concept of partnership from the more
general issue of employee involvement or new forms of work organization.
Partnership arrangements introduced in co-operation with unions often
include both direct and indirect or representative means of engaging
employees and union members in organizational decision-making. Notwith-
standing the significance of voluntary partnerships in the unionized sectors
of Anglo-Saxon countries and the growing academic interest in what they
represent and why they have emerged, it remains striking how little rigor-
ous attention has been devoted at the micro-level to the functioning,
antecedents and effects of partnership arrangements. William Cooke’s 1990
book, Labor–Management Co-operation, based on a study of US manufacturing,
remains the most detailed survey-based analysis of the antecedents, features
and effects of partnership in the US. More recently, Guest and Peccei (2001)
have examined the features and effects of partnership arrangements in com-
panies affiliated to the Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) in
the UK, while Roche and Geary (2000) have examined the incidence in
Ireland of approaches to handling change based on partnership and involve-
ment. The case-study literature has been dominated by a small number of
North American exemplars, in particular the Saturn Plant (Rubinstein and
Kochan 2001), the Shell Sarnia plant in Canada (Heckscher 1988) and the
General Motors-Toyota NUMMI joint venture in California (Grattan 1997).
Exemplary and brief case studies have also been reported in the UK liter-
ature (Knell 1999). Only recently have rigorous case studies been reported
in the UK, based on the experiences of companies such as United Distillers
and Allied Distillers Limited (Marks et al. 1998). Kelly (1999; 2004) has
also presented an important critique of some cases that have been widely
regarded as exemplars of partnership in the UK, including Blue Circle
Cement, Hyder (Welsh Water) and Asda.
No agreed definition or conceptualization of partnership exists in either
the academic or policy literatures (Guest and Peccei 2001: 208). Three
broad and overlapping approaches to conceptualizing partnership can be
identified. Two of these treat partnerships involving unions within more
general portrayals of partnership that encompass employee involvement and
non-union companies. The first broad approach to conceptualizing partner-
ship focuses on the principles and practices that shape co-operative employ-
ment relations arrangements. Thus, Guest and Peccei (1998; 2001) and
Knell (1999) locate partnerships in which unions are involved within more
general co-operative employment relations arrangements operating on the
basis of a series of principles and ‘beliefs and attitudes’ which are seen as
anchoring a distinctive set of partnership practices. Working on the basis of
the definition and conceptualization of partnership developed by UK-based
lobby group the Involvement and Participation Association, and a survey of
IPA member companies, Guest and Peccei (1998; 2001) undertook a study
of partnership practices. Through the survey they largely inductively estab-
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lish the principles, attitudes and beliefs and practices associated with
partnership. The principles of partnership are seen to entail ‘good treatment
of employees now and in the future’, including an affirmation of financial
participation and the disclosure of business information; the principles of
(accepting) ‘employee rights and benefits’, including the right to independ-
ent representation; on the employee/union side, partnership is seen also to
involve ‘employee responsibilities’ in such areas as flexibility, commitment
to business goals and a willingness to bring about improvements in produc-
tion processes (Guest and Peccei 1998: 20). The ‘beliefs and attitudes’
underlying partnership involve an acceptance of the role of trade unions and
a willingness to accommodate multiple interests in the running of the enter-
prise. The partnership practices that are seen to flow from such principles,
attitudes and beliefs include direct employee involvement, representative
involvement in decisions regarding employment issues and broader organi-
zational policies; flexible forms of job design and a focus on quality; the use
of performance management systems; employee share ownership pro-
grammes (ESOPs); communication practices; harmonized terms and con-
ditions of employment and practices aimed at promoting employment
security (Guest and Peccei 1998: 24).
Adopting such an approach, Guest and Peccei established that some IPA
‘partnership’ companies harboured considerable ambiguity regarding the
role and legitimacy of trade unions and the degree to which multiple inter-
ests needed to be recognized and accommodated in the running of com-
panies. Evidence also emerged of managements’ emphasis on employee
contribution and less than balanced recognition of the principle of ‘mutual-
ity’. Finally, the incidence of ‘partnership practices’ is seen to vary signific-
antly (1998; 2001). As the features of unionized IPA member companies are
not reported separately, no definite conclusion can be reached as to whether
the unionized partnerships mirror the survey findings in general in reflecting
ambiguous and diverse attitudes towards unions, employee contribution and
mutuality, as well as variable levels of involvement, representative structures
and partnership practices. Following the broad template of the approach of
Guest and Peccei, Knell’s (1999) study of exemplary cases of partnership in
the UK also locates unionized partnerships within more general co-operative
industrial relations arrangements and seeks to isolate ‘a core set of values’
that represent a ‘partnership philosophy’. The core values of partnership are
seen to involve ‘trust and honesty’, mutuality, the creation of a common
vision, open management, reaching agreement without coercion, multi-
faceted employee voice mechanisms, a stress on involvement, ownership and
responsibility, employment security (sometimes qualified in terms of
‘employability’), fair reward and an emphasis on quality (Knell 1999:
19–22).
A second broad approach to conceptualizing partnership again incorpor-
ates unionized partnerships within the more general category of the ‘mutual
gains enterprise’ (Kochan and Osterman 1994). What is distinctive about
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this approach, which draws extensively on US exemplary cases, is that it pre-
sents a multi-level model of ‘principles guiding the mutual gains enterprise’
(Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 3). At the ‘strategic level’, business strat-
egies that assign priority to quality and innovation are seen to be necessary
underpinnings of the mutual gains enterprise; top management commit-
ment and ways of providing an effective voice for human resource issues and
priorities in strategy-making and governance are also presented as generic
principles at a strategic level (Kochan and Osterman 1994: 55–8). At a
‘functional human resource policy level’, commitment to mutual gains is
seen to require staffing practices that promote ‘employment stabilization’,
investment in training and development and compensation practices contin-
gent on performance, especially contingent compensation practices such as
profit- and gain-sharing that are seen to reinforce co-operation, contribution
and participation (Kochan and Osterman 1994: 52–5). Finally, Kochan and
Osterman also identify a series of workplace-level practices that underpin
mutual gains enterprises, including high standards of employee selection,
broad job task design and teamwork, employee involvement in problem-
solving and a climate of trust and co-operation (Kochan and Osterman
1994: 47–52).
The final approach focuses directly on cases of partnership involving
unions and conceptualizes partnership mainly in terms of the structures of
decision-making arrangements that are put in place to promote co-operation
between management and unions and management and employees. Thus,
Cooke’s major work on partnership in US manufacturing focuses on direct
(team-based) and representative (committee-based) ‘co-operative efforts’ that
occur outside traditional contract negotiation; contain formalized mechan-
isms for union and/or employee inputs into management decision-making,
and are intended to improve performance in a variety of ways (Cooke 1990:
3). Cooke’s approach includes as instances of partnership cases where com-
panies remain ambiguous or even hostile towards unionization (Cooke 1990:
ch. 3). A second example of this broad approach is provided by a seminal
paper by Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma (1994). Drawing on North Amer-
ican exemplars, these researchers focus on cases of partnership where unions
and managements are involved in ‘joint governance’ arrangements. These
arrangements are distinguished from initiatives of the type identified by
Cooke, which are regarded as a long-established feature of North American
industrial relations (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994: 551). Joint gov-
ernance involves an ‘ongoing formal process where workers and their imme-
diate supervisors or union and management leaders bear joint responsibility
for making decisions (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994: 551; emphasis
in the original). Joint responsibility means the equal sharing of decision-
making power, understood in the procedural sense that the joint commit-
tees, forums or groups addressing issues subject to co-operation consist of
equal numbers of labour and management representatives, or operate on a
consensus basis – implying that either side enjoys the power of veto
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(Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994: 551–2). In the cases portrayed by
Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma as instances of joint governance, the scope
of decision-making is sometimes narrow (i.e. it may be restricted to a single
issue such as training or contracting out) and sometimes broad, encompass-
ing multiple issues and extending possibly to the fundamentals of competit-
ive strategy. In some instances of joint governance of broad scope, for
example, Saturn or Shell Sarnia, it would appear that co-operative engage-
ment between management and unions effectively subsumes collective bar-
gaining, rather than operating on a parallel track, as in the definition
proposed by Cooke.
Clearly a good deal of overlap exists between these approaches to defining
and conceptualizing partnership. Particularly striking is the symmetry
between the approach of Guest and Peccei, with its emphasis on principles,
attitudes and beliefs leading to practices, implying a hierarchical ordering of
attributes of partnership and the more concrete multi-level model of Kochan
and Osterman. Equally clearly, it emerges that empirical cases falling within
the scope of unionized partnerships consistent with these definitions and
conceptualizations may be characterized in practice by varying levels of
acceptance of such principles as the legitimacy of unions and their role in
decision-making; by varying degrees of emphasis on mutual gains as distinct
from the expected contribution of employees; by varying forms of gover-
nance, both with respect to the scope of joint initiatives and with respect to
the degree of decision-making power accorded to unions; by varying
employment and human resource practices; and varying relationships
between co-operative ‘voice’ channels and established collective bargaining
arrangements.
While this variability or diversity of postures and practices has emerged
mainly, as it were, in ‘cross-section’ in the literature outlined in this section,
it is also plausible to suppose that individual cases of partnership may reveal
considerable variability in longitudinal terms: with important changes in
postures, functioning and effects occurring as partnerships develop, confront
barriers and challenges and adapt in the face of attempts by the parties to
grapple with problems and challenges and their experiences of successes and
failures along the way. This raises the issue of the dynamics of partnership
arrangements and of the influences that may shape these dynamics. Such
influences are considered in outline here to provide a basis for the thematic
focus of this study. Individual chapters of the book will review the literature
pertaining to influences on partnership in more detail.
Influences and dynamics
Strategy and governance
The literature on partnership has adopted from the wider human resource
management (HRM) literature the premise that the viability of co-operative
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forms of industrial relations depends on the firms involved pursuing
competitive strategies that assign priority to quality and innovation rather
than depending solely on cost-based competition to secure advantage.
Unless such attributes as commitment, motivation, loyalty and skill are
required for firms to compete successfully, partnership may be impossible to
sustain over time (Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 3). Even where competi-
tion pivots in important respects around quality and innovation, strains may
arise as firms seek to accommodate to pressures on costs and to short-term,
cost-related commercial challenges (Colling 1995). A further important
issue with respect to the viability of partnership arrangements is the long-
term viability of quality-differentiated commercial strategies in industries
and markets subject to deregulation and increasingly intense cost pressures
(Colling 1995; Crouch and Streeck 1997).
Even where competitive postures may be conducive to partnership, it is
recognized that specific mechanisms for integrating human resource and
industrial relations policies and practices with strategic decision-making, for
example influential human resource executives, works councils or similar
structures, have an important bearing on the viability of partnership
arrangements (Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 3). Only thus can those pol-
icies and practices be taken into direct account when strategic options and
opportunities are being considered and strategic choices are being made.
Without specific mechanisms for ‘strategic integration’, strategic and opera-
tional priorities and decisions may become disconnected, leading to a pos-
sible proliferation of tensions and contradictions.
The priority accorded to partnership arrangements and ultimately their
sustainability is also widely understood as being predicated on wider
systems of corporate governance in firms, and in particular the influence of
capital markets versus bank-based credit in financing firms’ capital require-
ments (Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 5; Streeck 1997; Ferner and Quin-
tanilla 1998). In the case of public sector organizations, where the state may
be the main or sole ‘shareholder’, the posture of governments towards gover-
nance is of obvious importance, particularly as it is well documented that
both managements and unions in the public sector routinely attempt to win
support for, or to block, employment and employment relations proposals
through complex and often informal dealings with senior civil servants and
ministers and even with back-bench and local politicians (Ferner 1988;
Hastings 1994; 2003).
Organizational boundaries
Discussions of how competitive strategy may dovetail with the creation and
maintenance of partnership commonly take as given that the boundaries of
the business unit will remain stable over the medium term. It has recently
been argued that when such an assumption is untenable, major difficulties
may arise with respect to the attraction or durability of partnerships (Oster-
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man et al. 2001: ch. 3; Rubinstein and Heckscher 2003). Rubinstein and
Heckscher (2003: 192) note that, while radical initiatives in ‘co-manage-
ment’ in the US (the term, as they use it, appears cognate to ‘joint gover-
nance’) have been shown to lead to higher productivity and lower cost, the
diffusion of partnership arrangements of this kind has nevertheless remained
limited, while existing initiatives are under pressure. Rather than attribut-
ing this state of affairs mainly to such inertial forces as ‘old-line thinking on
the part of managers and union leaders’, Rubinstein and Heckscher believe
that it may reflect the cardinal priority now attributed by businesses to
achieving flexibility in turbulent markets (2003: 195–6).
Partnership is seen to impose constraints on flexibility as a consequence of
expectations and assurances with respect to the maintenance of pay and job
security and commitment to training and retraining. In turbulent competit-
ive conditions, firms are seen to focus on core competencies to secure
competitive advantage. They may as a consequence promote the vertical
disintegration of their operations: divesting themselves of non-core activities
and entering a series of alliances with other companies that may include
resort to outsourcing (Rubinstein and Heckscher 2003: 196–7). Such an
approach may be seen by firms to offer greater flexibility and promise than
partnership. Rubinstein and Heckscher accept that it remains an open ques-
tion whether competitive forces promoting vertical disintegration may
become so generalized and intense as to displace partnership of the kind that
has become familiar in North America. They nevertheless suggest the pos-
sible emergence of a qualitatively new kind of ‘networked partnership’ that
crosses organizational boundaries – the prototypes of which are barely visible
at present (2003: 202–3). What is important in the present context is the
observation, informed by empirical observation of some of the leading US
initiatives in co-management, that turbulent markets and fluid organi-
zational boundaries may pose serious challenges even to those partnerships
seen to be capable of delivering the highest flexibility and the most impres-
sive results with respect to costs, productivity and quality.
Senior management
Closely related to the basis on which firms seek to compete and the role of
industrial relations and human resource arrangements in firms’ competitive
postures, is the issue of corporate values or ethos (Kochan and Osterman
1994; Osterman 1994). It is recognized that, while market pressures are
important influences on the choices that firms make, such choices are seldom
determined by markets alone. Corporate values may thus be significant in
shaping firms’ strategies and their choice of employment systems and specif-
ically in sustaining partnership-based approaches to employment relations
(Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 4; Guest and Peccei 1998; Jacoby 1997).
Senior management is recognized as being of pivotal importance in under-
writing and communicating values that emphasize stakeholding and
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viewing employees as resources in a partnership context (see especially
Kochan and Osterman 1994: 56–8).
Top management support is also generally recognized as a prerequisite for
sustained human resource and industrial relations innovation, especially so
when the innovations involved seek to alter radically the status quo and
involve significant challenges to vested interests (Kochan and Osterman
1994: ch. 3). In normative models of change, top-level management is com-
monly seen as pivotal in articulating and communicating a vision of change
and in signalling to lower-level management the priorities and behaviours
that will find favour or result in sanctions. This view has been underlined in
the literature on partnership (see Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Cutcher-
Gershenfeld and Verma 1994; Knell 1999). If top-level managers are seen as
the key articulators, communicators and agents reinforcing changes and
innovation, senior line managers often emerge in the wider HRM literature
as the ‘heroes’ of programmes of change and innovation (Kochan et al. 1986;
Guest 1987; Storey 1992; Storey and Sisson 2002; Hastings 2003). Forced
to accommodate to external commercial pressures, it is senior line managers
who are seen to establish the main strategic and operational parameters of
change programmes in human resources and industrial relations – com-
monly in the context of a realignment of power and roles as between line
managers and personnel specialists. Where senior line managers drive
change programmes and assume responsibility for new practices, the sustain-
ability of innovations is seen to be enhanced. Such a model of the trans-
formative role of senior line managers has again entered the literature on
partnership (see especially Kochan et al. 1986).
Middle managers
Middle managers have almost universally received bad press in standard
accounts of the functioning of partnership and related programmes for
employee involvement. They have been viewed, in the main, as among the
most implacable opponents of partnership and related initiatives. Driven by
the defence of sectional interests, middle managers have been seen as seeking
to oppose such initiatives because they disturb established hierarchical ways
of working, dilute the authority of middle managers and ultimately,
through their commonplace association with delayering, pose a threat to
promotional ladders and job security (Cooke 1990; Hyman and Mason
1995). A perspective that seeks to locate middle managers’ resistance to
partnership and involvement in the context of organizational systems and
processes, both formal and informal, has challenged this standard view.
While not doubting that middle management resistance to partnership may
be fuelled to a significant degree by the defence of sectional interests, this
perspective draws attention to the ways in which the intensity of middle
management resistance may be shaped by a series of factors in the organi-
zational context in which middle managers work. Such factors as perceived
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divisions or inconsistencies in the management hierarchy towards partner-
ship and involvement initiatives, possible rhetorical rather than real support
for such initiatives – resulting in uneven coverage and optional engagement
or non-engagement by managers in general – and a divorce between the
objectives of partnership and control processes that hold middle managers
accountable in the main for the achievement of ‘hard’ business results, may
intensify middle management resistance (Marchington 1995). The possibil-
ity of incongruence between partnership and wider ‘organizational subsys-
tems’ thus provides a richer perspective within which to examine middle
managers’ responses to partnership (Fenton-O’Creevy 1998; 2001).
Unions and activists
Some key commentators, particularly in the United States, have argued that
partnership provides unions with a means of simultaneously promoting their
own revival and greater worker participation and involvement (Kochan et al.
1986; Heckscher 1988; Kochan and Osterman 1994; Kochan 1995; Rubin-
stein and Kochan 2001: ch. 4). Adversarial modes of representation are seen
to have the effect of locking unions and their members into arm’s-length
dealings with employers, curtailing their capacity to exercise voice and con-
tributing to a low-trust spiral, which ultimately becomes self-reinforcing.
Freeman and Rogers (1999) compliment this analysis by presenting evid-
ence from the US that employees seek independent but co-operative
representation in their dealings with employers. In the case of Europe,
Regini (1995: ch. 5) has made a similar point – claiming that workers have
become resentful of and estranged from traditional union postures and have
sought dynamic but forceful union representation showing greater flexibility
and far-sightedness and less indifference to the circumstances of firms.
Such writers, but especially those writing from the vantage point of the
US, show an awareness of the challenges involved for unions in seeking to
represent their members in new ways and of the peril that non-reciprocated
partnership could damage and undermine the position of unions. The
alternatives open to unions appear, however, less compelling, and partner-
ship is seen explicitly to provide a means of extending the frontier of collect-
ive bargaining and of union influence. Such an outcome may occur in
instances where traditional collective bargaining is institutionally insulated
and secured from decisions emanating from partnership arrangements; or
where partnership is supported by a nexus of complementary employment
practices, to be considered below, that may focus both parties on the gains
that can accrue from co-operation in the long run. Some observers, writing
from a more sceptical standpoint, have likewise noted the willingness of
unions in some European countries to enter various forms of voluntary co-
operative arrangements in circumstances where they enjoy strength and
security (Streeck 1995). While some major theorists of partnership are
emphatic that unions – like employers – retain their order of priorities while
Understanding voluntary partnership 9
working through partnership and only make pragmatic choices as to the
best means of pursuing these priorities (see especially Cooke 1990: ch. 2;
Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993), critics of partnership claim that it
amounts to a policy of union moderation that may commonly result in
incorporation (Kelly 1996; 1999; Terry 2000).
A number of contributors recognize that the construction and operation
of partnership arrangements may accord union officials and senior shop stew-
ards a more prominent role, possibly resulting in a centralization of
decision-making over industrial relations within the workplace and the firm.
In such circumstances the traditional advocacy role of shop stewards and
activists, as well as their role in defending workplace agreements, may be
undermined (see Kelly 1999 and Rubinstein and Kochan 2001 for altern-
ative versions of this scenario). Where this occurs, intra-union factionalism
and conflict can result, ultimately even threatening the partnership arrange-
ments around which the conflict originated. The ‘displaced activist thesis’,
as this syndrome may be described (Geary and Roche 2003), has been iden-
tified in varying degrees of intensity in a number of UK and US studies of
partnership (Marks et al. 1998; Clarke and Haiven 1999; Rubinstein and
Kochan 2001). Less prominent but also noted in the literature is the pos-
sible isolation of the union sections and branches promoting partnership
from their parent unions at national level. Reflecting the phenomenon of
‘plant level syndicalism’, first noted by Sorge and Streeck (1988), unions
that opt to deepen co-operation with management at firm and plant level
may incur the displeasure and censure of parent union organizations where
they are seen to promote or agree to terms, policies, conditions and working
practices that depart significantly from the terms set down in firm- or
sector-level collective agreements, or that otherwise contravene national
trade union policies and postures. The paradigm case here is provided by
friction and conflict between the United Automobile Workers (UAW) and
the union’s local branch at Saturn over aspects of the Saturn partnership and
its attendant work practices (Rubinstein and Kochan 2001: ch. 4).
At issue in the conflicting and overlapping views on the situation and
prospects of unions under partnership are alternative dynamics that are seen
to play out in strikingly different ways. The themes encompassed by these
dynamics have only just begun to be the subject of systematic empirical
inquiry and thus the general validity of the various positions outlined, or the
contingent circumstances in which alternative dynamics might be triggered,
remain open questions (see Geary and Roche 2003).
Vertical alignment
Empirical studies of participation during the 1970s suggested that the most
effective forms of participation included both direct and indirect or
representative arrangements (Wall and Lischeron 1977; IDE 1981). This
theme has emerged with varying degrees of focus in the literature on
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partnership. Cooke’s (1990) contribution to the partnership literature
sought to distinguish between instances of labour–management co-operation
in US manufacturing in terms of the focus and structure of the most import-
ant joint efforts or initiatives in operation, as judged by management and
union officials. ‘Team-based’ initiatives describe instances where these parties
attribute greatest importance to quality circles, work teams, quality of
working life and employee involvement initiatives and – more problematically
in conceptual terms – gain-sharing arrangements and employee share owner-
ship programmes. ‘Committee-based programmes’, on the other hand,
describe initiatives where greatest importance is attributed to labour–
management committees and productivity committees (Cooke 1990: 63–4).
This conceptualization of partnerships precludes a direct examination of
whether both teams and committees operating in tandem and in close align-
ment may have specific and superior effects with respect to stakeholder interests
rather than initiatives that may be viewed as either mainly committee-focused
or team-focused. Working with the distinction forced on survey respondents,
Cooke hypothesizes that team-based systems will have a higher impact on
company performance (improvements in productivity and quality) and the
quality of supervisor–employee relations than committee-based systems because
such systems involve a larger proportion of the workforce and supervisors than
committee-based systems (Cooke 1990: 96). The empirical results suggest,
however, that the systems have similar effects in the main provided that teams
in team-based systems meet frequently and regularly (Cooke 1990: 96). The
issue of alignment within partnership arrangements – what we will here term
‘vertical alignment’ – arose indirectly in Cooke’s consideration of the effects of
union leaders’ involvement in top-level joint steering committees, overseeing
both team-based and committee-based systems. Cooke found that the extent of
union leader participation in top-level partnership steering committees was
related to the overall intensity of the co-operative effort between the parties and
thus to the effects of partnership on the outcomes discussed above (Cooke 1990:
96–7). For Cooke this could be attributed to a series of specific effects of union
leaders’ involvement in top-level committees. These include a clear demonstra-
tion of support for the work of either team-based or committee-based pro-
grammes ‘on the floor’; the promotion of interaction between plant managers
and union officials, and the active policing of joint co-operative activities vis-à-
vis traditional contract administration (Cooke 1990: 97). Presumably top man-
agement involvement in such committees was regarded by Cooke as more
assured and less variable than that of union officials and was not thereby
deemed to have an effect on outcomes.
Kochan and Osterman (1994) go further than Cooke in presenting an
explicit multi-level model of the mutual gains enterprise, wherein the via-
bility and effectiveness of partnership arrangements is seen to depend on the
existence of an interlocking set of postures, arrangements and practices at a
series of levels ranging from the workplace, to the human resource function
to senior management values and competitive strategy. Though these
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writers stress the need for partnership arrangements to involve mutually
reinforcing sets of initiatives and arrangements initiatives at workplace and
strategic levels, the effects of vertical alignment per se on the functioning of
partnerships receives particular emphasis.
The most explicit and well-developed understanding of the significance of
vertical alignment is outlined by Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma (1994). In
a discussion of joint governance as a form of partnership, these writers
attribute considerable theoretical importance to the alignment of direct and
representative arrangements as an influence on the outcomes for stakehold-
ers. Direct forms of involvement, such as team-working and problem-
solving groups, are seen to be important in that they address the kinds of
changes in practices and organizational systems that are likely to affect
performance. Relatedly, they are seen to possess the capacity to involve a
sizeable section of the workforce. In isolation, however, such initiatives are
seen to pose problems of legitimacy because neither higher-level manage-
ment nor trade union support has crystallized in formal joint arrangements
that might provide ‘cover’ and security for managers, employees and union
members. Without a higher forum to provide strategic guidance and
integration, direct involvement initiatives might also suffer from a lack of
focus and cohesion. A further problem that might arise is that direct
involvement is likely to surface issues, such as the need for changes in
organizational processes and systems, capable only of being addressed at a
higher and more strategic level within firms. Should it not prove possible to
address such higher-level issues, direct involvement could foster new ten-
sions between management, employees and union members. In these ways,
the effectiveness of direct forms of involvement is seen to be predicated on
the existence of higher-level and representative arrangements (Cutcher-
Gershenfeld and Verma 1994: 566–7). Representative arrangements may
also possess the capacity to integrate partnership initiatives in general into
strategic decision-making, providing focus and cohesion for forms of direct
involvement and the issues that they address.
In isolation, representative partnership arrangements involve too few
people and are likely to have too little leverage over the kinds of changes
that can shift the performance of organizations and improve the conditions
of employees (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994: 564–7).
Guest and Peccei (2001: 228–32) found evidence consistent with this
thesis in their survey of IPA member companies. High levels of direct
involvement when combined with representative involvement in company
decisions were associated with positive outcomes for the stakeholders to
partnership: employers, employees and unions.
Employment practices
A number of ways of defining and conceptualizing partnership, as well as a
series of models of partnership, assign a central role to a series of human
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resource, employment and industrial relations practices as both empirical fea-
tures of initiatives that promote direct and representative involvement and as
theoretical prerequisites for durable and effective co-operative effort. Kochan
and Osterman (1994) in particular identify a set of human resource practices as
important features of mutual gains enterprises and as major prerequisites for
outcomes that benefit employers and employees. Of the various policies out-
lined by Kochan and Osterman, the bearing of contingent reward systems,
especially those based on profit-sharing, share ownership and gain-sharing, on
outcomes is most immediately apparent. To a significant degree, the notion of
mutual gains is predicated on employees enjoying a tangible stake in the
performance of the firms within which they are invited to regard themselves as
partners. Practices promoting ‘employment stabilization’ also have a clear-cut
bearing on partnership arrangements, in that they provide employees and
unions with an assurance that they will not become victims of their willing-
ness and efforts to work more productively (Kochan and Osterman 1994:
52–4). Other policies such as careful selection and a relatively high level of
investment in human resource development support an approach that seeks to
employ and develop people with the technical skills and behavioural disposi-
tion required to work on the basis of involvement in operational and possibly
strategic aspects of organizational decision-making.
Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma (1994: 552–3) extend this set of prac-
tices by drawing attention to mechanisms for dispute resolution and
problem-solving found in instances of joint governance and seen by them to
be important influences on the stability and general effectiveness of such
arrangements. Mechanisms like team leader mediation and a disposition to
engage in interest-based bargaining are seen as important features of joint
governance. In some instances these mechanisms may provide formal chan-
nels for resolving disputes and solving problems at multiple levels. In
essence, these types of mechanisms can be seen as involving alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) principles and practices when compared with the
types of grievance and dispute resolution practices associated with tradi-
tional industrial relations arrangements.
Other key contributors to the partnership literature, such as Guest and
Peccei (1998; 2001) and Knell (1999) add little to this picture in theoretical
terms, other than giving prominence to sets of communications practices as
a core facet of partnership and, perhaps more contentiously, including
performance management systems – as distinct from systems of this kind
adapted to reflect partnership values and objectives – as human resource-
related partnership practices (see Guest and Peccei 2001: 220–3; Knell
1999: 23–4). These writers also show that the incidence of such practices is
highly variable in IPA partnership companies, although apparently less vari-
able in other instances of partnership commonly viewed as exemplary cases.
Guest and Peccei (2001) also find evidence that some human resource prac-
tices, especially ESOPs, have significant effects on partnership outcomes in
IPA member companies.
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Mutual gains and the balance of advantage
It is a central premise of much of the partnership literature that co-operation
delivers mutual gains – so much so that this concept represents the core
principle in Kochan and Osterman’s (1994) influential book, The Mutual
Gains Enterprise. Sometimes, as in this book, the gains identified relate
mainly to employers and employees, as the principal stakeholders in the
enterprise. In other studies, possible institutional gains for unions as stake-
holders in their own right are also identified more directly (Guest and Peccei
1998; 2001; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001; Roche and Geary 2002). The
degree to which mutual gains are in fact realized in practice, for employees
and employers, or for these parties and for unions, as well as the balance of
advantage between the different stakeholders where gains arise, is only
beginning to be examined empirically.
Guest and Peccei’s (1998; 2001) survey of IPA member companies in the
UK established that the principles of partnership endorsed by employers
appeared to emphasize employees’ responsibilities to make a contribution to
the performance of the enterprise to a significantly greater degree than the
obligations of the enterprise with respect to employees’ rights and benefits
(Guest and Peccei 2001: 219–20). With respect to the legitimacy accorded
to unions, as outlined above, there appeared to be considerable variability in
the postures of the IPA members. On the basis of this evidence and the
pattern of employment practices among the companies surveyed, Guest and
Peccei (2001: 220) are led to the conclusion that in many cases mutuality
may be unbalanced or ‘lopsided’. The term ‘constrained mutuality’ is coined
to portray cases in which the balance of advantage, in terms of principles
endorsed and practices in place, manifestly favours management (Guest and
Peccei 2001: 231). For Guest and Peccei, ‘constrained mutuality’, under-
stood in this sense, is not without significant consequences for partnership
outcomes. The survey results indicate that instances where mutuality is
more balanced involve better outcomes for the three stakeholders: employ-
ers, employees and union representatives. In such instances, partnership
practices are seen to connect with outcomes through their effects on the atti-
tudes and behaviour of the parties, implying for Guest and Peccei (2001:
232) that ‘too great a distortion in the balance of advantage would fail to
lead to positive performance’.
The concept of constrained mutuality also resonates with one of the find-
ings of Cooke’s (1990: ch. 3) survey of co-operative arrangements in US
manufacturing companies: the fact that a number of companies co-operate
with unions while proclaiming themselves as either neutral towards or
opposed to unionisation. The implications for the outcomes of partnership
when mutuality is thus constrained ab initio are not, however, addressed in
the study. Osterman’s (1999) survey of new forms of work organization in
US establishments finds that the use of high performance work systems
(HPWSs) in non-union and unionized establishments results in gains in pro-
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ductivity, but that pay rises appear to be no more forthcoming as a result.
Unionized establishments implementing high performance work systems
appear less likely to have implemented lay-offs than establishments in
general (Osterman 1999: ch. 4). Thus Osterman is led to conclude that,
while high performance work systems provide the potential for mutual
gains, these gains are not unambiguously realized – even in unionized estab-
lishments (1999: 114). Contrary to Guest and Peccei’s claim that the out-
comes associated with partnership practices are predicated on changes in
employees’ attitudes and behaviour, Osterman proposes that where, as in the
US during the 1990s, the balance of power in the labour markets favours
employers, employees may countenance and accommodate to outcomes that
may entail highly skewed gains and that may even put them at a disadvan-
tage. For Osterman, they may even show increased commitment to the firm
in the face of such labour-market conditions (Osterman 1999: 114–15).
This kind of darker portrayal of the possible dynamics of partnership
turns darker still in the work of critics of partnership. Drawing on evidence
from a number of well-known UK partnership cases, John Kelly (1999;
2004) has argued that partnerships frequently originate in business con-
ditions that put employees and unions at an acute disadvantage. In con-
ditions of crisis or dislocation, employers are led to propose partnership
arrangements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; unions then operate as little
more than the junior partner in work restructuring, and the inevitable 
result is that the outcomes of partnership are highly skewed in favour of
employers.
The issue of whether partnership leads to mutual gains, and, even if it
does, where the balance of advantage may reside in such gains, thus emerges
from the research literature as empirically open or problematic. It also
emerges as theoretically problematic, especially in the work of Osterman but
also in the work of Kelly. Several questions are prompted regarding the
implicit or explicit links from partnership arrangements and practices,
through mutual gains, to attitudinal and behavioural changes, to positive
outcomes for stakeholders. Could it be that partnership arrangements may
alter attitudes and behaviour in the direction of higher commitment even in
the context of skewed and unequal gains? This is Paul Osterman’s question.
Could it even be that partnership arrangements may result in highly skewed
outcomes that grossly favour employers, without in any material way alter-
ing employees’ attitudes and behaviour in the direction of commitment, and
at the same time damaging unions’ representative capacity? This is John
Kelly’s question.
Collective bargaining
It appears commonplace for collective bargaining and partnership arrange-
ments to occupy separate and parallel spheres. Such a separation of channels
and processes is indeed explicit in Cooke’s (1990: 3) definition of
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labour–management co-operation. Textbooks on how to establish partner-
ship also sometimes elevate such a separation of channels and processes into
a major postulate. Thus Herrick’s insists on the need to create a ‘parallel
organization’ under partnership, wherein committees and groups established
to promote co-operation and participation are established in ‘parallel to the
units of the primary organization’ and ‘parallel to the traditional collective
bargaining structure, (Herrick 1990: xx and see also ch. 2). A later text on
creating labour–management partnerships further advocated that such a par-
allel organization needed to be perpetuated under partnership, as any blur-
ring or merging of co-operative and collective bargaining processes would
amount to the dilution of union representation (Woodworth and Meek
1995: 96–109). Other than such prescriptive works, analytic studies also
imply or point to the importance of the institutional separation of collective
bargaining and partnership channels, especially when considering the ratio-
nale for union involvement (Strauss 1998a: 132–3; and see Roche and Geary
2003: 660–1).
But the issue is not so clear-cut. Other desiderata are also found in the
prescriptive and theoretical literatures and other patterns are also empiri-
cally apparent. Lawler and Mohrman (1987) propose that collective bargain-
ing may be altered in a qualitative sense under management–union
co-operation through the advent and application of ‘organic’ or ‘living’
agreements. In the same way, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma (1994: 567)
propose that joint governance promotes ‘procedural rule-making’ and
reduces the emphasis on ‘substantive rules’. In some noted instances of joint
governance, in particular at Saturn, joint problem-solving, involving integ-
rative bargaining, appears to have nearly subsumed distributive bargaining
channels and processes; indeed, judging from the evidence available on the
dynamics of the Saturn partnership, distributive bargaining appears to have
arisen in circumstances when partnership was in difficulty or crisis (see
Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). In other reported cases of joint governance,
it would also appear that management and unions can arrive at decisions in
the areas subject to joint governance arrangements that may effectively
subsume or override collective bargaining and contract administration
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994).
Even where collective bargaining structures and partnership arrange-
ments may operate in parallel, questions arise regarding possible spillover
effects between them (Strauss 1998a: 132–3). It has been reported, for
example, that the high trust and positive employment relations climate fos-
tered within partnership arrangements may render established collective
bargaining channels less adversarial and even remove issues from the bar-
gaining agenda in such channels (see O’Dowd 2002). The converse possibil-
ity should also be recognized – though is less often reported in the literature
– that partnership arrangements and processes might be ‘held hostage’ to
collective bargaining in circumstances where employers or unions wish to
signal disaffection with progress with issues under negotiation in that
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channel. Other spillover effects with their own specific dynamics have also
been reported: such as the instances, noted earlier, where partnership results
in the disempowerment and displacement of union activists and shop stew-
ards, once possessed of a secure status under collective bargaining, and may
provoke ‘displaced activists’ in counter-offensives against partnership.
Also relevant here, but little examined in the research literature, is the
issue of formal mechanisms for dispute resolution in circumstances where
partnership arrangements have been established. Unless agreements institut-
ing partnership formally identify specific mechanisms for conflict resolution
within partnership channels – something that appears unusual outside
North America but uncommon also in the US and Canada (Cutcher-
Gershenfeld and Verma 1994: 553) – the possibility arises that conflicts and
disputes generated within partnership forums may by default be handled in
an ad hoc manner, or dealt with under established dispute resolution proce-
dures. The latter response, in particular, could have potentially destabilizing
effects on partnership arrangements and processes. This is because estab-
lished dispute resolution procedures are premised on a series of principles
and assumptions that partnership seeks to transcend: for example, that there
exists between the parties a zero-sum conflict of interests, implying a
win–lose outcome to conflicts, and that compromises must be brokered on
the presumption that the parties share the low-trust attitudes and disposi-
tion associated with distributive bargaining postures (Walton and McKersie
1965).
Pivotal events
The operation and durability of partnership may be critically influenced by
so-called ‘pivotal events’ and how they are handled (Cutcher-Gershenfeld
1988; Eaton et al. 2003). Though the concept may appear tautologous –
pivotal events are events with pivotal consequences – it is associated with
occurrences that give rise to ‘generic challenges’ to partnership (Eaton et al.
2003: 14). Pivotal events are not understood as acute or discontinuous
changes in the external environment. They are viewed rather as largely ‘pre-
dictable’ occurrences (Eaton et al. 2003: 57–63). Several such events are
identified in a case study of the development of labour–management
partnership in the US healthcare corporation, Kaiser Permanente. These
include an industrial dispute which posed challenges to the mutually
accepted principle of insulating partnership from normal collective bargain-
ing and contract administration (Eaton et al. 2003: 25–33); problems of suc-
cession that arise when senior managers or union leaders instrumental in
establishing partnership move on or retire (Eaton et al. 2003: 44); intensified
competition and pressure on cost and work restructuring (Eaton et al. 2003:
58–9).
By giving rise to generic challenges, pivotal events are seen to trigger
quite distinctive dynamics: the problems and challenges which they pose
Understanding voluntary partnership 17
may either be resolved, in which case partnership arrangements are further
institutionalized in a non-incremental manner; or the parties may fail to
resolve these problems, in which case pivotal events may generate a ‘partner-
ship-ending crisis’ (Eaton et al. 2003: 58–9). Thus underlying the concept of
pivotal events and generic challenges is the idea that the development of
partnership arrangements can be highly discontinuous. Many events and
problems may affect the diffusion and institutionalization of partnership in
an essentially incremental manner. Pivotal events, however, may be expected
to have highly discontinuous effects: either accelerating the development of
partnership, or destablizing partnership arrangements, depending on
whether the parties can find solutions for such occurrences in accordance
with partnership principles.
Antecedents
Many studies of partnership identify specific contingencies that lead
employers and unions to create particular co-operative industrial relations
arrangements. The types of contingencies commonly identified as
antecedents of partnership include more intense competition, the anticipa-
tion of increasingly intense competition, commercial crises, the deregulation
of hitherto regulated markets, and visionary senior managers and influential
trade union leaders who share a commitment to forging innovative ways of
working and new employment relationships.
Of greater interest and significance in the present context are more
theoretically informed studies that systematically attempt to locate general
antecedents of partnership and antecedents of particular forms of partner-
ship, such as joint governance. Few such studies are found but from the
available literature two theoretical models linking antecedents with partner-
ship arrangements can be discerned. Also relevant here are what have been
described as ‘pivotal events’, which appear to influence decisively the trajec-
tory of partnership arrangements once they come into being: either spurring
the institutionalization of the partnership or hastening the unravelling of co-
operation.
Normal competition theory: Cooke’s deductive theory of
partnership
Cooke (1990) presents a deductive theory of the origins of co-operative
industrial relations arrangements and seeks to test the theory on data from
US manufacturing. In Cooke’s framework, more or less normal or common
competitive forces trigger co-operative arrangements. The emergence of co-
operation is also influenced by a series of commonplace operational and
financial features of firms. Cooke begins by noting that normally manage-
ment and the workforce seek to maximize their respective gains or ‘absolute
utility’ from the employment relationship. This dimension of the employ-
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ment relationship is characterized by inherent conflicts of interest: what one
party gains, say in wages and conditions or in profits, is lost by the other or
forgone. These conflicts of interest are resolved at any point in time by the
exercise of ‘relative power’. The absolute utility enjoyed by each party is
dependent on the total utility derivable by both parties from the employ-
ment relationship. This variable-sum dimension of the employment rela-
tionship may induce the parties to co-operate in ways that will increase total
utility over time. Total utility – the overall size of the ‘pie’ to be divided in
the employment relationship – is a function not of the relative power of the
parties but of the combined ‘organizational power’ of management and the
workforce. Relative power then determines the distribution of a fixed sum of
utility derivable from the employment relationship. Total power determines
the size of the total utility available to the two parties (Cooke 1990: 21–3).
Each party to the employment relationship is assumed to utilize the com-
bination of relative and total power it sees as best serving its own interests.
In explaining the emergence of co-operative arrangements, the key concern
is to identify the factors that first, influence the perceptions of one or both
parties that the perceived benefits derived from increasing total organi-
zational power by instituting co-operative arrangements outweigh the costs;
and second, that influence the perceptions of each of the parties that the net
benefits from co-operation are greater than those derived from the exclusive
use of relative power. Cooke’s basic thesis is that the likelihood that parties
establish and succeed in managing joint programmes varies directly with the
following perceptions for each party:
1 higher perceived benefits from co-operation;
2 lower perceived costs of co-operation;
3 higher perceived costs of relying on relative power options;
4 lower perceived benefits of relying on relative power options.
Cooke’s explanatory strategy is to model econometrically the factors associ-
ated with either increasing or decreasing these perceived benefits and costs.
In this, the focus shifts to managements’ choices and to what are termed
‘grand labour relations strategies’. External and internal factors are seen as
shaping the perceived relative costs and benefits to management of opting
for a ‘co-operation strategy’ over alternative ‘union avoidance’ strategies and
what are termed ‘mixed strategies’. Strategies of the latter type are seen as
involving co-operation in unionized plants and union avoidance in non-
union plants (Cooke 1990: 47).
Executives choosing a co-operative or mixed strategy have concluded that
some degree of co-operation yields greater benefits than non-co-operation.
Those choosing a ‘union avoidance’ strategy perceive that they will derive
greater net gain from relying strictly on their relative power than from jux-
taposing relative power options and co-operative activities. In comparison to
the mixed strategy, the union avoidance strategy and the co-operation
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strategy are more radical (more ‘aggressive’, as Cooke describes them) and
more risky. This is obvious in the case of union avoidance. The risks in co-
operation strategies are seen to inhere in the limited experience of unions
and employers generally with creating and managing joint programmes, as
well as in the organizational changes required to give effect to joint pro-
grammes.
Cooke’s empirical test of this theoretical framework predicts that more
serious market threats require more aggressive, riskier strategies. Thus, the
greater the increase in import penetration in the sectors in which plants are
located, the greater the likelihood that senior executives will opt for radical
and risky co-operation strategies over mixed strategies. This prediction is
confirmed empirically, as is a related prediction that these strategies are pre-
ferred over mixed strategies where the decline in employment experienced
by corporations has been more serious. The higher the level of unionization
in a corporation – as indexed by the proportion of its plants organized – the
more likely it is that co-operation strategies will be pursued over alternative
strategies. It is further predicted that the higher the labour intensity of cor-
porations, the riskier co-operation and avoidance strategies become. The
econometric results confirm such a pattern of association between differences
in the labour cost proportion of total production costs and choice of strategy.
Also, the larger the level of capital investment, the greater becomes the
potential loss from radical and risky strategies that fail. Hence the predic-
tion, confirmed statistically, that the higher the average sales volume per
plant, the more likely corporations will be to choose the less risky mixed
strategy over the alternatives. The fewer the number of plants, the less scope
there will be for pursuing the mixed strategy and so the lower the likelihood
that this strategy will be adopted. Finally, it is predicted that the tighter the
cost pressures on sales across plants, the greater the gains to be extracted
from joint programmes addressing cost-cutting or quality improvement or
both, and so the greater the likelihood that corporations will choose co-
operation over alternative strategies. Both predictions are confirmed statisti-
cally (see Cooke 1990: 54–7 for a summary of the statistical results, and
Cooke and Meyer 1990 for detailed empirical results).
The underlying logic of Cooke’s model points to the effects of more or
less widely prevalent sets of competitive and operational/financial forces
which are seen as exerting discrete influences over (management) perceptions
of the costs and benefits inhering in strategies involving co-operation. In
short, ‘normal’ competitive and operational forces are seen to trigger stra-
tegic choices as between co-operation and alternative strategies. These
forces, acting in an incremental or additive manner, dispose managements
towards co-operation as against alternative strategies. While Cooke’s
research might appear to provide powerful confirmation of this theoretical
framework, a number of serious limitations are evident. While the under-
lying theory focuses on management and union assessments of the costs and
benefits of co-operation, the empirical application of the theory is confined
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to data on management postures. Cooke further focuses not directly on the
incidence of empirical co-operative arrangements, whether ‘committee-’ or
‘team-based’, but on broader ‘grand labor relations strategies’ from which
such arrangements are seen to derive. This approach involves adding the
complicating factor of posture towards unionization as an indicator of man-
agements’ grand strategies. The result is that firms categorized within the
co-operative strategy include those in favour of joint arrangements and
neutral towards unionization, as well as those in favour of such arrangements
and opposed to unionization. The latter represent a sizeable proportion of
Cooke’s co-operation grand strategists. While, as noted above, research sug-
gests that firms engaged in partnership with unions may commonly harbour
considerable ambiguity towards unionization, the portrayal of firms opposed
to unionization as ‘co-operators’ raises more serious conceptual and theo-
retical problems. Finally, the empirical test of Cooke’s theory of management–
union co-operation is limited to a small sample of 58 publicly quoted manu-
facturing companies. Taken together, these problems pose the question as to
whether all types of co-operative arrangements may have the types of
antecedents proposed by Cooke, especially arrangements that make provi-
sion for joint governance, and whether, even if they do, these antecedents
may be expected to operate in the discrete, additive manner proposed in
Cooke’s theory.
Configuration theories of partnership
What will be referred to as configuration theories of partnership locate the
antecedents of co-operative arrangements in configurations or clusters of fea-
tures and circumstances that affect firms, unions or both firms and unions.
These frameworks also sometimes identify disjunctures in the commercial or
industrial relations circumstances of firms as antecedents of co-operation,
especially in the case of joint governance arrangements.
The kinds of circumstances identified by configuration theories include
acute corporate crisis, or impending crisis and acute industrial relations
crisis. Where circumstances such as these combine with high levels of
unionization, ‘unioniate’ workforces, visionary senior executives and union
officials and influential human resource management departments, the
antecedents are seen to exist for co-operative arrangements that may displace
established industrial relations structures and processes. Manifestly, no
single one of these forces is uncommon. Combinations of these forces in con-
figurations, however, are more unusual, and studies that underscore such
configurations as antecedents involve an explanatory framework quite dis-
tinct from that advanced by Cooke.
Such a framework underpins Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma’s analysis of
the ‘antecedents of joint governance’ (1994: 561–3). Cutcher-Gershenfeld
and Verma emphasize that crisis is commonly the key catalyst for the emer-
gence of joint governance. But even acute crisis per se may be insufficient to
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trigger joint governance. The character of pre-existing relations between the
parties also conditions their early reaction to crisis. Cutcher-Gershenfeld and
Verma emphasize that ‘relationship building (formal or informal) through
advisory joint programmes’ and some degree of ‘strategic bargaining’ over
the survival and future direction of the business are also necessary
antecedents for the emergence of joint governance arrangements (1994:
562–3). This framework also recognizes possible curvilinear relationships
between commercial pressure and the genesis of partnership: too little
impetus from the competitive environment is seen to lead to little change;
too much impetus and acute crisis may dispose the parties to intensify a
zero-sum approach to the conduct of industrial relations.
This approach seems consistent with Kochan et al.’s (1986) analysis of the
circumstances triggering union involvement in strategic business decisions
in the US during the 1980s. In contrast with initiatives involving the intro-
duction of quality of working life, team-based and other ‘parallel pro-
grammes’, which arose in response to widely prevalent competitive trends,
the engagement of unions in strategic business decisions tended to arise only
in circumstances with well-defined features. So fundamental were the
changes required of both parties that radical or strategic engagement
through partnership was typically triggered by ‘deep crisis’ or ‘severe
environmental pressures’ (Kochan et al. 1986: ch. 7). Also necessary for the
emergence of strategic partnership was a high level of union organization.
This gave unions bargaining leverage against alternative management
responses to crisis, such as shifting production to non-union plants or engag-
ing unions in no more than consultative or even cosmetic joint dialogue over
the handling of crises (Kochan et al. 1986: 202–3).
Appelbaum and Batt’s review of the evidence on workplace innovation in
the United States also points to the origins of many significant innovations
in ‘special circumstances – a serious economic crisis, a charismatic leader, a
green-field site, a new product line – as the impetus for change’ (Appelbaum
and Batt 1994: 72, emphasis added). Unusual circumstances appear to have
been particularly pronounced where multi-stranded workplace trans-
formation had occurred: ‘work systems have tended to be transformed when
three conditions are occurring: a crisis threatens the product line or market
share, the company has the resources to gamble on a high-risk strategy, and
top management is willing to take that risk’ (Appelbaum and Batt 1994:
150).
Appelbaum and Batt (1994: 150) note, however, that the same circum-
stances often trigger downsizing and union exclusion. Other factors must
therefore be prevalent to ferment workplace innovation, and among these
may be the ‘personalities and commitments of key individuals – the CEO,
plant manager, and, where relevant, local and national union officials’
(Appelbaum and Batt 1994: 157).
Drawing on case-study evidence for Ireland, Roche and Turner (1998)
also emphasize the distinctive sets of circumstances that often represent the
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antecedents of significant partnership initiatives. Partnership arrangements
commonly developed where management and unions faced an acute com-
mercial or industrial relations crisis, or anticipated major imminent changes
in companies’ commercial circumstances. In subsidiaries of multinational
plants, co-operation was sometimes triggered by local plants’ attempts to
persuade parent companies to fund further investment, sometimes where
plants in other countries were vying for the same investment. Union density
was typically high in partnership companies and unions were well organized
– blocking alternative responses to crisis or more conventional rationaliza-
tion programmes. The values of senior human resource and other executives
were also often important in predisposing companies towards risky and
uncertain programmes of co-operation. The presence of unions favourably
disposed towards partnership, including supportive and influential union
officials, also characterized many instances of partnership. Finally, good pre-
existing relationships between key figures on both sides, possibly born out of
the joint handling of crisis, also allowed partnership to develop ‘organically’
out of ‘strong bargaining’ relationships of a more traditional character
(Roche and Turner 1998: 99–101).
Roche and Turner further sought to distinguish the configurations of cir-
cumstances and features that shaped different types of partnership arrange-
ments. Partnership arrangements based on consultative principles were more
likely to emerge where many of these factors interact with low ‘unionate-
ness’, as indexed by the limited engagement of union members in plant-
level union affairs. Joint governance arrangements, on the other hand, more
typically developed where crisis, impending major commercial change and
supportive pre-existing management and union postures, interacted with
strong traditions of union activism and solidarity at plant level and possibly
in the wider industrial community in which plants were located (Roche and
Turner 1998: 100).
A similar type of explanatory framework underlies Knell’s (1999) explo-
ration of the antecedents of partnerships in the UK. Knell (1999: 17) notes
that no single driver or catalyst encouraged the adoption of partnership in
all of the case-study companies examined. Rather it was necessary to recog-
nize the influence of ‘clusters’ of factors as antecedents of partnership. Four
such clusters are identified. The first includes a well-developed adversarial
collective bargaining tradition and a high level of unionzation. The ‘route to
partnership’ in such circumstances had not been via a direct response to
crisis in either the commercial circumstances of firms, or in their industrial
relations. Rather the parties seem to have arrived at the view that adversarial
relations ill suited their objectives. The second cluster identifies circum-
stances where partnership had evolved out of long-standing traditions of
paternalistic employee relations rather than emerging as a step change or
acute departure from established traditions. A third cluster involves circum-
stances in which partnership had been adopted in response to the trans-
formation of work organization. A fourth cluster involves circumstances
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where partnership had been established at the inception of firms as a reflec-
tion of a coherent values-based philosophy by management (Knell 1999:
17–18). Knell does not consider whether the different configurations or
clusters of antecedents give rise to different types of partnership arrange-
ments. Nor is it clear with respect to several of the clusters identified, espe-
cially the first and second clusters, why or due to what changes the parties
sought to depart from pre-existing traditions and to embrace partnership.
The presumption must be that partnership in such circumstances developed
gradually or incrementally over time.
In summary, two explanatory frameworks inform the limited research to
date systematically examining the antecedents of co-operative industrial
relations arrangements. Each framework attributes importance to commer-
cial and competitive conditions, the features of plant managements and
union organization. The manner in which these variables are conceived of as
influencing the adoption of partnership, however, differs significantly
between the frameworks. What has been termed normal competition theory
is based on a straightforward linear view of the kind of influence exerted by
variables like competitive pressure: the higher the level of competition, the
greater the probability that executives and possibly union officials will take
risks and opt for co-operation; the tighter the cost pressures on sales, the
higher the probability that partnership will emerge, and so on. The altern-
ative configuration framework emphasizes clusters of factors as the decisive
influence, particularly acute crisis, or impending crisis, the parties’ value
systems and pre-existing industrial relations traditions.
It is notable that the two frameworks have emerged for the most part out
of different research approaches. Cooke’s theory is informed by survey-based
research, which makes it technically difficult to discover and to model the
kinds of complex antecedent effects associated with configuration theories.
Configuration theories derive mainly from case-study approaches, which
make it possible to identify and allow for complex causal patterns and
alternative routes to partnership arrangements. Case-study approaches make
it difficult to establish, however, the relative incidence of different configu-
rations of antecedent conditions.
The effects of partnership
Some of the areas encompassed by partnership have been subjects of long-
running research interest, in particular the effects of job autonomy and
teamwork on employees and organizational performance and the effects of
participatory arrangements of various kinds on the parties to industrial rela-
tions (see Heller et al. 1998; Edwards et al. 2002a; Geary 2003 and Handel
and Levine 2004, for summaries of research on these and related areas).
The earlier and the wider literature on participation shows that
employees in general seek higher levels of influence over decisions affecting
their work and work lives than commonly available to them. This encom-
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passes both task-level involvement and participation in organizational
decision-making (Wall and Lischeron 1977; IDE 1981; Drago and Wooden
1991; Gallie and White 1993; Gallie et al. 1998; Freeman and Rogers
1999). A further body of research suggests that progressively higher propor-
tions of employees favour further scope for involvement and participation
(Kanter 1978; Heckscher 1988; Rose 1989; Inglehart 1997). The earlier and
wider literature also reports that participation in its various forms, including
task participation, teamwork, representative participation and communica-
tive participation (information exchange), impacts positively on such areas as
job satisfaction, levels of trust and attitudes to the employer (Blumberg
1968; IDE 1981; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Gallie et al. 1998). The evid-
ence with respect to the effects of participative arrangements in general on
wage levels is more equivocal, with the most careful review of international
evidence concluding that many involvement initiatives have no effect and
that the average effect may be no more than a few percentage points (Handel
and Levine 2004). The same review concludes that there is no evidence that
involvement programmes consistently increase employment security
(Handel and Levine 2004: 35–8).
Relatively little research has directly addressed the effects of voluntary
partnership arrangements of the kind that have emerged in unionized work-
places over the past two decades. Given the limited direct evidence available
on the operation and effects of partnership arrangements, it is perhaps not
surprising that these issues are keenly debated in the partnership literature.
In reviewing the literature on the effects of partnership, two broad posi-
tions or groups of writers will be identified: the ‘advocates’ and the ‘critics’.
Subsequent chapters of the book will expand on these positions and seek to
assess their respective merits by investigating the effects of different aspects
of partnership in Aer Rianta on the company, on employees and on trade
unions.
Advocates
Advocates derive their position from the view that adversarial industrial
relations are no longer viable in the light of modern competitive pressures
and the changing preferences of employees and union members. They are
also influenced by what they judge to be significant evidence as to the posit-
ive effects of partnership arrangements on organizational performance, on
employees’ conditions of employment and on the effectiveness of trade union
representation. These themes in the work of advocates will be considered in
sequence.
Employer outcomes
Kochan and his colleagues have emerged as the strongest and most consis-
tent advocates of partnership. Partnership arrangements, especially when
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based on mutual gains principles, backed by compatible human resource
practices, are seen to deliver a series of organizational outcomes of interest to
employers, including higher commitment among employees, higher produc-
tivity, lower costs, higher quality and higher profitability (Kochan et al.
1986; Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 3; Ichniowski et al. 1996; Osterman
et al. 2001: 83–93; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001 and see Heckscher 1988).
Effects such as these are underscored by Cooke’s research on joint co-
operative programmes in manufacturing, which associates both direct and
committee-based forms of involvement with improvements in quality, pro-
ductivity and supervisor–employee relations and increases in return on sales
and added value per employee (Cooke 1990: ch. 4). Knell (1999) also identi-
fies a series of positive outcomes for employers in his UK case studies advo-
cating partnership. Knell’s cases include non-union firms but the research
does not distinguish any outcomes as specific to these. The outcomes identi-
fied include various dimensions of improved competitive performance, such
as higher profits and higher turnover, lower levels of labour turnover and
lower absenteeism (Knell 1999: 28–30). While Guest and Peccei (2001)
cannot in the same sense be directly identified as explicit ‘advocates’ of
partnership, their research nevertheless strengthens the advocacy of the IPA
in pointing to a range of positive partnership outcomes. Again this research
includes non-union firms but does not identify any outcomes as specific
either to these or to unionized firms. Guest and Peccei (2001: 229–30) find
that direct and representative participation and flexible forms of job design
are associated with more positive employee attitudes and behaviours than
less participative and flexible work arrangements. These, in turn, along with
employee share ownership, are associated with higher labour retention and
lower levels of absenteeism. Share ownership and retention are associated
with better organizational performance in such areas as productivity,
product/service quality and innovation, and thus with higher levels of sales
and profits.
Black and Lynch have presented a series of survey-based and establish-
ment-level studies of the impact of high performance work practices
(HPWPs) (self-managed teams, job rotation, production workers trained
during past year) on a series of outcomes in the United States. These studies
also overlap with studies of partnership arrangements in unionized firms by
examining whether unions mediate the effects of HPWPs on outcomes
(Black and Lynch 1997; 2000; Black et al. 2004). Based on a 1994 establish-
ment-level survey, Black and Lynch suggest that co-operative, or ‘trans-
formed’ labour relations arrangements in unionized firms, comprising at
least 50 per cent of non-managerial employees using computers and meeting
regularly to discuss workplace issues, profit-sharing for non-managerial staff,
total quality management (TQM) and benchmarking and at least 30 per
cent of workers in self-managed teams, are associated with the highest levels
of productivity (Black and Lynch 1997: 23–4 and Table 2). Black and Lynch
(2000), using the same 1994 establishment data as well as data from a
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follow-up survey in 1997, again report an association between HPWPs and
levels of productivity in manufacturing. Profit-sharing and employee stock
options are also associated with higher productivity. Employee voice,
defined as the proportion of workers meeting regularly to discuss workplace
issues, is further associated with increased productivity in panel data, when
voice is exercised in this sense in the context of unionized establishments
(Black and Lynch 2000: 24).
Employee outcomes
Partnership arrangements have also been linked by some advocates with
positive outcomes of various kinds for employees, including profit- and
gain-sharing, more satisfying work, improved supervisory–employee rela-
tions and a higher level of employment security (Cooke 1990: ch. 4; Kochan
and Osterman 1994; Ichniowski et al. 1996; Osterman 1999: ch. 4; Oster-
man et al. 2001; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). Bearing in mind again that
UK research on partnership by Knell (1999) and by Guest and Peccei (2001)
extends to non-union firms, a series of positive outcomes of partnership for
employees are also identified. These include high levels of satisfaction and
strong identification with firms’ objectives and values (Knell 1999: 28–30),
a positive ‘psychological contract’, a positive contribution of ideas and sug-
gestions for innovation and higher organizational commitment (Guest and
Peccei 2001: 226 and 229–30). Black et al. (2004), drawing on US
establishment-level data, show that HPWPs are associated with higher wage
levels, especially in unionized establishments. The pattern with respect to
trends in employment in establishments, however, is less clear-cut. Self-
managed teams and profit-sharing are associated with large reductions in
employment (amounting to 20 per cent or greater), whereas the proportion
of workers involved in job rotation is negatively associated with such large-
scale reductions (Black et al. 2004: 20). The effect of ‘employee voice’ on job
cuts is shown to be mediated by unionization, ‘high voice’ establishments
that are unionized having a lower incidence of large-scale employment
reductions. HPWPs are also found to increase wage inequality in establish-
ments between production and non-production (managerial and profes-
sional) workers, but the effects of specific HPWPs are found to vary in
complex ways between unionized and non-union establishments (Black et al.
2004: 19).
Trade union outcomes
Some advocates of partnership identify a series of outcomes favouring
unions. Prominent here again are Kochan and his colleagues who advocate
union involvement in partnership as one means of promoting union renewal
and of extending employee participation (Kochan and Osterman 1994;
Osterman et al. 2001: ch. 4; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). This view is
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supported by research by Freeman and Rogers (1999), which shows that
workers in the US want greater involvement in their work and more
involvement by their representatives in organizational decision-making, but
prefer unions working in co-operation with management. These findings
echo the views of researchers like Heckscher (1988) that adversarial union
representation narrows the scope of representation and leads to a perception
among members that unions are remote and bureaucratic. In the UK,
Ackers and Payne (1998) have advocated partnership as a channel through
which unions can regain the ‘institutional centrality’ they once enjoyed in
workplaces. Based largely on a conceptual analysis of partnership and a priori
reasoning, they advocate partnership as a means through which ‘unions can
regain the initiative and work to rebuild their institutional presence’ (Ackers
and Payne 1998: 545).
‘Win win’ outcomes
Through addressing the effects of ‘high performance work systems’
(HPWSs), comprising participatory work practices and complimentary
human resource practices, in unionized and non-union firms, research by
Appelbaum et al. (2000) provides strong and explicit advocacy for some
partnership-related practices, concluding that they ‘pay off’ for firms and
employees. In steel, apparel and medical electronic instruments, a variety of
positive performance outcomes are found to be associated with the scope for
work participation, defined as a composite of worker autonomy, degree of
communication among frontline workers, work in self-directed teams and
participation in problem-solving teams (Appelbaum et al. 2000: 103–4 and
ch. 7). Positive effects are also found for such complementary human
resource practices as employment security, and pay related to group or
company performance. Synergies between both sets of practices are also con-
firmed in their higher combined than discrete effects on performance
(Appelbaum et al. 2000: ch. 8). Positive effects of work participation and
related HR practices are also found for a variety of work-related outcomes,
including trust in management, organizational commitment (apparel being
an exception), job satisfaction (in steel only) and earnings. No evidence is
found that HPWSs are associated with higher levels of stress or work inten-
sification; on balance the evidence suggests that they are associated with
more positive work experiences (Appelbaum et al. 2000: ch. 9). The study
concludes that high performance work systems in manufacturing lead to
‘win win’ outcomes for plants and workers (Appelbaum et al. 2000: 115).
Appelbaum and her colleagues devote little attention to whether unions
mediate the effects of HPWSs, confining their examination of unions to the
discrete effects of unionization on firm and worker outcomes.
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Dual commitment
A final theme that merits discussion concerns the possible link between
partnership and commitment to both employing organizations and trade
unions. ‘Dual commitment’ in the context of voluntary partnership can be
seen as an influence that might mediate the achievement of mutual gains.
Employer objectives like higher productivity and better organizational
performance appear more likely to be realized if partnership arrangements
result in organizational commitment. The institutional security and
representative capacity of unions are also likely to be copper-fastened if
partnership can also deliver commitment to trade unions. Positive employee
outcomes, like better pay and conditions and more secure employment also
seem more likely where both types of commitment and a better climate of
employment relations are fostered.
US research during the 1980s provided what might be described as ‘proto
advocacy’ for partnership by concluding that dual commitment arose in con-
texts marked by job autonomy and a positive industrial relations climate. A
series of studies in road and air passenger transport, newspaper distribution
and of union members at branch level found that different facets of job auto-
nomy and influence, perceptions of a positive climate of industrial and
supervisory relations and positive assessments of joint co-operative pro-
grammes, were associated with both organizational and union commitment
(Fukami and Larson 1984; Angle and Perry 1986; Magenau et al. 1988;
Sherer and Morishima 1989).
While research and commentary in other Anglo-Saxon countries during
the 1990s more explicitly related the theme of dual commitment to co-
operative industrial relations arrangements, a series of empirical findings failed
to replicate the US results of a decade earlier (Barling et al. 1990; Fullagar and
Barling 1991; Guest and Dewe 1991; Deery et al. 1994; Guest 1995).
Following Guest (1995), it remains a pertinent question whether formal
partnership arrangements may be particularly effective in fostering dual
commitment (see Guest 1995). Partnerships usually explicitly seek to foster
commitment to companies. In the eyes of advocates they underwrite and
enhance the representative capacity of trade unions. Partnerships seek to
foster these outcomes through enhanced job autonomy, the involvement of
unions in organizational decision-making and the promotion of a positive
industrial relations climate.
Critics
Critics of partnership fall into two distinct camps: those who believe
partnership to be beneficial to employers but not to employees or trade
unions and those who believe voluntary partnership arrangements to be of
little lasting or real advantage to any party. Each position will be considered
in turn.
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Good for employers but less so for unions or their members
John Kelly has been the main exponent of the view that voluntary partner-
ship, reflecting what he calls a strategy of ‘union moderation’, delivers few
benefits to unions and their members (Kelly 1996; 1998; 1999; 2004).
Kelly originally advanced his argument on the basis of a critique of the well-
known single-union arrangements at Nissan’s facility in Sunderland, pre-
senting Nissan as a paradigm case of ‘union moderation’ (Kelly 1996).
Subsequent work however has focused more tellingly on exemplary and
other cases of partnership in the UK. This latter research showed that
partnership was commonly initiated by employers in a largely coercive
manner, unions being presented with de-recognition or the closure of union-
ized facilities as the alternatives. Employers had also commonly failed to
honour commitments in partnership agreements to preserve employment
security and maintain competitive wage levels (Kelly 1999). Kelly’s sub-
sequent analysis of 22 UK partnership agreements found that the rate of job
losses was higher in partnership companies, as compared with a matched
sample of non-partnership companies or industry-wide trends. The evidence
with respect to pay rises in partnership companies revealed that some had
registered relatively high pay rises, whereas others had not (Kelly 2004:
281). Evidence with respect to levels of union influence on company
decision-making was sparse and seemed to preclude secure generalization,
but evidence existed that the influence of workplace representatives had
declined in some cases. Though partnership may have precluded union de-
recognition or the closure of unionized establishments, trends in union
membership arrangements were highly variable under partnership. Kelly
seems disposed to assess the evidence as suggesting that unions and their
members had gained little from partnership in terms of employment secur-
ity, wage rises, influence or organization, except in a few cases (Kelly 2004:
281–3).
The variability in the operation and effects of partnership revealed by
Kelly’s own research and the wider corpus of research, nonetheless leads
Kelly to qualify his original position. Kelly postulates a range of partner-
ships falling along a continuum anchored at one end by what he terms
‘employer-dominant’ partnerships and at the other by ‘labour-parity’
arrangements. Employer-dominant arrangements are characterized by a
balance of power favourable to employers, partnership agendas reflecting
employer interests and an emphasis on union compliance rather than co-
operation. Labour-parity arrangements arise where power is more equally
balanced; unions are well organized; agendas reflect the interests of both
parties; and employers are dependent on labour co-operation (Kelly 2004:
283–9). Besides emerging from different sets of commercial and institu-
tional conditions, these types of partnerships are expected to lead to different
outcomes: employer-dominant arrangements favouring employer outcomes
and labour-parity arrangements delivering mutual gains. Kelly remains
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pessimistic with respect to the wider diffusion of partnership arrangements,
especially of the labour-parity type, in the UK. Product market volatility,
union weakness and capital market pressure for short-term results are among
the forces seen to weaken the incentives for employers to initiate partner-
ships on a widespread basis (Kelly 2004: 287–9).
Kelly’s analysis of the outcomes and prospects of partnerships in the UK
is endorsed by Michael Terry (2003b). For Terry, partnerships in the UK
ally unions to the language and priorities of businesses, with local activists
commonly suffering displacement and employment security agreements
lacking much force. Terry’s work also provides a bridge with Wolfgang
Streeck’s critiques of voluntary co-operative arrangements, to be considered
in the next section, in his insistence that co-operation needs to be under-
pinned by a legal framework if unions and their members are to reverse the
decline in their fortunes (Terry 2003b: 470–1).
Weak and ineffective for all parties
Wolfgang Streeck has presented a critique of voluntary co-operative arrange-
ments that needs to be understood against the background of his corpus of
work on German works councils and co-determination (Streeck 1992; 1994;
1995). Streeck’s core contention is that strong and durable co-operation
must be embedded within ‘strong institutional constraints’ of the kind pro-
vided by the German legal code. In the absence of such constraints, the
operation of co-operative arrangements is likely to be contingent on employ-
ers’ willingness to seek agreement and consent when warranted by market
conditions or, more generally, on what Streeck calls unions’ willingness to
maintain ‘good behaviour’, or to accept managements’ priorities (Streeck
1992). Where markets are seen not to warrant co-operation, or unions are
disposed to pursue their own priorities on a co-operative basis, employers,
according to Streeck, will be prone to defect from voluntary co-operative
arrangements. The net effect of these features of voluntary co-operation is
that partnership will be unable to generate deep or durable co-operation,
proving instead to be weak in co-operative terms and unstable in institu-
tional terms.
Like Kelly, Streeck has softened his position in the light of the emergence
of voluntary co-operative arrangements embedded in strong and secure
union organization. While Kelly’s qualifications had been prompted by
labour-parity partnerships that had arisen in the Anglo-Saxon world,
Streeck’s reconsideration of voluntary co-operation arose from instances of
co-operation beyond the remit of legislation and collective agreements in
European countries like Sweden and Italy. While Streeck sees such arrange-
ments as significant, he nevertheless remains convinced of the limitations of
voluntary co-operation (Streeck 1995: 330).
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The breakdown of partnership
Advocates and critics of partnership generally agree that voluntary partner-
ship arrangements are vulnerable to defection either on the part of employ-
ers or unions in the absence of strong, robust institutional constraints
(Streeck 1992; 1995; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). The reasons why either
or both parties may consider it appropriate or expedient to defect vary, but
the literature has focused on a number of key factors.
Contingent commitment to partnership
The first reason why employers or unions might defect from partnership
arrangements is that the benefits from working in partnership may be short-
lived and finite, and, that after a certain period, either or both parties may
think it more beneficial to revert to traditional postures. For employers, as
the nature of competitive challenges varies, so too may they alter their
employment relations strategies. A partnership approach may thus be seen
to be advantageous in very particular market circumstances, but less so in
other contexts. Some scholars, however, have placed less emphasis on
competitive conditions as an important explanatory factor, and have instead
emphasized that management may withdraw from partnership arrangements
as they come to feel insecure in the face of an enhancement in the voice of
employees and unions (Edwards et al. 2002b; Hammer and Stern 1986).
In the same way, unions’ calculations of the benefits to be derived from
remaining within a partnership agreement may change over time. Trade
unions have been seen by some scholars to alternate back and forth between
partnership and adversarial postures depending on the perceived advantages
of pursuing one approach over another (Hammer and Stern 1986).
Union factionalism and internal strife
Second, defection is seen to occur as a consequence of tensions generated
within unions as decision-making in respect of the nature and structure of
partnership arrangements becomes centralized around a small group of
union activists (Heckscher 1988: 127; Kelly 1999; Rubinstein and Kochan
2001; Terry 2001; 2003a and b). We referred to this above as the ‘displaced
activist thesis’. The abandonment of partnership may thus occur where
senior union officials succumb to criticisms from union activists and mem-
bership that partnership has resulted in a centralization of power within the
union and the marginalization and alienation of shopfloor representatives.
Where such a dynamic takes hold, the future sustainability of partnership is
seen by advocates and critics to be jeopardized.
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The interface between collective bargaining and partnership
The relationship between collective bargaining and partnership arrange-
ments is widely seen in the literature as being a critical factor in explaining
the sustainability of partnership in the long term. Views as to whether both
processes can or should be kept separate and occupy different spheres, or
whether they should eventually merge through, for example, the adoption of
mutual gains bargaining, diverge. The latter view, as often expounded by
advocates of partnership, is premised on the opinion that the trustful rela-
tions which develop within partnership forums are likely to spill over into
collective bargaining and recast behavioural relations therein. As outlined
earlier, the possibility that spillover effects may flow in the opposite direc-
tion and that the adversarial relations which inform collective bargaining
may come to colour relations within partnership structures is recognized less
frequently in the literature. This, however, must be seen as a possibility,
especially in circumstances where trade union members fault partnership for
not having provided significant gains.
Reliance on established forms of dispute resolution
The adoption of so-called alternative dispute resolution procedures has
recently been recognized as a critical factor in explaining whether partner-
ship arrangements prosper or break down (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma
1994; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). The argument here is that established
mechanisms of dispute resolution informed by adversarial postures, where
the parties go head-to-head in pressing the merits of their respective posi-
tions, are inappropriate in a partnership context. To continue with such res-
olution procedures risks destabilizing and undermining partnership
arrangements. The argument thus advanced by Rubinstein and Kochan
(2001) is that, if partnership is to prosper, the parties need to give early
consideration to how they might recast their dispute resolution procedures
in line with the principles and values which underpin their partnership
agreement.
Management and union succession
Finally, there is the issue of the vulnerability of partnership arrangements in
the face of management and union succession. This brings us to the heart of
the critics’ case, certainly as proposed by Streeck, that, in the absence of legis-
lative or other institutional constraints, employers, in particular, retain consid-
erable freedom of manoeuvre in deciding whether to maintain or abandon a
partnership approach. Management and union succession or transition might
thus be seen as a ‘pivotal event’ in the sense described above. Advocates of
partnership have argued that such problems of succession may be handled suc-
cessfully where companies adapt their HR policies to complement the
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principles underlying partnership. Our attention is thus drawn to the level
of congruence that may or may not exist between, for example, performance
management systems, job descriptions and promotion criteria and the aims
and values underpinning the partnership arrangement. Where HR policies
are thus recast and the management of managers is informed by partnership
principles, the future viability of partnership is seen by advocates to be made
more secure.
In summary, it is possible to identify competing theoretical positions
within the literature as to whether voluntary partnership arrangements
between employers and trade unions are viable in the long term. For critics,
such as Streeck, in the absence of ‘hard’ institutional supports, voluntary co-
operation is unlikely to be sustainable, principally because both parties are
able to defect for strategic or opportunistic reasons. As defection remains an
option for either side, unions’ and employers’ commitment to working in
partnership with each other is likely to be half-hearted, tentative and
guarded. For Streeck, then, voluntary partnership arrangements are inher-
ently vulnerable because neither party can be trusted or required to co-
operate in the long term. Voluntary workplace partnership is thus seen to be
endangered by an inherent and chronic ‘co-operation deficit’.
Kelly’s critique of partnership agreements has focused on the grossly
unequal gains which workers derive from their unions’ co-operation with
employers. Although he does not specify an explicit link between the
manner in which such arrangements disadvantage workers and the break-
down of partnership, he does imply that there is such a connection. He also
draws our attention to the possibility of competing factions developing
within unions as partnership arrangements privilege the role of union offi-
cers over lay representatives. Breakdown may thus be seen to occur as a con-
sequence of the displacement of shopfloor union activists and the internal
strife and conflict which this generates.
The other theoretical position, as proposed by advocates of partnership, is
that partnership arrangements can be made viable where senior management
constructs the requisite institutional supports. There are a number of levels at
which this is seen to be necessary. At the strategic level, the viability of
partnership is seen to depend on the adoption of competitive strategies which
assign priority to security of employment, and good wages and conditions of
employment. Also seen to be critical is the vertical alignment and integration
of representative structures, such as steering groups, with team-based or other
direct participation initiatives. Advocates also lay stress on the need to recast
industrial relations and HR policies so that they are better aligned with the
values and objectives of partnership, principally in areas such as performance
management, promotion and dispute resolution. The interface between
collective bargaining and partnership is also seen to require careful manage-
ment. The thrust of the advocates’ case is that partnership arrangements can
be made effective for both parties and be made durable where mutually rein-
forcing policies and practices at a series of levels are introduced.
34 Understanding voluntary partnership
Conclusion
Voluntary partnership arrangements of various kinds have become a feature
of employment relations in Anglo-Saxon countries, yet little research has
been devoted to their features, antecedents, effects, and factors leading to
their breakdown. A review of approaches to the study of partnership reveals
considerable variation across partnership arrangements with respect to a
series of features: the legitimacy accorded to unions and their involvement in
decision-making; the scope and influence of joint decision-making, employ-
ment practices and relationships between co-operative channels and collect-
ive bargaining. A series of influences on the operation of partnership
arrangements have been identified in the literature, and these may be
expected to mediate the outcomes of partnership in ways that remain in
need of rigorous examination. These include competitive strategy, gover-
nance and the degree of fluidity of organizational boundaries; the postures of
senior and middle managers; the dispositions of union HQs and of union
activists. Aspects of how partnership arrangements are configured also influ-
ence their operation. Significant here are levels of vertical alignment
between direct and representative involvement; the existence of compatible
employment practices; the way partnership is aligned with collective bar-
gaining channels and the balance of advantage seen to inhere in the func-
tioning and outcomes of partnership. Pivotal events may critically influence
partnership. Depending on how these are handled, they may either acceler-
ate the institutionalization of partnership, or acutely destabilize co-
operation.
Two approaches to identifying the antecedents of partnership have been
distinguished. The first of these links the emergence of co-operative arrange-
ments with relatively high competitive intensity, aspects of the economics of
firms making co-operation a low-risk activity and some features of firms’
industrial relations. The second approach relates the emergence of partner-
ship arrangements to configurations or clusters of market and organizational
features and sometimes puts greater emphasis on partnership as an outcome
of discontinuous commercial change, interacting with unusual sets of
organizational features.
Approaches to the effects of partnership are also polarized between ‘advo-
cates’ and ‘critics’. The advocates draw from research showing that partner-
ship-type arrangements can lead to positive outcomes for all stakeholders.
Critics argue that partnerships commonly favour employers, or deliver few
benefits for any party. There are signs that the gap between advocates and
critics may be closing due to the acceptance by critics that partnership
arrangements may be highly variable in their operation and outcomes in
ways that have yet to be subjected to empirical examination.
The themes examined in this chapter will be considered empirically in
the chapters reporting our research on partnership in the Irish Airports
Authority.
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2 The case and research methods
This chapter outlines the logic behind the choice of Aer Rianta for intensive
study and the general significance of the lessons that may be learned from
the experiences of management, unions and employees in the Aer Rianta
partnership. The chapter also describes the fieldwork and research methods
employed in the study of partnership in the company.
The case
Only an outline of the major features of the company will be provided here,
with a view to locating the case in research context. A profile of the business
and industrial relations features and contexts of Aer Rianta will be presented
in subsequent chapters of the study. Until it was replaced by the state-
owned Dublin Airport Authority in late 2004, Aer Rianta was the state-
owned commercial company whose main activity involved the management
of the main Irish airports at Dublin, Cork and Shannon. The company
employed about 3,300 people, 2,400 of which worked in the airports. At the
outset of fieldwork in 1997, the numbers employed in the airports and
related activities were marginally fewer at 2,100. A subsidiary of Aer
Rianta, Aer Rianta International, managed duty-free outlets in a number of
overseas airports. The company also held stakes in several airports in the UK
and Germany. A second Aer Rianta subsidiary, Great Southern Hotels,
owned and operated a hotel chain within Ireland. The focus of the study is
on Aer Rianta’s core operations in the Irish airports, as partnership in the
company was largely confined to this part of the business.
Aer Rianta represents a significant case for the study of voluntary partner-
ship for four main reasons. First, as will be outlined in the next chapter, it
offers an important example of a genuine attempt to undertake a radical and
sophisticated partnership initiative, combining direct and indirect participa-
tion, covering in principle all areas of the business and extending across all
levels of the organization, from the shopfloor, to business unit and company
levels. This makes Aer Rianta the most radical and significant partnership
initiative undertaken in Ireland. Moreover, the authors are not aware of any
other initiative of comparable breadth and depth in the UK, and few compara-
ble initiatives have been undertaken in the Anglo-Saxon countries, outside the
exemplary North American cases that have dominated the literature. In recog-
nition of the significance of the case, the Joint Union Company Group at the
helm of the Aer Rianta partnership received an award from the Involvement
and Participation Association in 2000. Second, and related, such a major initi-
ative in voluntary partnership provides a rich setting in which to study the
influences, antecedents and effects of partnership outlined in the theoretical
and research literatures, especially in the context of a longitudinal research
design spanning some six years. In particular, as the case involved a multi-
level and multi-stranded partnership initiative, underpinned by considerable
management and union support, it can be used to examine the issues at stake
in the dispute between ‘advocates’ and ‘critics’ of partnership. Third, although
the company was publicly owned and a monopoly service provider at Ireland’s
main airports, it had always been highly commercial and entrepreneurial in
character, as evidenced by its track record in the pioneering of duty-free sales
and by its international operations. Furthermore, as will be outlined in later
chapters, Aer Rianta experienced very diverse commercial and labour market
pressures during the period covered by the research. These included strong
financial pressures arising from a burgeoning capital investment programme;
disjunctive commercial change arising from the loss of duty-free sales; a
radical turnaround in its local labour market, involving a shift from high
unemployment to virtual full employment; changes in its regulatory environ-
ment arising from the appointment of an airports’ regulator; ongoing threats
to its monopoly status; and the prospect of a break-up into three separate pub-
licly owned airport authorities in the second half of 2003. Hence the case
company cannot reasonably be viewed as a sheltered or ‘sleepy monopoly’, pro-
viding lessons of limited generalizability beyond the public sector, or beyond
Ireland. Partnership in Aer Rianta functioned, rather, in the context of com-
mercial pressures of a kind that in the main favour the generalizability of the
findings beyond the public sector and beyond Ireland. Finally, the authors
enjoyed complete access to personnel, documentation, committees and groups
and were able to conduct a major survey of the Aer Rianta workforce, as well
as undertake secondary analysis of earlier surveys conducted within the
company. Such a level of access remains unusual in studies of partnership,
particularly as access spanned a period of six years.
The authors were originally commissioned by the Irish Department of
Public Enterprise to examine the development and functioning of partner-
ship, or what was known as constructive participation (CP), in Aer Rianta.
Fieldwork spanned the period from 1997 to 2002, with the main phase of
intensive fieldwork concentrated in the period 1998–2000 and a second
phase of intensive fieldwork during late 2002. In between these intensive
fieldwork phases, the authors kept in close touch with developments in Aer
Rianta, conducted updating interviews with the principals involved, and
closely followed coverage of developments in the company in the business
and industrial relations press and media.
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Methods of research
Complete access was permitted to all CP activities and to all those involved
in the operation of CP: company management, union officials and activists
and the workforce. An invitation to join the joint steering group responsible
for overseeing the partnership, the Joint Union Company Group (JUCG),
and to contribute as ordinary members, was accepted. The authors and wider
research team also joined a number of other groups, including those dealing
with personnel and industrial relations policies and corporate strategy.
Finally, in the autumn of 2002 the JUCG asked the authors to prepare a
consultative document that might assist in the revitalization of the partner-
ship, by then effectively wound down. Their report was delivered to man-
agement and unions in early 2003. In these ways the research involved a
significant element of participant observation. From 1997 to 1998, as CP
was rolled out across the company, the project’s senior research officer spent
a lot of time at Dublin Airport and other locations observing the progress of
partnership and attending meetings connected in different ways with CP.
All internal files, documentation and research relating to CP were accessible
to the research team. The research team and the authors provided feedback
on the research and discussed their findings with key figures in management
and the unions at various points during the period covered by the research.
In particular, in the second half of 2002, formal presentations were made to
senior management and the JUCG at the request of both groups. During
these the authors discussed their findings and their interpretation of these
with senior managers and the JUCG.
Throughout the period of the research, business and industrial relations
developments at Aer Rianta received extensive coverage in the national print
and broadcast media, as well as in the specialist weekly industrial relations
publication, Industrial Relations News. Relevant coverage from these sources
and information from the company’s annual reports have been drawn on
where relevant.
Intensive interviews were conducted with senior managers, middle man-
agers, full-time union officials and activists across the three airports and in
other divisions of the company. A number of these interviews were con-
ducted in the context of periodic updates during the course of the period
spanned by the research. Most of the interviews were concentrated into the
two intensive fieldwork phases, the first phase occurring during 1998–99,
and the second in late 2002. The details of the intensive interviews are as
follows:
First intensive fieldwork phase 1998–99: 16 senior managers interviewed; 16
trade union officials and activists interviewed; 15 middle managers
interviewed.
Second intensive fieldwork phase 2002: five senior managers interviewed; five
trade union officials interviewed. Worker directors interviewed.
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The union representatives interviewed were selected from all the main
unions represented at Aer Rianta including the Services, Industrial, Profes-
sional and Technical Union (SIPTU), the Technical, Engineering and Elec-
trical Union (TEEU) and the public-sector union for employees in retailing
MANDATE, as well as the middle management staff association, the Irish
Aviation Executive Staff Association (IAESA), which transferred to another
public-sector union, IMPACT, during the period covered by the research.
The professional union officials interviewed included those who were cen-
trally involved in the design and implementation of CP and a small number
who had an arm’s-length relationship with the initiative. The ‘involved
activists’ occupied a variety of lay representative positions ranging from shop
steward to chair of Section Committee, to chair of Group of Unions. In each
case they had assumed a formal role, either through their membership of the
JUCG or as ‘facilitators’ or ‘mentors’, in the development of CP. These
union officers and ‘involved activists’ were identified as key informants.
The senior managers interviewed included two chief executives, top-level
executives at company level, airport general managers and executives in
charge of line and staff divisions at company and airport levels. These divi-
sions included duty-free sales/retailing, cleaning, personnel, planning, secur-
ity and other functions. Also included in the interviews were senior
managers centrally involved in the genesis and development of the CP
initiative.
The middle managers interviewed were selected from departments that
had some contact with and experience of the CP process across the three air-
ports, Superintendents from the Airport Police and Fire Service were
included among the interviewees. Four interviewees were from this division,
three were from finance, four from commercial departments, three from
airport maintenance and one from the airports car parks division.
A survey of a sample of the Aer Rianta workforce was conducted between
October 1998 and July 1999. Survey fieldwork was undertaken at a time
when, as will be outlined in subsequent chapters, CP initiatives were in
operation at a number of levels. In particular, they had become integral to
company and union responses to the imminent loss of duty-free sales and the
future status of Aer Rianta. Relatedly, the survey was undertaken during a
period of considerable, indeed, at the time, unprecedented change and
uncertainty for the workforce. Among other issues, the survey sought to
explore levels of participation and involvement in work tasks and wider
aspects of decision-making and governance; engagement with CP; percep-
tions of the effectiveness of CP; and commitment to the company and to
trade unions.
The survey sample was drawn from the register of employees working for
Aer Rianta in 1998 (excluding seasonal workers). The effective sample,
when non-available respondents were deleted from the target sample, com-
prised 1,184 employees. Initially, the survey fieldwork was conducted by
means of a postal questionnaire sent to respondents at their work address,
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accompanied by a return envelope addressed to the research team. Later, in
order to increase the response rate for some categories and locations, the
questionnaire was administered through direct contact with respondents.
The survey achieved a response rate of 52 per cent. A disproportionate strati-
fied probability sampling procedure was employed. The objectives of the
sampling strategy were twofold. First, there was a concern to ensure that the
overall pattern of replies was representative of workforce attitudes. Second,
sampling was undertaken so as to obtain reliable data on the views of cat-
egories like senior managers and supervisors, present in the workforce in
relatively modest numbers. To this end, the total population of
managers/supervisors was selected and one in two of the non-
managerial/supervisory population was selected. To adjust for this and for
category-specific differences in response rates, the response sample of 612
employees was re-weighted to restore the numbers of respondents in these
categories to their proper respective proportions in the workforce. The
resulting weighted sample size is 643. Table 2.1 contains details of the
sample, response rates and weighting. Unless otherwise specified, the data to
be reported in the book and used as a basis for multivariate analysis com-
prise the re-weighted data.
Finally, access was granted to two earlier surveys conducted for manage-
ment and unions in Aer Rianta in 1988 and 1995 by the Economic and
Social Research Institute (ESRI). These surveys were designed by managers
and union officials centrally involved in promoting partnership, drawing on
technical assistance and advice from the ESRI. The objectives of the surveys
were to establish levels of interest among employees in participation and
involvement, to examine attitudes to existing levels of involvement, and to
discover the levels of involvement and participation thought to be appropri-
ate by staff. The surveys employed probability sampling and respondents
were assured of anonymity to ensure that the replies received were a valid
reflection of their views and opinions. The 1988 survey generated 702
responses, representing a response rate of 73 per cent. The 1998 survey was
repeated in 1995 against the background of the emergence of a formal
partnership agreement (the Compact). The 1995 survey attracted 664
responses, representing a response rate of 66 per cent. Data from the surveys
are subjected to secondary analysis in the study, primarily to examine the
climate towards involvement and participation prior to the formalization
and roll-out of partnership arrangements.
Conclusion
Aer Rianta was selected for study because it was viewed as a radical and
sophisticated partnership initiative, which could illuminate a series of issues
covered in the theoretical and research literature: in particular influences on
the operation of partnership; the antecedents of partnership; and the out-
comes or effects of partnership. At a more general level, the case seemed






















































































































































































































































































































particularly apposite for an examination of the issues at stake between the
‘advocates’ and ‘critics’ of partnership. Though the company was publicly
owned, it experienced chronic commercial pressures and discontinuous
change during the period covered by the fieldwork, culminating in a govern-
ment declaration in the middle of 2003 that the company would be broken
up into three separate publicly owned airport authorities. Apart from pro-
viding an opportunity to study a major partnership initiative in a context
marked by substantial commercial change, the authors also enjoyed an
unusual level of access and co-operation from the main parties involved over
a period of some six years. This ranged from participation in major partner-
ship committees and groups, access to all internal documentation, intensive
interviews with managers at various levels and with union officials and
activists. Finally, a survey of the Aer Rianta workforce was conducted in
1998–99 to examine attitudes to partnership and the effects of partnership
on employees and union members. To this survey could be added data from
two previous surveys of attitudes to involvement and participation, con-
ducted in Aer Rianta in 1988 and 1995. Few previous studies of partnership
have been able to draw on such an extensive empirical base, covering a
period marked by major and discontinuous commercial change.
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3 The emergence and
development of partnership
This chapter examines the emergence and evolution of workplace partner-
ship in Aer Rianta from the mid 1980s until the late 1990s. Under the
rubric of what came to be known as ‘constructive participation’ (CP), Aer
Rianta management and unions set about establishing a series of arrange-
ments which were to provide employees and their representatives with a say
in decision-making processes at all levels of the organization from work
groups, departments, business units (airports) to the making of corporate
strategy at corporate level. The origins of CP are traced to the mid 1980s
when the unions in Aer Rianta gave early consideration to the manner in
which the company might respond to and transpose into practice legislation
designed to allow for worker participation in state-owned companies. The
development of partnership in Aer Rianta went far beyond that envisaged in
the legislation and is among the most significant voluntary initiatives of its
type in the English-speaking world.
This chapter sets the scene for subsequent chapters in the book by docu-
menting the influences that shaped the approach and contours of partner-
ship, the evolution of CP, including its underlying principles and features –
both designed a priori and improvized en route, the effects of CP, and the
challenges and obstacles encountered as partnership bedded into the
company. The chapter gives particular attention to the manner in which the
industrial relations context within Aer Rianta and the commercial pressures
facing the company influenced the development of CP.
The chapter concludes by highlighting key themes that come to light
from our review of the emergence, development and effects of CP. This is an
outline review. These issues receive more extensive treatment in later chap-
ters. The chapter begins by providing a brief summary of the antecedents of
partnership as outlined in Chapter 1.
Antecedents of partnership
Chapter 1 presented a detailed discussion of two theoretical perspectives
linking antecedents with the emergence and development of voluntary
workplace partnership arrangements. The first, which we termed the normal
competition thesis, is premised on the existence of more or less linear rela-
tionships between certain influences and employers’ decision to adopt a co-
operative industrial relations strategy. The model is associated in particular
with the work of William Cooke (1990). The key influences are identified as
competitive threats and cost-control pressures. These are ‘normal’ pressures
or constraints and are seen as exercising discrete influences over employers’
perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a partnership
approach. These influences are also seen to be additive: the more intense
these commercial pressures, the greater the probability that employers will
seek to develop more advanced forms of partnership.
The alternative theoretical perspective emphasizes how a configuration of
influences may constitute necessary antecedents to partnership arrangements.
Here, too, commercial pressures are seen to be important, particularly those of
an acute or disjunctive form, but of themselves are insufficient to prompt
employers to establish collaborative relations with unions. But where such
economic circumstances combine with the presence of strong unions, a high
level of union awareness among workforces, visionary management and union
officials, and influential HR departments, the antecedents are seen to exist for
partnership arrangements to emerge and possibly subsume conventional
industrial relations structures and processes. A number of scholars, including
Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma (1994), Kochan et al. (1986) and Appelbaum
and Batt (1994), have argued that clusters of factors such as those here listed
are the decisive influence, and are critical in determining whether the parties
could opt to depart from pre-existing industrial relations traditions. Others,
most notably Roche and Turner (1998), have examined whether particular
types of partnership arrangements develop from particular configurations of
antecedents or clusters of influences. They make the case, for example, that
pre-existing traditions of industrial relations are an important mediating influ-
ence. Thus, where an impending commercial crisis and supportive pre-existing
management and union postures coincide with a well-established trade union
and a strong tradition of union activism, partnership of a joint governance
form is more likely to develop. But where such features interact with weak
unions and low ‘unionateness’, partnership arrangements based on joint
consultative principles are more likely to emerge.
We now turn to examine the origins and development of CP in Aer
Rianta and to locate its evolution in the context of the company’s industrial
relations and commercial environment. In examining the antecedents to CP
we will appraise whether the ‘normal competition thesis’ or the ‘configura-
tion thesis’ provides a better explanatory purchase on the evolution and
shape of partnership in Aer Rianta.
Getting to ‘jointness’
The genesis of workplace partnership can be traced back to 1984 when, in
anticipation of the enactment of the Worker Participation (State Enter-
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prises) Act (1988), a union study group was established to examine the
likely consequences of the legislation for employee participation in Aer
Rianta. There were two elements to the Act. First, the statute provided for
the election of three worker directors – elected by the workforce from
candidates nominated by the trade unions, who in turn comprised one-third
of board members – to the Board of Aer Rianta. The transposition of this
segment of the legislation into company practice was relatively straight-
forward. The second element, which made provision for the introduction of
sub-board participative arrangements, allowed management and unions’ rep-
resentatives to devise mutually acceptable forms of employee participation.
A variety of arrangements were permitted under the Act, including direct
and indirect participative mechanisms, as well as relatively informal and
highly structured arrangements.
The union study group subsequently evolved into a new body called the
Industrial Democracy Council (IDC). The IDC was comprised of representa-
tives of all the trade unions in Aer Rianta. Following early deliberations
between the IDC and management, it was agreed that the development of
participatory structures within the company should be approached on a joint
basis, involving management and union representatives from the company’s
three airports. A joint working group (JWG) was duly established in 1986.
The JWG set itself four objectives: to issue a joint statement on partici-
pation; to establish employees’ views and preferences in respect of current
and future participative mechanisms; to research existing examples of
employee participation; and to prepare a report and make recommendations
to the management and unions at Aer Rianta. A series of discussion meet-
ings were convened by the JWG across the three airports to communicate to
employees and management how the group proposed to move forward and
to ascertain in a preliminary manner their views of participation. Subse-
quently, in 1988, a random sample of the Aer Rianta workforce was sur-
veyed with the help of the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI),
an independent research body in Dublin. The survey produced a response
rate of 73 per cent, 702 employees in all. The results of the study indicated a
substantial participation gap: the information which Aer Rianta employees
sought in respect of the affairs of the company was significantly less than
that afforded them by management; and their level of involvement in
respect of decisions which affected their work was also seen to have been
inadequate.
With the help of the Irish Productivity Centre, the JWG identified and
arranged study visits to a number of exemplar organizations in the United
States and Sweden. The choice of countries was deliberate. The former was
chosen because of the absence of state legislative support for employee par-
ticipation in organizational decision-making, in contrast to the latter, where
there is a rich heritage of participation reflecting a wider context of institu-
tional supports. In the US, the group visited three companies to examine a
variety of initiatives: in Ford, they looked at a training and development
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initiative jointly sponsored by Ford management and the UAW; in General
Motors, they were particularly interested in the Saturn project, and at Royal
Oak City Authority, they examined the introduction of quality circles. The
JWG’s report of their visit to the US highlighted a number of factors which
gave rise to, and were seen to be crucial to, the successful implementation of
partnership activities. These included: significant competitive threats,
visionary leadership, and the manner in which change was jointly initiated
and managed with the support of senior management and union representa-
tives. In Sweden, meetings were convened with representatives of the
employers’ organization, SAF, and the LO, the blue-collar union confedera-
tion. Site visits were arranged to two Siemens’ plants and to the Uddevalla
shipyard. Notwithstanding the different legislative context, the group also
tried to identify the critical factors promoting employee participation in
Sweden. In their report, emphasis was placed on the need for comprehensive
agreements, mutual security, effective union organization, mutual respect,
and full disclosure of information.
Following four years of research and deliberation, the JWG had acquired
a complex and sensitive understanding of different models of participation
and of Aer Rianta employees’ and management’s attitudes to employee par-
ticipation. In its report it recommended that the company’s unions should
be extended significant levels of influence over organizational decision-
making. The JWG, for example, identified the company’s business strat-
egies, service quality, training and employment creation as areas over which
unions’ influence should come to bear. In so doing, the JWG recognized
that their understanding and ambitions for participation went ‘beyond the
provisions of the legislation for employee participation within public sector
organisations’ and that their overall objective was to produce ‘proposals for
cultural change in Aer Rianta which would be supported by structures for
“jointness” in the organisation’ (JUCG 1993). It thus bears emphasis that
the JWG envisaged Aer Rianta’s unions acquiring significantly more influ-
ence over management decision-making than that conceived of in the 1988
Act.
In its report, the JWG was very clear in its delineation of ground rules if
a partnership model was to be pursued. Four such understandings or reassur-
ances were highlighted (JWG 1990: 1). They were outlined thus. First,
employee participation is more likely to succeed where there is a strong
management and a strong trade union. This was identified as a ‘prerequisite
and an on-going requirement’. If participation were to be used by either
party to weaken or undermine the other ‘side’, it would ‘be self-defeating’.
Second, partnership and collective bargaining would exist in parallel. It was
made plain that the objective was not to ‘syphon-off’ issues from collective
bargaining and to place them in a partnership arena. Third, where partner-
ship and collective bargaining co-exist, members of management and union
representatives would be required to perform twin roles. Finally, where
persons work solely in the partnership arena, it would be incumbent upon
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them to work closely with their colleagues in industrial relations, to have
their support and to establish clear terms of reference.
When it came to making recommendations, however, as to the precise
shape of the participation arrangements to be adopted, agreement among
JWG members proved elusive. The impasse centred on competing concep-
tions of participation as well as the desirability or otherwise of adopting a
partnership approach in preference to traditional representative structures
and, in respect of the former, whether representatives might be elected or
nominated. Views of JWG members did not divide neatly along manage-
ment/union lines. While leading trade union representatives tended to
favour the development of what came to be known as ‘jointness’ – meaning
joint decision-making between management and unions and direct partici-
pation of employees at the point of work, shop stewards were more equivocal
as to how to proceed. Some favoured ‘jointness’ while others preferred a
traditional representational model. Upon receiving the JWG’s report, senior
management chose not to endorse one form of participation over another.
Instead, management agreed to accept whichever model the unions might
eventually come to agree upon. Essentially, therefore, the matter came to
rest with the unions in Aer Rianta as to whether and how they wished to
take the process forward.
The formation of the Joint Union Company Group
The impasse continued for a further year. The shop stewards who made up
the IDC decided to refer the matter to the full-time union officials in the
Aer Rianta Group of Unions. In 1991, they decided to give the initiative
fresh impetus by establishing a Joint Union Company Group ( JUCG),
which was charged with revisiting how participation might be defined in an
Aer Rianta context. The JUCG was composed of equal numbers of senior
managers and senior full-time union representatives, together with an exter-
nal consultant. Their deliberations lasted for another three years. Further
study visits to other organizations were arranged, in-depth interviews with
management at various levels and shop stewards were conducted by outside
consultants, and the employee survey of 1988 was replicated in 1995 to
identify any significant changes in employees’ views. Weekend seminars and
workshops involving experts in airport economics were organized to explore
the competitive threats faced by Aer Rianta.
In 1992 the composition of the JUCG was altered to permit the admis-
sion of two lay union representatives. In turn management were allowed two
further members. To facilitate an open and frank exchange of views,
members of the JUCG were required to relinquish their traditional
representative roles – to ‘leave their hats outside the door’ as they were often
reminded – and to adopt a non-representational role. From the outset, par-
ticipation in the JUCG required adherence to the principles of a joint
problem-solving approach: all participants were made to endeavour to see
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how other interest groups might view an issue, and in turn to try to find
mutually acceptable solutions. The JUCG was cast thus as a non-representa-
tional body, independent of both management and unions. Members’
primary responsibility was to contribute their expertise to the development
of partnership and to bring their influence to bear in a general sense to
promote partnership within the company.
The group’s deliberations came to be informed and influenced to a
significant degree by personal construct psychology (PCP) as developed by
the American psychologist George Kelly (1991). PCP provided the group
with a philosophy and methodology for understanding how people see the
world about them, how their fears might be addressed and aspirations real-
ized and, in turn, how people might be animated to pursue change. PCP
places emphasis on empowering the ‘client’ (in the case of Aer Rianta, the
employee), who is viewed as ‘the expert’ in respect of the nature and influ-
ences acting on their working life. The ‘therapist’ (i.e. the workplace facilita-
tor) is to act as a catalyst for the client’s own development. Central to the
approach is the idea that an individual can re-fashion their own ‘life-worlds’
and it behoves the facilitator to view the world as the employee sees it and
to suspend or block their own values and prejudices (see Kelly 1991;
Fransella 1995). Consultants versed in PCP played a significant role in the
early development of CP in Aer Rianta, providing advice, research and
preparing training materials.
The influence of PCP was evident particularly in the JUCG’s advocacy of
the adoption of a non-directive approach to the establishment of pilot work
groups and to the so-called ‘research phase’, wherein group members identi-
fied issues or problems they wished to tackle as well as the form participa-
tion might assume within the groups. Six such groups were formed across
the three airports in mid 1992 (Corporate Finance, Passenger Services at
Dublin, Shannon’s Building and Maintenance and Cork Airport Police and
Fire Service – involving 181 employees in total). The main functions of the
groups were: to examine methods for establishing participatory structures;
to explore employees’ perceptions of participation; to highlight potential
obstacles; and finally, to assist employees develop problem-solving skills. It
was intended that these groups would operate for a defined period and
would be disbanded following the completion of their respective tasks. The
procedure for establishing pilot groups and the provision and sequence of
support followed a set pattern. (These would also come to be replicated with
later ‘mainstream’ participation initiatives.) First, the JUCG would make a
presentation on its aims to staff. Interested groups were then invited to
become involved where they had the requisite management and staff
support. Second, a research phase would commence, as outlined, to examine
employees’ views of participation, to identify suitable subject matters and to
address training and facilitation needs. In addition, it was clearly stipulated
in advance that industrial relations procedures and processes would remain
separate from the participation process. In this context, the issues addressed
48 Emergence and development of partnership
by the pilot groups would be agreed with the JUCG and their recommenda-
tions for future courses of action would also be put to the JUCG.
The pilot groups met with limited and uneven success. The principal
obstacles as identified by the groups themselves included a lack of senior
management support, limited union engagement, differences of view as to
the purpose of participation between line management and shop stewards,
inadequate financial resources and the intrusion of festering industrial rela-
tions difficulties. Most groups were disbanded in 1993 but one or two con-
tinued for a few more years. The experiment had, however, fulfilled its
purpose for the JUCG. It was not simply a question of whether the pilot
groups succeeded or failed, but rather what lessons might be usefully
gleaned from the experiment so that participants in future initiatives might
be better positioned to foresee and resolve potential problems. The following
aspects were highlighted. First, work groups had existed as islands of
innovation and to have survived in the long term would have required the
development of a broader participative framework; second, while it was diffi-
cult to draw neat clinical lines between participation and industrial rela-
tions, the issue deserved greater consideration; and finally, there had to be
greater investment in training.
By this time, in any case, the JUCG had become increasingly preoccupied
with securing the requisite financial resources to further develop and imple-
ment participation within Aer Rianta. The early portents were not encour-
aging. In 1994 when the JUCG estimated it would need an annual budget
of IR£200,000 (C254,000) for the coming year, the company reduced its
annual funding from IR£75,000 (C95,000) to IR£50,000 (C63,000). A
two-year campaign to obtain additional and more secure funding began,
with the JUCG also seeking the active support of senior figures within and
outside the company. In May 1994, Peter Cassells, the then General Secret-
ary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, endorsed the JUCG’s efforts. A
formal expression of support from Aer Rianta’s CEO came somewhat later in
early 1995. Shortly thereafter, a JUCG request for funding from Aer
Rianta’s parent government department was successful, subject to the estab-
lishment of agreed milestones; departmental representation on the JUCG;
and regular reviews of the project including an independent external evalu-
ation. The latter stipulation was identified as being particularly important
so that the lessons of CP might be recorded, analysed and made available to
other public organizations facing similar commercial pressures as a con-
sequence of the liberalization of markets in the state sector. The funding
provision made available to the JUCG was substantial. A request for
IR£97,000 (C125,000) for the ‘promulgation phase’ and IR£457,000
(C580,000) for the first year (1996) and somewhat less for the following two
years (1997 and 1998) was met without demur. The JUCG was given sole
responsibility for the distribution of the funds.
The acquisition of such significant funds represented a watershed in the
development of partnership in Aer Rianta. The JUCG was now in a position
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to resource its plans and crucially, from its perspective, it had secured finan-
cial independence from the company. A senior full-time trade union official
seconded to the project and a key senior management champion became the
main animators of partnership. Other Aer Rianta staff were seconded to the
project in the role of full-time ‘facilitators’ and others still acted as
‘mentors’, supporting partnership in various parts of the organization. A
‘Participation Bureau’ was also established to resource and oversee the
administration of partnership activities. Secretarial staff and a librarian were
recruited for this and related purposes. Figure 3.1 summarizes the develop-
ment of CP in Aer Rianta.




































Figure 3.1 The development of constructive participation in Aer Rianta, 1984–87.
The contours of CP
By 1995, the JUCG had finally settled on the development of a ‘joint
approach’ to participation. There was unanimous agreement within the
group that the preservation of traditional representational roles and adver-
sarial postures would not serve the company well. ‘Root and branch trans-
formation’ was called for:
(t)he transformation process would of necessity have to be comprehen-
sive, detailed and radical. . . . The participants (of the JUCG) concluded
that any attempt at transformation would have a possibility of succeed-
ing only if the traditional adversarial postures were abandoned. It was
clear that the owner, management and unions would have to adopt a
constructive alternative to the traditional approach in dealing with the
threats and opportunities they faced.
(JUCG 1999: 1–2)
The influence of one senior management participant and two senior union
representatives was decisive. Together they were a vital force in conceiving
of a joint approach and in articulating its benefits for employees and the
company. In this crucial sense, and from its earliest inception, the critical
design and conception decisions were taken by an ‘elite’ grouping and were
transposed in a top-down direction.
The JUCG proposals for the development of partnership in Aer Rianta
were outlined in two key documents, known as The Compact and The Requi-
site Arrangements. The Compact set out a series of principles aimed at rebuild-
ing employee–management and union–management relations in Aer Rianta
along partnership lines. The Requisite Arrangements identified a series of
structures and measures to be put in place to facilitate the realization of
partnership. The main proposals in these documents, which provided the
framework for what came to be known in Aer Rianta as ‘Constructive Partic-
ipation’, are summarized in Table 3.1.
The word ‘compact’ was chosen for a clear purpose. According to the
JUCG (1993):
A contract is essentially adversarial in nature, representing compromise
between the separate interests of each party to the agreement. . . . In
contrast, a ‘compact’ is fundamentally a co-operative document, provid-
ing for a mutual vision and a joint system for achieving common goals
that foster the general well-being of all stakeholders in a given endeav-
our.
CP envisaged multi-level and multi-stranded partnership arrangements
in which employees and unions would be accorded a role in decision-
making, spanning task participation, department and business-unit strategy
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Table 3.1 Workplace partnership in Aer Rianta: principles and arrangements
Principles of constructive participation (The Compact)
Both parties accept their joint responsibility to work together in order to improve
the economic performance of each constituent part of the organization.
Both parties reject competing on the basis of a low-wage policy but will do all
possible to improve company performance and living standards for employees
through the conscientious application of best systems and practice at all times.
Both parties will share their objectives and strategic plans in regard to Aer Rianta.
Both parties accept their obligation to work together to serve the interests of
customers, staff and stakeholders.
Both parties accept the right of employees to share in the financial success of the
enterprise.
Both parties accept the principle of employees shareholding as a legitimate objective
in certain circumstances.
Both parties will commit to mutual disclosure of information and will respect
confidentiality where necessary.
Both parties will share their perception of future developments, will ensure an
awareness of market realities and will anticipate the implications for the enterprise
and employment.
Both parties undertake to jointly pursue a policy of equal opportunities and the
elimination of discriminatory practices and policies.
Aer Rianta management accept that trade unions have a legitimate and central role
in strategic decisions and policy making in addition to their role in day-to-day
relationships between management and staff.
Aer Rianta will encourage its employees to support and engage actively in trade
union affairs and will not discriminate against union members or representatives.
Aer Rianta management accept employment security as a major policy objective
that will figure as importantly in the strategic planning process as does finance,
marketing, customer service, etc.
Requisite Arrangements
Regular work groups
There should be an opportunity for everyone to participate fully at departmental
level. The participants will include management, trade union representatives and
staff members. Participation at departmental level can be designed around the
normal managing process, including departmental subjects and timetable of events.
The group should meet four to six times per annum and the agenda is likely to
include: review the work of regular work groups; review departmental financial and
operational performance; discuss any difficulties, problems or threats to the
department, departmental objectives, financial and operational plans and 
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Table 3.1 continued
relationships with clients or other company departments. The JUCG will agree on the
membership of departmental groups. In addition to receiving the training outlined
above for regular work groups, training will probably be needed in trade union
policies and procedures, and in the company’s organisational systems, budgeting,
departmental strategy, etc.
Business-unit arrangements
Business-unit participation should have a strong input into the annual strategic
plans and financial plans of the individual airports. These groups should give full
consideration to all aspects of the business unit’s objectives with regard to its
operational activities, marketing activities, capital investment programmes and
business development. It will be important for the participation group to include
managers, executives, supervisors and general staff. The JUCG will have the task of
ensuring that there is a fair spread of membership and that both the management
and union position are safeguarded. Training will require an introduction into
airport economics, pricing policies, aviation standards and other subjects which
must be taken into consideration if the airport is to meet its statutory obligations
and act within commercially acceptable parameters.
Significant issue groups
From time to time particular topics will need to be addressed which transcend the
activities of the various groups or which require a particular combination of
personnel and skills, e.g. loss of duty free, change of status, etc. In such a case a
significant issue group will be nominated to deal effectively with seeking a joint
solution to the difficulty.
Corporate arrangements
The arrangements for CP at corporate level will involve nominees of the JUCG as
well as the most senior executives in the company and membership from the various
levels and activities throughout the organization. The JUCG will be obliged to
determine an appropriate spread of membership. This group will review the growth
of the company and its financial and investment performance as well as matters such
as the creation of employment, the growth of the business and the policies as
articulated in the company’s strategic planning document. Training will be needed
in company strategic planning, policy formulation and corporate finances.
Board of directors
Three members of the board are elected by the employees. The executive has no
board member. The chief executive attends board meetings in his executive capacity
only. The JUCG would consider it appropriate and indicative of real commitment if
both worker directors and executive directors had seats on the board of the
company.
Source: Abridged and adapted from Towards Constructive Participation: A Positive Approach to
Management/Union Relationships (1994) and Requisite Arrangements: Towards Constructive Partici-
pation (1995), Aer Rianta Joint Union Company Group on CP.
and competitive strategy for the company as a whole. To support joint
decision-making, the unions received guarantees of institutional security;
employees were assured of employment security (the preservation of employ-
ment levels would be an agreed parameter of commercial strategy); and
financial participation was espoused. The company in turn gained assurances
from the unions that they would assist in improving the economic perform-
ance of each of its constituent units. The parties pledged that Aer Rianta
would seek to compete on the basis of service quality and workforce skill
rather than on the basis of cost minimization and low pay. There was also a
pledge to provide training covering all aspects of engagement with CP.
The formal roll-out of CP began with the JUCG’s communication to all
staff of the principles and objectives of CP. Staff seminars were convened in
the three airports in 1997. Later a magazine, entitled Compact News, was pro-
duced and distributed company-wide. In April 1998, a CP exhibition was
organized to coincide with the official launch of Compact News and was
opened by the Minister for Public Enterprise, and by the chief executive in
Shannon. Staff were invited to attend. Facilitators and strategy group (SG)
and regular work group (RWG) members were on hand to discuss CP with
those who attended. Facilitators also made presentations on the Compact as
part of all staff induction programmes. A ‘participation intranet’ was
developed where staff were provided with direct access to up-to-date
information on CP. Subsequently, the RWGs in Dublin maintenance
developed their own intranet site within which group members communi-
cated with one another and individuals were permitted to develop their own
personal pages to store information and access their own personal calendar.
Upon communicating the principles of CP across the company, the prac-
tical implementation of CP began in 1997. This task fell increasingly upon
the Participation Bureau. It became pivotal, acting as steering group and
trouble-shooter for the process. Increasingly, too, it was drawn into the han-
dling of operational problems. These included the reluctance of some man-
agers to engage; attempts by others to use CP to push through changes on a
unilateral basis; allegations that unions sometimes sought to use partnership
to stall management proposals; and more generalized uncertainty and ambi-
guity concerning the relationship between partnership and established
industrial relations processes.
As the Bureau assumed this central role, so the involvement and signific-
ance of the JUCG progressively waned. The frequency of JUCG meetings
declined noticeably from 1997 onwards, as well as membership attendance.
In the process, the profile and responsibilities of the senior union official
who was seconded to the project on a full-time basis, together with a key
senior management champion, increased. In being the main animators of
partnership and having become intimately involved in the day-to-day
implementation process, decision-making authority became increasingly
concentrated around these two individuals.
Originally it had been planned to develop departmental work groups
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(DWGs) and regular work groups (RWGs) (see Table 3.1) by first establish-
ing steering groups. These were to be the focus for intensive training in the
principles of jointness and were to identify the issues around which DWGs
and RWGs would come into being and the logistics surrounding their
operations. In time DWGs were expected to network around higher-level
participative structures. Participants soon complained that they found this
preparatory training too abstract and that the pace of progress threatened to
turn participative forums into ‘talking shops’. There was a general impa-
tience among those involved to address concrete problems and issues. This
resulted in the creation of so-called strategy groups (SGs). SGs focused on
single issues, such as the future viability of maintenance operations at
Shannon Airport, problems with the provision of the cleaning service at
Dublin Airport, and the future of Dublin duty-free shops. For instance, the
cleaning department’s SG in Dublin examined a range of issues including
pricing, non-revenue-earning services, organizational structures and work
practices. The group also researched passengers’ opinions on the standards
and performance of the cleaning services. They also benchmarked their ser-
vices against similar operations in other airports. They used ‘breakthrough
thinking’ to envisage how their department might operate in the future.
During 1997–98 some seven SGs were established at Dublin and Shannon.
All SGs addressed issues of service cost, efficiency, viability and development
in the context of the strategic commercial priorities outlined in the Compact,
including employment security.
A DWG following the intended trajectory became established in the
Dublin maintenance department. Participation was confined, however, to
skilled craftspeople as the semi-skilled employees had earlier voted not to
participate in CP structures or initiatives. This DWG was the first of its
kind in Aer Rianta. The group’s activities included making submissions to
the department’s budgeting process and the formulation of a business plan
for the future of the department.
To these structures was added during 1997–98 a series of significant
issues groups (SIGs), as provided for under the Requisite Arrangements (see
Table 3.1). SIGs developed to address two distinct types of issues. First, a
number addressed cross-company commercial issues and challenges, such as
the likely disappearance of duty-free sales from the summer of 1999 and an
imminent change in the status of Aer Rianta under which the company was
to be assigned full control over its assets, becoming liable in the process for
corporation tax and rates. In 1998, the brief of this group was broadened to
address the critical question of the future of the company in the light of the
government’s rolling programme of partial or full privatization of state-
owned commercial companies. Second, a number of SIGs addressed key
issues linked with the progress of CP, such as the revision of personnel and
industrial relations policies, including reward systems and future training
requirements. In all, six SIGs came into operation during 1997–98. All SGs
and SIGs were expected to address issues on a joint basis, based on the
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collection, examination and validation of relevant data. Following such a
joint process, proposals were to be presented to management and unions.
There was no requirement that a common position be arrived at. Some dis-
cussion papers indeed articulated an agreed common position on the issues
addressed, whereas others simply summarized the points of view that had
arisen in the groups’ deliberations. Also, in line with the approach adopted
under CP, discussion papers were presented to management and unions for
evaluation, feedback and possible implementation or negotiation. Crucially,
the prerogative as to whether and on what terms a paper’s recommendations
might be implemented remained with the union and the company.
Two SIGs in particular came to occupy a pivotal role in the partnership
process during 1998–2000. The Duty-Free Group produced a paper on how
the imminent disappearance of duty-free sales on the instigation of the EU
might be handled, and this became the basis on which management and
unions subsequently addressed post-duty-free retailing at the airports. The
Corporate Strategy Group arrived at a joint vision of the future of Aer
Rianta, which supported the partial privatization of the company as the
most viable means of meeting its burgeoning capital requirements and pur-
suing its competitive strategy. The group favoured an Initial Public Offer-
ing (IPO), with shareholdings capped at 5 per cent and advocated the
creation of an ESOP. The sell-off of the Great Southern Hotel subsidiary was
also agreed, to allow the company henceforth to focus on its core business:
the management and operation of airport facilities and services. The Corpor-
ate Strategy Group’s report became the basis for a common front between
the Aer Rianta board and management and the Group of Unions, to the
degree that on this issue, more than any other, partnership effectively sub-
sumed or displaced collective bargaining and traditional industrial relations
channels within the company. Thus, the SGs and SIGs were among the most
significant partnership structures to be developed in Aer Rianta.
Given the welter of activity involved in the creation and operation of SGs and
SIGs, progress on the establishment of RWGs was very limited. These became
established in the maintenance department of Dublin Airport (11 groups), and
less extensively in the finance department at Shannon (two groups). The former
became involved in equipment selection, training, health and safety, workload
allocation and work scheduling. In assuming the role and agenda originally
envisaged for RWGs, the SGs came to involve, directly that is, a modest number
of employees. The consequence of limited activity at RWG level was that the
principle that all employees should be able to ‘participate fully at the[ir] imme-
diate place of work in their regular work groups’ (Requisite Arrangements 1995:
7), was realized to a much more limited degree than intended.
Furthermore, the level of support needed, and in many cases demanded
by employees, to sustain participative structures proved in excess of what the
JUCG and Participation Bureau were able to deliver. Additionally, the
demand from ever more departments to become involved in CP as well as
dealing with ongoing resistance to partnership further stretched the
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Bureau’s resources and diluted its efforts. This was of evident concern to the
JUCG (1999: 13).
The requirement to respond to facilitation demands from unit strategy
groups as well as providing services to the significant issue groups and
the time spent in dealing with opposition to the participation pro-
gramme has overstretched our resource.
The penetration of partnership arrangements was uneven across airports,
departments and issues. Dublin Airport was most heavily engaged, followed
by Shannon. By late 1998, active groups (including SGs, SIGs, steering
groups and RWGs) at Dublin and Shannon covered the majority of staff.
Cork was the least engaged due to the rejection of CP by the airport’s
general manager and problems between local and national officials in one of
the main unions. The airport’s general manager retired in 1998 and was suc-
ceeded by a manager who had participated strongly in the JUCG. The
retailing department in Cork did become actively involved in discussions on
the likely consequences of the loss of duty-free sales, and some progress was
made with the establishment of an SG in the finance department. There-
after, however, little or no advancement was made. As business-unit struc-
tures had not been established, airport-level commercial strategy planning
fell outside the scope of partnership, except insofar as it was affected by
cross-company SIGs that addressed the duty-free issue and corporate strat-
egy. Areas like property management and physical planning for airports also
fell outside the scope of partnership. Department-wise, Dublin and Shannon
maintenance departments were heavily engaged, as was Dublin cleaning.
The duty-free shops also became involved on an intensive basis and there
was some considerable involvement by the Airport Police and Fire Service.
The set of participative structures that evolved following agreement on
the Compact and Requisite Arrangements are outlined in Figure 3.2.
Partnership and the industrial relations context in Aer
Rianta
Aer Rianta was highly unionized, with an overall union density level of over
90 per cent. The main unions during the period covered by the research
were MANDATE, which organized workers in airport retailing (formerly
duty-free) shops, SIPTU, which represented ancillary staff grades, airport
police and fire services, operatives and clerical staff, IAESA (now a branch of
the public-sector union MANDATE), for middle management, and a
number of craft unions, prominent among them, the TEEU, for mainte-
nance craft workers. The unions negotiated together on company-wide issues
under the aegis of the Aer Rianta Group of Unions. Since 1987, pay adjust-
ment had been based on the awards set down in the national tripartite pro-
grammes. Aer Rianta had a tradition of positive and progressive industrial
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relations and personnel management and was a pioneer of progressive pol-
icies in areas such as work-sharing and quality of working life. The inci-
dence, level of participation and number of working days lost due to strikes
in the company, adjusted for workforce size, had been significantly below
the profile for the rest of the public sector and also compare very favourably
with the strike record of the private sector (Strikes Datafile, Department of
Industrial Relations and Human Resources, University College Dublin).
The main unions in the company, operating under the aegis of the Aer Rianta
Group of Unions, supported CP. The exception was the union representing
middle managers, the Irish Aviation Executive Staff Association (IAESA), which
was subsequently to merge with the public-sector union, IMPACT. IAESA had
not participated in the development of partnership and saw itself as effectively
excluded from the process. The JUCG’s insistence that all its members act in a
non-representational capacity grated with IAESA representatives and ostensibly,
at least, became the reason for their refusal to join the JUCG.
The unions viewed CP as a possible means for emancipating workers from
traditional, autocratic and regressive forms of work organization. Team-
working, for example, was presented as a means of enhancing employees’
working lives and giving team members a greater say in how their work
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Denotes extensive or significant development
Figure 3.2 The evolution of partnership arrangements in Aer Rianta, 1995–2000.
Note
Strategy Groups overlapped the activities originally envisaged for Departmental Work Groups in areas
like duty-free sales, cleaning and maintenance, while Significant Issues Groups addressed the duty-free





might be organized. But partnership was also presented as an imperative in
the face of increasing competitive pressures, tighter budgetary controls,
demands for greater efficiency of services, and the likelihood of the deregula-
tion and dismantling of monopoly markets. Traditional collective bargain-
ing, by contrast, was portrayed as disabling union influence. The case was
made with some force that partnership offered unions the opportunity to
extend their influence over management decision-making and in a way
which ensured their institutional security.
The unions’ perspective was informed to a considerable degree by what
they had witnessed on their study visits to the US. Their communication
materials to the rank and file, for example, were frequently illustrated with
US case examples and the findings of American research. Still, an uneasy
relationship existed within the unions and its constituent structures as
between the merits of traditional forms of worker representation and the
merits of pursuing a partnership approach.
Relations between the worker directors and the JUCG were difficult and
tense. The roots of this unease can be traced back to early deliberations on par-
ticipation within and between the various union representative structures. As
outlined, the basis for union involvement in participation had initially been
considered by the IDC. This body subsequently divested itself of respons-
ibility for framing an agreement with management on participation to the
JWG, and later the JUCG. Notwithstanding this, there were protracted and
on-going negotiations and disagreements between the IDC and the Group of
Unions as to the appropriate body for dealing with participation in the
company. The latter were largely sympathetic to the JUCG’s approach and
ambition, but the IDC were perceived, by the JUCG at least, as not having
come fully ‘on-side’ with respect to the manner in which CP was being con-
ceived. It was interpreted by some that the IDC’s unease was due to its once
dominant hold on employee participation within the company having been
captured by another body, i.e. the JUCG (JUCG 1992: 1). The IDC’s engage-
ment with participation had been largely through the function performed by
the worker directors. The latter reported to the IDC. The rivalry between the
two structures centred essentially on whether CP would marginalize worker
directors and reduce the influence of the IDC. The appointment of two lay
representatives, both of whom were IDC members, to the JUCG in 1992 was
an attempt by the Group of Unions to appease the IDC.
Tensions remained, however. Contacts between the IDC and the JUCG
continued for a further four years in an effort to define and clarify the bodies’
respective roles. It was not until May 1996 that significant progress was
made, with the formal incorporation of the IDC into the Group of Unions.
A new constitution was drawn up for this purpose. Despite this, internal dif-
ferences remained in respect of approaches to participation, especially
between worker directors and other union activists and full-time union offi-
cials, as well as intra-union differences at different airports, and variable
levels of commitment to CP amongst shop stewards. These tensions were to
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prove significant impediments in the face of the JUCG’s efforts to diffuse
partnership across the company.
From the outset, CP envisaged a clear-cut division of roles between
partnership structures and established industrial relations channels. Both
systems were to co-exist in parallel realms. Individual work groups and
departments were free to choose through which route they might advance
their interests or address problems and difficulties. The Compact did not pro-
claim a priori that certain issues should be addressed within partnership
forums and that other items could be dealt with via established industrial
relations channels. The parties involved in partnership structures were not
enjoined to arrive at a single common position with respect to any problem
or agenda. Even if they did, it was understood that management and unions
retained their established rights under collective agreements, and that either
party, or both, could dissent if they chose. Thus, partnership neither incor-
porated nor displaced established collective bargaining and industrial rela-
tions channels. Issues could be handled on a partnership basis, in which case
it was ultimately open to unions and employers to accept or reject any pro-
posals put forward. Alternatively, issues could be handled through estab-
lished industrial relations channels.
The basis for this formal separation of channels was the perception that
this was the best way to proceed when CP was in its developmental stage.
To have ordained at the outset that partnership could have or might have led
to the recasting of existing collective agreements, or that it might have sub-
sumed collective bargaining would, according to its champions, have
alarmed and worried shop stewards and union officials. It would also, it was
claimed, have overstretched the joint understanding reached by the parties.
Pragmatism thus prevailed in an effort to reassure management and
unions that their established prerogatives and rights would not be endan-
gered or undermined by CP. But as CP became embedded in Aer Rianta in
the late 1990s, and as it came to address significant commercial challenges,
like the loss of EU duty-free sales and the future ownership of the company,
and as the confidence of a wider network of people in partnership arrange-
ments grew, the erstwhile domain of collective bargaining began to shrink.
With respect to these two pivotal issues, collective bargaining was effect-
ively subsumed by joint governance arrangements. In this sense, the good
relations generated through the Compact provided the foundations for
partnership to ‘spill over’ into addressing issues which otherwise would have
been handled within traditional managerial channels and collective bargain-
ing and may also – by most senior managers’ and union officials’ assessment
– have led to adversarial industrial relations. But the spillover dynamic did
not operate in only one direction and nor, as later events would reveal (see
Chapter 10), did partnership disable collective bargaining. The bypassing
and marginalization of worker directors, as outlined, had its own spillover
effect with its particular dynamic in leading them to question and launch a
sortie against partnership (see Chapters 7 and 10).
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Partnership and the business context at Aer Rianta
Partnership had developed in a largely benign commercial and labour-
market context. Passenger volumes grew steadily and the duty-free business
was highly profitable. Commercial pressures emanated in the main from the
deregulation of the airline industry which resulted in strong downward pres-
sure on landing and handling charges. Charges were heavily discounted,
especially for low-cost operators like Ryanair, and otherwise tightly regu-
lated by government in the interest of promoting tourism. From about
1998–99, however, the company experienced change of a more disjunctive
character: the sharp relative decline in its aviation revenues (from 41 per
cent of the total revenue in 1986 to 19 per cent of total revenue in 1997);
the loss of duty-free revenues for passengers travelling within the EU (which
contributed IR£30 million (C38 million) to company profits, which in
1998 were IR£48 million (C61 million). Dublin Airport lost 75 per cent of
its duty-free sales, while Shannon, whose passengers were mainly going to
and from the US, lost 20 per cent); increasing passenger numbers caused
serious congestion in airport facilities, especially in Dublin; powerful exter-
nal lobby groups sought the sell-off of Aer Rianta, while others, including
Ryanair, lobbied for the building of a terminal at Dublin Airport that
would compete with Aer Rianta; the part or wholesale privatization of Aer
Rianta looked increasingly likely in the near future; and an airport regulator
was established to vet proposed increases in charges. Meanwhile, the Irish
labour market continued to tighten to near-zero levels of unemployment;
and finally, at a time when its most profitable business line was disappearing
and airport charges remained tightly regulated, the company faced an acute
need for access to capital to permit further physical and commercial develop-
ment. It was around discontinuous change, involving these new pressures,
that partnership took shape in the late 1990s.
Despite having been adopted as official policy by the company and Group
of Unions, CP, as will be examined in Chapters 5 and 6, encountered signific-
ant obstacles within management. Senior management was divided on the
merits of the approach. A minority supported CP – most of these occupied
staff rather than line management roles. Most senior managers were sceptics
and doubted whether ‘bottom-line’ benefits had or would accrue; the rest
were overtly opposed. The chief executive in office up to 1998 supported the
Compact, but managers who opposed CP were not sanctioned. A new CEO
appointed at the implementation stage provided more active support and
altered the balance in favour of CP at a time when the process began to
engage major commercial issues. Many middle managers were apprehensive
and insecure, a posture that hardened into formal opposition when their
union instructed them at the implementation stage not to co-operate with
CP. The postures of middle managers were also influenced by their percep-
tion of senior management division and ambivalence. Prevailing formal
organizational structures and control systems remained substantially
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unaltered – CP was expected, in effect, to colonize prevailing modes of
decision-making and change them from within. Human resource and indus-
trial relations policies were expected to change, but progress in these areas in
joint bodies remained slow. In consequence, prevailing reward systems pro-
vided little incentive for either management or staff to engage with CP.
The largely benign commercial conditions of the 1980s and much of the
1990s favoured deliberation and planning in the development of CP. The
same conditions also favoured inertia in prevailing structures and modes of
decision-making. From about 1998 commercial conditions provided more
fertile ground. The acute challenge represented by the EU’s abolition of
duty-free sales and the fundamental challenge posed by the review of the
company, provided opportunities for supporters of CP to demonstrate the
potential of partnership – while in the process tackling senior and middle
management scepticism and opposition. The dramatic growth in traffic
volumes and a tightening in labour markets from the mid 1990s, as the
Irish economy grew by about 9 per cent annually, allowed scope for absorb-
ing the loss of duty-free sales while observing the employment security
injunction set down in the Compact.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the origins and development of CP in Aer Rianta.
The roots of the experiment lay in an attempt by the state to legislate for
employee participation in state-owned companies. The legislation was not
prescriptive however, and allowed employers and unions significant freedom
to devise arrangements which would best suit their specific circumstances
and preferences. Most other state-owned companies’ initiatives remained
largely within the realm of traditional representative structures, and resided
within precast adversarial structures and processes (cf. Hastings 2003; Kelly
and Hourihan 1994). The significance of the Aer Rianta case is that manage-
ment and unions attempted to go beyond the requirements of the legislation
and to develop voluntarily an ambitious partnership approach to the manage-
ment of workplace change.
In the context of the theoretical review outlined at the beginning of this
chapter and in Chapter 1, the following themes deserve amplification in this
concluding section. First, CP had a long gestation, and advanced and
developed in a slow and prolonged manner. The protracted nature of the
initiative and the slow speed of decision-making and diffusion was a reflec-
tion of the inertial forces within the organization in combination with the
absence – certainly until the ending of duty-free sales in 1999 – of any
major external or internal stimulus for change. From about 1998–99,
however, Aer Rianta experienced change of a more disjunctive nature culmi-
nating in an acute commercial crisis. It lost a very significant and profitable
revenue stream with the abolition of intra-EU duty-free sales and its ability
to raise capital to accommodate significant increases in passenger numbers
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either from increasing landing fees or borrowing money was severely con-
strained. As well as these ‘normal’ competitive pressures, there was also the
prospect that the government would soon act to privatize Aer Rianta in part
or whole, and that its monopoly in the provision of airport services, in
Dublin Airport at least, was unlikely to last indefinitely. It is commercial
pressures of this magnitude that are often identified in the literature as
antecedents of partnership. There is no doubting that they were certainly
influential contingencies in spurring management and unions to institution-
alize CP in Aer Rianta.
Of their own, however, these commercial pressures were insufficient to
ensure the adoption and development of CP. Other influences were also
important. In particular, the conception, design and steering of CP was crit-
ically dependent on the energy and vision of one senior manager and a small
number of senior union officials. Together, they came to the view that estab-
lished industrial relations arrangements were no longer viable and that the
adoption of a co-operative approach provided the best means for handling
the pressures emanating from the commercial circumstances facing the
company. Thus the postures of unions and management within Aer Rianta
were important influences. All the major unions, with the exception of the
middle management staff association, were prepared to engage in joint
deliberations as to the shape and role of CP. Senior national officials, includ-
ing the General Secretary of ICTU, endorsed CP and lent their support to its
introduction. On the management side, the company’s CEO supported the
adoption of CP as official company policy. The appointment of a new CEO
coincided with the implementation of CP and his active involvement in sup-
porting CP was critically important in convincing his colleagues of its
merits. The significance of the backing garnered from senior civil servants
and successive government ministers was of obvious importance, both in
giving legitimacy to CP in the face of wavering and ambivalent support
from senior management and in providing the financial ‘space’ and
independence for the champions of CP to develop the initiative. Crucially,
too, it endorsed a very particular business strategy and employment system,
wherein priority was accorded to quality-based competitive strategies, the
involvement of employees, and the enhancement of their skills as well as
making provision for the security of their employment.
Pre-existing relations between management and unions in Aer Rianta had
also been good and were based on a strong bargaining relationship; instances
of overt conflict were rare. Union membership was high and, although there
was a multiplicity of unions, inter-union organization and policy formula-
tion were effectively co-ordinated; links with external union officers were
also well developed.
Thus, the evidence in respect of Aer Rianta illustrates how a confluence of
influences brought CP to fruition and in time led to its integration into the
mainstream of strategic decision-making within the company. In its early
guise, CP emerged as a consultation-based model of partnership and
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operated in parallel to senior management decision-making. Subsequently,
however, with the catalyst provided by the prospect of significant commer-
cial changes and the appointment of a new CEO, CP began to engage
directly with major strategic issues and assumed the form of a joint gover-
nance model to the extent that in respect of two major business issues – the
loss of duty-free sales and the future strategic direction of the company –
partnership arrangements effectively subsumed conventional management
decision-making and collective bargaining processes. In these instances, as
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, CP came to fuse with the formula-
tion of business strategy.
Elsewhere, too, the internal design and structure of CP was intended to
alter significantly employees’ role in decision-making processes and to
enhance their influence. Champions of CP appreciated the importance of
having a multi-level model of partnership of the type envisaged by Kochan
and Osterman (1994), whereby both direct and indirect mechanisms of par-
ticipation would be introduced in tandem to engage employees and their
representatives in decision-making at workplace and strategic levels. In
practice, however, the development of CP was concentrated at the peak of
the organization, first, with the formation of the JUCG and subsequently
with CP’s involvement in various strategy and significant issue groups. The
development of CP at other levels, for example, at business-unit level,
corporate level, and particularly at teamworking level was limited or non-
existent. Thus, for large sections of the company’s workforce, CP remained a
distant activity divorced from their daily work routines. The bespoke
modalities for achieving vertical integration were thus poorly realized in
practice and, in this critical respect, the interlocking arrangements identi-
fied by advocates of partnership to be crucial for its successful operation were
absent in Aer Rianta. But, in general, the shape and reach of CP varied
across the company. In some cases, CP transplanted collective bargaining, in
others it existed in parallel, and in yet other instances CP made very little if
any inroads. What is striking, therefore, about the Aer Rianta case is the
variability and diversity of decision-making processes which emerged across
the company, and also that the shape of CP, where it took root, altered and
assumed different functions and had diverse consequences over the period in
which it was the accepted policy of Aer Rianta management and unions.
One of the key factors influencing the dynamics of partnership was the way
in which key groupings responded. This brings us to the key issue of resis-
tance to CP.
CP’s reach was uneven and its import contested in various quarters. It
met significant resistance from both within management and the trade
unions. While CP was primarily management-driven, its conception and
development was critically dependent on the energy and vision of a small
group of champions. But it was manifestly not line management driven –
hence management’s (senior and middle) residing indifference and scepti-
cism. CP thus came to be seen by many, but particularly by management, as
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aloof and remote, as will be examined in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. The
decision by the middle management’s staff association to remain formally
detached from the process because its representatives were not permitted
formal representation on the JUCG amplified its members’ misgivings
about CP. Clearly, too, the JUCG had, through its attempts to resource CP
through its own budget, offices and staff, ‘ghettoized’ the initiative and fash-
ioned something of a rod with which to beat itself. Further, the language of
participation, drawing directly as it did from personal construct psychology,
as deployed by champions of CP, was criticized for being abstract and
having limited congruence with ‘hard’ business realities. And while the
champions of partnership in Aer Rianta bridled against the charge that
many of the problems were of their own making, they saw themselves as
operating within a company which was deeply wedded to an adversarial
industrial relations tradition. The overlap of ‘old’ and ‘new’ agendas was
there from the outset, evident, for example, in tensions between the IDC
and the JUCG; the intrusion of IR issues on pilot groups’ activities; team-
working and the role of middle management; and critically, the uneasy
articulation between CP and the role of worker directors. The exclusion of
worker directors from the planning and operation of CP resulted in the
‘uncoupling’ of different strands of participation. This created significant
problems ultimately to the detriment of CP. These issues are discussed in
detail in Chapters 7 and 10.
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4 Partnership and commercial
strategy
This chapter is the first of two that will examine a series of interlinked
themes concerning the relationship between partnership and business
decision-making in Aer Rianta. This chapter develops a key theme out-
lined in Chapter 1, by examining the linkages that developed between CP
and strategic decision-making in Aer Rianta, as CP was introduced across
the company’s airports and departments at a time when commercial chal-
lenges of an unprecedented nature arose within the company. The next
chapter examines in more detail the evolution of senior managers’ pos-
tures towards partnership and the forces that shaped management
postures.
As outlined in Chapter 1, there is much emphasis in the literature on the
importance of strategic integration for the harnessing, effectiveness and sus-
tainability of innovative approaches to HRM and industrial relations.
Notwithstanding the significance of this theme, little research has been done
on the mechanisms and dynamics through which strategic integration is
pursued, particularly in the context of voluntary partnership. In The Mutual
Gains Enterprise, Kochan and Osterman state that they know of ‘no studies
that systematically analyze the effects of integrating human resource consid-
erations into strategic managerial decision-making’. On this issue, as they
put it, the ‘rhetoric and aspirations of human resource executives and worker
representatives continue to be far ahead of organizational reality’ (1994:
74–5). Kochan’s subsequent study of the Saturn partnership (Rubinstein and
Kochan 2001) addresses the area to some degree, but still little is known
about the interface between partnership and commercial strategy, or of the
dynamics that arise at this critical interface.
The evolution of CP in Aer Rianta provides an opportunity to examine at
first hand the ways in which high-level decision-making may be linked with
a distinctive approach to industrial relations based on mutual gains prin-
ciples. The challenges and setbacks in the process of strategic integration
also emerge clearly, as do their implications for the design and management
of the partnership process.
As discussed in the last chapter, the Compact was predicated on the prin-
ciple that commercial decision-making would assign priority to service
quality rather than simply emphasizing cost. The implications of market
and regulatory trends for this posture are considered in this chapter. The
chapter begins by examining the concept of strategic integration. It then
considers the idea that mutual gains-type innovations and associated prac-
tices may generally depend on the development and sustainability of certain
types of competitive strategies. These themes provide the focus for the
chapter’s examination of the experience in Aer Rianta during the high tide
of partnership over the period from 1998–2000.
A variety of models and views of innovative human resource and indus-
trial relations practices emphasize that their effectiveness and sustainability
depends on the degree to which they have been integrated into strategic-
level decision-making in organizations (Wood and Albanese 1995; Huselid
et al. 1997; Roche 1999). In Kochan and Osterman’s influential ‘mutual
gains’ model, ‘an effective voice for human resources in strategy making and
governance’ is presented as a key ‘strategic-level requirement’ for mutual
gains industrial relations (Kochan and Osterman 1994: ch. 3).
The rationale behind these views is straightforward. If human resource
practices aimed at involvement, commitment and management–union co-
operation are to survive, operate effectively and be harnessed to competitive
objectives, these practices need to be taken into account in major strategic
decisions. The implications of strategic options for employment practices
and partnership arrangements can then be considered systematically. At the
same time, human resource strengths can point towards strategic opportun-
ities and influence the options decided upon (Dyer et al. 1985; Kochan and
Osterman 1994; Pfeffer 1994).
The wider HRM literature understands strategic integration in terms of a
series of features of overall corporate ‘architecture’ that incorporate the ways
in which human resource issues are aligned with competitive strategy
(Wood and Albanese 1995; Huselid et al. 1997). These include:
• the involvement of the HR department in the firm’s strategic planning
process;
• the existence of a clear strategic mission that is well understood and
communicated at every level throughout the firm;
• a high degree of alignment of business and HR strategies.
The HRM literature seldom considers the role of unions, or of joint
management–union partnership initiatives, in the context of strategic
integration. In part, this may reflect the paucity of exemplary cases of stra-
tegic joint decision-making in countries with a history of voluntary
partnership (see Kochan and Osterman 1994; Cutcher-Gershenfeld and
Verma 1994; Strauss 1998b; Verma and Chaykowski 1999). Where the
issue has been considered directly in the literature on mutual gains indus-
trial relations, the following channels or forms of strategic integration
have been identified:
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• board-level representation for key union advocates of partnership initi-
atives;
• works councils and consultative forums at enterprise and establishment
levels;
• executive directorships held by top-level human resource executives,
who then become the advocates for, and custodians of, human resource
and industrial relations innovations and the opportunities to which they
give rise;
• strategic-level joint forums, operating at the apex of partnership
arrangements;
• informal channels and mechanisms for ensuring that senior executives
and boards take account of and comply with the priorities and practices
agreed in joint forums (e.g. periodic review meetings between top man-
agement and key union officials, strong informal relationships and chan-
nels of communication between key animators of innovation and senior
management).
Kochan and Osterman, in particular, suggest that these alternative arrange-
ments for strategic integration could be equally effective in the context of a
mutual gains approach (Kochan and Osterman 1994: 55–8). At the same
time, the possibility should also be recognized that alternative channels could
give rise to tensions and impose strains on strategic integration. To the degree
that different channels are used to articulate different priorities, and reflect dif-
ferent vested interests at different levels, such an outcome is likely to result.
As outlined in Chapter 1, commentators are in agreement that competit-
ive strategies focused on ‘quality enhancement’, ‘differentiation’ or ‘innova-
tion’ are best supported by innovative HRM practices and mutual gains
industrial relations (Schuler and Jackson 1987; Arthur 1992; Kochan and
Osterman 1994: ch. 3). A stronger version of the same view is that high
commitment human resource practices and mutual gains industrial relations
may be prerequisites for competing effectively on the basis of quality, product
difference and innovation. Looked at in another way, the literature is clear
that these types of competitive strategies provide the most secure basis for
viable high-commitment human resource and industrial relations strategies.
Commentary is more divided on whether competitive strategies emphasiz-
ing cost minimization or cost containment can also be supported by high-
commitment human practices and mutual gains industrial relations (Walton
1985; Pfeffer 1994). Theory aside, research findings suggest that the adop-
tion of high-commitment and mutual gains practices may not commonly be
associated with any particular type of competitive posture, possibly because
no clear-cut competitive posture pivoting on the cost–quality axis has been
articulated (Locke et al. 1995; Wood and Albanese 1995; Cappelli 1999;
Guest et al. 2003). Other research suggests that the effectiveness of high-
commitment human resource strategies may not in practice be dependent on
the type of competitive strategy in being (Huselid 1995; Guest et al. 2003).
68 Partnership and commercial strategy
Kochan and Osterman (1994) provide the most direct treatment of what
they see as the necessary link between the type of competitive strategy being
pursued and the viability and effectiveness of mutual gains industrial rela-
tions. They are quite categoric on the question of the strategic underpin-
nings of mutual gains practices (1994: 55):
It is essential that the firm not depend solely on low costs, especially on
low wages, salaries and benefit levels, but rather on such sources of
competitive advantage as affordable quality, innovation, flexibility,
speed and customer service.
The rationale behind this view is again straightforward. High employee
commitment is seen to be impossible to sustain over time unless a company
has adopted a competitive strategy that actively requires the commitment,
loyalty and motivation of employees to succeed (Kochan and Osterman
1994: 56).
To the degree that a competitive strategy is built to a considerable extent
around the guiding principle of service quality, as is the case in Aer Rianta,
questions remain, however, regarding the viability of mutual gains indus-
trial relations. As is well understood, the development and implementation
of commercial strategy are complex, open-ended and iterative processes (see
Purcell 1999). Ambiguities and differences of view regarding the implica-
tions of strategic objectives for employment practices can still occur and
give rise to difficulties at an operational and even strategic level. An inter-
national review of changing industrial relations and human resource prac-
tices found that firms commonly pursue competitive strategies combining
aspects of quality enhancement and cost containment. This occurs in spite of
injunctions in the normative strategy literature about the perils of being
‘stuck in the middle’ between strategic poles rather than accepting the
rigours associated with either posture (Locke et al. 1995). The consequence
is that ‘hybrid’ human resource and industrial relations practices might
develop, combining elements of traditional ‘control’ and innovative commit-
ment or mutual gains models. In such situations competitive postures might
also oscillate between a primary focus on cost and on quality enhancement,
depending on immediate or short-term commercial pressures (Colling
1995). Oscillation of this type, perhaps dictated by attempts to deliver
quality within sustainable price or cost constraints, can obviously introduce
tensions into commitment and mutual gains-oriented employment
practices.
A related question that arises is whether, in an increasingly competitive
and deregulated market, a strategy focused on service quality may remain a
viable competitive option. British Airways (BA) provides a paradigm case of
a company that espoused service quality and high-commitment human
resource principles but was nevertheless pulled by competitive forces down a
road in which cost minimization became the dominant force driving the
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business. In the BA case, pressure on costs, pay and work practices became
so intense that they seriously damaged the human resource and industrial
relations strategies originally favoured by the company (Colling 1995).
These issues go to the heart of the link between partnership, strategy and
governance in firms. They will be considered in the remainder of this
chapter in the context of the evolution of the link between CP, strategy and
governance in Aer Rianta during the period 1998–2000.
Parallel processes: CP, corporate and business unit
decision-making
The Compact and Requisite Arrangements documents sought to institute a stra-
tegic-level partnership in the company, backed by participative arrange-
ments at multiple levels, and geared to a commercial posture best suited
both to reaping the potential benefits of mutual gains principles and, more
basically, to their preservation in a competitive environment. These docu-
ments provided then a basic constitution for CP in Aer Rianta. Apart from
setting down the procedural principle of joint decision-making at strategic
levels, the main CP documents also articulated a set of substantive para-
meters for commercial strategy. In ratifying the Compact as company policy,
Aer Rianta underscored the pursuit of a commercial posture oriented to
competing on the basis of skill and quality, rather than that of cost and
price, and geared to the preservation of good employment conditions and
employment security.
So from the beginning, CP set down the basic procedural and substantive
‘architecture’ for strategic integration. But the key CP documents were also
abstract and general and provided few details of the mechanisms through
which strategic integration would be achieved. Strategic-level decision-
making in Aer Rianta was soon to open out to hard choices that needed to
be made in the light of concrete pressures and opportunities in an increas-
ingly competitive and complex commercial environment. The remainder of
this chapter examines the manner in which partnership principles and
arrangements related to strategic decision-making, particularly as Aer
Rianta faced discontinuous commercial change in the period from
1998–2000.
For a good deal of the time from the inception of partnership until about
1998, CP and strategic decision-making activities can be viewed effectively
as parallel processes. Mainstream management processes carried on virtually
unchanged and the Compact represented in reality a form of ‘shadow’ or
‘would-be’ strategic decision-making. This was in part attributable to the
balance of opinion towards CP within senior management, to be explored in
detail in the next chapter. Most senior managers remained sceptical of CP.
While top-level management supported partnership, non-compliance with
the processes involved among sections of senior management was not sanc-
tioned. The Compact’s avoidance of tightly prescriptive participative
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machinery, like works councils or other consultative forums, backed by
detailed rules of operation and formulae for representation, meant that
staff and union engagement in strategic decision-making was far from
automatic. It also meant that senior management’s lack of engagement
with the Compact’s objectives did not surface immediately or directly in
clashes over the role, agendas and operation of participative forums. The
actual shape of the participative process was evolving in any event, as out-
lined in the previous chapter, reflecting the demands of staff and the pres-
sures facing different business units, leaving considerable latitude for
non-engagement or pseudo-engagement by mainstream decision-makers
grappling with strategic issues.
Some of those interviewed at senior management level felt that CP was
viewed at board level in the main as a sub-board issue – part of operational
industrial relations and human resource policy. There was seen to be a
basic convergence of views as between the commercial parameters set
down for competitive strategy in CP and the views of the board and top
management as to the proper commercial orientation for the company.
The balance of opinion among worker directors towards the Compact was
perceived to be negative by supporters of CP. Given this set of factors, the
board was unlikely to promote a tight integration of commercial decision-
making and Compact processes and practices within the company.
For some, the main impact of the Compact on the decision-making activ-
ity of senior managers was negative: preventing senior executives from
making decisions or pursuing options likely to stir controversy. Positive
engagement and a change in the modus of managers responsible for business
units or the entire company, towards more inclusive dialogue with staff and
unions, remained uncommon.
It was not uncommon for senior managers to view a range of Compact
forums as mere ‘talking shops’, with little real impact on their day-to-day
decisions and operations. As one manager put it, offering a generalized por-
trayal of CP, even as it had begun to engage critical issues like duty-free
sales and the future of Shannon Airport: ‘it’s seen as being a talking shop . . .
there’s that world and there is the world of business, and the view would be
that the two don’t overlap’. Another manager, reflecting on the conduct of
senior management decision-making at airport level, could see little evid-
ence either of real engagement:
I would say that the amount (sic) of times we’ve devoted items on the
agenda to the Compact . . . is certainly less than you could count on the
fingers of one hand in the last two to three years. That doesn’t mean that
they’re against it, or neutral to it. It doesn’t seem to get addressed
specifically by the airport senior group.
As one senior manager, who supported CP, put it, while reflecting on the
situation company-wide up to late 1997:
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there was a twin track thing. I think that we, sitting around at manage-
ment meetings . . . or preparing for board meetings, or actually sitting
through board meetings – that we would only have been aware of the
fact that the Compact is working ‘down there’. . . . So I think that at the
time . . . we hadn’t married the two together. It hadn’t happened.
This remained the case in spite of the fact that strategy was by this time
viewed as a very real and vital process in the company in the light of inter-
nationalization, deregulation of the airline industry and other significant
commercial changes. Major strategic issues were now routinely debated and
fought out at senior management level, and strategic planning was no longer
a periodic process of producing and revising formal plans and documents.
As airports and other business units continued to run largely along tradi-
tional lines, the major mechanism for promoting strategic integration at
business-unit and corporate level was provided by regular weekly meetings
of senior managers. At this forum, attempts to bring the Compact to bear on
decision-making took the form of advocacy by the main management cham-
pion of CP. Others, however, appear to have been reluctant to give much
attention to the case being argued:
We’d say . . . ‘there are more important things that I want to talk about
actually than that’. . . . So the Compact was a bit of a pain, if it came up,
because it was slowing down getting decisions and debate on what we
thought was a much more important issue, which might be safety on
the ramp, or it might be a better profit margin in the duty-free shops.
Even ‘supporters’ of the Compact saw the limitations of this form of advocacy
as a mechanism for bringing CP to bear on strategic decision-making:
[The CP advocate] would regularly say: ‘wait a minute! You guys can’t
be deciding these things anymore. There’s another whole process to
reach [decisions on] these things’. And then we’d kind of say: ‘yeah,
yeah, we know, we know, but just put that aside for the moment. We
really have to resolve this issue now and we’ve got to finish this argu-
ment’. So there was a twin-track, and at that point the tracks hadn’t
met.
Against such a background, CP had failed to impact on a range of areas of
strategic decision-making at the company, including the deployment of
physical assets:
Where we’re deciding to use land for public car parking as opposed to
warehousing and as opposed to apron development for aircraft parking.
Are those things the Compact should be involved in? . . . The ‘master
plan’ is another perfect example. We’re updating the master plan, which
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will drive the physical development of the airport for fifteen to twenty
years: a new runway; more passenger terminal developments; a second
passenger terminal. But there’s no Compact involved.
Management budgets were also seen to be determined in isolation from CP:
Does [a senior manager] worry about the participative process when he’s
doing up the budgets for the organization? . . . The last thing in the
world he probably wants is the participative group to come up and tell
him their view of what the budget should be.
Business-unit engagement of CP around strategic decision-making was also
to remain limited, with higher degrees of engagement in the case of the
Shannon maintenance review and the maintenance division of Dublin
Airport. As will be outlined below, it was primarily cross-company issues,
like the threat to duty-free sales and a government-initiated review of the
future of the company, that were to draw senior management at business-
unit level into more active engagement with CP.
The JUCG appeared largely powerless in the face of the prevalence of
traditional management decision-making channels. At business-unit level,
the JUCG sought to play a role as both umpire and guarantor of the Compact
process in circumstances where either managers or unions complained that
the process was being used incorrectly. Thus the JUCG sought to mediate in
a dispute over the application of CP principles to a review of cleaning opera-
tions in Dublin Airport and principals on both sides intervened in a review
of maintenance operations in Shannon amid claims that the parties involved
had not consistently engaged with the process.
Converging processes: CP and major corporate
challenges
Virtually all shades of management opinion towards CP acknowledge that
the Compact and strategic processes in Aer Rianta began to fuse around the
threat to duty-free sales, the change in the status of the company and the
company strategic review, initiated by the government in 1998. These issues
represented the most significant challenges in Aer Rianta’s history up to
that period.
The impending loss of duty-free sales in the summer of 1999 was handled
within the Compact by a strategy group. This comprised sub-groups drawn
from the commercial divisions at the three airports. The joint groups
involved developed a detailed analysis of the likely commercial outcome of
the loss of duty-free sales and identified a range of options for responding to
the new commercial circumstances. Senior managers felt that for the first
time the Compact was a major force and had fused with the formulation of
strategic options by the company.
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It’s absolutely integrated. Absolutely. . . . You’ve a lot of staff involved,
you have a lot of people working on it, and it has enormous implications
for the company. . . . There are certain things we will not be doing post
July 1st 1999, and what those things are is being addressed by the joint
working groups and the detailed line-by-line analysis which my people
could not possibly do without involving these people in a different way.
The way they’re doing it is much better than me going and asking them
questions and probing them.
Here senior management worked within the Compact review process, satisfied
to allow the review groups to play an active role in the process of commer-
cial adjustment.
I can see that 98 per cent of the decisions will be channelled through
[the airport-level duty-free significant issues group] and coming from
there. . . . Now, in fact, I won’t make decisions without at least discus-
sion with the group.
While the various groups did their work, the company and the union
group continued to lobby Brussels for the retention of duty-free sales, but
with little real expectation that the lobbying process would this time bear
fruit. Duty-free was abolished on sales of goods for passengers on flights
within the European Union on 1 July 1999. The loss of margin on what had
been a highly profitable business for Aer Rianta had significant implications
for the future finances and status of the company, as well as for work prac-
tices in airport retail shops as will be discussed below and in later chapters.
As government policy towards the semi-state sector evolved in favour of
external investment or privatization, the future status of Aer Rianta became
a live issue of public policy. Before the long-term future of the company
could be decided, it was necessary to change the status of Aer Rianta from a
public agency to that of a fully fledged commercial, semi-state company.
This involved amending the legislation under which the company had been
established. As important commercial and staff-related issues were involved,
and there was a perception that the change in status might be a prelude to
privatization, the JUCG established a significant issues group to consider
the change in status.
The group met and discussed the issues involved – some technical, such
as the profit implications of liability for the payment of rates on airport
facilities, dividend payments to the government and liability for corporation
tax. Preferred policy with respect to treatment of the company’s assets was
also covered, as were the implications of the company’s new status for the
staff pension scheme. The Change of Status SIG also considered the implica-
tions for the CP process of stipulations in the Amending Bill concerning
prohibition of unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Disap-
pointment was expressed at the failure of the Bill to make provision for an
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employee shareholding scheme. The view was also articulated that, whereas
ESOPs had recently been established to compensate staff in other semi-state
companies facing rationalization programmes, in the case of Aer Rianta
corporate change was being undertaken voluntarily by staff through CP. The
Change of Status SIG urged that the company should not be penalized for
its success by any future attempt to tie the offer of an ESOP to expected job
losses. The SIG also sought to have the chief executive made a member of
the company’s board. His exclusion from board membership was seen as not
‘entirely appropriate to a company which intends to make constructive par-
ticipation a significant feature of its strategy’.
The SIG prepared a joint ‘discussion paper’ on these and other issues.
Issues on which it had not proved possible to put forward a common view,
for example, the role of the government as both shareholder and regulator,
were also covered. The discussion paper was sent, in accordance with pro-
cedure, to the ‘sponsors’ of CP, including the minister. Simultaneously with
the deliberations of the Compact group, company senior management and the
Group of Unions also addressed these issues and along broadly consistent
lines.
A number of key issues broached by the Change of Status SIG arose
again, and very soon, when in the summer of 1998, the Minister for Public
Enterprise requested that the board of Aer Rianta should undertake a stra-
tegic review of the future of the company. The chief executive and board
chairman resolved that the review, formally the responsibility of the board,
should connect with the CP process. The brief of the Change of Status SIG
had been broadened in June 1998 to encompass company strategy in its
entirety, as provided for in the Compact. This group now became the main
vehicle through which the Compact process would contribute to the review of
Aer Rianta’s long-term strategy and future corporate status. To underscore
his commitment to a joint review of the future of Aer Rianta, the chief exec-
utive attended an early meeting of the group. At this meeting, he gave his
views on the options the company might face and invited views and com-
ments from the union, management and external members of the group.
The first meeting of the ‘Corporate Strategy’ SIG, held in the shadow of the
review, attracted probably the largest turnout of senior managers yet wit-
nessed at a CP initiative. At the meeting, the CEO indicated that, consistent
with CP philosophy, the financial consultant engaged by management and
the board to advise the company on the review had been briefed to treat all
‘stakeholders’ within the company as their ‘clients’, and not solely the board
and management.
The Corporate Strategy SIG set to work on its strategic review. The man-
agement participants included the chief executive and all senior managers at
airport and corporate levels. The union participants included the national
officials of all the major Aer Rianta unions, including IAESA, the chairman
of the Aer Rianta Group of Unions and SIPTU’s economic advisor. A
number of external experts with backgrounds in the airports industry,
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capital markets and financing and industrial relations also participated in
the work of the group. In all, six meetings were held, and a 20-page discus-
sion document was submitted to the ‘sponsors’ of constructive participation.
The group was concerned to emphasize that, while the ministerial review
had ‘given a sharper focus and added emphasis’ to its work, its establishment
and deliberations reflected the commitment in the Compact to extending par-
ticipation to corporate strategy. The discussion document sought to synthe-
size what was described as a ‘rich debate on the company’s future strategic
direction’ (Corporate Strategy SIG Discussion Document 1999: 4). In line with
the approach adopted under CP, members were not viewed as representa-
tives, but as contributors with distinct bodies of expertise. It was understood
that no party could be held accountable for their contribution to the discus-
sion. A series of papers by participants summarizing their views on the posi-
tions in the debate within the SIG were appended to the discussion
document, without attribution to any party. The discussion document was
explicit as to the group’s status under the principles of CP: seeing its role in
terms of identifying options but not binding any of the parties to a particu-
lar course of action:
The . . . discussion paper may also be useful in the formulation of a joint
strategy policy paper. However, the question of formulating a joint
strategy paper does not come within the remit of a ‘significant issues
group’. It is a separate matter and would require the specific agreement
of unions and management.
(Corporate Strategy SIG Discussion Document 1999: 4)
The discussion paper advocated that Aer Rianta should develop as an
Irish-owned multinational airport management company, with core
strengths in airport operations and retailing. Through CP, it aimed to
promote an approach to change that secured benefits and advances for all the
major stakeholders. Change that ‘advanced the cause of one stakeholder at
the expense of another’ was portrayed as ‘inevitably divisive and destructive’
(Corporate Strategy SIG Discussion Document 1999: 5). The document advoc-
ated the retention within the company of all three airports, reflecting exter-
nal debate that the three airports be set up as separate businesses to
engender competition. On this principle there was ‘joint consensus’ within
the group. The group also believed that the logic of promoting a two-
airports or two-terminals strategy at Dublin Airport, where a second airport
or terminal would be privately owned and operated, was flawed and failed to
comprehend the damaging consequences of such approaches in other airports
internationally. It was noted that airport charges in Aer Rianta were among
the lowest in the industry in Europe, and that whether this was sustainable
was a highly significant issue for the company’s future. The document sup-
ported the appointment of an independent regulator to regulate charges and
pricing. The report noted that it was necessary to depart from existing per-
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sonnel structures and work practices; to promote flatter company structures;
and to foster continuous learning and competency development. Such
‘organizational and personnel transformation and renewal’ was being con-
ducted with the commitment of management and unions under the prin-
ciples of ‘jointness and participation’.
The group believed that the issue of how the future growth of Aer Rianta
might be funded was a critical strategic issue. Of the various options avail-
able, some members of the group ‘strongly argued’ that the state should
fund further investment, and that this could be advocated on purely com-
mercial grounds. It was also recognized, however, that the state seemed
determined not to invest in Aer Rianta, consistent with its policy of with-
drawing from involvement in commercial semi-state activities to the great-
est possible extent. It was questioned whether, in the light of the state’s
poor track-record of investment in semi-state companies, it made sense to
leave Aer Rianta in full state ownership and thus vulnerable in the future to
‘policy shifts by different governments’. The option of expanding through
increased borrowings was currently hindered by a legislative cap on borrow-
ings. Irrespective of such a limit, reliance on borrowings posed the risk of
leaving the company vulnerable to future pressure to sell off assets. The
existing capital programme was also of such magnitude as to call such an
option into question. The option of an initial public offering (IPO), involv-
ing the offer of shares on the stock exchange was considered. Those on the
group advocating further state investment as a preferred option favoured an
IPO as a second choice, provided that certain conditions were met. The con-
ditions were that the state would maintain a majority shareholding in the
company; that a new set of rules for the commercial operation of the
company would be agreed by government; that the maximum shareholding
of any entity in the company, with the exception of employees, should not
exceed 5 per cent, and that an employee share ownership plan (ESOP)
should be agreed on acceptable terms prior to flotation. The document noted
that the Compact explicitly endorsed the principle of employee shareholding,
and that ESOP holdings of 5 per cent or more were now commonplace in
commercial semi-states that had undergone major programmes or changes
in ownership status.
The document agreed that the option of a strategic alliance held few
advantages, as the company’s need was for finance not expertise; Aer Rianta
was already internationally respected for its expertise in the industry. The
option of an asset sale was also seen to present little advantage and it was
agreed that the company should seek to retain all assets relevant to its core
business. The group did not address the future of the Great Southern Hotels,
noting that a review was also underway in that specific area. It noted that
there were, nevertheless, ‘strong views that hotel ownership was not part of
the core business of Aer Rianta’ (Corporate Strategy SIG Discussion Document
1999: 12). No support existed for a ‘trade sale’ in which the company would
simply be sold off to another company, probably the highest bidder. Such an
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option was seen as tantamount to a hostile take-over. The option of a
‘private/public partnership’ was also seen to carry little advantage, except
possibly in the context of other forms of funding.
The new centrality of CP strategic decision-making in Aer Rianta can be
attributed to a combination of a new chief executive’s active support for the
process and, critically, a disjuncture in the commercial situation of the
company towards the end of the 1990s. Aer Rianta had experienced a sharp
acceleration in the pace of commercial change from the 1980s into the
1990s, arising from the deregulation of the airline industry, pressure on
landing charges and discounting and sharply growing passenger numbers.
These changes, however, were largely accommodated within established
management structures, and were insufficient in themselves to propel CP
into mainstream management decision-making. The impending loss of
duty-free sales at a time when the company became liable for the payment of
corporation tax and rates, while at the same time facing the heavy borrowing
required to fund infrastructural expansion at the airports, confronted Aer
Rianta with quite unprecedented commercial challenges.
These challenges provided the catalyst for the ministerial decision to seek
a fundamental review of the company’s future. They also forced hard
decisions on Aer Rianta, with major implications for staff and trade unions.
Decisions of this order could only have been taken within traditional man-
agement and board channels with a major risk of industrial relations disloca-
tion. That similar decisions had given rise to serious industrial relations
turmoil in Aer Rianta’s near neighbours at Dublin Airport, Aer Lingus and
the aircraft maintenance company, TEAM, was not lost on senior manage-
ment. The existence of CP channels – albeit at that point faltering for lack
of senior management engagement – provided a means of broaching funda-
mental commercial decisions without provoking an acute industrial relations
crisis. At the same time, the commercial success and position of the
company allowed the parties the time and space in which to consider all
options available for responding to commercial challenges. Unlike Aer
Lingus, in which virtual bankruptcy provoked a sharp focus on cost cutting
and headcount reduction, and TEAM, where headcount reductions became a
prerequisite for attracting external investment, Aer Rianta’s underlying
performance was strong. The company enjoyed growing passenger numbers
and could envisage absorbing job losses from duty-free retailing through
redeployment of staff within the company.
The coupling of CP with the handling of the duty-free issue and,
simultaneously, with the conduct of the strategic review, breathed new life
into the Compact at a point when even its staunchest supporters began to fear
that it might be on the point of collapse.
The company is looking at change being forced on it through competi-
tion, deregulation, financial issues and wanting to grow itself. So the
Compact was suddenly seen in another light. It’s no longer just a big
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training, development and educational thing. It’s a vehicle through
which you try to become more competitive; try to become a more com-
petent organization; you try to become an organization with less layers
and [within which] communications flow a lot better.
Even sceptics, still harbouring considerable doubts regarding the effective-
ness of the process, felt that CP had become a more central force in company
activities. As one manager put it, ‘on a scale of one to ten in terms of its
impact, I’d say its hovering around the eight mark now and I’d say in the
last twelve months [1997–98] it’s moved from three or four to eight’.
The interface with management decision-making
If CP assumed more central importance in the context of the company’s
attempt to confront major commercial issues and decisions, it was also tested
by the closer alignment with strategic decision-making. Tensions became
apparent with respect to the carefully orchestrated separation of roles and
responsibilities envisaged in the Requisite Arrangements. First, some senior
managers believed that it was in practice difficult for them to step outside
their formal management roles when engaging staff and unions in joint
forums. The implications of options discussed, positions articulated and, as
they saw it, expectations created, for day-to-day operations and processes
were difficult not to bear in mind in Compact forums. In short, for some at
least, the avoidance of postures strongly conditioned by formal management
roles and accountabilities remained problematic even under the separation of
channels, roles and responsibilities envisaged in the operation of CP. Sup-
porters of CP tended to attribute this to reluctant engagement with partner-
ship, or to closed ‘mindsets’ in some circles. Other managers worried that
commercially sensitive market information made available under CP
processes would be particularly welcome to competitors and opponents of
Aer Rianta.
More important still, given the ambition of the Compact to transform
decision-making in Aer Rianta by infusing participation into strategy devel-
opment, the effective separation or uncoupling of strategy formulation from
gaining closure or agreement on strategy – the latter being regarded as the
business of management and the unions – created considerable uncertainty
among sections of senior management. What was uncertain above all in
their eyes was their capacity to act once issues had been addressed in stra-
tegic forums. An example was provided by the experience of one manage-
ment group at airport level in the aftermath of the work of the SIG dealing
with the imminent loss of duty-free sales:
The business unit was asked to respond and set up a small group to
prepare a response. . . . Our brief was literally to take the Compact report,
to embellish it in any way we felt relevant and to come back with a
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conclusion and recommendation in terms of a response. That is being
seen very negatively: ‘there’s the management again going off behind
closed doors, their own little cliques putting together a report and not
involving anybody’.
Even managers who were on the whole supportive of CP, questioned how
strategic decision-making was actually occurring, given the parallel channels
that now formally existed:
A very real fear that a lot of people would share [is] are we really driving
the strategy? Or is it outside consultants that drive it? Is it the board
that is really driving it? Or is it senior management that are really
driving it?
Authority and accountability were also seen as problems in the context 
of CP:
I’ve asked the question a number of times: ‘is it me [who is expected] to
drive this within my own department?’ And the answer is no, that it
should be a joint process and we have to go through that, and I under-
stand that. But at the end of the day then who is accountable for actu-
ally getting results? It’s one thing to produce papers and to have
discussion and to say that this is a joint approach. What you really need
is action.
The formal separation of roles and processes was also seen to lead to sharp
changes in postures across different forums within the company.
You can have unofficial conversations and official [conversations] within
the Compact; conversations where you talk about radical things. As soon
as it tends to become normal again it’s ‘oh hang on, this is an industrial
relations arena; it’s not a Compact arena’, and there’s shifting sands all
the time as to whether you’re in one mode or another.
The interface with collective bargaining
The formal separation of CP forums and collective bargaining was both a
reflection of the philosophy of partnership underlying CP and pragmatism
rooted in realpolitik. The methodology of joint discussion was intended to
allow for the identification and fact-based examination of options and the
acknowledgement of differences of views where these persisted following
joint discussion. There was no requirement that participants in review
groups reach a definitive joint position with clear and jointly agreed
implications for action. Reports produced by joint groups were conveyed via
the JUCG to the ‘sponsors’ of CP: the ICTU general secretary, who was
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regarded formally as the conduit to the Aer Rianta Group of Unions, the
CEO, regarded as the conduit to management and the board, and the Secret-
ary General of the Department of Public Service, the conduit to the minister
and government. The process allowed these parties to dissent from or
support the conclusions of joint reviews, as they saw fit.
This philosophy had important consequences. It led to intensive research
throughout the organization on perceptions of participation and views on
issues seen to warrant participation. It inclined the main champions of
partnership towards a highly non-prescriptive approach and made them
opposed to setting down fixed agendas for participation at any level. The
perspective championed by the major animators and supporters of CP also
predisposed them against the establishment under the Compact of councils or
structures with consultative or decision rights tightly defined, for example,
by issue, subject or representative constituency. Even active supporters of CP
in senior management were clear that they would not welcome the establish-
ment of works councils or similar mechanisms in Aer Rianta.
Pragmatism, however, had also influenced the ground-rules for CP. CP
could not conceivably have developed without assurances to the parties that
existing rights and arrangements, not least those established under collective
agreements, would be respected and preserved. Champions of CP felt that,
irrespective of the preferred methodology, it would have been inadvisable in
the early stages to encourage joint forums and groups to produce precise
proposals because, as one person put it, ‘if they were shot down, then every-
body would say: there, what did I tell you? This thing is only a sham’.
The formal separation between strategy formulation within the Compact and
pre-existing channels of management–union accommodation was also reflected
in the strategic review of Aer Rianta. The chairman and chief executive sought
to link the strategic review with CP through the work of the Corporate Strat-
egy SIG, and, as discussed, consultants were briefed that the company had
multiple stakeholders. Nevertheless the formal strategic review was managed
by a sub-committee of the board, working with senior management, assisted
by the consultants. This group worked independently of the Compact SIG,
though management members of each group overlapped, and did not meet
with the Compact group. The Compact SIG report was issued to the sponsors in
March 1999 and the Aer Rianta strategic review document was published the
following month. An unattributed paper appended to the discussion docu-
ment published by the Compact SIG, expressed the concerns of a member
arising from the formal separation of strategic reviews:
I would like to remind the Corporate Strategy Group that the minister
has not chosen to directly involve this Group in her review and it would
be useful and reassuring to know how the Corporate Strategy Group’s
deliberations will be reflected in the final document sent to the minister
by the board.
(Corporate Strategy SIG Submission on Company Review, n.d.)
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Notwithstanding the formal separation of strategic processes under the
review and attendant anxieties, there emerged in practice a high degree of
overlap or commonality in the positions reached under the parallel strategic
reviews, and in the resulting positions of management and unions as to the
issues at stake. The company review made explicit reference to the fact that
‘other stakeholders, under the Compact for Constructive Participation, have
evolved . . . conclusions [regarding the future of the company], which are
substantially in agreement with those of the board and management’ (Future
Strategic Direction: A Report to the Minister for Public Enterprise, April 1999: 7).
Like the Compact discussion paper, in which the IPO strategy was seen in
effect as the most beneficial practical option, the Aer Rianta review docu-
ment endorsed an IPO as the best way forward for the company. The desir-
ability of instituting an ESOP was accepted. Partnership was identified as
one of the ‘core values’ of the company, critical to the maintenance of its
competitive advantage in the future. While one clear strand of opinion in
the Compact review was that shareholding by any outside party should be
capped, this was not formally endorsed or proposed in the company review.
Here the issue was simply considered in respect of the impact it might have
on the valuation of the company for flotation (Future Strategic Direction: A
Report to the Minister for Public Enterprise, April 1999: Appendix, iv.).
Subsequent to receiving the Aer Rianta strategic review, the minister
appointed a further group of consultants to evaluate the report and consider
its recommendations on the wider canvas of other options that had been
mooted by third parties for the future of the airports. The ministerial review
involved contact with Aer Rianta management, but no contact with any
Compact forums, or with the unions. The report substantially endorsed Aer
Rianta’s proposed strategy, with its emphasis on the company remaining an
international airports group, with core competencies in airport operations
and retailing, and on raising the capital required to expand through an IPO
(Report to the Minister for Public Enterprise and the Minister for Finance: Review of
Strategic Options for the Future of Aer Rianta, December 1999).
Following the publication of the various review documents, the Aer
Rianta Group of Unions met to formulate its position on the future of Aer
Rianta. The union group favoured the option of further investment in the
company by the existing shareholder. It recognized that this was unlikely
to occur and, as such, concluded that an IPO provided the best fall-back
strategy for the company. The group favoured the capping of outside share-
holdings at 5 per cent and sought an ESOP. The unions had taken the dis-
cussion document produced by the Compact SIG and used it as a basis for
developing its policy, discussing the proposals with senior management in
the hope of gaining agreement on a common position (Report of senior
union official to Meeting of the Corporate Strategy Group, 25 February
2000).
Management, meanwhile, also sought to win support within the company
and in the department for the preferred options outlined in the strategic
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review, favouring an IPO floating a significant minority interest in Aer
Rianta. The Corporate Strategy Group was reconvened in early 2000 to con-
sider the situation that then existed and to advise on moving forward with
the IPO and other changes sought. By that time, the positions of the
internal stakeholders were close. Management, the board and the unions
agreed that the challenge was to retain control of the company and its strat-
egy, while obtaining the funds necessary to finance its capital programme
and medium-term plans for expansion. The parties’ views were also broadly
consistent on the need to cap shareholding and on the establishment of an
ESOP.
Manifestly, in the light of these developments, a considerable degree of
spillover had occurred between both the processes and strategic deliberations
of forums under the Compact and the formal positions and strategic decisions
adopted by the board, management and the unions. Though these processes
and strategic forums were separate under the Compact, mutual gains-type
principles influenced the approaches taken on both sides following delibera-
tions in Compact forums and facilitated speedy accommodation between
them. Discussions of strategic options in Compact forums had also shaped
decisions with respect to strategy and action in the case of both management
and unions. The observation of a key animator of the Compact that, as the
process became more sophisticated, management and unions might not have
to ‘operate in that mandate’ in traditional ways seemed to reflect the evolu-
tion of relations around the strategic review.
Confidence in the new centrality and effectiveness of CP fostered new
aspirations among key animators. The formal separation of CP and estab-
lished decision channels had been dictated in part by pragmatism, and prag-
matism also now prompted some to envisage radical changes in the basic
institutional architecture of the process. Supporters of the Compact began to
articulate a long-term perspective in which the processes inherent in CP
might subsume formal deliberations between the agents of the ‘sponsors’: ‘I
think that you make it more and more sophisticated so that people who are
management [or] union are actually not required to operate in that mandate
a lot’.
The Compact process even began to be seen as a prelude to the emergence
of a form of organization in which co-operative joint decision-making would
become the very fabric of management–staff interaction at strategic and
operational levels, facilitated by a flatter structure, team-based working and
genuine staff empowerment at all levels. Such a vision remained highly
abstract, however, and had not emerged or been articulated through the CP
process itself, except briefly in the discussion document of the Corporate
Strategy SIG.
Duty-free sales for intra-European passengers ceased at the end of June
1999. The main animators of the Compact and Compact facilitators on the
ground then sought to ensure that the process of adjusting to the new situ-
ation in the shops would be informed by both CP principles and the
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substantive options outlined in the reports of the strategic issues groups. In
a tense and uncertain situation, they now feared that management might
seek to act unilaterally at the same time as the main union involved 
might seek assurances on behalf of its members. Such traditional postures
might interact to engender crisis and bring to the fore actors either opposed
to the Compact, or poorly conversant with the principles involved. It was, as
one key animator put it, a case of the ‘old culture . . . always trying to take
over’. Reflecting on the situation immediately after the disappearance of
duty-free sales, a Compact supporter pointed to the potential for crisis:
This is the dangerous thing. This is a particularly dangerous point
because if [people on the union side] who haven’t been involved meet [a
manager] who is not involved at all, they would agree that ‘this is our
agenda now, crisis, staff being let go’, and they would just have their
blinkers on.
Another key animator of CP saw a need for a fundamental reassessment of
the ground-rules of constructive participation. In this climate the approach
taking shape in the minds of champions of CP involved achieving closure on
issues in Compact joint forums, precluding the need for issues handled in
such forums to be referred back to established channels of management–
union engagement for final decision or accommodation. Ideas began to
develop on changes that would involve ending the separation of processes,
roles and structures as between joint decision-making and established indus-
trial relations channels, as enshrined under the Compact. A single channel for
joint decision-making was envisaged, based on ‘mutual gains bargaining’,
backed by an internal arbitration process incorporating alternative dispute
resolution principles. Compact supporters began to examine examples of
arrangements of this kind outside Aer Rianta.
Strains between the Compact and established industrial relations channels
also emerged following the completion of the strategic reviews. Although
the strategic review SIG, the board, management and the Aer Rianta Group
of Unions all endorsed a future strategic direction involving the flotation of
part of the company through an IPO, worker directors now came out
strongly against this position, denouncing these plans as a form of privatiza-
tion. The Aer Rianta Group of Unions sought to respond by pressing worker
directors to accept the policies articulated by the group. These tensions and
their effects will be examined in detail in Chapter 10.
The sustainability of competitive priorities and Compact
assurances
The strategic reviews and their implications for the future ownership status
and commercial strategy of Aer Rianta also throw into sharp relief the issue
of the sustainability of the competitive posture underpinning both the
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Compact processes and its associated assurances on pay and conditions of
employment. Two intertwined sets of issues arose here. The first was the sus-
tainability in the light of market trends of the upstream or quality-focused
commercial posture informing Aer Rianta’s support for CP. The second con-
cerned the implications of possible changes in corporate governance and
associated changes in the regulatory environment of the company for the
processes and assurances involved in CP.
Concurrent with the conduct of the strategic reviews of the company’s
future, senior management held differing views of the implications of
market trends for a quality-focused competitive posture. The dominant view
was that Aer Rianta could continue to pursue a strategy in the home airports
wherein the quality of the service provided to airport customers would
remain a major consideration. The implication was that the skill, commit-
ment, flexibility and attitudes of the staff would remain an important com-
mercial asset. A senior executive articulated his position with regard to both
domestic and international airport businesses:
I always felt that there wasn’t any other intelligent way for us to proceed
except that basis [i.e. the Compact’s commercial parameters] because I never
felt that we could compete internationally through using a low-cost strat-
egy. I just didn’t think that was a runner. I didn’t think that we would be
able to win anything on that basis; that we could only win internationally
on the basis of quality, on being what we are and adding unique flavours.
We’re not big enough and we have no tradition of working as a low-cost
supplier of services. And if you were to try to become a low-cost supplier of
services it would mean such a dismantling of everything that you’ve ever
been that you would lose your whole brand by doing it.
Other executives were equally determined that Aer Rianta would continue
to compete on the basis of high quality rather than seeking to emulate what
was described as the ‘Ryanair model’: ‘follow the Ryanair model, as one
executive put it, and you’ll drag the whole airport down as well’. With the
exception of continuous criticism of Aer Rianta’s landing charges by Ryanair
and to a lesser degree Aer Lingus, most criticism of the service was seen to
have focused on quality issues and facilities rather than on cost. As a number
of managers saw it, Aer Rianta’s costs were well in line with other operators;
productivity had risen very sharply as a result of high passenger growth
combined with only modest employment growth; the market was set to con-
tinue growing significantly and a range of new facilities was set to come on
stream in Dublin and the other airports. The employment effects of the loss
of duty-free sales could, as they saw it, largely be neutralized in such a
context through staff redeployment. The Compact assurance of employment
security to permanent retailing staff had been respected, and, less than one
year on from the loss of duty-free sales, the overall level of employment in
Aer Rianta was higher than in June 1999.
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Dublin and the other domestic Aer Rianta locations had one airport only
and, unlike many airports in Europe and the US, they did not have to
contend with direct competition from neighbouring low-cost airports. They
also appeared unlikely to face such competition in the future. Low-cost, no-
frills operators might be accommodated in suitable facilities, without the
entire service getting ‘dragged down to its absolute base minimum’.
‘Network carriers’, prioritizing customer service, would remain a major cus-
tomer of all airports. In such a context, intensifying competition between
airlines and between airports would not translate into irresistible pressure on
costs, necessitating a major commercial repositioning away from quality and
service towards cost, and requiring the abandonment of Compact assurances
on pay, skill development and employment security.
Other managers, however, interpreted medium-term to long-term market
trends in a different way.
The industry, as I understand it, has very little tradition of people sur-
viving for long on a quality basis. . . . We would have had first-hand
knowledge here that as soon as somebody comes along with a low price
– a lower price in this environment – people will flock to it absolutely
and there’ll be little loyalty to higher service, or, as they call it, a full-
service airline.
In this scenario, the posture towards Aer Rianta of low-fare operators like
Ryanair represented the thin end of a wedge that might be expected, on
certain assumptions, to corrode service quality priorities from the competit-
ive mix of the company. Ryanair had sought a cheap, ‘no-frills’ terminal
facility (‘a shed’, as one executive described it) at Dublin Airport. Aer Rianta
responded by providing a cost-differentiated service in Pier A, with further
capacity of this type in the pipeline. In the event of a downturn in the avia-
tion industry, one senior executive believed that all carriers would seek to
use such low-cost facilities. The possible advent of a privately run terminal
would add further pressure to costs and prioritize ‘operational flexibility’
over the human resource attributes underpinning the Compact. Other execu-
tives approached the competitive sustainability of Compact commercial para-
meters on the basis of the circumstances of the different airports. If the
assumptions underpinning the Compact might be viable for Dublin Airport,
other airports were seen to require a level of numerical flexibility inconsis-
tent with the Compact to allow them to respond to highly seasonal traffic
patterns. Higher levels of contract employment, and more scope to match
staffing levels to business volume, were seen to be the main competitive
imperatives here, and were seen to go directly against the grain of the
Compact. At its most radical, this airport-level scenario pointed to the possi-
bility of ‘three or four different types of operation’ within the company.
It was equally, clear, however, that alternative competitive scenarios also
depended on assumptions regarding the future of the company and regula-
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tion of competition in the sector within Ireland. Thus the sustainability of
the Compact’s commercial parameters depended also on issues of ownership,
corporate governance and regulation. These issues were central to the various
strategic reviews, but they also opened out into public policy and politics
beyond the direct reach of the parties to CP.
While management and unions in Aer Rianta were clear that their pre-
ferred competitive posture was predicated on an appropriate form of corpor-
ate governance, they were also well aware that the future of the company had
become subject to intensive lobbying. Aer Rianta was seen as a gilt-edge
acquisition or investment, and various interests lobbied in favour of different
options. These were seen to include wholesale privatization and the break-up
of the company through selling off each of the airports separately. For some
time, lobbying had also been underway to permit the building of a privately
financed terminal at Dublin Airport and the development of a passenger
airline capacity at the existing military airport at Baldonnel. While all the
strategic reviews reported unfavourably on most of these options, politics
would determine the ultimate fate of the company.
The establishment of an independent aviation regulator, viewed in all the
reviews as a precondition for change in the status of the company, also posed
challenges to Aer Rianta’s commercial strategy and associated Compact assur-
ances. The reviews dealing with the nature and structure of regulation
advocated a method of regulation known as ‘price cap’ or ‘RPI plus or minus
X’. In the report for the government, the consultants elaborated this prin-
ciple further and advocated so-called ‘single till, price cap regulation’. This
type of regulation involved fixing increases in airport charges across all oper-
ational areas, aeronautical and non-aeronautical, on the principle of allowing
for increases in the retail price index minus (or plus) a so-called ‘X factor’
designed to promote improvements in efficiency and productivity on an on-
going basis. The calculation and evolution of the ‘X factor’ could, of course,
take into account the service quality objectives of the company, ensuring
that service standards were not driven below the requisite quality levels in
pursuit of crude efficiency improvements. In this way, external regulation
could operate in a manner that was compatible with the priorities assigned
to quality and service in the company’s commercial strategy and the
Compact, and could even conceivably drive those priorities and associated
working practices in a positive way.
At the same time, the advent of regulation manifestly reduced the scope
of the company to position and price its services in accordance with its own
conception of quality and service. These service attributes and their relation-
ship to price and charges in the product mix now become subject to media-
tion and negotiation with an independent regulator. In consequence, a
regulator would have to be convinced that the commercial parameters
underpinning the Compact, as well as the work practices and organizational
principles it enshrined, were consistent with meeting competitive prin-
ciples, and did not entail prices out of line with economic cost. Again this
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was new territory with respect to the link between company strategy,
Compact assurances and modes of working favoured by CP.
Conclusion
CP provides an opportunity to examine in depth the links between strategy,
governance and partnership. CP formally encompassed staff and union
involvement in strategic decision-making in business units and at corporate
level. The Compact also set down clear parameters for commercial decision-
making: Aer Rianta was enjoined to compete on the basis of service quality
and the skills of its workforce and not to promote business options that
entailed lower pay and poor working conditions. This commercial strategy
appeared both viable to the parties and consistent with the Compact; short-
term cost or market pressures posed few problems for longer-term commer-
cial priorities, and none of the challenges that arose appeared to warrant a
shift in strategic priorities.
Formal arrangements for integrating partnership with strategic decision-
making appeared strong. The board had endorsed CP; champions of CP
could be found among senior managers and the CEO supported the
approach. The board included three worker directors. The shareholder or
minister responsible for Aer Rianta and the parent department were sup-
portive of partnership. Great effort was devoted to establishing and facilitat-
ing a range of structures to integrate CP and strategic decision-making at
department and business-unit levels.
But the formal position disguises the complex and variable processes that
determined the degree to which partnership meshed with strategic decision-
making in Aer Rianta. In general it can be said that Compact processes and
actual management decision-making processes focused around strategic
issues occupied parallel channels until the late 1990s. Senior managers had
failed to engage Compact processes to any significant degree at business-unit
level or cross-company level. Advocacy by supporters of constructive partici-
pation was of very limited effectiveness, even though they had the ear of top
management. The JUCG’s main brief was to orchestrate the variety of
Compact structures and initiatives underway, but it also intervened in cir-
cumstances where it believed the Compact was under threat or was being
inappropriately applied.
While the board had endorsed the Compact, it had done so in the spirit of
regarding the approach involved as a positive approach to industrial rela-
tions: as an essentially sub-board concern. The board’s awareness of the com-
mercial parameters set down in the Compact was of a general character.
Compact processes and commercial principles can thus be viewed as having
been ‘loosely coupled’ with board-level strategic decision-making. The
board understood that an affinity existed between Compact objectives and 
the commercial traditions of the company. The chief executive supported
the Compact, as did the minister who had made appointments to the board.
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This did not, however, amount to Compact objectives guiding commercial
decision-making at the top in any active or vigorous manner, or involve an
active concern to assess strategic options open to the company in the context
of Compact processes and assurances. The worker directors on the board were
seen by champions of CP, if not by themselves, in the main as opponents of
CP.
Parallel strategic and CP decision processes changed when a new CEO
was appointed and largely incremental commercial change gave way to
change of a disjunctive nature in 1998–99. These two developments inter-
acted. The new chief executive was faced with the handling of major and
potentially contentious issues and he had to handle them quickly. He opted
to link the company’s response with the Compact, and tied senior manage-
ment into more active engagement with CP on these issues. The duty-free
problem and the strategic review breathed new life into constructive partici-
pation and led to a convergence between strategic decision-making and
Compact structures and processes. The state facilitated strategic integration
by favouring the involvement of the partnership initiative in the strategic
review of Aer Rianta’s future.
Though still formally separate, management’s strategic decision processes
and Compact strategic forums were now in reality fused in important ways,
and evolved a largely common response to major strategic challenges. More-
over, now the process of engagement between CP and strategic decision-
making actually went further than formally allowed for in the Compact and
Requisite Arrangements. Two distinct ‘spillover’ effects could be identified.
First, the open, fact-based and constructive process of joint dialogue under-
pinning the work of Compact forums spread to dealings between manage-
ment and the trade union group in collective bargaining, as attempts were
made to find common ground based on the work of the SIG involved in the
strategic review. Second, Compact forums were expected only to identify and
review strategic options, leaving the board, management and unions free to
make whatever decisions they deemed necessary. Under the strategic-review
process, however, these lines of ‘demarcation’ became blurred. The formula-
tion and adoption of strategy encompassed formal management structures
and Compact structures in a kind of seamless web of dialogue based on over-
lapping membership and shared concerns.
As strategic engagement based on partnership emerged in earnest, ques-
tions also arose about the formal modalities for strategic-level decision-
making as set down in the Compact. Supporters of CP saw how Compact
processes might, at it appeared to them, productively displace adversarial
industrial relations. The question for them then became whether CP could
take over important functions and areas originally intended to remain
within the sphere of established industrial relations channels. If extending
the frontier of participation now became an option in their eyes, the risks
inherent in the existing formal separation of the processes also became
clearer. Paramount in their eyes was the danger that adversarial industrial
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relations postures might become amplified in the process of adjusting to the
loss of duty-free sales. A new and even more radical vision of partnership
that would require fundamental changes to the architecture of CP began to
form in their minds.
Few in the company believed that market trends alone would force Aer
Rianta to reposition downstream, prioritizing cost over service and quality
and thereby rendering the Compact unsustainable and possibly redundant.
But market forces alone would not determine the continued viability of CP,
or even the continued existence of the company. Under the aegis of CP, the
board, management and the unions had worked out a common vision of the
company’s future. This was to be secured through the flotation of a sizeable
minority holding through an IPO, share-capping and the creation of an
ESOP.
In short, Aer Rianta and its unions proposed to move forward through an
agreed change in the ‘organization’s boundaries’ which could preserve the
key priorities of commercial strategy and retain partnership. Whether this
might be realized, however, was beyond the powers of the company or its
unions to determine and dependent ultimately on the posture of govern-
ment. For now the political climate was positive. There appeared to be little
prospect that political considerations might result in the derailment of the
new corporate and organizational form jointly endorsed by the company and
its unions; less still that the state might seek fundamentally to redraw the
organizational boundaries of the company without reference to the board,
management or unions. The appointment of an aviation regulator meant
that in future Aer Rianta would need to negotiate key parameters of the
company’s commercial strategy with a powerful and independent external
agent. In this process, quality and service standards were likely to be more
highly formalized, and their cost and price implications would come under
closer scrutiny. This opened up uncharted ground for the Compact.
Even at the high tide of partnership in Aer Rianta, some perceptions and
some developments struck an ominous note. Champions of CP had formed
the view that, if partnership was to be preserved, it had to be extended into
operational aspects of industrial relations, so as to preclude the emergence of
adversarial industrial relations postures in the immediate aftermath of the
abolition of duty-free sales. As will be seen in Chapter 10, fears of the emer-
gence or re-emergence of adversarialism proved to be prescient, if not per-
ceptions as to the likely dynamic through which adversarial postures might
develop. The joint agreement on the partial privatization of the company
soon provoked opposition from worker directors. Finally, although the
government for now appeared to favour the parties’ own blueprint for
redrawing organizational boundaries and changing corporate governance
arrangements in ways that preserved and even strengthened partnership,
very soon politics and partnership were to become disaligned, as first stale-
mate developed over the future of Aer Rianta and then proposals emerged
for the break-up of the company.
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5 Senior managers
This chapter examines the attitudes of senior managers to CP and considers
in more depth their role in the evolution and operation of partnership in Aer
Rianta up to the high tide of partnership in 2000. Senior management, in
the sense understood here, comprises executives at company level, general
managers at airport level and executives in charge of line and staff divisions
at company and airport levels, including duty-free retailing, cleaning, per-
sonnel and planning, among other functions. Also included are top-level
managers and the senior executives centrally involved in the genesis and
management of the constructive participation initiative.
The discussion focuses on the influence of corporate values on manage-
ment postures, as well as on the priority accorded to partnership by the
company’s board. The effects on senior management postures of support pro-
vided for partnership during the high tide by the shareholder and senior
civil servants is also examined. The chapter also considers differences in pos-
tures towards partnership within the senior management group. The advan-
tages and disadvantages inherent in the process from their vantage point are
explored, as are the dynamics surrounding top management succession at a
time when partnership was in peril of coming unstuck in the face of wide-
spread management scepticism and indifference.
Corporate values
US studies in particular have stressed the role of corporate values, ethos or
culture in sustaining innovations in human resource management and
industrial relations. Reflecting a wider literature on variations between com-
panies in corporate values and their human resource effects, Osterman
(1994) shows that companies committed to ‘helping to increase the well-
being of employees with respect to their persons or family situations’ are
more likely to have adopted innovative forms of work organization. The role
of ‘humanistic values’ in the choice companies make between alternative
employment systems is also addressed by Kochan and Osterman (1994). As
firms facing similar market conditions enjoy some latitude regarding their
choice of employment practices, corporate values may be significant in
shaping the choices made (Kochan and Osterman 1994: 97–8). Corporate
values commonly reflect the original vision and priorities of company
founders, and may also obviously reflect national institutional traditions
(Kochan and Osterman 1994; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990).
In the UK, the role of ‘paternalist’ corporate values has been examined in
the context of the employment practices of companies, such as M&S, commit-
ted to co-operative employment relations (Turnbull and Wass 1998). Here it
has been argued, however, that the ‘sophisticated human relations’ underpin-
ning M&S employment practices had eroded in the face of intensified competi-
tion and no longer provided ‘signposts for management action’ (Turnbull and
Wass 1998: 108). As outlined in Chapter 1, Guest and Peccei’s (1998; 2001)
studies of ‘partnership companies’ in the UK also found that a broadly
common set of values or principles underpinned partnership practices. The
EPOC study of innovative forms of work organization in enterprises in Europe
also established a link between the incidence of direct involvement practices
and management values. Here it was found that the most commonly reported
motive for introducing forms of direct involvement was the belief that
employees could capably and substantively contribute to the improvement of
organizational performance through their input (EPOC 1997).
In a public-sector context, the ethos of senior managers is likely to be
influenced by the posture of the shareholder and senior civil servants.
Although senior executives within state companies and their boards of man-
agement enjoy considerable discretion with respect to both strategic and
operational aspects of decision-making, senior civil servants and their minis-
ters also play an important role, and, in some degree at least, can be con-
sidered part of the management system. The minister is the shareholder, and
senior civil servants are the agents of the shareholder. The posture of the
minister and civil servants towards both competitive strategy and employ-
ment practices thus becomes another parameter bearing on decision-making
at senior executive levels within state companies. Taking account of the
positions of ministers and senior civil servants is important not only because
these parties are capable of directly influencing company plans and opera-
tions. It is also important because of the well-documented tendency in state
companies for management and unions to seek to build support for their
positions and actions, or to block plans and actions by the other side,
through direct and indirect dealings with civil servants and politicians
(Ferner 1988; Hastings 1994; 2003). This means that strategy is made or
unmade in public companies through both senior executive decisions and
those of boards of directors as well as through complex political brokerage
activity above the level of the company. What the minister, departmental
secretary general, assistant secretary and other senior public servants wish to
achieve, and more particularly how they wish their objectives to be achieved,
thus becomes another major force bearing on levels of senior management
support for such practices and the sustainability of innovative employment
and industrial relations practices.
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Senior line managers and innovation
Senior line managers assume particular importance in the literature on
human resource management innovation. One of the defining features of
contemporary human resource management, it is often argued, is the degree
to which line managers are the key drivers and sponsors of human resource
and industrial relations practices. No longer do personnel departments
follow their own agendas regarding the best or most effective means to shape
or implement employment practices. Their more appropriate role, according
to current ideas of best practice, is to act as technical specialists, conversant
with commercial pressures and their implication, with the capability to act
as ‘internal consultants’ to line managers. The latter must be viewed cate-
gorically as the key human resource managers, at all levels, from general and
senior line management to first-line supervisory management (Guest 1987;
Storey 1992: ch. 2). One of the key factors influencing such new normative
thinking on the appropriate roles and relationships between personnel and
line managers is the observation that it has frequently been line managers
who have driven major initiatives in change and restructuring in their
attempt better to align employment practices with commercial pressures
and opportunities (Storey 1992). As Storey (1992: 194) has suggested: ‘Line
managers have come to the fore in this regard not only as the crucial delivery
mechanism for new approaches in employee relations . . . but, more
assertively, as themselves the designers and drivers of the new ways’.
Storey’s (1992: 194) evidence from major UK companies that personnel
managers were not infrequently ‘foot-draggers rather than . . . active change
agents’, is consistent with US evidence that line managers commonly cham-
pioned change and innovation in response to commercial pressures, while
industrial relations and human resource specialists were slow to change
(Kochan et al. 1986).
Overlapping the literature on line managers as primary drivers of trans-
formation in employment practices, is the literature considered earlier on
the external drivers of partnership. Both of the main perspectives identified
on the origins of partnership arrangements, in common with the literature
on line managers as agents of change, emphasize the role of intensified
competition and attendant commercial pressures and setbacks on the adop-
tion of human resource and industrial relations innovation. In the change
model at the core of HRM and theories of industrial relations trans-
formation, external commercial drivers provoke senior line managers into
radical and innovative responses, which involve a realignment of roles
between line and personnel management with respect to leadership and
‘ownership’ concerning human resource and industrial relations policies. The
resulting new centrality of employment practices to senior line managers’




One of the stock themes, indeed almost clichés, of the literatures on indus-
trial relations and human resource management innovation, is the degree to
which significant and lasting change is predicated on senior management
support for change programmes. Without support from the top, ultimately
from the chief executive, it is commonly argued, change programmes are
unlikely to build up sufficient momentum to overcome inertia and vested
interests, or to ride out setbacks (Kochan and Osterman 1994: 55–8). The
more radical the change programme, the greater the degree to which it
threatens the status quo and, commensurately, the more urgent the need for
support from the top of the organization. Normative change models gener-
ally assign primacy to top-level executives in articulating and communicat-
ing the vision underpinning innovation. Senior executives also send ‘signals’
to managers at lower levels regarding the kinds of priorities and behaviours
favoured by the organization, and ultimately hold the power to reward and
sanction executives in relation to those priorities. Given the importance of
senior management support for innovation and mutual gains industrial rela-
tions, the issue of succession at the top becomes a critical one for sustaining
innovation once it has begun. It is critical not least because some of the
benefits expected to accrue from change are likely to become evident only
over the long term. The handling of the succession issue involves both perils
for existing innovations and an opportunity to underscore them through the
appointment to senior management positions of executives sympathetic to
the aims and methods involved.
Each of these themes is examined in the rest of the chapter, drawing on
intensive interviews with senior managers conducted during the high tide of
partnership, as well as on documentary data. A final section draws the
themes together to consider their combined import for the development and
impact of CP in Aer Rianta.
Corporate values and senior managers in Aer Rianta
As a semi-state company with a record of progressive personnel policy, and
with government as the shareholder, corporate values and corporate gover-
nance might be expected to be favourable for the development of partner-
ship. Aer Rianta had a history of progressive personnel policy in such areas
as job-sharing, child-care, consultative arrangements, gain-sharing and
organizational development. These developments reflected an underlying
ethos in many ways typical of a long-running tradition in Irish commercial
semi-state companies prior to EU-instigated deregulation. A senior person-
nel practitioner characterized the ethos as that of a ‘caring, sharing . . . pater-
nalistic company’. For senior executives in general, the emergence of the
Compact reflected such a long-running strand in the company’s approach to
dealing with staff issues.
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A number of key senior executives had worked in the personnel depart-
ment during their careers in Aer Rianta, including the two chief executives
in office during the CP initiative and the main champion of the Compact
among senior management.
Given the underlying ethos towards staff issues and the prominence at
senior management level of executives who had worked in personnel, it is
hardly surprising that, as one executive put it, ‘human resources always
figured prominently in a positive way’ in the affairs of the company. Sections
within senior line management, however, also criticized these values for
being ‘soft’ and contrasted Aer Rianta’s ethos with what they understood to
be the hard-nosed commercial values that had animated successful Irish
companies. In the eyes of one senior executive, there had always been a
‘struggle in Aer Rianta’ between executives espousing alternative value
systems. Executives who had worked in personnel were likely to champion
the idea of achieving commercial success through commitment by people
over those favouring ‘kicking ass’ and managing on the basis of a ‘good hard
dose of reality’.
While the Compact thus drew on pre-existing values favouring concern for
staff, good pay and conditions and positive industrial relations, the limits
imposed on innovation by a traditional paternalist ethos and the company’s
largely orthodox approach to personnel management also bear emphasis.
Though, by definition, paternalism embraces or entails people-centred
values, its conception of the role of personnel concerns in commercial success
is qualitatively different to that underpinning value systems associated with
radical innovations in employment practices and radically changed modes of
decision-making of the type entailed by the Compact. The more conservative
or constraining aspects of the traditional approach to personnel management
in Aer Rianta emerges, in particular, in three interrelated aspects of the
company’s operations: the virtual monopoly of authority and expertise in
people management long enjoyed by the personnel department; the sub-
sidiary role of human resources in line management; and the posture of the
board towards personnel issues. The Compact challenged all of these aspects
of the traditional approach to personnel management in Aer Rianta. The
effect on CP of the traditional personnel ethos and approach and that of the
subsidiary role of HRM in line management will be considered in the next
section. The section after this will consider the ethos and posture of the
board towards personnel issues and their effects on CP.
The postures of personnel and line management
One clear indicator of the organizational stature of the personnel depart-
ment, as described above, was the success of former members in gaining
senior line and general management positions in Aer Rianta. In the day-to-
day operations of Aer Rianta, personnel enjoyed a high degree of control
over the determination of pay, employment conditions and working
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practices. One senior executive was emphatic that in the past the ‘personnel
department ran Aer Rianta’:
I remember as a young fellow [in the personnel department] going to
meetings with what would have been senior middle-aged managers, and
really I’d be calling the shots and they’d be only too glad to allow that
to happen; to the extent that I’d say to myself if I ever move into a line
job, I won’t let one of those [expletive] from industrial relations near
me.
In the 1970s, in particular, when industrial relations activity was intense in
Aer Rianta as in semi-state companies generally, a line manager ‘only at his
peril dealt with personnel issues’. During the 1980s the company engaged
in a programme of decentralizing management systems in general. Major
business units like the three airports could now develop their own specialist
management functions, including personnel. While devolution was sup-
ported by the corporate-level personnel function, and envisaged personnel
specialists acting in support of line and general management, in practice
things changed only to a limited or variable extent. In one airport, as a
senior manager put it, the ‘practice was to let the personnel manager get the
heart attack’.
Notwithstanding the sequence of organizational development (OD) initi-
atives in which the personnel department had engaged, the fulcrum of per-
sonnel philosophy and activity involved the handling of industrial relations
claims and the regulation of terms and conditions of employment. A senior
executive pointed towards the degree to which OD-type initiatives were
marginalized in the operation of the function.
An OD unit was founded, and we did, I thought, very good work. But
when I left and went back to a line department . . . and came back the
next time I found that the OD unit was gone. It had turned into a job
evaluation unit, and there was nothing but the old IR job evaluation –
‘recruit them, retire them, and in the middle wring what you can out of
them’ sort of things.
Against such a background, it was hardly surprising that the Compact
originated outside the personnel department. The department in its turn,
while formally supportive of CP, remained cautious about the development
of the process. Champions of the process too remained cautious about the
perils of allowing the process to be subsumed to the prevailing approach to
personnel and industrial relations management. One consequence of this was
a separation of the Compact and the personnel function. Personnel specialists
joined the JUCG and participated in a series of Compact groups and initi-
atives. The prevailing approach to good practice in the wider profession now
also converged to some degree at least on the principles informing CP.
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However, in the eyes of champions of CP, the outlook of the department
remained distinct in major respects from that of the Compact. As one cham-
pion of CP remarked: ‘On Significant Issues Groups on wages and union
agreements [there was] a hell of a job trying to shake them off simply updat-
ing or rewriting what they have; trying to get them into a new mode of
thinking’.
As the Compact gained momentum, this divergence of approach was com-
pounded by anxiety about the implications that the Compact might have for
the future role of the department and even for its continuation. Some within
the function now felt that it should have had more involvement in the
process at the initial stages. Senior executives admitted that much ‘confu-
sion’ had arisen about roles in the personnel department. Personnel special-
ists at airport level took their cue from general managers, and these were
often lukewarm towards or opposed to CP. Not surprisingly, as the Compact
was rolled out across the company in 1998 and 1999, what some called the
‘separateness of personnel and the Compact’ came to be seen by supporters of
the Compact as a problem that required resolution.
Next we consider the effects of personnel’s dominance of people manage-
ment expertise and authority for line management practice and the implica-
tions for CP. An active and custodial personnel department and a largely
passive and reactive line management approach to personnel issues were, of
course, mutually dependent features of company decision-making. All senior
executives interviewed agreed that some line managers were naturally good
people managers and took the personnel challenges arising from their roles
seriously. With decentralization during the 1980s, some line and general
managers were seen to have engaged with personnel issues more directly.
But no systemic change had occurred in the degree to which human resource
management had become integral to line management practice. Line man-
agers in general were not viewed as particularly ‘proactive’ with respect to
the management of human resources. Things like the conduct of perform-
ance appraisal were very uneven and depended on the inclination of indi-
vidual line managers. In handling recruitment, line managers were heavily
dependent on personnel. No bonus or performance-related reward system
existed based on line management assessment of the performance of subordi-
nates. In the words of a senior line manager, line managers in general were
‘traditionalists’.
So an ethos and approach to people management, which was in broad
terms ‘progressive’ in its willingness to experiment with new initiatives, and
which was portrayed by Aer Rianta managers themselves as ‘paternalist’ in
its concern to treat staff well and offer good terms and conditions of employ-
ment, went hand in hand with a largely traditional, custodial style of per-
sonnel management and an approach to line management in which the
proactive handling of people issues was not a recognized priority. Values
concerning how people should be treated established parameters to manage-
ment decision-making and predisposed personnel specialists to experiment
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with a range of progressive policies. At the same time, people-focused values
were not seen by line managers in general as integral to business success, or to
carry clear and specific implications for how they should work with staff under
their control. This underlines the extent to which the principles underlying
the Compact, through resonating with aspects of the pre-existing ethos towards
people in Aer Rianta, also represented in important respects a discontinuity
with past values and postures. From now on, the approach to personnel man-
agement to be favoured by the company involved breaking many of the rules
in the traditional personnel textbook. Its success would ultimately depend not
only on active engagement of human resource issues by line managers but also
on a kind of engagement in which managers were expected to involve staff in
accordance with the principles of the Compact. Both the level and type of line
engagement involved were without precedent in the company.
The posture of the board
The values espoused in the Compact found support at board level, but the
nature of support at this level is important to appreciate. Senior executives
interviewed were of the view that the board had little real or deep awareness of
the values underpinning the Compact, or even of the implications of Compact
assurances for commercial priorities. In part this was attributed to the affinity
perceived between the Compact approach, the traditional ethos in the company,
and to the joint affinity of these with the commercial focus and operation of
the company. Reporting to the board were successive chief executives and
senior managers who believed that the approach and commitments set out in
the Compact were consonant with the company’s prior commercial focus, and
further believed that the ‘upstream’ commercial posture underpinning the
Compact was an advisable – if not the only advisable – course to follow. Aer
Rianta senior executives were also disposed towards what one key executive
described as a ‘non-ideological’ approach to the future of the company. What-
ever worked was seen to be the ‘sensible’ policy to adopt.
Another senior executive was more pointed. In his opinion the ‘board
wouldn’t give a cobblers about the Compact’. He saw the board as properly
totally focused on business issues, and the Compact was viewed as no different
to any other issues within the ambit of personnel management like health,
safety or welfare. The board-level constituency most concerned with the
Compact was seen to be the worker directors. They, however, had been
excluded from the Compact process.
The shareholder and senior management
The postures of senior managers and the position of the board with respect
to CP was also likely to have been influenced by the position of the ‘share-
holder’ and of the senior civil servants charged with developing policy
towards the Airports Authority. Developments at these levels during the
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high tide of CP were to tilt the balance in favour of more active senior man-
agement engagement. During the second half of the 1990s, a close affinity
developed between the approach to change management enshrined in the
Compact and Aer Rianta’s parent department’s concern with the process of
managing liberalization and intensifying commercial pressure in state com-
panies. The process of liberalizing the hitherto highly regulated markets of
many state companies had become a central concern of senior public servants
and of governments since the 1980s. Given the strategic economic signific-
ance of these companies, their high levels of unionization, and not infre-
quently their turbulent industrial relations histories, the handling of
liberalization and its attendant effects on employment conditions and indus-
trial relations became of considerable concern. Partnership-based approaches
had been attempted in the electricity utility, ESB and the then communica-
tions utility, Telecom Eireann. On the whole, the outcomes in each case
were seen as successful. Industrial relations strife had been sparked by acute
commercial crises in Aer Lingus and the state-owned aircraft maintenance
company, Team Aer Lingus, where partnership approaches had not been
possible. This seemed further to underline the advantages of promoting
partnership in Aer Rianta, and determining thereby whether the approach
developed there might have wider applicability to other semi-state organi-
zations faced with deregulation and growing commercial pressures. Some
senior managers in Aer Rianta emphasized their belief that the department’s
endorsement of the Compact was largely ‘instrumental’. According to this
view, partnership was regarded as a more effective way to handle a change
process that might ultimately require significant job reductions – an end
result that contradicted one of the parameters of CP.
At a more general level still, the Compact was gaining momentum at a
time when a ‘mandarin revolution’ was in progress in the Irish public
service, involving high-level training for a rising cadre of senior public ser-
vants in business and strategic management and a growing determination on
their part to implement aspects of ‘new public management’ in the Irish
public sector. This shift in management ethos within the public service was
tempered by a growing realization that new management principles and
approaches might only prove viable and effective if they meshed with insti-
tutional and political realities and constraints.
These forces resulted in departmental support for CP at the highest levels
from the mid 1990s until the early 2000s, and in a willingness to under-
write the costs of the initiative by allowing Aer Rianta to withhold a
portion of the annual dividend paid to the government. This allowed
funding for the project to be ‘ring-fenced’ and to be administered by the
JUCG. This was a highly significant development in the eyes of supporters
of the Compact, as it precluded hostility towards the Compact within sections
of senior management finding expression in pressure to contain or cut the
budget available to fund CP initiatives.
But of far greater significance than direct financial support, was the
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adoption of a policy stance which underscored the Compact as the govern-
ment’s and department’s preferred or expected line of response from the
company to handling the commercial challenges which it faced. Until mid
2002, successive ministers pledged their support for CP, and key senior
civil servants took an on-going interest in the progress of the Compact
process. As outlined in the last chapter, departmental and ministerial
support for the Compact were to assume particular importance when the
company prepared for the loss of its duty-free business and almost
simultaneously addressed whether its future should lie in continuing
within the public sector, in some form of strategic alliance, in a partial
flotation on the stock market, or in wholesale privatization. The stimulus
for the ‘strategic review’ of the company had been a wider policy of reform-
ing public enterprises in the light of EU-instigated liberalization and more
positive political attitudes towards privatization and private investment in
state companies. But support for the Compact within the parent department
copper-fastened the attempts of champions of CP within Aer Rianta man-
agement to ensure that the review would be conducted to a significant
degree under the processes and principles of constructive participation.
Thus, as was discussed in the last chapter, departmental sponsorship of the
Compact helped ensure that the process was ‘mainstreamed’ into strategic
decision-making at a time when it might otherwise have been bypassed or
sidelined by the pace and urgency of events and the scale of the commercial
decisions facing Aer Rianta.
The department’s posture reflected more than on-going support for CP in
Aer Rianta and its cumulative experience of change management in the
semi-state sector. The first two ministers to hold office during the life of CP
provided general support and agreed to act as ‘sponsors’ of the initiative.
However, the incumbent minister during the high-tide phase was probably
more conversant with the principles underpinning CP and more politically
committed to them than her predecessors. As a former Minister of State at
the Department of Enterprise and Employment, she had first-hand
experience of handling industrial relations difficulties and emerged as a more
active supporter of partnership. The posture of the minister and her civil ser-
vants also reflected the salience of enterprise and workplace partnership
under the national-level tripartite social partnership agreement, Partnership
2000. This national agreement, in force from 1997–2000, contained a
framework agreement intended to foster partnership in firms and workplaces
as well as enshrining partnership as a prevailing mode of political, economic
and social governance.
Support for the Compact at departmental and ministerial level served to tie
senior line management more closely into CP. Support at these levels was
important in leading senior managers to the view that, whatever they might
personally think of CP, the process could no longer be ignored. Supporters
of CP were not slow to emphasize departmental support as a factor that
brought wavering or opposed managers into line.
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It was very useful to be able to say: ‘look, the Minister has said and the
Department has said and the Government has said that this is the way
they want to see it going’. We used that as a stick to beat people who
didn’t want to move with it.
Sceptics of CP also recognized that the department’s stance carried signific-
ant implications. ‘A lot of communications from the Department would be
enshrined in this new language called “jointness” or participation, or what-
ever, and that would have instilled in people the need to treat it more
significantly’.
External endorsement of this kind had not featured in previous organi-
zational development-type initiatives within Aer Rianta. Outside interest in
and support for the Compact was seen, as one sceptical senior manager put it:
to ‘give gravitas to the thing’. Public service endorsement was also seen by
some to have brought some discipline into the process, because civil servants
were required to ‘report on these things, and they have to see results’.
Contrasting postures among senior managers
This section looks at the closely intertwined themes of top-level and senior
line management attitudes towards CP up to the high-water mark of
partnership. It draws heavily on intensive interviews with senior executives
conducted during 1998. The Compact, as outlined in Chapter 3, originated
in a debate over sub-board level participation in the company. Senior man-
agers generally had not been central to, or interested in, that debate. The
Compact, therefore, was not part of a package of changes pressed by senior
line or top-level managers in the light of acute commercial pressures faced
by the company. Given the origins of CP, it is not surprising that senior line
management opinion was mainly sceptical towards or opposed to the
Compact. CP also had supporters, of course, but these tended in the main to
be managers in staff positions and departments. The most active and vocifer-
ous opponents, on the other hand, occupied key senior line management
positions. Between the active supporters and the outright opponents were a
group best described, perhaps, as ‘sceptics’. The sceptics were probably
closer in outlook to the views of the opponents than they were to the sup-
porters.
Canvassing senior line management opinions of the Compact confronts the
problem that executives could posture support for the process on grounds of
expediency – something that was flatly admitted by some, and that probably
became more pronounced as CP gathered force in the company in the late
1990s. Thus there was a general recognition, in the words of one senior
manager, of the advisability of ‘bowing to the totem’. Or, as another put it
‘posturing support became the order of the day’. In the climate that pre-
vailed during this period, a good number of managers were seen to be
‘sitting on the fence and playing it each and every way’.
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Supporters
The supporters and sponsors of CP within management had little doubt
from the start of the challenge they faced in convincing their colleagues of
the merits of partnership. Shortly after the unions had agreed to opt for a
‘comprehensive approach to participation’ rather than arrangements that
minimally conformed with legislation on sub-board participation, senior
management was briefed on the implications. At that stage supporters of CP
‘found out’, as one put it, ‘that we didn’t have a great deal of management
support’. Supporters feared that some opponents were manipulating middle
management views and seeking to undermine the Compact by complaining
about having to release staff to attend meetings; by criticizing the expendi-
ture involved and by complaining that the Compact was wasting their staff’s
time. Supporters looked to support from chief executives, ring-fenced
funding for the Compact and elicited the ‘sponsorship’ of the Department of
Public Enterprise as ways of copper-fastening CP. Once the Compact had
become the formal policy of Aer Rianta, supporters could seek on occasions
to sanction recalcitrant managers, sometimes with support from the unions.
Active support from the new chief executive appointed in 1997, support
from the ‘shareholder’ and a quickening of the pace of commercial change
towards the end of the 1990s, also strengthened the cause of the supporters.
Thus, even though the supporters of constructive participation failed to
command anything approaching numerical superiority among senior line
managers, during the high tide of partnership they increasingly came to
command the support of the most powerful managerial figures within the
company, combined with support from senior civil servants and ministers in
the parent state department.
Opponents
Opponents warned supporters from the start that there were many ‘people
nodding and agreeing’ who were, in fact, opposed to CP. Opponents some-
times claimed, as did some sceptics, that the Compact was skewed towards
the interests of ‘union activists’. Opponents ranged from managers who felt
that the achievement of ‘positive industrial relations’ along largely tradi-
tional lines was sufficient for the company’s needs, to managers who rejected
the Compact approach as without substance. The strongest and most strident
opposition involved rejecting the Compact out of hand.
It’s not for real. If I’m doing something it has to be for real. This is
mirrors put up for the Department because they like it and it sounds
good. . . . The final benefits are not coming from it.
Management decentralization within Aer Rianta during the 1980s meant
that initiatives seen as impositions by the corporate level on business units
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and airports were treated with suspicion. Territory granted under the new
management structures was protected, and this increased both the inclina-
tion and the capacity of managers to oppose centrally driven initiatives, even
where they had become formal company policy and enjoyed support from
top-level management. Local autonomy could also be a matter of pride: ‘The
head office [believed that they] had all the best ideas – what I called the
“metropolitan fog”!’
As discussed earlier, personnel specialists at airport level also took their
cues from general managers at that level with respect to their attitude to CP.
By the late 1990s, the Compact had gained such a degree of support and had
become so central to the handling of significant issues and challenges that
outright opposition had become unusual. Opposition now more commonly
emerged as resistance to a CP-based approach to a specific issue, or a dif-
ference of view as to what the Compact might entail that was articulated
nevertheless as support for CP in principle.
The sceptics
The largest group of senior managers appeared to be sceptics. Though some
within this camp were closer in attitude to active supporters of the Compact
than to opponents, most, as outlined above, were probably closer in attitude
to opponents, tilting the overall balance of senior managerial opinion
against CP, especially in the early and roll-out stages of the Compact process.
The sceptics avowed an intellectual understanding of the benefits of partici-
pation and staff involvement and claimed to recognize that this was the way
the ‘world was going’ both inside Aer Rianta and outside. Their avowed
stance was one of broad agreement in principle with the approach. This was
combined, however, with considerable scepticism as to the practical func-
tioning of CP, as well as of the benefits that had accrued when set against
the costs and disadvantages. The latter were very salient to senior managers
in this camp.
One aspect of the sceptics’ disposition was the view that CP simply had
to be better than their experience of traditional adversarial industrial rela-
tions in the company.
I can remember a time when every day you went from industrial rela-
tions meeting to industrial relations meeting. Everything was an indus-
trial relations issue. In and out of the Labour Court; in and out of
conciliation; in and out of Rights’ Commissioner hearings. . . . You felt
as if you were in a war situation practically. . . . I would submit very
strongly to the principle of participation because to me it’s the only real
way to go.
The sceptics also averred to the growing support for the Compact by top-
level management and the parent state department, necessitating a more
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active level of engagement with the process than might initially have been
seen to be necessary. While the sceptics thus avowed either principled
support or pragmatic engagement, or both, they were also far from con-
vinced that the Compact process had proved effective in delivering better
decision-making and concrete benefits for the company. Scepticism arose
from a series of overlapping doubts. Many managers questioned what they
regarded as the prolonged and open-ended nature of the Compact process.
You have to have something; some answer, and nobody will wait while
people debate about self-improvement, and issues, and maybe this and
maybe that. Somebody has to call it.
Where is it that the process is supposed to be leading other than in
[the] very broad terms [of] whatever is written in the document? But,
you know, what type of company is it trying to deliver? What type of
parameters? What type of benchmarks? What type of standards? Those
things don’t figure in the discussions.
There is confusion about what all the different processes are at the
moment. . . . What’s a strategy group? What’s a working group? What’s
a natural work group and whatever? What’s a steering group? And there
is confusion among people as to where they are and where they’re
leading and whether they fit this into this process and nobody really
knows where it’s going.
Linked with concern about open-endedness and direction was criticism
with respect to the speed of decision-making when issues were subject to
deliberations under CP.
There’s a trade off between speed and deliberation involving a lot of
people, and there are times when I feel extremely anxious about the
speed aspect.
I think that deadlines are terribly important in this. There are real deadlines.
It’s trundling along and I also think that what we need are strict dead-
lines that we want to meet.
Sceptics doubted whether major concrete or bottom-line business achieve-
ments had arisen from CP.
It has established good relationships; it has established openness; it has
established a certain amount of trust. These things are not to be under-
estimated. But to get into the making of hard-nosed business decisions
. . . it’s beyond the scope of experience for a lot of players. . . .
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I know that it is the only way forward actually, and if I try to go and
beat it, I’m not going to beat it. There’s no way I can do that so I’ve got
to embrace it. But I have seen no results out of it.
I’d like to ask someone the question: show me what it has achieved and
show me what we have put into it? . . . I’d like to see, if you like, the
balance sheet and I don’t mean in financial terms, but I’d like to see it
drawn up and to see where we are and what we have got.
On balance the existence of a forum within which serious issues can be
deliberated upon is of value. It has to be of value because the alternative
is imposition and decisions by others. But whether the Compact can
assist in meeting the demonstrated needs of the outside influences is a
question because of the structure of the Compact, the sheer scale of the
Compact and the time frame of the Compact. I don’t know.
Sceptics were also critical of what they saw as unclear procedures for
taking decisions and unclear lines of authority for executing positions
arrived at in joint initiatives and working groups.
There’s a lot of different reviews going on at different departments like
the cleaning and maintenance departments, and then there are the
significant issues groups. I’m on a number of them, and it seems to me
that a lot of work is done and a lot of research is done; a lot of presenta-
tion, but they seem to be very inconclusive. Nothing seems to come out
of them in forming hard recommendations.
The question I had was who makes the decision to push the button?
How can I say ‘let’s go with this’? ‘We’re doing it’?
Some senior managers also felt that the Compact had diluted their authority,
capacity or even inclination to make decisions.
There would also be a view: ‘well look you really don’t do anything in
case you upset the participative climate’, as such, and that really there
would be a certain frustration with line managers that ‘ah sure, there’s
nothing to be managed. That’ll all be looked after from the Compact’.
Whether it will or won’t is not really the issue.
I think that what management has lost, particularly the line manage-
ment group, when it [comes to] day-to-day or slightly more longer-
term issues; what they have lost is the capacity to make that decision.
So, in a way, and I’ve seen and experienced [it], is, you know, it’s almost
a stick to beat a manager who tries to initiate a change that is perceived
to impact negatively on staff.
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For some the Compact process was seen to have worked with respect to
issues where a manifest common threat existed, but it was also regarded as ill
suited to the handling of management concerns in general.
I’d see it as functioning well where there’s a commonality of interest
and maybe where there is mutual dependence in terms of the issues. . . .
Where I would be critical is where you get down into the more micro-
type issues and there’s the old classic conflict. For example, where a
manager . . . sees an issue in terms that would have a negative impact, or
a perceived negative impact on staff, or any particular group of staff. I
don’t think the participation process is, having experienced it, capable
of handling those issues.
Others pointed towards what they perceived as ‘cherry picking’ by unions,
adept at using the Compact in a largely instrumental or tactical manner.
If they [unions] are confronted with an issue that’s too hot to handle
from their point of view, that it does have, or could have, a negative
impact on staffing or individual staff members, or whatever, they 
will gladly kick it into the Compact process in the sure and certain
knowledge that it’s going to sit there for an extended period of time. . . .
For some of the sceptics, Aer Rianta’s experience during a 1998 strike over
union recognition at Ryanair, represented something of a litmus test for the
effects on staff behaviour of CP. A number of baggage handlers working for
Ryanair at Dublin Airport pressed for recognition for SIPTU – an important
union in neighbouring Aer Rianta. The resulting stoppage spread to Aer
Rianta and closed Dublin Airport over two days for the first time in its history.
A number of senior managers believed that union and staff postures in Aer
Rianta during the Ryanair strike demonstrated that the Compact had little
impact on behaviour or loyalty towards the company. They pointed, in con-
trast, to the role played by middle managers – then outside and in dispute with
the Compact – in attempting to keep the airport open and services in operation:
For all the input that was put into fostering relationships and participa-
tion and all the rest, here was an issue where there was another organi-
zation in dispute and staff followed, I suppose, a union agenda in breach
of all industrial relations. And . . . if you were being ultra critical you
would say [that] part and parcel of the problem was that the company’s
identity has been weakened.
Key members of the JUCG had anticipated just such a reaction. During the
Aer Rianta work stoppage JUCG personnel sought to play a role as media-
tors between unions and management within Aer Rianta. Their role in
obtaining a return to work won credit from some managers.
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Perceived advantages and disadvantages of CP
This section examines the advantages or benefits and disadvantages or costs
associated with CP in the eyes of senior managers. Virtually all the advan-
tages identified during the high tide of partnership could be portrayed as
process advantages. That is, they related to improvements of various kinds in
processes of decision-making or related aspects of company operations. That
these advantages were salient for senior managers generally indicates that
they were viewed as significant in helping them to do their jobs more effect-
ively and in making Aer Rianta operate more effectively. At the same time,
few pointed to concrete or ‘bottom-line’ advantages such as cost reduction,
quality improvement, increased job satisfaction or service innovations. It is,
of course, reasonable to suppose that benefits such as these are long-term in
nature and would have taken some considerable time to have emerged from
changes in decision-making processes. The disadvantages identified by
senior managers, on the other hand, related both to process and concrete or
bottom-line effects attributed to CP.
To a considerable degree the postures of senior managers towards CP, as
outlined in the last section, reflected their assessments of the overall ‘balance
sheet’ regarding the net effect of the Compact in Aer Rianta. At the same
time, managers’ personal philosophies and predispositions towards the prin-
ciples involved in CP also conditioned their perceptions and assessments of
the overall impact of partnership on the company. As management postures
towards CP thus overlapped assessments of concrete advantages and
disadvantages, this section highlights key themes not covered in the discus-
sion in the last section of management postures.
Table 5.1 outlines the main process and concrete advantages and
disadvantages associated with CP in the eyes of senior managers. A number
of senior executives believed that Compact forums allowed management
access to a range and depth of expertise and knowledge not hitherto avail-
able because employees now opted to share their understanding of work
processes with management.
Having the people intimately involved in the business, putting their
heads together, giving it their best shot to come up with a good analy-
sis, even as a challenge to the management team to take and try to move
beyond that point – it’s a huge advantage and an example of where
jointness actually does contribute.
Some executives believed that external consultants, using traditional
methods of analysis, would not have been capable of acquiring such a level
of intimate knowledge of work processes and commercial procedures.
There was also a perception that the Compact had fostered a disposition on
the part of staff to ‘ask business questions’ and had encouraged a
better awareness of the business challenges facing the company. For some
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managers, the CP facilitators, in particular, had acquired a very good know-
ledge of business issues – though this was sometimes seen to leave them
vulnerable to isolation from their work colleagues. Most senior managers
believed that the documents emanating from the Duty-free and Change of
Status SIGs had proved to be very beneficial, though some felt that the posi-
tion arrived at in these Compact forums was close to managers’ own views of
the challenges involved.
There was a general perception that as the Compact had gathered momen-
tum, issues that had hitherto sparked traditional industrial relations activ-
ity, or that had ended up in industrial relations processes, no longer
proceeded through these channels to the same extent. Managers spoke of the
‘absence of the knock on the door with every little tittle-tattle’, and how a
‘lot of issues that may have landed on my desk in the past are not landing
there’. The short-circuiting of traditional industrial relations processes was
seen to be of particular importance in the context of big or critical issues like
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Table 5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of constructive participation as seen by
senior managers
Advantages of constructive participation Disadvantages of constructive 
participation
Process advantages Process disadvantages
• Wider range and deeper levels of • Slows down decision-making.
knowledge and expertise brought to • Authority and procedure for action 
bear in decision-making. post-deliberation in partnership 
• Understanding of business issues forums now unclear.
promoted. • Reduces managers’ predisposition to 
• Specific discussion papers have been tackle (potentially) contentious 
beneficial. issues.
• Adversarial industrial relations • Corporately developed structures for 
processes have declined. constructive participation are 
• Critical issues no longer generate inflexible to local arrangements and 
adversarial postures and processes. traditions.
• Trust and openness enhanced and • ‘Dual channels’ for pursuing issues 
key issues can now be dealt with tactically exploited by unions.
constructively. • Raised expectations carried forward 
into adversarial industrial relations 
forums.
Bottom-line advantages Bottom-line disadvantages
• Modest changes in work practices. • Direct cost of CP.
• Cost of staff time off to attend
meetings and of time senior
management devote to meetings.
the loss of duty-free sales and the review of Aer Rianta’s future status. In the
context of the ministerial request during August 1998 that the board under-
take a major review of the future of Aer Rianta, one executive observed:
I reckon that if that had happened maybe three years ago, two years ago,
I would have been inundated with trade union requests for meetings to
explain what was actually happening and there would have been a lot of
unrest on the ground in relation to people’s perception of what was hap-
pening to the company. Now that didn’t happen, and it didn’t happen
because there were meetings held; there were representatives from all
the trade unions; there were observers from the staff; there was a lot of
documentation issues. At the end of it every staff member got a copy of
the discussion paper and the thing passed without a murmur, and really
what could have been an issue wasn’t an issue.
Another manager provided a detailed account of the manner in which the
breaking news was handled through the Compact process.
There was a meeting with the CEO and the facilitators because the facil-
itators said: ‘people are asking us; people are saying what’s going on?’ So
the CEO met them and talked to them about it. They asked a lot of
questions and they were happy going out onto the streets that they
could answer all the questions. . . . The press got hold of it and a
number of the press got onto the trade unions and said: ‘we believe the
Minister is going to talk on the radio tomorrow morning about Aer
Rianta and privatization et cetera and what have you got to say?’ A
number of them had been to our first strategic issues group and I had
calls from three of them who said: ‘the press have told us about this; we
were at the strategic issues group’. So I was able to tell them what that
was about and what the Minister was actually saying and we’re going to
have another meeting [of the Corporate Strategy SIG]. So they went
back – SIPTU in particular – and issued a press statement, saying:
‘we’re already in discussion on the strategy and the future of Aer Rianta
and this is nothing new or surprising’.
In reflecting on the manner in which these major issues were handled in
Aer Rianta, managers were commonly mindful of the highly adversarial
ways in which acute commercial problems had been handled in Aer Lingus
and its aircraft maintenance subsidiary, TEAM – both close neighbours at
Dublin Airport and both organized by some of the Aer Rianta unions.
Some managers, however, coupled their observations on the short-circuit-
ing of adversarial industrial relations postures and processes with somewhat
darker observations on the underlying dynamics of this trend. In some man-
agers’ eyes, the Compact had ‘softened’ union officials: ‘union officials have
been sorted; they’ve been taken on promotional trips’. In the same way,
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some pointed to how management too had been ‘compromised’, [made] less
willing now to tackle contentious issues for fear of being seen as opposed to
the Compact. Management was also seen to have pulled their punches: ‘[con-
frontation] is much less, provided that the manager bites his tongue and
stands back from confrontation’.
A number of senior managers believed that the Compact had enhanced
trust and openness, allowing issues to be handled in a constructive manner.
‘Hot heads’ now had to submit to a process that tempered militancy and
promoted dialogue.
Though these advantages were clearly perceived by many to be of particu-
lar significance, few were inclined to point towards clear-cut concrete,
‘bottom-line’ gains from the Compact process. For some the only perceptible
benefits, during the high tide of partnership were process-related benefits.
Other senior executives pointed to benefits on minor, or what they termed
‘bread and butter’, issues – modest changes in working practices stimulated
by Compact forums. A near constant theme of the commentaries of sceptics,
in particular, was the perceived need for CP to deliver more concrete ‘hits’,
‘big eggs’ or successes if senior managers were to show more active support.
The perceived disadvantages associated with constructive participation
are outlined in the righthand column of Table 5.1. In summary, Compact
processes were commonly seen to have slowed down decision-making; to
have increased decision-making cycles; to have reduced the resolve of some
managers to tackle contentious issues; and to have led to uncertainty con-
cerning what action could be taken by managers subsequent to issues being
discussed with staff through CP. There was a perception that the structures
of the Compact were configured to suit the requirements of a large and differ-
entiated workplace-site like Dublin Airport. Some managers, as has already
been discussed, believed that unions had become adept at exploiting Compact
processes and established industrial relations channels on tactical grounds.
Others felt that discussions in Compact forums covering issues like pay and
conditions, performance bonuses and ESOPs might build up staff expecta-
tions that would spill over into established industrial relations forums.
While senior managers had not emphasized bottom-line benefits,
bottom-line disadvantages were identified by many, irrespective of whether
they could be portrayed as ‘supporters’, ‘sceptics’ or ‘opponents’. Apart from
the actual direct costs associated with the CP in the company, senior line
managers were very aware of the costs associated with releasing staff to
attend meetings, particularly at busy times, and of the time input into CP
forums required of themselves.
Top-level management and the pivotal impact of
succession
When agreement had been reached on the Compact and Requisite Arrangements
with the Aer Rianta unions, the CEO voiced his support for CP, mindful
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that a sizeable section of his senior management either harboured deep scep-
ticism or opposed the initiative. During a key early meeting of senior man-
agers at which the Compact was discussed and outright opposition voiced by
some individuals, the CEO was seen to have made his position clear. ‘When
all that wound up [he] said to them – I think he surprised them because he
said – “this is the way the future is going to be, so you’d better change your
tunes . . .” ’. Following this intervention, as seen by one sceptic of CP, it was
a case of the Compact having become ‘compulsory for managers but optional
for unions’.
It remained the case, however, that senior managers choosing to ignore
the Compact faced little real sanction. In the words of one senior manager,
‘nobody ever got rapped about it’. Senior managers were subject to an
appraisals scheme linked with performance-related bonuses. The CEO now
introduced familiarity with participation and the practice of a participative
approach to management as an objective to be encompassed within the
annual objective setting in the performance management system. In the eyes
of supporters of the Compact this had little effect on management behaviour.
Understanding and skill in the area of CP did not become a key or mission-
critical objective and at best had only a loose and tenuous connection to
performance awards. Opponents and sceptics remained willing to court dis-
favour and calculated that little other than generalized support for the
Compact would emanate from top management, now increasingly preoccu-
pied by major commercial challenges.
Against such a background, senior managers, irrespective of their shade of
opinion, believed that the Compact was likely to fade away with the immi-
nent retirement in 1998 of its chief management champion. Opponents and
sceptics were satisfied to bide their time. Even those most closely involved
in the long-term evolution of CP sensed that the initiative might soon run
out of steam.
The surprise retirement of the CEO and his replacement by a new CEO
seen to be a supporter of the Compact brought about an immediate change.
The company’s most senior executive espoused the philosophy underlying
the Compact, as his predecessor had done, but also undertook a series of con-
crete initiatives that altered the formal status of CP processes and forums in
company decision-making. As top-management support became active and
insistent, the Compact seemed destined to grow in influence in company
affairs. Among the concrete measures now undertaken in support of the
Compact, the following were the most significant. First, the recently retired
champion of the Compact soon agreed to return to the company on contract
to remain the main management linchpin in CP. Second, a change in report-
ing relationships at senior management level at Dublin Airport was seen to
be important in bolstering support for the Compact. The airport general
manager in Dublin now reverted to reporting directly to the CEO, rather
than to an assistant CEO. As the new CEO actively espoused the principles
of the Compact, the influence of CP was seen to have been copper-fastened,
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not only in Dublin but throughout the organization. Third, job advertise-
ments and the appointments process for new senior management positions
now formally identified as key selection attributes a willingness and ability
to work in a manner consistent with the Compact. Several senior appoint-
ments that followed were seen to be in line with the new practice. At Cork,
a long-standing member of the JUCG took up the post of airport general
manager, which had been occupied by a strident opponent of CP. Fourth,
the training function in Aer Rianta was reconfigured as a corporate-level
function, and an executive closely involved in the training effort associated
with CP was promoted in moves which sought to integrate the philosophy
of CP into training activity in general in Aer Rianta. Fifth, the new CEO
attended meetings of key Compact forums, a move interpreted by senior man-
agement as a clear signal that they too were expected to engage with the
process actively. Sixth, subsequent to his remaining on at Aer Rianta to
handle CP, the main champion of the process in senior management took up
the post of general manager of Dublin Airport. There followed a manage-
ment reshuffle at the airport, which was seen to have bolstered CP at this
key workplace. Finally, and more generally, the new CEO was seen to have
engaged in a process of centralizing management decision-making, and pro-
moting corporate priorities over the immediate priorities of the airports and
business units. His approach was to promote the identity of the company
over the identity of its units, and to end competition within the company,
particularly between the airports.
The new CEO saw his active support for CP both as a matter of personal
managerial philosophy and in terms of responding pragmatically to the chal-
lenges that he faced on taking up his post. He had told senior managers that
he needed to make many changes, and that he had to make them quickly,
and if the Compact had not been in place he would have had to invent it
himself. Others had heard him remark that, if the main champion of the
Compact had proceeded with his plans for retirement, the CEO would
himself have taken charge of CP.
To the degree that decentralization had led senior managers to harbour
suspicion of the Compact as a corporate-level intrusion onto their ‘turf’, a
renewed corporate focus on commercial and operational matters generally
favoured a company-wide initiative like CP. The centralization of decision-
making on key issues of strategy and direction, also allowed for a more
coherent and effective top-management impetus behind the Compact process.
In this sense, the assertion of hierarchical power in support of CP buttressed
the process in the absence of senior and line management support rooted in
commercial challenges.
Conclusion
Aer Rianta had long been viewed and viewed itself as a progressive
company, willing to engage in innovation with respect to personnel and
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industrial relations. This, combined with the embeddedness of the company
in a public-sector tradition wherein personnel priorities of a broadly ‘pater-
nalist’ character informed management postures, both encouraged and con-
strained the development of CP. The Compact resonated with a tradition of
experimentation and innovation that attributed priority to people-focused
values. In this sense it was nothing strange or alien, and had grown organi-
cally out of the company’s history and traditions. At the same time, the pre-
vailing corporate ethos had not been forged in the cauldron of intense
competition, and, by some at least, was increasingly seen as being inconsis-
tent with the imperatives of competing in a changing industry. Thus, the
prevailing corporate ethos or value system in Aer Rianta, while receptive to
the values underpinning the Compact, was quite different to corporate value
systems in which, to use Kochan and Osterman’s terms, ‘humanistic values’
reflect hard-nosed corporate choices about how best to compete, made in the
context of intensely competitive markets. It is mainly value systems like
these, possibly of a business-defining character, that provide the focus for the
US literature on the importance of management ethos for mutual gains prac-
tices. Value systems of this type also have the greatest capacity to bind
senior managers, especially those occupying line positions, to HR innova-
tions, as the latter are seen to have emerged out of commercial conditions
and priorities.
What must in contrast be recognized about paternalism of the kind
prevalent in Aer Rianta was its inherent conservatism and tendency to shy
away from radical innovations in employment practices and modes of
decision-making of the type entailed by partnership. The Compact envisioned
a changed role for the personnel department, a realignment of roles and
responsibilities between personnel and line managers, new roles for man-
agers generally and new relations between management and employees and
between employees and unions. Little sanction for these types of changes
could be found in the company’s paternalist values and traditions.
The support and ‘sponsorship’ of senior civil servants and of the ‘share-
holder’ were important in underwriting CP, particularly in the light of con-
siderable senior management scepticism and opposition. Major change was
on the agenda for Aer Rianta as for other state-owned companies during the
1990s. The Compact provided a means whereby radical change might be
handled without the extreme unrest or turbulence that had ensued in a
number of state-owned companies. Perceived ministerial support for CP
became pivotal at the time of the strategic review in 1998–99, buttressing
the attempts of top management and supporters of the Compact to align the
strategic review with CP. Relatedly, senior management sceptics and oppon-
ents of CP were also mindful of the department’s on-going support. Support
by the departmental ‘sponsor’ helped to ensure that CP became part of
mainstream corporate decision-making at a time when it might otherwise
have been sidelined by the pace of events and by the scale and nature of the
challenges facing the company.
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While homage had to be paid to CP by senior managers, considerable
scope existed for managers to manage as they saw fit. Personnel and indus-
trial relations problems were by tradition absorbed mainly by the personnel
department. Line managers had seen personnel and organizational develop-
ment initiatives come and go, without significantly changing their ways of
working. The Compact sought to institute a fundamentally new way of
working, but for some time it was thought that this too would go the way of
previous initiatives. The change process in Aer Rianta was thus quite differ-
ent to what might be regarded as the standard pattern identified in the liter-
ature. The standard pattern was for deep and lasting changes in practices to
originate in the attempts of senior line managers to realign employment and
working practices to changed external market pressures. In the case of Aer
Rianta, a new approach to management, based on staff and union involve-
ment, had originated among visionary figures in management and unions
sceptical of pre-existing methods of promoting worker participation and
intent on moving beyond adversarial industrial relations. The management
sponsors of CP were faced with the task of ‘selling’ the concepts involved to
a largely disinterested, sceptical or straightforwardly hostile management
group. Early on, the main management supporters of CP tended to be execu-
tives working in service functions. The main opposition, or the deepest
levels of scepticism, came, however, from senior executives in line positions,
especially at airport level. The capacity of managers at airport level to resist
CP was buttressed by a move to decentralized management structure during
the 1980s.
Senior managers on the whole were willing to identify advantages arising
from CP. Most of the advantages identified were however ‘process advan-
tages’, and few believed that substantive, bottom-line advantages had arisen
yet in such areas as cost reduction, service quality improvement or opera-
tional processes and practices. Alongside such advantages, many senior man-
agers identified what they saw as both process and bottom-line
disadvantages arising out of CP. For most, the overall balance between
advantages and disadvantages was such as to confirm them in their scepti-
cism towards partnership.
The slow pace of development of CP reflected to a major degree line man-
agement disinterest and opposition, and this in turn was sustained by the
slow pace or incremental nature of change in the domestic business context
over much of the period covered by the Compact. By the late 1990s the
pattern and pace of change had altered. Landing charges had remained
unchanged for some years and heavily discounted charges remained in place
for major customer airlines. Low and static landing charges, combined with
the imminent disappearance of duty-free sales and changes rendering the
company liable for the payment of rates and corporation tax, threatened to
undermine the company’s commercial success and even viability. At the
same time, rapid economic growth resulted in escalating passenger numbers
and airport congestion, especially in Dublin, and the need to finance an
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expensive programme of capital development of runway facilities, airport
buildings and other facilities. In this context, the government signalled its
intention of moving forward with changes in the status of Aer Rianta,
raising the prospect of a partial or complete sell-off.
When commercial changes of a more ‘disjunctive’ nature began to bite in
the closing years of the 1990s, the Compact was just about surviving and pro-
vided a ready-made vehicle through which they might be addressed. Yet CP
might still not have survived or become a key channel for change manage-
ment were it not for the succession of a new CEO who had been a supporter
of the Compact. With change at the top came new appointments and revised
reporting arrangements that strengthened CP for a time. A general process
of centralization, involving a greater emphasis on corporate priorities, also
strengthened CP, which from the beginning had been a corporate-level
initiative. In these ways, hierarchical power for the first time underwrote a
process that represented the very antithesis of decision-making authority
based on formal positions in a hierarchy. The effects of management succes-
sion at Aer Rianta finally provide an illustration of how a ‘pivotal event’,





As outlined in Chapter 1, middle managers have long occupied a relatively
unambiguous role in the literature on employee involvement and partner-
ship. They have been viewed in the main and in simple terms as opponents
of innovative approaches to work organization and joint decision-making.
The classical themes in the literature concern the threats posed by involve-
ment and partnership to middle managers’ authority and established ways of
working; the tensions that arise between new decision-making processes and
established accountability for the attainment of hard business objectives; and
ultimately, the fear that innovation may entail or lead to delayering, the loss
of promotional ladders and even of jobs. In one way or another these themes
have informed nearly all studies of middle managers’ reactions to employee
involvement and associated innovations in work organization and decision-
making (for reviews see Cooke 1990: 8–9; Hyman and Mason 1995: ch. 8;
Fenton-O’Creevy 1998; 2001; for an exception see Storey 1992: chs 7–8).
Only recently has this view begun to be modified in significant respects.
While not doubting that middle managers frequently resist employee
involvement and workplace partnership in defence of sectional or self-inter-
est, several researchers have sought to locate middle management reactions
to work innovations on the wider canvas of organizational systems and
processes. In this perspective, middle managers’ and supervisors’ reactions
are understood to a significant degree as a reflection of the extent to which
senior management supports work innovations, both directly and through
multiple organizational systems for which they bear ultimate responsibility.
This approach will inform our analysis of middle management attitudes in
Aer Rianta, where, for much of the period from the genesis to the high tide
of partnership in the late 1990s, considerable tension and at times outright
conflict characterized the relationship between middle managers, their union
and CP.
Middle managers in organizational context
Splits in the management hierarchy
Marchington (1995: 296–90) anticipates such a broader perspective in his
wide-ranging discussion of how managerial actions or inaction can reduce
the impact of employee involvement initiatives, or cause them to function in
ways not intended by their champions. Marchington’s analysis identifies
resistance from first-line managers as one barrier to success. While he relates
this to self-interest and threats of a familiar kind to the position and
prospects of first-line managers, he suggests that first-line resistance also
needs to be understood in the context of ‘splits and discontinuities between
different levels in the management hierarchy’ (Marchington 1995: 289).
First-line managers may view employee involvement initiatives, for
example, as little more than ‘soft’ management, or as ‘idealists at corporate
headquarters’ pandering to the workforce (Marchington 1995: 289).
Incomplete coverage of involvement initiatives
Other shortcomings in management and organizational systems may com-
pound these problems. Significant gaps may exist between formal policy
statements and senior managers’ beliefs and the real level of penetration of
involvement initiatives at workplace level. This may in particular represent
a problem where involvement is voluntary, as is often the case. Some
involvement-based groups may meet infrequently or only exist in a formal
sense. Incomplete coverage might in turn reflect operational pressures and
difficulties, such as tight production or service schedules, or the dispersion
of the workforce over multiple sites and logistical problems in bringing
people together for participative activities (Marchington 1995: 286–7).
Competing initiatives and contradictory rationales
Marchington suggests that in large establishments it may not be unusual for
a series of different employee involvement techniques to operate at the same
time. The multiplicity of techniques may result in particular techniques
competing with, or even contradicting, each other, especially where they are
championed by different management functions or departments. Techniques
could sometimes be introduced promising empowerment, while employees
also find themselves being subjected to tighter control (Marchington 1995:
287–8).
Practical difficulties
First-line managers may experience work overload and find it difficult to set
aside the time to consult with or brief subordinates, particularly if they are
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not explicitly rewarded for such activities, or their performance is judged
against something other than narrowly defined production or service criteria.
Training in the implementation of involvement initiatives may also be inad-
equate (Marchington 1995: 289–90).
Marchington’s analysis points in major degree to problems in organi-
zational hierarchies and systems as a way of accounting for the commonplace
failure of involvement initiatives to live up to their promise. Splits and dis-
continuities in the management hierarchy, both vertical and lateral or cross-
functional; contradictions between avowed policy and operational pressures
and priorities; a failure to align rewards and performance management
systems with the goals of involvement and training difficulties, may all
accompany first-line management resistance as barriers to success. Signific-
antly, some of these forces are also seen to interact with and intensify first-line
management resistance.
Congruence with organizational subsystems
The postulate that middle management resistance needs to be understood as
more than simply a reflection of sectional interest is more explicitly
developed by Fenton-O’Creevy (1998; 2001). Like other writers, Fenton-
O’Creevy identifies sectional interest, rooted in the standard fears and anxi-
eties, as a significant source of middle management resistance to employee
involvement. He emphasizes, however, that middle managers need to be
seen as simultaneously pursuing their own interests and responding as
members of an organization that has selected and socialized them for a
particular role and that reinforces particular types of behaviour through
multiple organizational systems and signals (Fenton-O’Creevy 1998: 70).
Drawing on an empirical study of employee involvement initiatives in a
sample of 114 UK enterprises across a diverse range of industries, he identi-
fies a series of organizational systems that influence the reactions of middle
managers to employee involvement. The degree to which senior managers
show clear personal commitment to change influences middle management
reaction. So also does the extent to which organizational systems like
rewards and performance management systems reinforce middle manage-
ment co-operation with change. Middle management capability to function
under involvement arrangements is also identified as an important force, and
this is shaped by such things as the degree to which they can access informa-
tion and control resources and exert influence over change. Capability is also
shaped by training and development activities (Fenton-O’Creevy 1998:
70–2). Echoing a theme also developed by Marchington, Fenton-O’Creevy
(1998: 72) suggests that ‘role strain’, engendered by high short-run
performance pressures, may also engender fatigue and resistance to change.
Such a ‘systemic explanation’ of middle management resistance, which
highlights how middle managers may be treated as ‘scapegoats’ for organi-
zational failures, is seen as providing a more adequate explanation of middle
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management behaviour in the context of involvement initiatives than clas-
sical notions of the middle manager as self-interested ‘saboteur’ (Fenton-
O’Creevy 2001).
Middle managers in Aer Rianta
This chapter examines the attitudes of middle managers and first-line man-
agers such as supervisors and superintendents to the development and
implementation of workplace partnership at Aer Rianta. The analysis is
based in the main on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with middle
managers. It also draws on internal research on middle managers’ attitudes
to CP, conducted by consultants working for the JUCG. It is important to
note that the interviews were conducted with middle managers from depart-
ments that had some contact with the participation process and across all the
airports. However, the level of contact varied in intensity across different
departments and also across individual managers within departments. Chap-
ters 7 and 8 will report survey data on the attitudes and responses of middle
managers to CP.
Before discussing the findings from the in-depth interviews and other
sources in the context of the theoretical framework outlined above, we first
examine middle management attitudes towards a series of aspects of CP.
Attitudes towards participative approaches to management
Middle managers’ involvement in the early development of CP in Aer
Rianta was very limited. As reviewed in earlier chapters, participative prin-
ciples and arrangements had been developed largely by champions within
senior management, with support from key trade union officials. Middle
management was not directly involved in the foundation-laying work of the
Joint Working Group on Participation between 1986 and 1990. Although
middle managers’ comments were elicited through an employee survey and
through internal communications exercises, held with mixed groups of
employees, there had been no direct representation of middle management
views within the main participation forum. This situation was maintained
when the Joint Working Group was reincarnated as the JUCG in 1991.
Thus, there was little direct representation of middle management views at
the top table during a period when the conceptual and practical approaches
to participation were advancing steadily, for example, through the develop-
ment of the Compact and Requisite Arrangements.
Middle managers were however becoming engaged with the developing
participation effort in a number of other ways. Certain groups of middle
managers became involved in pilot groups, and a more general introduction
to the issues came through a further employee survey along with continuing
internal communications and research exercises. The pilot groups, running
from late 1992 and gradually declining in activity after late 1993, exposed a
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small section of middle management to a concrete example of participation
in action. However, the tentative and experimental nature of the pilot
groups did not result in many tangible benefits at departmental levels.
Rather, from the middle managers’ viewpoint, these early efforts presented
participation in a relatively limited, poorly articulated and frustrating guise.
Clear indications of substantial middle management concern regarding
CP emerged in two research studies conducted as part of the internal
research programme associated with the initiative. In 1996 and 1997
studies of middle management attitudes were undertaken in Dublin and
Shannon. In Dublin a random sample of 20 middle managers was inter-
viewed. Some 41 per cent were reported as believing that middle managers
had most to lose in the participation process, and the main concerns were
reported to revolve around the erosion of the middle management role,
loss of power and slower decision-making. These views were held in spite
of a general perception that participation could be beneficial for both man-
agement and staff. Middle managers saw their role in clear-cut terms as
involving ‘control of the situation and making decisions’. Participation
was perceived to be about consultation and allowing people to voice
decisions at all levels. Only five of those interviewed anticipated that par-
ticipation would involve staff sharing directly in the decision-making
process (The Anticipated Effect of Participation on the Role of the Middle
Manager, n.d.).
Forty middle managers were interviewed in Shannon in June and July
1997. Here the research reported that, overall, CP was seen as having more
negative than positive implications for middle management as a group.
There were ‘consistent concerns that increased levels of participation would
lead to the erosion of role for the middle manager’. Some 42 per cent of
those interviewed defined their role as being about decision-making and
control of information. Many feared that CP could result in job cuts at the
airport. Perceived lack of senior management commitment to the process
emerged as a major theme, as did a belief that senior managers’ expectations
of middle managers revolved around getting the job done and achieving
results. CP might heighten the expectation of staff, imposing new demands
on middle managers. It was concluded that middle management did not
have ‘as ambitious an understanding of participation as is stated in the
Compact’. Throughout the research exercise, the researcher had encountered
what was described as a ‘strong demand for an explanation of the perceived
exclusion of middle management from the process to date’ (Report on the
Middle Management Group in Shannon Airport, December 1997).
After 1996 then, as the participation process shifted from development to
implementation, middle managers came to the process from a relatively
uninformed and uninvolved position, but with considerable anxiety or scep-
ticism towards the extension of participation. Throughout 1997–98 a wide
range of managers encountered a burgeoning series of participation initi-
atives within their departments. The material presented below captures the
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response of middle management to these new developments. The findings
reflect attitudes during a period of sustained activity in the development of
participation within the everyday work contexts of middle managers. So the
period was one in which the existing attitudes and beliefs of middle man-
agers were being tested against what, for many, were radically new concepts
and ways of working.
What emerges from the interviews conducted in association with this
study, as from the earlier internal research, is that many managers claimed
to support some form of partnership within management–employee rela-
tions. In particular, there was a strong avowal of the value of workplace
partnership for the competitive posture of Aer Rianta. This was reflected in
a series of comments across a number of departments:
Eventually it will just be the way we do our business . . . if we’re not
going to change we’ll just get left behind.
(commercial manager)
I think it’s the only way any organisation can proceed now.
(finance manager)
As a principle I think it’s the way forward . . . the only way to make
things happen is to bring people along.
(commercial manager)
This us and them, this sort of turn of the century sort of stand-offish
structure . . . anything that breaks down these historical suspicions and
gets people more involved [is welcome].
(finance manager)
I would say [it is a] fundamental mechanism through which we can
make our business better.
(maintenance manager)
It is a very positive way to do business.
(maintenance manager)
I think it is essential if we are to move forward.
(commercial manager)
I was initially sceptical because I would come from the hierarchical sort
of background. . . . Very quickly after maybe three or four education
programmes . . . particularly thought it was an initiative that we could
do with and was very much something that we would work here if it
was supported and used properly.
(maintenance manager)
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However, such views were not universal. In the eyes of a manager from the
Airport Police and Fire Service:
Basically the way I looked at CP at the very start, my own feeling on it,
was that it was really another wing of the union.
Another manager from the same department shared this view:
Instead of the dog shaking the tail, it was going to be the tail shaking
the dog.
In significant degree, attitudes were conditioned by the degree to which
middle managers had engaged with the process. As one middle manager in
maintenance commented:
You can virtually see a gradation of belief if you like between people
who are heavily involved . . . to people who . . . believe that there is
something in it, but they are not quite sure what yet, to the people . . .
who write it off as just another gimmick.
Many middle managers felt that they already worked in a participative way,
and often that they had been doing so for some time. For example, one com-
mercial manager commented:
I think really to be quite honest about it this airport has always kind of
worked in that kind of way. People are always involved in things. I
mean there is never [any] kind of ‘them and us’. I mean, okay, there are
industrial relations problems that come up, but that’s different. But
we’ve always, all the staff, have always been involved in what goes on
around the place.
A manager from the finance department also claimed that participation had
been routine there for some time:
I suppose to some extent we have been doing that anyway (participa-
tion). In our area, we would have constant contact with one another
every day. Maybe not in a total group sense but certainly in ones or twos
and threes, so that has worked pretty well.
If participation was commonly understood as a way of relating to colleagues,
in the Airport Police and Fire Service a more formalized method was said to
have been common.
I’m here since 1964 and we’ve had committees and I’ve been involved in
all of those committees right through. The 1971 agreement is one of the
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top ones that we have and is still being used to resolve disputes or argu-
ments. CP, I would see as just a follow-up from that in our department.
Now other departments wouldn’t use that but we’ve always been very
constructive in our approach.
Middle managers appear to have conceived of participation largely in terms
of downward communication. Thus, most managers saw information-
sharing as a key issue in partnership. In the words of a maintenance
manager:
It is the sharing of information where before it was perceived by people
that decisions were secret. . . . Now that still applies, let’s be honest
about it, particularly from the point of view of industrial relations prob-
lems, you know like staffing levels or salaries, or even to a degree,
budgets. But in general where it involves the people on the floor, the
approach would be that it is more open.
Another comment typical of middle managers’ views came from a finance
manager.
The staff levels are staying the same. I am finding it difficult to cope.
Now I am not sure if CP will solve that problem, I don’t know. But
what it could do perhaps is maybe help identify what is critical in terms
of information needs and what isn’t. And not just in a departmental
level, but more so at a company level.
As indicated, middle managers saw this type of activity as part of their exist-
ing routines. Thus, for many managers, CP meant building upon existing
practices to inform staff about plans, either through regular structured tech-
niques, or quite often, via informal or non-routinized channels. Problem-
solving activities that involved employees were not so apparent in middle
managers’ understanding of what partnership entailed. There did not appear
to be a clear understanding that structured processes for employee involve-
ment, such as quality circles, suggestion schemes, or attitude surveys, might
be entailed by partnership. Some of these mechanisms had previously been
used in a number of departments, for example the Airport Police and Fire
Service.
At the moment I’m getting information back through the committees
that have been set up so it seems to be working. But we’re lucky I
suppose in our section that we’ve always had committees and we’ve
always worked through committees.
Problem-solving activity was associated by middle managers in the main
with committees or working groups, such as the various SIGs and related
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CP initiatives that had come into being. However, the degree to which
middle managers were integrated within these structures was highly vari-
able and middle managers held mixed views on the merits of these
approaches as effective forms of partnership. The attitude of middle man-
agers to the joint forums is discussed in more detail below. Certainly, the
forums were not seen to be middle management-inspired or led, at least at
the department level.
Nor did middle managers in general associate partnership with task par-
ticipation or changes in work organization. However, the link between
partnership and work organization was more salient in departments where
teamworking had previously been pursued. For example, awareness of task
participation possibilities was greater in maintenance departments,
although, as discussed below, negative connotations were also associated
with teamworking.
Attitudes to Compact forums
While the majority of middle managers declared themselves to be support-
ive of increased levels of partnership, it appeared that middle managers fell
into two general camps with respect to their detailed attitudes towards
partnership. For the majority of middle managers interviewed, partnership
was viewed in the relatively limited terms of direct employee involvement,
focused primarily around downward communication. For a smaller group,
with a greater degree of involvement with CP, joint arrangements were seen
as having a greater role to play, although middle managers viewed their own
relationship to these structures as uncertain. This was partly due to the
problems of middle management integration within CP. While some man-
agers saw positive outcomes from Compact forums, many others viewed these
as either unproven, or as intrinsically flawed.
Some managers looked positively on Compact forums, when they saw tan-
gible results being produced. As a commercial manager put it:
For me really getting involved with the duty free strategy group was the
one [event] that made me realise that there is . . . benefit in this. . . . I
suppose when we were involved in that process a lot of the staff got
involved in it and they were involved in the decision-making the same
as I was. So on that project . . . looking to our future and how we’re
going to handle the future, it definitely would have been handled differ-
ently. . . . Some of the groups have actually had some very good results. I
mean I know one or two of the groups . . . and they have come up with
very good reports . . . and it has been the union and staff working
together. Now I mean whether you get it to work in all areas I don’t know.
Managers also identified as an advantage of the Compact forums the manner
in which they had allowed employees to contribute their knowledge and
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skills in a much more productive way than previously. As one maintenance
manager commented:
It has given a certain amount of support in working the way I have
always worked but which from time to time has been against the
normal pattern of how Aer Rianta works. . . . It has given me the
opportunity to use people’s knowledge and brain in the way that they
don’t feel intimidated, or that they are going to be abused. . . . So the
very fact that we meet people we wouldn’t normally meet – the hierar-
chical structure before would have kept many people in the background,
we wouldn’t have met them. . . . So I think it is a two-way stream here.
I call that the fizzy drink situation where you suddenly let the top off
the bottle and you get this effervescence coming out, of ideas, and a lot
of what is coming out is only gas but there is genuine ideas in there
which have never been released before.
However, other managers saw Compact forums as of limited value. A
further influence on negative middle managers’ attitudes was uncertainty
over the direction and shape of evolving structures. The non-prescriptive
nature of CP precluded a clear picture of an end goal for middle managers.
As noted by a commercial manager:
The principle I’m happy with it but the methodology of implementing
it and pursuing it I wouldn’t be too happy with. . . . I’m not quite 
sure that the way we’re doing it is the right way to do it . . . because 
it seems to me to be very secretive or biased against my particular
grouping.
Views on the role of trade unions
Rather than viewing partnership as a means of undermining trade unionism
and worker solidarity, middle managers equated CP with a strong and even
dominant role for union representatives, rooted in the Compact forums.
However, it appeared less clear to middle managers whether joint commit-
tees or joint working groups might be channels for increased trade union
influence, or merely another channel in which to address issues.
On the whole, middle managers perceived the role of CP as a potential
route for overcoming past adversarial attitudes, which they associated with
trade unions: ‘We have a number of union representatives down here. They
come in and they talk to you and they keep you informed. It has changed
people’. There was little sense that CP might diminish the role of trade
unions. However, given the limited interaction of middle managers with
CP, it was difficult to identify if they had considered how the relationship
with trade unions might evolve. In the context of the Compact forums, it was
not clear to what extent the middle managers involved were prepared
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actively to engage in partnership with unions and staff. However, there was
some evidence of intent in this respect. A maintenance manager stated that:
I also see the unions getting so involved in it instead of the traditional
conflict role. . . . To me this is a milestone. . . . The unions are very
much committed to this and I think that is a good thing and that cer-
tainly would sway my attitude towards the whole thing.
Another manager in maintenance commented:
So do they [staff and unions] then have a part to play in the overall level
of control, in the strategy of the department? Yes they do. . . . Given
that there are still things that have to remain confidential there is no
reason why we can’t be more open about the way things work.
Some managers believed that the balance of advantage arising from CP
favoured unions. Referring to the posture of shop stewards, a commercial
manager reflected:
I’d say they’d be a lot more sympathetic to CP than, say, middle man-
agers would, because they would see from their own point of view that
they’re going to have a bigger say in the workings of the departments or
decision-making and the whole lot. That’s the way they’d see it.
A number of managers believed that Compact forums were likely to give way
to adversarial patterns as soon as greater demands were made from
employees. In the words of a manager from the Airport Fire and Police
Service:
There’s a lot of involvement when it comes to being able to do some-
thing for them from my side. But when it comes to something out of
my remit then we have to go somewhere else and then it becomes an
industrial relations issue . . . that once you’re saying no and you give a
good reason for saying no then it becomes an industrial relations issue.
Middle managers’ views of employee attitudes
The middle managers interviewed considered employees to be divided into
two main groups: a largely ambivalent or sceptical group without much
contact with CP, and a more enthusiastic group that had experienced partic-
ipation in Compact forums. A commonplace position was reflected by this
comment from a maintenance manager:
There are sceptics. We seem to manufacture sceptics here, but that may
be because of the way things were handled in the past. . . . It’s getting
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better by the day. I would say we are around the half-way mark at the
moment.
A finance manager was marginally more positive:
Generally there is a positive buzz about it. People are still in the ‘I’m
not quite sure about how this is going to affect me’ mode to some
extent. I wouldn’t call it scepticism, not as strong as that, but you know
a question mark, because I suppose people come out of these meetings
and they go back to their work and there really isn’t a lot of time to go
and discuss the thing.
However, middle managers felt that the continued interest of the sceptics
was conditional on positive gains from the forums. As one maintenance
manager put it, with reference to limited employee enthusiasm:
Well it will only change if there are results. . . . There is no point in
making a talking shop out of it . . . and if I am totally honest again I
suppose to some degree it is at the minute . . . so until they see action
and see results, I would say that will stay as it is.
Some managers felt that the process had been one-sided in advantaging
employees. Where a potential cost arose for employees as a result of Compact
deliberations, they believed that the process might unravel. Others were
concerned that employees would increasingly associate their work roles with
the business of Compact forums and that their ‘everyday’ work would suffer as
a consequence. A maintenance manager based this view on previous
experience of teamworking, which he felt had affected employees in a way
that had been detrimental to productivity:
I think some of the problems with teams are going to be some of the
problems with participation. Where people are no longer satisfied with
their lot . . . we were losing all our workmen because they were all
becoming professors you know . . . there are a lot of people who would
use the developing situation to do less and less.
An associated problem was seen as being the removal of ‘teeth’ from supervi-
sors and the insulation of staff against criticism.
Middle managers pointed commonly to the influence of employee age and
career stage in determining attitudes to workplace partnership. Almost uni-
versally, managers saw older staff in general as an impediment to change. A
typical explanation was that given by a manager in the Airport Police and
Fire Service:
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‘We’ve seen it before’ is their attitudes. Some of them would be for it.
Most of the older officers would look upon it as another committee. . . .
The older staff don’t trust it. . . .
This perspective was in part informed by the established work practices of
long-serving employees. In addition, those nearing retirement were viewed
as having little incentive to invest time and effort in learning new ways of
working. In contrast, younger employees were seen not only as ‘clean slates’
but as being more in tune with a partnership ethos. A commercial manager
remarked:
there’s a younger group of staff coming in there now so those are the
ones that you really need to get at. You know. I suppose if you have a
group of older staff, a lot of older staff in a department I think you
could have a problem there because older people then I suppose maybe
they’re not as open and they fear change, you know. Younger people are
a lot more open-minded. . . . It seems to be more staff at the junior level
that seem to feel the benefit of it because they would never have been
involved in decision-making before and for them it is an opportunity.
Perceptions of staff attitudes to participation are also coloured by a lack of
management engagement in the process. One commercial manager declared
with respect to employee attitudes to participation:
I wouldn’t have personally gone out and even asked that question. I would-
n’t have even my ear tuned in to even try and get a vibe for it, you know.
I’m more concerned with the day-to-day running of the business. . . .
Middle management attitudes in organizational context
Defence of sectional interest
From the discussion above, a number of reasons were apparent as to why
middle managers had engaged to a limited degree with CP, in spite of their
commonly avowed support for the underlying approach involved. Concerns
for their own interests emerged as an important factor in the internal
research, reported earlier, and were also reflected in the research reported
here. But the direct role of opposition rooted in the defence of middle man-
agers’ interests was underscored in the interviews to a surprisingly limited
and muted degree.
A concern to defend the position of middle managers against encroach-
ment under CP had been evident in the dispute between IAESA and the
JUCG. The proximate cause of the dispute had been the JUCG’s insistence
that members could not occupy a representative role. However, the under-
lying dynamics of the dispute seemed to have been driven mainly by the
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concern of the middle managers’ union with the implications of CP for the
status and security of middle managers as a group. Several finance and com-
mercial managers interviewed linked the IAESA debacle directly to fears
about the future of the middle management role:
That organization needs to be taken seriously . . . because middle man-
agement are very much the ham in the sandwich anyway . . . there is a
train of thought that says that this is the layer we can take out much
more easily, that it’s a blockage anyway. Maybe there is a certain feeling
of being threatened.
There was an in-built bias against IAESA from the unions and the
company turned around and said ‘Okay we’ll go with the union guys,
our pals, on this thing and exclude the IAESA guy’. . . . It’s saying to
the middle managers, ‘Look, you’re going to be the meat in the sand-
wich here. In this process that’s going on it’s going to be tougher and
tougher and tougher for you to do your job because at the end of the day
now you’re going to have a whole lot of people who have a whole lot of
opinions on how you should do it, rather than the person that you’re
reporting to’.
Evidence from in-depth interviews with middle managers made it clear
how the dispute between IAESA and the Joint Union Company Group
impacted directly on the CP process. The call from IAESA for their
members to boycott CP had been a major impediment to middle manage-
ment engagement.
But the evidence also indicated that IAESA’s defence of the interests of
middle managers was less strident or forceful than it might have been
because many middle managers were ambivalent about their loyalty to the
union and their role as managers in Aer Rianta. Despite the official action of
the union, some managers felt obliged to preserve a relationship with CP.
This could mean involvement at arm’s length, for example providing rele-
vant information for CP meetings, or facilitating staff release for attendance
at meetings. Others took a more direct role in CP, feeling that to abstain
would involve a dereliction of their job. A commercial manager explained:
I mean I was involved even though I shouldn’t have been involved. But
simply because I was in a position that I was responsible for . . . I felt it
was my job. But it was a very awkward situation. I mean you were
getting letters from the union telling you not to be involved. If you
didn’t become involved you weren’t doing your job.
Not all middle managers belonged to IAESA, and so some felt relatively
insulated from the effects of the IAESA boycott. In addition, the bargaining
strength of the organization was perceived to be relatively weak, compared
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with other trade unions, as was the solidarity and militancy of members.
Middle managers as a group identified closely with the interests of the
company, as was evidenced by their ultimate unwillingness to put the
dispute between their association and the JUCG ahead of job commitments.
Nonetheless, while many middle managers kept an eye on CP develop-
ments, and often facilitated them, there was a strong sense of grievance with
the participation process and a widespread perception that middle manage-
ment had been excluded from the development of workplace partnership.
Frustration about this was evident, and was articulated by a commercial
manager in the following terms.
Well I think it came about, from the little I know about it, I think it
came about simply because IAESA weren’t allowed to become involved
as full members [of the JUCG]. I mean . . . I think basically . . . that
middle management in the company felt that they were being excluded
from the process and I mean if they’re not going to be totally involved
in it you might as well forget about it.
This feeling was compounded by the dilemma of whether to follow the staff
association action or to engage with developments in their respective depart-
ments. As one finance manager commented:
So we had a conflict here. You either let your job go to pot by failing to
participate in different things, or you take a directive not to participate,
or you just ignore all that, a bit more of a dilemma because at the end of
the day you are going to protect your job first. There were a number of
people here who were hoping to get involved on a sort of secondment
basis with the Compact. Each one of them pulled out. They were very
keen on this and then they pulled out for career reasons.
The reasons given for middle management non-involvement were
twofold. First, personal differences between IAESA and the JUCG leaders
were seen as having made it difficult to establish effective relations between
both bodies. Second, the problematic nature of defining a middle manage-
ment role in joint arrangements that was independent of, and distinct from,
that of senior management was also seen to have caused problems. In the
words of a manager from a maintenance department:
The real problem is that we don’t fit into either group. We don’t fit into
the senior group and we don’t fit into the pure trade union group. That
is the real problem. Therefore we weren’t considered . . . when the
JUCG was being put together . . . therefore people have not got the con-
fidence in the JUCG to be making the right decisions or even to be
putting forward the right policies that represent middle managers as
well.
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A further factor, highlighted to a lesser degree, was trade union
opposition to the involvement of IAESA. On the whole, middle managers
felt uncertain as to the real underlying rationale for non-involvement. As
discussed below, this uncertainty occasionally manifested itself in suspi-
cions about hidden agendas aimed at ‘delayering’ the management
hierarchy.
The theoretical framework outlined earlier in the chapter allows for an
exploration of how middle managers’ attitudes also reflected the wider
context in which CP was introduced in the company. A series of dimensions
of the wider organizational context are relevant in understanding the atti-
tudes and postures of middle managers, and will be discussed in the follow-
ing sections.
Coverage
As outlined earlier in Chapter 3, coverage of CP was limited and uneven
across airports and business units or departments. While all the middle
managers interviewed came from departments having some contact with CP,
their level of exposure to partnership varied considerably. In addition,
middle managers had not been subjected to a systematic training pro-
gramme centred on CP, as had other staff categories and union representa-
tives.
Further, the IAESA dispute had restricted the extent to which middle
managers engaged in the more general training exercises focused on the
functioning of Compact forums. Thus the exposure of middle managers to the
ideas embodied in CP was restricted. For many, exposure was limited to
attendance at large-scale employee gatherings aimed at providing an intro-
ductory overview to CP, or was sometimes restricted to independent study
of CP documents.
An important factor in the slow spread of CP ideas amongst middle man-
agers appeared to be the relatively weak lateral communication between
departments, and particularly between middle managers from different
departments. Peer communication of this character about the workings of
CP, and especially about benefits stemming from some of the joint working
groups, seemed highly restricted in the case of middle managers. Most
middle managers interviewed had very limited awareness of events in other
departments at their own airport, and even less about developments at other
airports. The weakness of lateral co-ordination between middle management
groups had the further effect of increasing the influence of negative signals
about CP, originating from either IAESA or within sections of senior
management.
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Earlier initiatives and contradictory rationales
Various involvement initiatives had been undertaken in the past, and the
legacy of these had informed middle management attitudes to new pro-
grammes for organizational change. Comments from two managers in
finance point towards the continuing influence of experience with past initi-
atives.
We have had a load of different other initiatives over the years . . . like
the ‘Human Factor’ . . . and the ‘Kilkenny Experience’, and there have
been all sorts of things at other stages along the development of the
culture of the company.
Initially a lot of people had some reservations about it, and perhaps felt
‘Well, oh sure they tried it before. It didn’t work’.
Thus, what was perceived as the transient and ineffective nature of former
initiatives had left middle managers somewhat sceptical about the potential
or ‘staying power’ of CP. Such a state of mind probably reduced the time
and resources middle managers were willing to invest in CP.
More significant, in terms of impact, was a perception of contradictory
rationales arising from the business and participative aims of departments.
In both the internal research conducted for CP and the research reported
here, middle managers had a strong sense of being pulled in two directions.
They were pulled one way by what many proclaimed to be the welcome goal
of establishing inclusive and participative structures. They were pulled in
another direction by what they perceived as the need to resolve, often
quickly, important business decisions. Many managers cited CP as a real or
potential impediment to the speed and quality of business decisions. A
worry was expressed that CP both slowed down decision-making and led to
decisions based on compromise rather than to best solutions, as seen by
them.
Similarly, an important question for many managers was whether output-
based objectives should assume priority over workplace partnership in the
event of conflicting objectives arising. Most middle managers seemed to
think that the bottom line in the eyes of senior managers was about meeting
hard-nosed business objectives. They certainly felt themselves to be judged,
at the end of the day, by their immediate business objectives or service cri-
teria. Part of the problem here was that middle managers did not perceive
any explicit reward to exist for developing workplace partnership, but they
did see themselves as being strongly judged on the basis of their short-term
contribution to the business.
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Division in the management hierarchy
Another issue impairing commitment to partnership was the relationship
between middle managers and senior managers. Both the internal CP
research and interviews with middle managers revealed that the ‘signals’
being received by middle managers from their superiors were often non-
committal or unclear. A common feeling was that many senior managers
only paid lip service to CP and that they were not fundamentally in support
of the approach. Comments from two managers in different departments are
typical of thoughts generally on this issue.
The senior management layer above me would all ‘salute the flag’. . . .
That’s as far as it goes. Nobody has ever sat down with me and said
‘look, this is what participation is all about, the Compact is all about’.
There’d be a kind of formal approval and that’s it.
I would say that they’re [senior management] not enthusiastic. That’s
about the nearest I can go to it . . . I’m being diplomatic . . . and it’s the
same I think in most of the departments until we can prove that this is
good for Aer Rianta and it’s good for the whole of Aer Rianta, both
management and staff, then it’s an uphill battle.
It is not enough for the Chief Executive, or any of the board members,
to say they support participation . . . you have to see evidence that they
support us. Why don’t they roll up their sleeves some day and get
involved. Now I know the Chief Executive is involved in a number of
groups, which is good for a busy man, but there is a hell of a lot of
people who aren’t as busy as him who aren’t involved.
In some settings, senior management opposition had been overt. In most
other cases, there was a pervasive sense that only a small group of senior
managers was fully committed to CP. One manager explained:
I believe there are a handful of people who feel that this is an extremely
wonderful thing. There is a big band who don’t care really one way or
the other. . . . I think there is a lot of, at management level more so than
at staff level, there is much more ‘what’s it all about anyway?’, ‘I have to
say it is a good thing because I’ve been told I must’. There is a touch of
that I think.
It is harder to assess the direct impact of senior managers’ attitudes on
middle managers’ behaviour in general, but the dominance of the ‘sceptics’
among senior management, as outlined in the last chapter, may well have made
many middle managers think twice about committing themselves to a process
about which their superiors where known to harbour considerable doubt.
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A related aspect of the role of senior management was the perception of
middle managers of their superiors’ management style. Quite often this style
was seen to be authoritarian, indeed more so than the dominant style of
middle managers themselves. In consequence, some middle managers
thought many senior management figures were unlikely advocates of a par-
ticipative approach. For example, one manager stated:
I think in the corporate level . . . you have very hierarchical structures.
There is a touch of . . . ‘I am up here and you are way down there’. . . .
There are old styles. Now there are some who are very, very good on
this; have a very good style. . . . But those who don’t are not really con-
ducive to suddenly changing from being authoritative to being partici-
pative.
As with their perceptions of other employees, middle managers viewed many
established senior managers as set in their adversarial and hierarchical ways.
Practical problems
We have already highlighted middle management concern about the impact
of CP on the speed and quality of decision-making. Many managers inter-
viewed believed that decision-making would be impeded in such as way as
to interfere with the effective running of departmental business. A mainte-
nance manager’s comment was typical of such concerns:
I still think that at the end of the day we will need managers to
manage. . . . I don’t believe that this department can run on the basis of
group decisions on an ongoing basis, but that polices and directions and
issues such as grass-cutting or issues such as budget maintenance . . . can
be thrashed out in a bigger forum and CP does give us that opportunity.
A related concern was the amount of time available for middle managers to
engage effectively in the development and operation of workplace partner-
ship in a departmental context. Practical difficulties of this kind were echoed
by a finance manager:
Our biggest problem is workload versus numbers. . . . It is difficult
when you put a lot of time into something and you want to get involved
in these things to find that you are handcuffed, because you are so busy
with other things.
A further concern for middle managers was their avowed inability to point
to many concrete outputs from CP. While they were aware that the process
was relatively new, they nonetheless saw a pressing need for results. As a
maintenance manager commented:
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If it doesn’t achieve things, and I mean achieve things within . . . say six
months to twelve months, then it will just be written off as a talking
shop by a lot of people.
Conclusion
Middle management involvement in the development of CP was very
limited. Participative practices and arrangements had been championed by
sections of senior management, with support from the major trade unions.
Some middle managers had experience of CP at the early development stage
through their exposure to pilot groups and communications exercises. When
the initiative began to impact significantly on decision-making in the late
1990s, few middle managers had extensive contact with the process and its
guiding principles. Internal research provided clear indications that middle
managers viewed CP as a threat, and, at least in the case of Shannon, as
involving more negative than positive implications for the group. The main
concerns articulated were the possible erosion of the middle management
role and more diffuse fears over job security. Yet many of those interviewed
nevertheless avowed support for partnership as an approach to running the
company. A posture in which generalized support for participation by
middle managers and recognition of its benefits by middle managers went
hand in hand with concern about its likely effects on their specific interests
has been underlined in the wider literature (cf. Klein 1984), and was appar-
ent in Aer Rianta.
A dispute between the middle managers’ union, IAESA, and the JUCG,
ostensibly over the nature and purpose of membership of the JUCG, led the
union formally to withdraw from CP as the initiative entered a critical
developmental phase. The underlying dynamics of the dispute, however,
seemed to reflect considerable concern within IAESA and among many
middle managers regarding the implications of the partnership process for
the status and security of the group as a whole. While the posture of middle
management towards CP thus harboured concerns rooted in the sectional
interests of the group, the union’s stridency and effectiveness in defending
its members’ interests was limited by the ambivalence many members felt
with respect to their loyalty to the union and their role as managers within
Aer Rianta. Many members continued to involve themselves in CP initi-
atives against the policy of their union, though resenting the dilemma in
which they were placed. The next chapter will examine middle managers’
attitudes to their union and permit an assessment of whether the union’s
opposition to CP delivered any organizational premium.
It was clear that partnership was understood by middle managers primar-
ily as a means of providing opportunities for employees to ‘voice’ their opin-
ions and also as a mode of downward communication and information
provision. Few middle managers saw CP as encompassing shared decision-
making or work task restructuring. Their core understanding of the middle
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management role, indeed, involved middle managers bearing responsibility
for controlling information and making decisions. Partnership was seen
more as a buttress to union influence than as a channel for bypassing unions.
Middle managers perceived employees as being divided between those who
were sceptical and ambivalent and ‘enthusiasts’ who had more experience of
CP. Many middle managers interviewed voiced doubts about the concrete
benefits of CP, some believing that the future of the process was predicated
on the achievement of more tangible results.
While concerns rooted in the defence of their own interests account in
part for the posture of middle managers towards CP, the evidence shows
that middle managers’ attitudes were also shaped by the wider organi-
zational systems in which both they and CP were embedded. Middle man-
agers had not been systematically engaged in the development of
partnership, nor had they been the recipients of systematic training as to the
nature and effects of CP. The group had witnessed programmes for organi-
zational change come and go in the past, and were disposed to believe that
CP might go the way of previous initiatives of a similar kind. Middle man-
agers articulated what they saw as the contradictory demands arising from
the process objectives of partnership and the hard-nosed business objectives
for which they were above all held accountable by their superiors. This
dilemma was heightened by the absence of organizational systems like
performance management or reward practices that might have sought to
balance performance across ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ aspects of managers’ roles. While
the need to revise such organizational systems to provide support for CP had
been explicitly recognized, the systems developed before the advent of CP
largely remained in place in the company. Though employment security was
an explicit feature of CP, this was not perceived by middle managers as pro-
viding them with a guarantee of security in their existing job roles. The
dilemma of responding to contradictory pressures was heightened too by
pressures on time and staffing levels, which were seen to have left little scope
for participative decision-making. Perceived divisions within the manage-
ment hierarchy were also an important factor conditioning the attitudes of
middle managers. Middle managers had not been convinced of the support
of senior managers for CP and stated that ‘mixed signals’ had been received
concerning senior management support and commitment. This was in turn
compounded by the view, expressed by some, that senior managers appeared
unlikely advocates of participative approaches to working with staff.
The interviews explored the attitudes and postures of middle managers
during the high tide of partnership, when they were viewed by champions of
the Compact as the category most opposed to CP, and when their union’s
stance involved formally boycotting the initiative. The union’s stance was to
soften in 1998–99, when the newly appointed CEO invited the middle
managers’ union, IAESA, to join the SIG dealing with the company’s future.
This move responded to the major objection by IAESA that it had not been
involved as a representative body in overseeing the operation of the Compact.
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The new CEO’s support for CP, as reported in the last chapter; the signific-
ance of the SIG in question for middle managers’ future prospects; and the
subsequent transfer of IAESA to the major public sector union, IMPACT,
were important in bringing middle managers formally into CP in spite of
the attitudes and tensions revealed in the research.
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7 Trade unions
This chapter builds on the analysis of union involvement in the develop-
ment of CP in Chapter 3 by examining the role of unions in the operation of
workplace partnership in Aer Rianta, and the effects of partnership on
unions and their members. As outlined in Chapter 1, the academic literature
on unions and workplace partnership is sharply polarized between the posi-
tions of ‘advocates’ and ‘critics’. These rival groups present different views as
to the nature of trade union engagement with workplace partnership and as
to the effects of partnership on unions, union activists and union members.
Cross-cutting the debate between advocates and critics is a second keen
debate focusing on the effects of workplace partnership on relations within
unions between full-time officials and senior shop stewards on the one hand
and union activists and rank-and-file members on the other. These two
themes provide the analytical focus for this chapter and will be considered in
the next two sections.
Advocates, critics and union involvement in partnership
Amongst the most noted advocates of workplace partnership is Thomas
Kochan who, together with colleagues, has advocated the development of
partnership arrangements as a means of union renewal and of extending
employee participation (Kochan and Osterman 1994; Kochan 1995; Rubin-
stein and Kochan 2001). Kochan’s arguments are set against the failures, as
he sees them, of the New Deal system of industrial relations in the US. The
New Deal’s principal failing is that, in restricting the opportunity for
unions and employees to influence management decision-making, it has per-
petuated a low-trust spiral, from which both parties find it difficult to extri-
cate themselves. Kochan is not unmindful of the challenges that such a
departure poses for unions, in particular the fear that management might
use employee participation to undermine the union’s position. Running
against such concerns, however, is the important issue of what workers
themselves want. Drawing on research conducted by Freeman and Rogers
(1999), Kochan argues that workers are acutely aware of the existence of a
participation/representation gap; that they want greater involvement in
their work and more involvement by their representatives in the formulation
of business strategies. Workers were also seen to have little patience for
adversarial industrial relations and demonstrated a clear preference for their
union leaders to work in co-operation with management.
The challenge for employers and unions, Kochan (1995) contends, is to
find innovative ways of accommodating and meeting employees’ request for
more ‘voice’ and influence. While Kochan and Osterman (1994) ideally
favour the introduction of structures that seek integrative, joint gains solu-
tions, accompanied by bundles of human resource practices emphasizing
mutual gains and quality-focused competitive strategies, this need not
result, they argue, in the abandonment of collective bargaining. Implicit in
their argument is a call for an institutional separation of collective bargain-
ing (an adversarial and distributive process) from joint consultation (an
integrative/consensus-orientated process), which echoes Storey and Sisson’s
(1993) work in the UK. The benefits – and concerns – are seen to be broadly
similar. With joint consultation, unions are allowed scope to influence man-
agement decision-making. Unease exists that this may provide the sem-
blance but not the substance of influence. Without the power of veto, unions
may compromise their independence by involving themselves too deeply in
company decisions.
John Kelly advances a critique of partnership and of what he calls the
associated strategy of union ‘moderation’ based largely on UK experience
(Kelly 1996; 1998; 1999; 2004). His critique has two major strands. First,
drawing from a wide range of empirical evidence, Kelly seeks to demon-
strate that UK employers have grown increasingly hostile to trade unions
and collective bargaining (Kelly 1996: 88–92). Kelly concludes – not unrea-
sonably – from such aggregate trends that the outlook for partnership in the
UK is bleak, and that unions would be better served by the adoption of
more militant postures in relations with employers. The second strand of
Kelly’s critique focuses on an assessment of the features and outcomes of the
strategy of trade union ‘moderation’, which he believes to be at the core of
workplace partnership. Kelly’s original choice of a paradigm case is curi-
ously Nissan’s facility in Sunderland. From this case a general model of
‘partnership’ is developed, based on a template of single-union recognition
agreements, full flexibility arrangements and company-sponsored and con-
trolled works councils. Such a test of ‘partnership’ cannot be taken as an ade-
quate examination of the concept. Arguably such instances of union
moderation fall outside the remit of partnership altogether and are best con-
ceived as straightforward cases of employer-dominated modes of co-
operation based on pseudo-participation. Later research by Kelly (1999;
2004) does set out to examine a number of other cases of partnership in the
UK. The findings are again on the whole bleak, with ‘partnership’ com-
panies threatening to derecognize unions, or engaging in derecognition, as
well as failing to honour collective agreements which pledged to maintain
employees’ employment security and competitive wages. A study of 22
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partnership companies concludes that the rate of job losses is found to be
higher in partnership companies than in other comparable firms. Wage rises
are variable in partnership companies as contrasted with other comparable
firms. Trends in union density and influence also vary among partnership
firms (Kelly 2004). Again, however, the case needs to be made that the com-
panies chosen for examination by Kelly appear to be skewed towards
instances where partnerships emerged from companies in extremis, or forced
to implement major restructuring programmes, and include few instances
where partnership arrangements emerged in less turbulent commercial cir-
cumstances; or were jointly designed by employers and unions and embraced
multi-level and multi-stranded forms of participation and involvement –
closer to what Kelly himself describes as partnership based on ‘labour parity’
(Kelly 2004). In such cases, Kelly believes that a more even balance of power
between employers and unions, higher levels of union organization and
security and dependence by employers on union co-operation may lead to
different outcomes and a higher probability of mutual gains, including gains
for unions (Kelly 2004).
Michael Terry (2003a and b) underscores Kelly’s analysis with respect to
the balance of advantage in partnership arrangements commonly favouring
employers. Terry’s resulting emphasis on the need for a legislative basis for
partnership to bring about a more even balance of power between employers,
employees and unions provides a bridge between Kelly and Wolfgang
Streeck. Wolfgang Streeck’s arguments against the effectiveness and viability
of ‘voluntary’ forms of union–management co-operation are set against his
wider corpus of writings on German works councils and co-determination
(Streeck 1992; 1994; 1995). In contrast to works councils, voluntary partner-
ship arrangements are seen to be inherently unstable and unlikely to prosper
in the long term. Streeck’s objections to voluntary partnership are based, first,
on a deep asymmetry of power between management and organized labour.
Second, union interests are seen to be accorded legitimacy by management
only to the extent that they serve particular market functions. Third, for
Streeck the only way unions can ensure continued influence over management
actions in voluntary partnership arrangements is by, as he puts it, maintain-
ing ‘good behaviour’ (Streeck 1992: 326). Thus, the key feature of Streeck’s
critique is that ‘hard’ institutional constraints of the kind provided by the
German labour code, are necessary conditions if anything other than a parody
of strong and effective co-operative industrial relations is to emerge.
In a later work, a softening in Streeck’s position is discernible with the
recognition that new forms of management–union co-operation in some
European countries, most notably in Italy and Sweden, had developed outside
pre-existing works councils and beyond the remit of legislation and central-
ized collective agreements (Streeck 1995). It is to the voluntary nature of
such arrangements, then, that Streeck draws our attention. The reasons why
such voluntary forms of co-operation developed are explained in terms of
wider institutional conditions in which unions ‘were firmly established in
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their positions’ and ‘felt safe enough to offer themselves as agents of work-
place participation without fear of losing their representational status and
capacity’ (Streeck 1995: 329). While Streeck (1995: 330) recognizes that
these voluntary forms of co-operation are of no small significance, he never-
theless retains his earlier doubts and reservations concerning the limitations
of ‘voluntarism’.
Streeck’s argument rests on the assumption that legislation supporting
employee voice is a necessary basis for securing effective and long-lasting
forms of union–management co-operation. The issue is presented in terms of
a simple dichotomy between stable arrangements, backed by strong legal
rights, on the German model, and voluntary and thus less effective and
unstable arrangements. Even a priori, this position seems too crude. In the
light of empirical research on German works councils alone (cf. Royle 1998;
Thelen 1991), it appears more convincing to think in terms of a continuum of
effectiveness and stability along which co-operative arrangements might fall:
marked at one extreme by legally regulated and institutionally rooted co-
operation and neither legally regulated nor institutionally rooted arrange-
ments at the other extreme. Streeck’s admission, reluctant though it might
be, that other institutional forces and sets of circumstances may induce
unions and management to co-operate provides a bridge to a recurring
theme in the theoretical literature advocating partnership arrangements.
Advocates argue that the viability of workplace partnership is dependent
upon the presence of supportive HR practices, together with the promotion
of ‘strategic integration’ between HR/IR concerns and strategic manage-
ment. The question then arises as to whether the existence of such practices
and constraints might come to act as ‘functional equivalents’ to the powers
of the legal code which underpins German co-operative arrangements. If this
is indeed the case – and such a matter must be considered empirically – vol-
untary partnership arrangements may be capable of operating effectively and
durably for both management and unions where conditions are conducive.
Given the main issues in contention in the theoretical dispute between
the advocates and critics, in examining the empirical data below, we focus
on the following set of research questions.
1 Given that partnership in Aer Rianta involved, as discussed in Chapter
3, a quality-focused competitive strategy, commitment to a bundle of
human resource and industrial relations practices promoting mutual
gains, strong unions and distinct collective bargaining channels, did
unions feel sufficiently secure and confident to represent workers’ inter-
ests in partnership forums? Further, were they unimpeded by concerns
about incorporation, potential damage to terms and conditions, or
doubts regarding management’s bona fides and the durability of
partnership?
2 How did union officers and activists assess the consequences of partner-
ship? Did partnership operate to the advantage of unions and extend
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their reach into management decision-making, or were unions co-opted
and disadvantaged through their involvement in partnership?
3 Was the operation of partnership associated with union members
holding positive or negative perceptions of union effectiveness and influ-
ence?
4 To the degree that union members may have been differentially
involved in, or affected by, partnership arrangements, did a positive or
negative association exist between variations in members’ involvement
in partnership, their attitudes to union influence and effectiveness and
their level of commitment to unions?
5 Where a union opposed partnership, as arose in Aer Rianta in the case of
the middle managers’ union, IAESA, was opposition associated with
higher levels of commitment from members, or with lower levels?
Relations between officials, shop stewards, activists and
members
Cross-cutting the debate between advocates and critics is a second promi-
nent debate focused on the effects of union involvement in workplace
partnership on relations between full-time union officials (FTOs) and senior
shop stewards and rank-and-file trade union activists and members. Kochan
(1995) hails the case of partnership at GM’s Saturn plant as a learning tem-
plate. Although the Saturn local is explicitly identified as a ‘new American
style of enterprise union’, Kochan is keenly aware that the workplace union’s
long-run success – and that of workplace partnership – is dependent on an
‘affiliation with a national [union] organisation that can provide the right
type of resources and leadership’ (Kochan and Osterman 1994: 151, 163)
and support when confronted by pressures to compete by driving down
wages and other labour standards (Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). Nonethe-
less, it is clear where the emphasis is to lie: ‘unions of the future may need to
be highly autonomous and decentralized in order to be close to their
members’. Thus an important thrust of Kochan’s argument is that, for
partnership to prosper, national union officers must loosen their control over
local unions’ operations and permit local representatives more discretion in
their dealings with employers. Rubinstein and Kochan (2001) are equally
awake to the danger nonetheless of the local union organization becoming
centralized and isolated from the membership. To guard against this, they
place considerable emphasis on leadership accountability, the establishment
of dense communication networks and the preservation of competitive elec-
tions to representative positions.
Although John Kelly, like critics of partnership more generally, has given
less explicit treatment than have advocates to the implications of partnership
for trade union organization and intra-union relations, the following argu-
ments can be discerned. For Kelly (1999), it would seem that the co-
optation of unions is led by FTOs beguiled by management’s promise of an
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increased say in decision-making. In turn, FTOs are seen to assume the
‘managerial’ task of demobilizing rank-and-file resistance. In effect, union
organization becomes hierarchical and decision-making centralized around a
small privileged group. Thus, with management sponsorship, FTOs develop
separate ‘institutional interests’ from the membership.
A striking feature of the literature to date is the paucity of empirical
studies that have examined the consequences of partnership for intra-union
relations (Taylor and Ramsay 1998: 118; Rubinstein 2001). Nonetheless, a
small number of in-depth case studies of partnership initiatives exist and
provide important clues as to the conditions that generate particular pat-
terns of intra-union relations
These case studies point to partnership being associated with significant
intra-union tensions, but the implications for activists’ influence and the
future viability of partnership vary significantly between the different
organizations studied. Partnerships at Saskatoon Chemicals (Clarke and
Haiven 1999) and at United Distillers (UD) and Allied Distillers Limited
(ADL) (Marks et al. 1998) emerged against similar backgrounds: brownfield
locations, significant union strength and adversarial industrial relations. The
achievements of partnership at Saskatoon Chemicals were, in the authors’
judgement, quite extraordinary, both in respect of the inclusion of union
representatives in joint governance arrangements and of the gains won for
employees (Clarke and Haiven 1999: 178, 188). Nevertheless, considerable
tensions existed within the union as to the manner in which decision-
making influence had become concentrated around a small elite and the
accountability of officers to the membership. These tensions spilt over into
intra-union conflict and factionalism, and the initiative floundered.
In contrast to Saskatoon, partnerships at UD and ADL were imposed
upon wary union representatives and a sceptical workforce. Management set
about privileging the role and influence of FTOs who, in turn, were given
the task of winning over the support and co-operation of shop stewards and
the membership. The consequences for union representation were at once
beneficial and detrimental. FTOs were the main beneficiaries as industrial
relations considerations came to form an important element in business
strategy formulation. At plant and shopfloor level, however, the outcomes
were not so benign. In some UD plants the number of stewards was reduced
and steward management committees were replaced by plant-wide and sec-
tional consultative committees, comprised of union and non-union
members. As FTOs redirected their energies towards company-level
decision-making, a representative vacuum was left in their wake. Shop stew-
ards were not only poorly prepared to respond to the decentralization of
decision-making authority within management structures, but they were
also poorly equipped to counter line management’s newly exhibited
assertiveness.
A third well-reported case, that at Saturn, is a greenfield site facility. In
contrast to the other case-study companies, partnership was introduced
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without any undue pressure from management. From the outset, GM and
UAW representatives set about jointly developing a form of organizational
governance based on stakeholding principles. Nonetheless, similar dif-
ficulties emerged in respect of union decision-making and the legitimacy it
enjoyed amongst the membership. Management and union officers
responded by deepening and extending the partnership process: developing
so-called ‘on-line co-management by the union’. This was a key factor in winning
employees’ and representatives’ endorsement for management–union co-
operation (Rubinstein 2001; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001: chs. 2 and 4).
Critically, then, and in contrast to arrangements at UD and ADL, the conduct
of partnership was decentralized to the level of production modules, where
considerable influence was permitted to workplace union activists.
There were other tensions in respect of union organization and
representative capacity. First, there were allegations that the selection of
worker representatives to line positions by management and union leaders
had created ‘a new privileged class’ within the union, which had become
distant and removed from the membership (Rubinstein 2001: 182, 188).
Eventually these tensions gave way to the ousting of the union’s leading offi-
cers. The new leadership moved quickly to restore membership confidence
in the partnership initiative, and the union’s role therein, by increasing
shopfloor input to the selection of worker representatives. Second, tensions
existed between workplace representatives and senior national UAW offi-
cers. The latter exhibited considerable ambivalence towards the Saturn
project: principally as some of its innovations departed from, and in time, it
was feared, might come to undermine, the system of national standards and
pattern bargaining and unleash a whipsawing dynamic within the wider car
industry. The local union’s authority to initiate changes to Saturn’s contract
without first having the UAW’s approval was revoked. Saturn, then, is a
story of the creation and dismantling of a representative elite which had
become sandwiched between an alienated rank and file and a national leader-
ship feeling that it had lost control over a wayward offspring. It bears
emphasis, however, that the membership’s suspicions concerning their
employee representatives did not spill over into disillusionment with
partnership or indeed with trade unionism.
In the case studies examined, the centralization of decision-making gave
rise to a series of intra-union tensions, in most cases of a grave nature, but
which in turn had different consequences for the role and influence of
activists, union cohesion and for the future viability of partnership. As to the
mechanisms which link the centralization of union influence with discontent
among workplace activists, the following warrant particular emphasis. First,
there is the manner in which change is introduced and its consequences for
the representative capacity of stewards. Consider again the example of UD
and ADL. Partnership was imposed on the workplace union (albeit with the
participation of FTOs) and the structures of workplace governance and con-
sultation were significantly reshaped. Shop stewards lost their strategic
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coherence and became disoriented. And while workers acquiesced to partner-
ship, there was considerable disquiet and concern as to management’s
motivations. Their perceptions of partnership and its benefits were thus cast
in ambiguity and doubt. Second, there is the issue of participation. In the
cases examined here, employees’ and activists’ fears were aggravated where
there was little attempt by union officers to engage in consultation. Saska-
toon and Saturn were found to reveal contrasting tales here. Third, whether
such tensions or discontent result in intra-union conflict and resistance to
partnership, would seem to depend on the perceived possibility of maintain-
ing traditional bargaining postures and the perception of a firm’s competit-
ive position in the marketplace. The differences between UD and ADL and
Saturn and Saskatoon could not be more marked. In the former two com-
panies, there seemed little alternative but to work with management’s pro-
posals, whereas in Saskatoon and Saturn, where pro- and anti-partnership
factions developed, the option of resistance and a resort to traditional bar-
gaining postures appeared feasible.
From this review of the positions in the debate regarding the effects of
partnership on intra-union relations, we pose a second series of questions
that will guide our analysis below of data from Aer Rianta.
6 Did partnership again in this case involve centralized power and control
within participating unions and did this result in a redistribution of
power away from shop stewards and activists?
7 What were the consequences for intra-union relations and did conflict
and factionalism result?
8 Did partnership result in the emergence of an alienated and disaffected
cadre of shop stewards and activists, characterized by distinctive and
negative attitudes towards their unions’ level of power and influence and
towards CP?
Trade unions’ assessments of the effects of CP
This section begins by looking at union officials’ and activists’ attitudes
towards CP. We turn then to examine representatives’ views of the implica-
tions of partnership for the institutional position and representative capacity of
unions in Aer Rianta (AR). In doing so, we begin by considering two of the
research questions posed above. First, we consider whether on balance repre-
sentatives believed unions at AR were advantaged or disadvantaged by their
participation in CP. Second, we look at the possible effects of perceived man-
agement ambivalence on union attitudes to partnership and its durability.
Proponents, sceptics and opponents
The intensive interviews conducted with union officials, shop stewards and
activists during the first intensive fieldwork phase revealed three contrasting
Trade unions 145
shades of opinion among union representatives towards CP. The ‘propo-
nents’ comprised in the main the small group closely connected with the
development and implementation of CP. They believed partnership was
operating to the benefit of unions and their members, and that union influ-
ence had been extended into new areas of organizational decision-making.
The ‘sceptics’ were active supporters of CP and represented the vast majority
of those interviewed. They also acknowledged that partnership had the
potential to extend the reach of union influence into management decision-
making, but they feared that it faced significant obstacles, principally that
management was seen to be ambivalent and, at times, openly hostile, and
that it might not succeed over the long term.
Finally, for much of the period up to the late 1990s, the main ‘opponents’
comprised the middle management staff association, IAESA; and at least
some worker directors were opposed to the substantive proposals emerging
from CP and to the use of CP to address pay and conditions, as the Compact
began to engage major strategic and operational issues from the late 1990s.
Partnership accorded the worker directors little formal role or status, instead
establishing alternative channels of participation. IAESA’s objections had
focused on the manner in which the JUCG was constituted, its membership,
the insistence that members of the group act in a non-representational
capacity, and on the perception that IAESA had been excluded from partici-
pating in the JUCG. Once IAESA agreed to join the JUCG in January
1999, its public posture towards CP was one of active engagement and
support. IAESA representatives’ views were closer, however, to the predomi-
nant sceptical pattern of other union representatives.
Perceived advantages and disadvantages
Virtually all those union officials and activists interviewed felt that CP had
resulted in significant benefits for unions. Specifically, they highlighted the
significant improvement that had occurred in the climate of
management–union relations; the enhancement of employee and union
influence at the level of work tasks, at department, business-unit and
company levels; and generally stressed the increased attention management
now accorded to hearing employees’ views and establishing effective two-
way communication channels. The following remarks from representatives
highlight the ways in which partnership was seen to have advantaged unions
and their members:
Traditionally management decided what the problem was: ‘you’re the
problem, there’s too many of you, we have to get rid of some of you’.
Whereas the union would say, ‘this manager is useless’. They would see
him as the problem. So they weren’t talking about the same problem at
all. We insist that they start with identifying what is the problem. That
is the precondition.
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This way (via the Compact) we are more likely to reach a consensus that
benefits both unions and management, rather than an accommodation
that benefits nobody.
As we are now involved in management decision-making the goal posts
on business strategy cannot be moved.
People are now empowered on the ground to be involved in the
decision-making process in their own department. That’s something
that never happened before.
Other attendant benefits were identified: employees’ knowledge of the
company’s market position and competitive context was seen to have
improved; workers were believed to have become more willing to contribute
voluntarily to the success of the company in ways that had been absent in
the past; employees’ skills were seen to have been enhanced to the extent
that they had acquired a greater confidence in their own abilities and were
increasingly competent in participating in joint decision-making processes;
and a better quality of working life was also seen to have come into being,
with an assurance of good pay and employment security.
Union officials drew further sharp distinctions between the negative con-
sequences of traditional adversarial industrial relations processes and the
positive benefits of partnership. In contrast to the former, which was seen to
have inhibited employees’ participation in union activities, partnership was
identified as having acted as a catalyst in ‘radicalizing’ the rank and file,
encouraging union members to question and criticize union decision-
making and thereby according them greater influence over the definition
and representation of their interests. In turn, shop stewards who sought
sanctuary in a lax and lazy representation of employee interests were seen to
have been exposed and compelled to go beyond simple oppositional postures
and to identify solutions to difficulties. Adversarialism, it was believed, had
provided an easy and ready-made fall-back position for at least some shop
stewards:
Some of my own shop stewards who would have been of an antagonistic
and adversarial mind-set are now much better able to think things
through logically and better able to identify solutions, rather than
merely digging in their heels.
(senior union official)
Partnership also had the benefit of distinguishing qualitative issues from
quantitative concerns. Once qualitative issues were sorted and placed in
what was regarded as their ‘proper place’, they could then be resolved
without the appendage of financial wrangles. Issues of pay and rewards could
subsequently be taken up in collective bargaining, where traditional
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postures might be deployed. The important point, then, is that the institu-
tional separation of collective bargaining from joint decision-making
processes did not result in the ‘decommissioning’ of the power of collective
bargaining, or that ‘effort bargaining’ had ceased. As one union representat-
ive remarked: ‘Collective bargaining hasn’t stopped because we are involved
in participation and no one has ever suggested that it should stop. A lot
more change issues, however, are being developed through participation’.
Turning to the important issue of union incorporation, the most striking
aspect of officials’ and activists’ views was how rarely it was remarked upon.
When asked, interviewees were generally bemused by the question; it was
seen as an unlikely prospect. This accords with research conducted for the
JUCG examining shop stewards’ views at Shannon Airport. This found that
the majority of stewards were ‘very positive’ in their response to CP, with
only one in ten believing that there was a danger of unions ‘colluding with
management’ and of ‘shooting [themselves] in the foot’ (Offer 1998).
That there was little concern about the risk of incorporation does not
mean, however, that union officials, especially the most senior among them,
were not awake to the possibility. They believed that guarantees had been
secured to guard against such an eventuality, principally through the adop-
tion of the Compact and the Requisite Arrangements. The following elements
were pointed to: first, management had pledged to preserve the unions’
representative position and to involve representatives in any business adjust-
ment process; second, management was committed to competing on the
basis of service quality and the provision of good and secure conditions of
employment; and finally, the right to resort to traditional industrial rela-
tions processes was preserved. These provisions were seen to offer consider-
able comfort and security. One union official put it thus: (the Compact is a)
‘well balanced document that allows us (unions) to buy into a process of
change but gives a lot of protection as to how we do that’.
The perceived disadvantages of CP included the complexities and dif-
ficulties that came with the co-existence of ‘old’ and ‘new’ industrial relations
processes. Certain sections of the workforce had not entered CP either because
they had not agreed to work in partnership with management or they had not
received the requisite training. This led to some sections of the workforce
coming to define themselves as being either pro- or anti-Compact which, in
some situations, was seen to have created new rivalries, usually between
departmental boundaries. Union representatives, in turn, were compelled to
inhabit the realms of two different forms of employee representation. The
most unsettling aspect of this chameleon existence was that both proponents
and opponents of CP ‘had still to be brought behind the SIPTU banner’, as
one union official put it, and reassured that, whichever approach they sought
to pursue, they would receive the necessary support from their union. The
same official quipped: ‘It would be very useful if one was schizophrenic in this
job’. There was also the additional complication that the co-existence of two
systems allowed some employees, as one union official put it, to ‘manipulate’
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either process to advance claims and grievances. The length of time it took to
develop and diffuse partnership structures had also made it difficult for sup-
porters to demonstrate to sceptics and opponents that partnership could work
to unions’ advantage. Obviously, this difficulty was compounded by a prevail-
ing scepticism towards management’s bona fides.
The following conclusions with respect to questions 1 and 2, posed at the
outset, seem warranted by the evidence. First, officials and activists were
broadly positive in their assessments of partnership. Unions’ institutional
security was assured, their representative capacity was enhanced and their
influence over the formulation of business strategy was consolidated. These
provisions were sufficient to guard against union co-optation and any risk
that conditions of employment might be undermined. Second, and notwith-
standing this positive endorsement, union representatives remained cautious
and sceptical when evaluating the future prospects of partnership. The
equivocal support from management was identified as a significant obstacle.
Considerable doubt remained, therefore, as to the future durability of
partnership. On balance, then, the weight of evidence as presented thus far,
principally that union representatives were largely in favour of partnership
and could point to appreciable benefits, tilts the argument in favour of the
advocates with respect to our answers to research questions 1 and 2.
Union effectiveness and bargaining power
In this section we focus on the relationship between partnership and members’
attitudes to unions, and attempt to answer research questions 3–5 posed
above. Ninety-one per cent of those responding to the survey conducted in
1998–99 were trade union members. Table 7.1 examines members’ views as
to the effectiveness of unions in representing employees’ interests and as to
whether unions’ influence over management had increased over the three-year
period preceding the survey. A considerable spread of opinion existed as to the
effectiveness of Aer Rianta unions. Only 38 per cent of all employees endorsed
unions as either ‘fairly good’ or ‘very good’, and a further 23 per cent stated
that they were unsure how effective unions have been. A spread of opinion was
again evident on the issue of unions’ bargaining influence. Only a minority of
union members (15.3 per cent) took the view that union bargaining influence
over management had increased, compared with nearly 40 per cent who
believed that union bargaining influence had declined.
Overall, in answer to question 3, partnership can be said neither to have
been associated in AR with a predominant view that unions had been highly
effective and had increased their influence over management, or with the
converse view that they were ineffective and had lost influence. Positive and
negative attitudes on the former issue were almost equally divided. On the
issue of changes in union influence, negative attitudes were more than twice
as prevalent as positive attitudes, but were still outweighed by positive and
non-committal views combined.
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As outlined in Chapter 3, the penetration of partnership arrangements
varied substantially across airports, departments and groups of employees. It
is important therefore to examine question 4 outlined above: whether
members’ exposure to and involvement in partnership influenced their
assessments of the situation of unions in the company, and whether it influ-
enced their commitment to unions. In order to examine these issues, a series
of scales were used to measure levels of involvement in partnership activities
and to measure commitment to unions. Table A1 in the Appendix presents
details of the scales used to measure varying levels of contact, familiarity
with and involvement in different aspects of CP, and displays summary and
scale reliability statistics. The first scale measures variations in the level of
membership of formal CP groups and committees, as well as occupancy of support
roles. This scale allows for an examination of the impact on attitudes and
practices of union members’ involvement in the formal arrangements set in
place by CP initiatives. A second scale measures variations in more general
engagement with CP. This scale is heavily focused around the exchange of
information, feedback and discussion concerning CP issues and concerns.
A third scale focuses on communicative involvement through the receipt of
information regarding the deliberations of formal decision-making struc-
tures in the company. This scale measures the degree to which information
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Table 7.1 Attitudes to the effectiveness of unions in representing employees and to
change in their bargaining influence
All union members
(%)
How good have Aer Rianta unions or staff 
associations been in representing your interests 







Over the last three years, do you think union or staff 
association influence over management has
Increased greatly? 2.0
Increased somewhat? 13.3





Results are based on weighted data.
on the activities of established formal aspects of company decision-making
had been made available to staff – the sharing of valid information with staff
being an important principle of CP. Finally, a work participation scale seeks
to measure the degree to which employees experience scope for participation
and autonomy at work. This is captured by sets of items describing varia-
tions in how work tasks are conducted and the character of management and
supervisory styles. In a sense, this scale measures the very bedrock of CP.
The various formal structures and roles established under CP and the various
channels for wider engagement, discussion and feedback were all intended to
be part of a systematic attempt to encourage management and employees to
change the character of day-to-day work and decision-making in the
company. The greater the degree to which this had been achieved, the more
employees should have directly experienced the principles underlying CP in
their day-to-day work. But what must here be recognized also, in the light
of Chapter 3’s examination of progress with respect to CP structures and
arrangements, and especially the creation of regular work groups, around the
time of the survey, is that variations in work participation cannot be viewed
in any strict sense as a reflection solely of partnership. While CP initiatives
and the philosophy underlying CP influenced people’s work roles and rela-
tionships, other factors may also have been important: for example, pre-
existing differences between departments and areas in work organization and
management style, and indeed employees’ own concerns to seek autonomy
in their day-to-day work.
To test the influence of experience with partnership on attitudes to union
representation and bargaining influence, replies to the questions outlined in
Table 7.1 were converted into two scales. The first scale measures attitudes
to union effectiveness in representing members’ interests. On a 1–5 scale
attitudes are scored from 1, where unions are seen to be ‘very bad’ at repre-
senting members’ interests, to 5, where they are seen to be ‘very good’. A
second scale measures attitudes towards changes in union bargaining power
over management. Again responses are scored on a scale from 1, where union
bargaining power is seen to have ‘decreased greatly’ to 5, where it is seen to
have ‘increased greatly’. The critical issue here is whether members’ atti-
tudes are more positive the more involved they have been in partnership, as
the advocates would imply, or more negative, as the critics would imply.
Table 7.2 presents the results of regression models examining the association
between the various facets of union members’ experience of partnership and
their attitudes to union representation and bargaining influence. A series of
control variables is also entered into the regressions. The underlying atti-
tudes to unions of different categories of staff are controlled through dummy
variables for senior managers, middle managers and supervisors. Possible
differences in attitudes by gender and age groups are also controlled through
dummy variables (under 35s versus older age groups), as are differences spe-
cific to airport locations (Cork and Shannon airports relative to Dublin). For























































































































































































































































































































































What emerges from the results in Table 7.2 is that only work participa-
tion influences the attitudes examined, and in a positive direction. The more
scope union members enjoy to make decisions about the conduct of their
jobs, the more positively they view union representation and the more likely
they are to believe that unions have increased their bargaining power over
management. The evidence thus provides modest support for the proponents
of union engagement with partnership – modest because most attributes of
partnership appear to have no effect and because work participation explains
little of the variance in the attitudes to unions examined.
Commitment to unions
We move now to examine whether experience with partnership in AR
affects members’ commitment to their unions. Union commitment is meas-
ured using the 12-item version of the scale developed by Gordon et al.
(1980). Individual scale items, associated descriptive statistics and scale reli-
ability statistics, are outlined in Table A2. The composite scale is expected
to comprise four underlying dimensions: ‘loyalty to the union’, ‘belief in the
union’, ‘responsibility to the union’ and ‘willingness to work for the union’
(Gordon et al. 1980). The existence of these underlying dimensions was con-
firmed through factor analysis. Sub-scales measuring the four discrete
aspects of union commitment and associated items are thus also presented in
Table A2. Table 7.3 examines the effects of experiences with CP on the
composite measure of union commitment and on each discrete aspect or
mode of commitment. The control variables outlined above are again
entered into all regressions reported. A variable measuring perceptions of
the industrial relations climate, sometimes found to influence union
commitment (see Deery et al. 1994), is also entered as a control variable (and
is insignificant in all equations). Results for the underlying attitudes of dif-
ferent staff categories are presented in Table 7.3 and these will be discussed
in the next section.
The results show that engagement with CP is positively associated with
union commitment. This holds both for the composite measure of union
commitment and for two of its discrete dimensions: belief in the union and
willingness to work for the union.
So the evidence is that the more union members had been informed and
informed themselves of participative activities and the greater the degree to
which they had debated and discussed what had occurred under the rubric of
CP, the more committed they were to their unions. This finding is consis-
tent with the claims of the advocates. Because the data are cross-sectional,
however, the possibility that members more highly committed to their
unions may have engaged with CP cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled
out that these results might be attributable to reciprocal causation. The
various other modes of involvement appear to have had no effect on union


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































benefited in commitment terms from work participation, membership of
formal partnership groups and committees, or from communicative involve-
ment with respect to the formal decision-making structures of the company.
Middle management opposition to CP and union commitment
In this section we seek to answer research question 5 posed at the outset:
whether a union that opposes partnership benefits in respect of a higher level
of union commitment relative to other unions, or may be penalized by a
lower level of commitment. As reported in Chapter 6, the Aer Rianta
middle managers’ union, IAESA, was a strong critic of CP in the period pre-
ceding the survey. We examine, therefore, whether the union’s opposition to
partnership was associated – as might be consistent with the claims of critics
– with a higher level of commitment on the part of its members. The results
outlined in Table 7.3 provide little support for this view. The table reports
the relative commitment levels of middle managers, supervisors and senior
managers, as compared with the ‘other employees’ group. All managerial
and supervisory groups show lower levels of commitment to unions on some
or all dimensions of commitment than non-managerial and non-supervisory
employees. What stands out, however, is that middle managers show the
lowest relative level of commitment of all groups. This might be attributable
in part to the apparent ambivalence of IAESA members towards their
union’s injunction against co-operation with CP, as reported in Chapter 6,
and what seems to have sometimes been overt or covert defiance of the offi-
cial union line. Whatever the explanation, the survey evidence appears
inconsistent with the view that IAESA’s opposition to CP (until the late
1990s) might have garnered credit among members of the union in general.
Partnership, centralized decision-making and its effects
We turn next to an examination of questions 6–8 above regarding the pos-
sible effects of union involvement in workplace partnership on intra-union
relations. As in the case of the empirical studies of partnership reviewed
above, CP in Aer Rianta was associated at the outset with centralized
decision-making and influence, focused around a small group of FTOs, and
subsequently around a small group comprised of union and management
representatives. There were two main reasons why this came to pass. First,
increased influence was conceded to this small group of FTOs at the behest of
lay activists and other FTOs when discussions within Aer Rianta reached an
impasse with respect to how the legislative provisions of the 1988 Worker
Participation Act might be transposed into practice. The legislation was not
prescriptive but allowed employers, unions and employees to devise their
own preferred form of participation. Opinions within Aer Rianta did not
divide neatly along union–management lines; views differed within both
groupings. In an attempt to overcome this stalemate, a joint
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management–union body was established to consider how participation
might be defined and operationalized. Critically, union activists within AR
reasoned that, as a number of FTOs had prior experience of translating the
legislation into practice in other state-owned companies and, as they were
better informed of debates with respect to different models of participation,
it would be more appropriate to hand responsibility for the discussions over
to them. Subsequently, a close affinity developed between these FTOs and
one senior manager and (although there were some changes in personnel on
the union side) they were to become the key drivers in shaping the CP
process. Second, as CP took shape, decision-making remained centralized
around this key group within the JUCG, principally to ensure, as they rea-
soned, that the initiative would be protected from those opposed to its
development. CP’s key animators thus saw themselves performing an
important protective and nurturing function.
We review here the views of FTOs and ‘involved activists’ as they relate
to the centralized nature of decision-making within the JUCG. The other
important issue of whether, as commonly reported in the literature, partner-
ship resulted in a redistribution of power in favour of FTOs and away from
activists within participating unions is also assessed. For evidence we rely on
in-depth interviews and a variety of other measures and institutional indic-
ators. To the degree that partnership involved centralized decision-making
around a closed circle within the JUCG and a redistribution of power within
unions more generally, the analytical task is to understand the consequences
for shop stewards’ and activists’ support for and attitudes towards partner-
ship and trade unionism.
As outlined above, the interviews revealed three groups with distinctive
attitudes towards CP: ‘proponents’, ‘sceptics’ and ‘opponents’. The propo-
nents reported little concern with centralized decision-making and saw few
problems arising with respect to relations between those actively involved in
central partnership arrangements and union representatives and activists in
general. We review here, therefore, the views of the sceptics and the oppon-
ents as they relate to centralized decision-making within the JUCG and
unions, and the consequences for intra-union relations and for partnership.
A principal concern of the sceptics was that CP had become too closely
associated with, and controlled by, a small group. Significantly, this view
was shared both by activists and by those FTOs who were not part of this
small union management group. As one such FTO described the situation:
The concept of partnership is exactly what we [unions] need. But I have
some reservations about how it functions. The fundamental difficulty I
have is that so much of it resides with the [key management and union
animators]. I have to use the word ‘control’ rather than ‘guiding’.
Critics also complained that the JUCG as an institution had been relegated
to a ‘talking shop’. As such it had assumed a largely ineffective role as an
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initiator and developer of policies but provided a basis for the exercise of
influence by a small cadre of FTOs and managers. Otherwise, the JUCG
acted largely as a secretariat for the CP initiative.
Frustration with centralized decision-making showed itself in a number
of ways. One was the difficulty of establishing departmental autonomy over
the development of work groups or departmental groups, as indicated in one
of the quotations above. Another was the practice of dissuading SIGs and
SGs from making firm recommendations in discussion documents. In
respect, for example, of the report on the company’s Change of Status, which
had been prepared for the government minister responsible for Aer Rianta, a
compilation of differing views was presented, without any preferred position
being identified and articulated.
The outcome of the Change of Status Group was very much a wasted
exercise. It was a collection of opinions which neither had any focus nor
any thrust to it. Every point that was ever raised was listed and left.
Once again they [the group’s participants] were told what exactly they
were about and they were not allowed to develop it [the report] beyond
that. If an agreed position had been put to the Minister by the unions
and the company, think of how much influence that would have had. It
would certainly have been greater than a . . . list of points.
The central figures did not dismiss the charge that they ‘controlled’ SIGs’
and SGs’ activities, but in their defence argued that this was necessary to
guarantee managerial and union rights to dissent if they sought fit. Their
argument centred on protecting CP: if groups were permitted a free hand,
there was the danger that they and CP would be seen to challenge manage-
ment and union powers, and to displace established industrial relations pro-
cedures. One key animator of CP explained it thus:
We have never asked the unions or management to give over any of
their prerogatives to us. And that does a number of things. It leaves the
group free to explore things in a non-threatening way because the
unions and management can deny anything that comes out of it.
It was also clear from our observations of JUCG meetings that decision-
making had indeed become centralized within the JUCG in the manner por-
trayed by our interviewees. First, CP’s key animators acted as a ‘clearing
house’ for all CP documents, materials and proposals; second, they closely
scrutinized and sought to determine the pace of development of partnership
activities in the various departments; third, they appointed CP facilitators
and mentors across the three airports; fourth, they devised training pro-
grammes for activists and facilitators which were deliberately conceived as
integrative devices; and finally, as indicated above, they discouraged discus-
sion groups from prescribing preferred courses of action in their reports.
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Thus the concerns expressed by interviewees with the manner in which
decision-making had become centralized within the JUCG parallel those
identified in other investigations of workplace partnership. There are
important points of contrast, however. In Aer Rianta, decision-making in
respect of the development of CP resided within a small management–union
caucus, but only a small number of FTOs formed part of this group. As a
consequence, both activists and some FTOs were unhappy with the manner
in which control had been exercised over CP’s activities. In other studies of
partnership, decision-making was also centralized but it was the preserve of
FTOs and excluded shopfloor activists. This is an important difference.
There are two other contrasting points which are of more significance, espe-
cially in respect of understanding the contingencies which have a bearing on
explaining whether or not partnership gives rise to factionalism and intra-
union conflict. First, while arrangements for the development and imple-
mentation of partnership in AR were indeed centralized around a small
group, as documented above, partnership did not result in the ‘centraliza-
tion’ of power within participating unions per se. Centralized decision-
making within the JUCG did not lead to power being wrested away from
shop stewards and activists. There was no indication from our interviews or
from other sources that, prior to partnership, shop stewards and activists had
exercised more influence within unions and that CP had somehow resulted
in power being redistributed in favour of FTOs to the detriment of shopfloor
representatives. The decision as to whether to operate ‘under the Compact’ or
to continue with traditional adversarial approaches was taken at section level
by employees and their representatives, although such decisions were then
notified as a matter of form to unions’ branch secretaries. Where they opted
to work under partnership principles, local activists were central to the
development of CP, albeit the JUCG core group continued to scrutinize and
control these processes from a distance. But more importantly, CP did not
result in any major dislocation in activists’ roles, such that work practices or
existing agreements were altered ‘above their heads’ in exclusive dealings
between FTOs and management, as was the situation in some of the other
partnership cases reported in the literature.
Another point of contrast with other studies of partnership was that,
while activists and FTOs in Aer Rianta had concerns in respect of the cen-
tralized nature of decision-making within the JUCG, this did not culminate
in active resistance to CP. Possible indicators of activists’ displacement and
resistance such as meetings to campaign against partnership, intra-union
conflict, and factions opposed to partnership contesting union elections – as
witnessed in other studies of partnership – were not observed in Aer Rianta.
Resistance in Aer Rianta came from two other quarters and these repre-
sent the opponents to CP. The resistance from the middle management
union, IAESA, did in part reflect an objection to centralized decision-
making within the JUCG and to the ‘summit politics’ which were seen to
be exclusive to other unions’ representatives and senior management. But
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IAESA’s decision to stand apart from and oppose partnership was rooted also
in their anxieties regarding the implications of participative management
for the union’s members.
Within the ranks of union members and activists, some worker directors
became dissatisfied with partnership. They were to voice their objections to
CP, principally that joint groups did not have a formal mandate to speak for
union members, that the pre-ordained division of spheres between collective
bargaining and partnership was being eroded, and also that the proposed
privatization of the company did not have the full support of the workforce.
Some of these issues were to achieve a greater resonance as CP began
to engage with major issues of reorganization and restructuring at depart-
mental level within Aer Rianta. They are discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 10.
Thus in response to research questions 6 and 7 posed above, the following
conclusions seem warranted. First, partnership in AR, as in other cases
reported in the literature, did involve centralized structures and arrange-
ments. In this sense, the development and implementation of partnership
was controlled by a closed circle, in which a number of FTOs gained promi-
nence. This was a source of some concern among other FTOs and activists.
Second, although CP involved centralized decision-making within the
JUCG, this did not result in a fundamental shift in the balance of power
within unions, of the type witnessed in other studies, and involving a redis-
tribution of power and influence in favour of FTOs at the expense of stew-
ards and activists. Nor was any change in activists’ role or influence plotted
or executed de haut en bas. Finally, whatever objection FTOs and activists
had towards the manner in which CP’s key animators sought to control
decision-making in respect of the design and implementation of partnership,
this did not result in intra-union factionalism or in overt resistance to
partnership.
Shop stewards’ attitudes to partnership
In this section we examine levels of involvement of shop stewards and
activists in CP and consider, as posed in research question 8 above, whether
they display more negative attitudes to partnership than the rank and file, or
any otherwise distinctive set of attitudes that might point towards acute dis-
affection.
The first approach we have adopted involves examining whether the
behaviour and attitudes of shop stewards and activists reveal lower levels of
involvement in partnership and more negative attitudes towards its effects
than union rank-and-file members. This analysis proceeds by examining the
signs and significance levels of coefficients on dummy variables for shop
stewards and activists in a series of multiple regressions. The regressions
incorporate a series of controls for variables that might affect involvement in
partnership and attitudes towards its effects. Possible differences by staff
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category are controlled by dummy variables for senior managers, middle
managers and supervisors (with other employees as the reference category).
Possible differences by gender and age group are also controlled (under 35s
versus older age groups). As the climate towards partnership varied across
the airports, with Dublin appearing the most receptive and Cork the least
receptive, airport dummy variables were also entered as controls (Cork and
Shannon, with Dublin as the reference category). For economy of presenta-
tion, the results of control variables are again omitted from tables.
Of those sampled in the survey, 8.3 per cent said that they were currently
shop stewards and a further 13.5 per cent said that they were ‘actively
involved in union affairs and business’. The involvement of shop stewards in
formal CP groups and committees varied from 55.6 per cent who partici-
pated in regular work groups, to 29.5 per cent who were members of SIGs.
Activists had lower levels of participation varying from 36.5 per cent
(regular work groups) to 20.9 per cent (SIGs). Levels of engagement with
CP were very high in the case of both groups. For example, 69.4 per cent of
shop stewards and 70.5 per cent of activists attended CP seminars or train-
ing sessions.
Table 7.4 shows that shop stewards and activists were also highly
involved in CP relative to the rank and file. This is the case with respect to
participation in formal groups and committees (equation 7.4.1), as well as
with respect to wider engagement in training, information exchange, discus-
sion and debate (equation 7.4.2). Overall, there is scant evidence here that
shop stewards or activists had seceded from or abandoned CP as a con-
sequence of disaffection arising from centralized decision-making.
It is also important to examine shop stewards’ and activists’ attitudes to
union performance under CP relative to rank-and-file members. The key
issue is whether shop stewards and activists were even harsher critics of
union performance under CP and less convinced of the effects of CP than
members in general – pointing towards acute disaffection and alienation.
This is also examined in the regressions in Table 7.4. Shop stewards emerge
as more likely to believe that unions had been effective in representing their
members than the body of trade union opinion (equation 7.4.4). Neither
shop stewards nor activists were more positive regarding changes in union
influence (equation 7.4.5). Attitudes to the effects of partnership on a series
of facets of decision-making and on levels of trust between unions and man-
agement were measured by combining a series of five questions. Details of
scale items and scale reliability statistics are outlined in Table A3. Both
shop stewards and activists were more likely to believe that CP had benefi-
cial effects (equation 7.4.6). The issue of whether employees’ interests were
better represented by CP is a component of the scale used to measure atti-
tudes to the effects of CP in equation 7.4.6. As this is a key issue, however,
we examine it separately and specifically in equation 7.4.7, where it emerges
that activists rather than shop stewards were more likely to be of this view.









































































































































































































































































































































sibility that groups of union members may exist with distinctive attitudes
to union performance and the effects of CP. If this is the case, it will be of
interest to examine whether shop stewards and activists might be concen-
trated among such groups. For example, it might be hypothesized that
groups broadly equivalent to advocates for partnership, sceptics of partner-
ship and critics of partnership can be found among the body of union
members and that shop stewards and activists might be concentrated among
the second such group: less critical and disaffected than some members but
still less positive and convinced than others. To test this hypothesis, a series
of latent class models was fitted to the three variables measuring attitudes to
union effectiveness and influence and attitudes to CP (for an examination of
latent class analysis, see Hagenaars and McCutcheon 2002; for details of the
software program used here see http://www.latentgold.com).
The results are detailed in Table 7.5. The best-fitting model suggests that
four clusters or latent classes are identifiable. Cluster 1 comprises 87 per
cent of union members who were either of the view that union influence
over management had stayed the same or had decreased somewhat (scale
response categories 2 and 3 combined). Cluster 2 is characterized by the
view that unions are fairly good in representing members’ interests and that
their bargaining influence had either not changed or had increased some-
what. Cluster 3’s attitude is that unions are very bad at representing their
members’ interests and that their bargaining influence has decreased greatly.
Cluster 4, which represents only 7 per cent of union members, is character-
ized by the view that unions are fairly good in representing their members’
interests, that it is either unclear whether their bargaining influence had
changed or increased somewhat, and that CP had beneficial consequences.
The important issue for the displaced activist thesis is how shop stewards
and activists are distributed across these clusters. The evidence provided by
the beta coefficients for the covariates in Table 7.5 suggests that they are
more likely to be in cluster 4 – the most positive overall cluster with respect
to partnership and its effects – but that the result is not statistically robust.
Overall, therefore, the latent class cluster analysis discounts the view that
shop stewards and activists can be viewed in any meaningful sense as critics
or sceptics; they are more likely to be found in the sample, if not the survey
population, among those with the most positive attitudes towards the effects
of partnership, with positive attitudes towards union effectiveness and with
neutral to mildly positive views as to changes in union influence.
Conclusions
A series of research questions was derived from the debate between advocates
and critics concerning the effects of voluntary partnership, as well as from
the literature on the possible effects of partnership on intra-union relations.
The first question considered whether partnership of the type implemented
in Aer Rianta provided unions with a basis for active co-operation with
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management without fears of incorporation, potential damage to terms and
conditions of employment, management’s bona fides and the durability of
partnership. The evidence suggests that the absence of a legislative frame-
work had not precluded the emergence and development of a significant vol-
untary partnership initiative and that unions’ strength and institutional
security were, to a significant degree, the key to their willingness to proceed
along partnership lines. Unions actively engaged in partnership on several
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Table 7.5 Attitudes to unions and to constructive participation: latent class cluster
analysis results
Model fit statistics: L2 =364.1; df=342; p=0.20 (testing that additional class(es) required
for model fit).
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Cluster size 0.5297 0.2507 0.1520 0.0675
Union effectiveness
Very bad 1 0.0916 0.0067 0.6095 0.0004
2 0.3316 0.0751 0.3407 0.0109
Unsure 3 0.2682 0.1875 0.0426 0.0726
4 0.2942 0.6350 0.0072 0.6540
Very good 5 0.0144 0.0956 0.0001 0.2621
Change in union influence
Decreased greatly 1 0.1095 0.0004 0.9805 0.0007
2 0.3683 0.0239 0.0194 0.0322
Stayed much the same 3 0.5018 0.5459 0.0002 0.5964
4 0.0202 0.3687 0.0000 0.3268
Increased greatly 5 0.0002 0.0610 0.0000 0.0439
Attitudes to effects of CP1
Strongly disagree/disagree 1 0.2491 0.1102 0.4344 0.0002
2 0.2062 0.1405 0.2309 0.0017
Disagree/can’t decide 3 0.1843 0.1712 0.1584 0.0076
4 0.2271 0.2880 0.1344 0.0620
Agree 5 0.1283 0.2901 0.1419 0.9285
Beta Beta Beta Beta
Cluster covariates:
Shop stewards2 0.9585 1.4786 1.2840 3.7211
Activists3 0.4699 3.9330 1.1842 4.5871
Notes
1 For ease of estimation and presentation, the categories of 5–25 scale were reduced to a 5-
category scale. The resulting descriptive anchors in the table are broadly equivalent to the
points ranges involved in the non-grouped categories and reveal a skew towards the lower
points ranges, as discussed in the text of the paper.
2 Difference in distribution across clusters: p=0.51.
3 Difference in distribution across clusters: p=0.29.
major strategic issues and a range of operational issues. There was little
evident fear of incorporation or damage to terms and conditions. Doubts
regarding management’s bona fides and commitment did not impair the co-
operation proferred in any discernible manner. With regard to the second
question, which concerned the balance of advantage for unions in partner-
ship arrangements, the evidence suggests that union officials and activists
closely involved with partnership assessed its effects on unions’ representat-
ive capacity and power in positive terms. Considerable benefits accrued:
unions’ institutional security was guaranteed, unions’ organization and cohe-
sion had strengthened; the frontier of worker and union influence was
extended into new areas of organizational decision-making; and employees’
skills and the quality of their working lives were enhanced. At the same
time, collective bargaining had not been displaced, but remained an indis-
pensable adjunct to the development of partnership. Nonetheless, union rep-
resentatives were aware of the difficulties faced and the tensions generated
and harboured continuing doubts regarding management’s commitment to
partnership and its long-term durability.
Question 3 considered the relationship between unions’ involvement in
partnership and union members’ attitudes to union effectiveness and power.
The survey results are neither consistent in a straightforward way with the
hopes of the advocates nor with the fears of the critics. Partnership had
clearly not proved to be transformative in its overall effects on attitudes in
either a positive or negative direction. Positive and negative attitudes
towards union effectiveness and influence were equally pronounced. That
such a spread of opinion existed probably reflected to some degree the
uneven and contested reach of partnership structures and initiatives across
different categories of staff and across the three airports.
Interest then turned to question 4 regarding the effects of differential
levels of involvement in partnership on members’ attitudes to unions.
Notwithstanding the conventional reservations regarding the interpretation
of cause-and-effect relationships in cross-sectional data, the more workers
had engaged with certain aspects of partnership the more positively disposed
they were towards unions’ effectiveness and the more committed they were
to their unions. But their experience of other features of partnership
appeared to have had no effect on members’ perception and assessment of
union influence or rank-and-file commitment to unions. In answer to the
final question regarding whether opposition to partnership might reward
unions, IAESA’s decision to stand apart from and oppose partnership until
the late 1990s appears to have garnered the union little credit in the eyes of
its members, judged in terms of relative levels of union commitment among
middle managers.
At the same time, aspects of the functioning of partnership illustrate
some of the concerns expressed by the critics and raise the issue of the long-
term survival of CP. Management ambivalence and opposition, as reported
in earlier chapters, limited the spread of partnership in Aer Rianta and con-
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ditioned the areas or issues around which it had taken root. Overlying
unions’ positive responses to partnership was a persistent concern as to
whether it would prosper or survive in the face of management attitudes.
In the literature, both advocates and critics of union involvement in
workplace partnership present a series of theoretical arguments regarding
the potential effects of centralization under partnership arrangements. The
most serious effect identified concerns such as the likely displacement of
shop stewards and activists resulting in factionalism and conflict within
unions. A number of case studies of partnership have confirmed the existence
of a series of tensions or conflicts, of varying degrees of seriousness for union
cohesion. These arise from the negotiation of ‘peak-level’ agreements on the
shape and import of partnership between FTOs and senior management, and
from a centralization of union power under partnership around ‘elite’
groups.
The issue of centralization and its effects was rehearsed in in-depth inter-
views with FTOs and activists in AR. Union activists and some officials
expressed concerns over the manner in which partnership was associated
with centralized decision-making around a small group of union and man-
agement representatives. But these reservations apart, shop stewards and
activists participated in and supported CP activities. The attitudes of shop
stewards and activists did not reveal a hostile or alienated grouping within
the ranks of union membership. If anything, workplace representatives
appeared more positive in their views than the rank and file. The sternest
challenge to partnership in Aer Rianta was to come not from displaced, dis-
affected and disempowered activists, but from among another group of
worker representatives, the worker directors, operating at the apex of
decision-making structures in the organization. Critically, then, while some
FTOs, shop stewards and activists might have had reservations and concerns
over the manner in which a small group of management and union represen-
tatives sought to steer and control decision-making in regard to the imple-
mentation of CP, they were not sufficiently critical or opposed to move to
obstruct the development of partnership, or to damage the standing of
unions.
Among the contingencies that distinguish Aer Rianta from other cases
reported in the literature and that may also cast light on differences between
the reported cases, the following appear to merit emphasis. First, partner-
ship in Aer Rianta originated in a joint union–management commitment to
building a new type of industrial relations consistent with the principles of
CP. FTOs were permitted to explore such a new model and the resulting
partnership arrangements were not seen to have been imposed under duress.
No displacement of traditional shop steward or activist roles and
representative arrangements occurred and established collective bargaining
procedures and processes remained in place in parallel with partnership
arrangements. Critically, partnership in Aer Rianta did not involve, as in
other cases, a redistribution of power towards FTOs at the expense of
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shopfloor representatives. That this had not occurred would seem to have
been an important factor in explaining the absence of opposition and the
relatively positive orientation among shopfloor representatives towards
partnership. Shop stewards, too, were encouraged to engage with partner-
ship initiatives at multiple levels and training was provided on the union
side to cover the new negotiating and representative skills required by CP.
Many of these features seem to have been absent in the UD and ADL cases
and at Saskatoon Chemicals, where serious intra-union conflict arose.
Second, the context of the partnership initiative in Aer Rianta, as in
Saturn, was positive, with joint commitment to partnership as a new model
of industrial relations and joint design of partnership arrangements. What
distinguishes Saturn from Aer Rianta, however, was the unique radicalism of
the former, which entailed the near complete encoding of partnership into
mainstream organizational structures and into decision-making processes at
all levels. This required intensive involvement by shop stewards and
activists and effectively left them with only one model of representation and
trade unionism. The partnership initiative in Aer Rianta was, as has been
outlined, more variable in its penetration of mainstream decision processes
and co-existed with established industrial relations structures. Shop stewards
could in this sense ‘ride either horse’ or even both in their dealings with
management. This set of contingencies at Aer Rianta, we would argue,
involving less disturbance to traditional roles and structures than observed
in UD, ADL or Saskatoon Chemicals, and less radicalism in partnership
arrangements than at the unique Saturn experiment, account in major
degree for the findings reported in this chapter. The major import of the
findings reported here is that the displaced-activist thesis cannot be
sustained as a valid generalization with respect to the functioning of
partnership.
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8 Employee attitudes and
behaviour
The effects of voluntary partnership arrangements on attitudes and behavi-
our at work have yet to be studied to any significant degree. The effects of
different aspects of CP on work attitudes and behaviour will be examined
systematically in this chapter. The next chapter will examine whether
partnership in Aer Rianta led to the emergence of dual commitment. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, the recent literature on partnership reflects a long-
running interest in the more general theme of the impact of participative
arrangements and work reorganization on employees, and the relevant liter-
ature on participative arrangements and teamwork in general will first be
examined in the next three sections before key issues arising from the more
recent literature on the effects of partnership are highlighted. The rest of the
chapter will examine the effects of CP on work-related attitudes and behavi-
our, as revealed in the survey conducted during 1998–99, as well as in two
earlier surveys conducted in association with preparation for the implemen-
tation of partnership in Aer Rianta.
Interest in participation
Research generally confirms that significant numbers of employees wish to
exercise a greater say over decisions affecting their jobs and working lives
(for reviews of relevant research, cf. Wall and Lischeron 1977; IDE 1981;
Drago and Wooden 1991). Employees value good pay and conditions and
employment security, but they also value the opportunity to use their abili-
ties, good relations with supervisors and jobs that allow them to use their
initiative. Moreover, these work attributes appear to be becoming more
important to employees over time, as well as good pay and security (Gallie
and White 1993: 13–14). A study of employee attitudes in Saturn and in
Chrysler’s North Jefferson plants also shows a positive demand for participa-
tive arrangements in two plants combining team production with
autonomous working arrangements and union involvement in management
decision-making. Shaiken et al. (1997: 29–35) interviewed 120 workers split
evenly across both plants. They found that workers rated both plants highly,
particularly when compared with plants where they had previously worked.
Workers reported liking their level of involvement and participation in
decision-making most about working in the plants.
Some theories of long-running change in employee priorities in advanced
economies have posited a ‘culture shift’, involving, in the world of work, a
more emphatic concern for autonomy and ‘self-actualization’ or the pursuit
of challenge and development (Kanter 1978; Rose 1989; Inglehart 1990).
This trend has been generalized to trade union members by US comment-
ators (cf. Heckscher 1988). Some commentators have sought to link rising
skill with employees’ growing propensity to seek greater influence in the
workplace, as well as pointing to the negative consequences for commitment
and performance if traditional control strategies fail to change in the light of
changing employee priorities (Walton 1985; Rose 1989; Gallie et al. 1998).
Reviewing the research literature on employees’ interest in involvement
and participation, Marchington aptly comments that: ‘Employees are
attracted to the general concept of involvement and participation; indeed it
would be remarkable if they were not, given that the alternative is to argue
for autocratic and non-communicative management styles!’ (1995: 290–1).
It has been observed that surveys reveal employees as being more inter-
ested in a direct say in matters affecting their own work domain (their job,
work group, department, etc.) than in joint decision-making powers with
management (Blumberg 1968; Wall and Lischeron 1977; Marchington
1995: 291). This position warrants caution, however, for five reasons. First,
surveys of employee involvement have seldom been conducted in partner-
ship contexts where multi-level channels of influence are in operation, so
reliable data on the priority that employees accord different channels or
levels of influence in such contexts have yet to be obtained. Second,
employees in practice enjoy least influence over wider aspects of company
decision-making (Gallie and White 1993; Gallie et al. 1998: ch. 4; Cully et
al. 1999: 151–3). In consequence, they have less experience of the ways in
which such influence might be exercised; the possible effects of influence
over company decision-making and the implications for their own interests
(Drago and Wooden 1991; Wilpert 1998: 59–60). Third, studies commonly
report that employees do indeed express interest in more scope for participa-
tion in high-level or long-term decisions, as well as in work-based decisions
(Wall and Lischeron 1977; IDE 1981; Freeman and Rogers 1999; ICTU
1998; 2001). Some studies report that employees have a preference for forms
of involvement based on co-operative relations with management, or based
explicitly on partnership (Freeman and Rogers 1999: ch. 3; ICTU 2001).
Fourth, employees may at once seek wider involvement in organizational
governance while being critical of the degree to which available channels
actually allow them to have any meaningful influence, or possibly critical of
the manner in which influence can be exercised through existing channels.
Thus, the large-scale employee attitude survey undertaken in the UK in
1992 by Gallie and his colleagues shows that, in the minority of workplaces
where works councils exist, employees rarely saw them as having significant
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influence. At the same time, the same survey revealed very substantial levels
of dissatisfaction with existing levels of participation in organizational change
– suggesting a desire for influence that goes well beyond immediate issues
affecting the job (Gallie and White 1993: 39; Gallie et al. 1998: 103–4).
Fifth, both theory and evidence suggest that employees’ attitudes and
behaviour may be most strongly influenced by forms of participation and
involvement that combine direct and indirect channels or forums. Empirical
studies undertaken during the 1970s concluded that direct and indirect par-
ticipation should be seen as complementary and that the most effective
forms of participation were likely to combine both approaches (IDE 1981:
328–9; Wall and Lischeron 1977: 150). This theme was carried forward into
the theoretical and empirical partnership literature (Cutcher-Gershenfeld
and Verma 1994; Guest and Peccei 2001).
Effects of participation
In the late 1960s, a classic review of international experiences with various
forms of worker participation concluded that they were highly positive in
their impact on attitudes and performance (Blumberg 1968). During the
1970s and 1980s, greater scepticism was apparent, as more careful reviews
were undertaken of the claims of earlier studies and their supporting
methodologies (Wall and Lischeron 1977). The mammoth study of indus-
trial democracy in 134 establishments in 11 European countries and Israel,
undertaken during the 1970s, nevertheless presented a broadly positive
picture of the relationship between individual-level involvement,
representative involvement and worker attitudes (IDE 1981). Data from a
sample of nearly 8,000 employees suggested that variations in direct partici-
pation at the individual level were associated with variations in individual
satisfaction with work and the company (IDE 1981: ch. 8).
Survey-based studies undertaken internationally during the 1990s indi-
cated that employee involvement in decision-making was generally associated
with higher levels of commitment and more positive attitudes towards the
employer and industrial relations. Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) report evid-
ence for the US and Japan based on large samples of employees in plants in a
range of manufacturing industries. Appelbaum et al. (2000) also report results
for the US based on large samples of employees in plants in the steel, clothing
and medical electronics industries. Lincoln and Kalleberg’s surveys show that
a number of features of task participation have positive and substantively
significant effects on attitudes. ‘Job complexity’, levels of ‘job autonomy’, and
‘intrinsic rewards’ from work (mainly involving ‘meaningful’ and ‘challenging’
work) have positive effects on organizational commitment and job satisfaction
in both the US and Japan (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: ch. 4). Quality-circle
membership is also associated with higher organizational commitment in both
countries (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 121–2). Lincoln and Kalleberg sum-
marize their results in unequivocal terms:
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Taken as a whole, the findings suggest that organizational designs and
management practices which engender ‘responsible autonomy’ . . . as
well as participation, integration, careers and intrinsic rewards foster
loyalty and diminish alienation in a workforce.
(1990: 123)
Freeman and Roger’s surveys of employees in the US found that particip-
ants in employee involvement programmes reported making more frequent
suggestions to management and that management was more likely to act on
these. The same study showed that a majority of participants in employee
involvement programmes believed that such programmes raised productiv-
ity (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 103–5).
Appelbaum and her colleagues’ research (2000) established that employee
experiences of various forms of involvement and participation in US manu-
facturing have been positive in the main. In their survey of 4,000
employees, variations in employees’ involvement in ‘high performance work
systems’ (HPWSs) are shown to have positive effects on levels of trust in
management, intrinsic returns from work, job satisfaction and organi-
zational commitment (Appelbaum et al. 2000: ch. 9). While the detailed
pattern of findings with respect to the effects of discrete dimensions of
employees’ ‘opportunity to participate’ differs across the industries studied,
in general the degree of autonomy over task-level decisions emerges as the most
significant and robust influence on employee attitudes. Levels of stress were
also found to be inversely related to employees’ opportunities to participate
(Appelbaum et al. 2000: 198). Again Appelbaum et al. interpret their results
as providing a strong endorsement of participative forms of work organi-
zation:
Taken as a whole, our results suggest that the core characteristics of
HPWSs – having autonomy over task-level decision making, member-
ship in self-directed production and off-line teams and communication
with people outside the work group – generally enhance workers’ levels
of organizational commitment and job satisfaction.
(Appelbaum et al. 2000: 201)
Gallie et al. (1998: chs 4 and 9) found that variations in levels of direct or
task participation were associated with more positive attitudes to change;
with perceptions that the organization was operating effectively; with posit-
ive attitudes to the quality of management–union relations; and with levels
of organizational commitment. Levels of ‘communicative involvement’ –
comprising the issuing of news of what was happening in the organization,
the holding of meetings where such information was imparted and where
employees could express their views – were also positively related to percep-
tions of organizational effectiveness, the quality of management–union rela-
tions and organizational commitment. In contrast, indirect representation
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through works councils was found to have had no consistent positive effects
on employee attitudes (Gallie et al. 1998: 112–13, 115–16, 253).
Work reorganization and teamwork
Commentators who advocate ‘empowerment’ look upon management
motivations for introducing participative schemes as congruent with
employees’ interest in having a greater say over decisions which affect their
daily working lives. A series of imperatives, most emanating from the
market place, is commonly identified as having compelled employers to con-
sider granting employees greater participation in their work in recent
decades. This has led in turn to a number of ‘up-beat’ accounts, with the
declaration that the nature of work and employment regulation had been, or
was about to be, transformed. The sharpest presentation of this trans-
formation thesis is Walton’s (1985) famous claim that there had been a shift
from the ‘management of control’ to the ‘management of commitment’. Par-
ticipation, principally through teamworking, was seen to have a number of
advantages for management. It would lead to lower labour costs by reducing
performance-monitoring costs, flattening hierarchical structures, and
tapping employees’ discretionary efforts and tacit knowledge. Workers were
also seen to benefit through the elimination of routinized, boring jobs.
Greater job satisfaction would also flow from increased training, enhanced
skills and greater autonomy. In the workplace partnership literature, teams
are also accredited with considerable influence in helping to create industrial
harmony by replacing adversarial forms of ‘job control’ and work organi-
zation (Kochan et al. 1986).
These claims, as well as their managerialist bias, have become the focus of
much criticism (cf. Godard and Delaney 2000; Ramsay et al. 2000; Webb
1996). While most commentators are now agreed that the scenario por-
trayed by those who espoused an ‘empowerment’ perspective on teamwork is
deeply flawed, there is still some considerable debate and disagreement as to
what constitutes a more accurate portrayal of the nature and consequences of
teamworking. A critical perspective arguing that work reorganization has
resulted merely in intensifying work and increasing the exploitation of
employees has enjoyed considerable popularity. The consequences of the
introduction of new work structures are here seen to be detrimental to
employees’ welfare, resulting in job losses and effort intensification (Sewell
and Wilkinson 1992; Sewell 1998). Hyman and Mason (1995: 191, 193) in
their review of employee involvement initiatives argue that: ‘basically and
critically, empowerment becomes a euphemism for work intensification’ and
that similar practices are being ‘used to disguise workers’ growing occupa-
tional impoverishment’. In this sense, it is claimed, management’s motives
are the same as they have always been; all that has changed is the means by
which they are pursued. Few benefits are seen to accrue to workers.
The difficulty many observers have with the ‘exploitation’ thesis is that it
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overstates the degree to which management is able, or indeed would wish, to
use teamworking more fully to exploit workers. Such determinism is in turn
matched by a view of workers who are seen to be readily passive and mal-
leable in the face of new management ideas and, as argued by Barker (1993:
1999), impotent in the face of worker indoctrination (cf. Hales 2000;
McCabe 2000; Geary 2003). The fundamental failing of the ‘exploitation’
perspective is that, by simply inverting the optimism of the empowerment
thesis, it ironically shares with it the belief that new work practices actually
achieve their stated objectives (Edwards 2001).
Most accounts of teamworking and other employee involvement initi-
atives now report a more complex picture (Marchington et al. 1994; Wilkin-
son et al. 1998; Wright and Edwards 1998; Hales 2000; Geary and Dobbins
2001). In their review of the evidence, Edwards et al. (2002a) conclude that
management initiatives are ‘more limited and controlled than the enthusi-
asts claim, but more constructive than the critics admit’; essentially that the
intentions and consequences of management’s actions are more complex and
variable than allowed for by either camp. In place then of the ‘empower-
ment’ and ‘exploitation’ theses, is proposed the ‘re-regulation perspective’
(Geary 1995; 2003; Edwards et al. 2002a). The starting point of the re-
regulation view is that new forms of work organization entail both auto-
nomy and control, and embraced within managerial actions are a series of
tensions and ambiguities. The management problem of identifying the
apposite balance between exercising control and generating employee con-
sensus remains. Workers may assume greater responsibility for their work
and be permitted greater involvement in work organization, but this may
not lead to wider empowerment. While there may be a shift away from
direct command-and-control mechanisms, this cannot be read as an aban-
donment of all forms of control. Rather there is often a shift to new means of
control, which may, at first sight, seem less constraining. It is the failure to
understand this distinction, as Edwards (2001) stresses, which underlies
many of the more up-beat managerialist accounts, which contrast traditional
supervision with alleged autonomy and empowerment. But the move from
traditional authority structures – as incomplete and partial as it may be –
has resulted in the deployment of a different mix of control structures. In
this sense, ‘new forms of work organization are a re-regulation of work, not
the end of regulation’ (Edwards et al. 2002a: 52).
Complementing this perspective is Batt’s research on the effects of self-
managed teams in a former Bell regional telephone company in the US (Batt
2004). Batt notes that the utility studied introduced self-managed teams as
part of a partnership programme with the union: a context likely to be most
conducive to the delivery of mutual gains through teamwork (Batt 2004:
190–1). The research reveals that, in the case of non-managerial and non-
supervisory workers, self-managed teams were associated with higher levels
of discretion, employment security and satisfaction. These results, however,
did not generalize to supervisors or middle managers. Supervisors reported
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lower levels of satisfaction, derived mainly from higher job insecurity.
Middle managers involved in initiating self-management were somewhat
more positive in their attitudes than other managers (Batt 2004: 197–205).
Echoing the literature on middle managers and partnership, discussed in
Chapter 6, Batt concludes that self-managed teams have differential effects
across organizational hierarchies. In the organization studied, the self-
managed teams programme was thus abandoned ‘for political reasons’ in
spite of pay-offs for the firm, employees and union and their congruence
with the joint partnership programme. Both teamwork and the partnership
programme eventually collapsed due to the political turbulence created by
self-managed teams, the company ultimately shifting to a programme of re-
engineering and downsizing (Batt 2004: 206–7).
Drawing from the general literature on participation, involvement and
teamwork, the following questions can be posed to focus the analysis of data
on Aer Rianta.
1 Was there a significant level of interest in more scope for work-level and
organizational-level participation in Aer Rianta prior to the establish-
ment of CP, and how was this distributed across grades and categories of
staff?
2 Did participation under CP positively affect work-related attitudes and
behaviour?
3 What were the effects on attitudes and behaviour of teamwork in the
form of the ‘regular work groups’ instituted by CP?
Partnership, attitudes and behaviour
As discussed in Chapter 1, direct and indirect participation and work reor-
ganization are commonly examined in studies that fail to distinguish
between unionized and non-union contexts, or fail to consider union
involvement in different forms of participation and work reorganization as a
mediating variable affecting attitudes, behaviour and outcomes. Studies that
examine participation and work reorganization in the context or under the
rubric of ‘partnership’ also commonly fail to distinguish between union and
non-union contexts. Even studies that deal with partnership arrangements
that involve unions tend to examine attitudes and behaviour indirectly
through management reports of their effects on employees (for example,
Cooke 1990); presume that partnership affects attitudes and behaviour in
ways that contribute to organizational performance and other outcomes
without demonstrating such effects (for example, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and
Verma 1994 and Rubinstein and Kochan 2001); or more or less ignore
employee attitudes and behaviour altogether, focusing instead on objective
outcomes like pay, employment security and union influence (for example,
Kelly 2004). An exception is Kelly and Kelly’s (1991) examination of
the effects on attitudes and behaviour of various ‘new industrial relations
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practices’ (profit-sharing, share ownership, quality circles, autonomous
teams), as reported in a number of US and UK studies conducted during the
1980s. This review concludes that such practices had few effects, reporting
in particular that employees’ perceptions of the state of industrial relations –
that is, the degree to which there was a perception of ‘them and us’ – as well
as levels of commitment were little affected by experiences of new industrial
relations practices (Kelly and Kelly 1991). Some of the research dealing with
‘dual commitment’, to be examined in Chapter 9, also represents an excep-
tion in directly examining attitudes and behaviour, although much of this
research preceded the advent of ‘new industrial relations’ or partnership.
A number of research questions concerning attitudinal and behavioural
effects arise from the literature on partnership, and these will provide a focus
for the analysis of later sections of the chapter.
4 As partnership often involves the creation of channels for participation
at multiple levels and with respect to a range of issues, did the various
channels established under CP each positively affect work-related atti-
tudes and behaviour?
5 Consistent with the claims and findings of a number of theoretical and
empirical studies of partnership (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma 1994;
Guest and Peccei 2001), did involvement in multiple channels, espe-
cially channels combining direct and indirect participation, affect work-
related attitudes and behaviour to a greater degree than participation in
single channels in isolation?
6 Did involvement in CP arrangements affect attitudes and behaviour in a
manner consistent with the ‘mutual gains’ principle (Kochan and Oster-
man 1994; Knell 1999), or the ‘unbalanced’ or ‘constrained mutuality’
principle (Osterman 1999; Guest and Peccei 2001)? Critical here is
whether CP positively affected organizational commitment and produc-
tivity, as well as employees’ well-being and satisfaction, or whether its
effects on commitment and productivity were more pronounced (Kelly
2004).
Interest in participation in Aer Rianta
As outlined in Chapter 3, two employee attitude surveys had been carried
out in Aer Rianta before the research reported in this study was undertaken.
The first survey was conducted in 1988, as figures in management and
unions began to consider developing a new approach to participation in the
company. The survey was repeated in 1995 against the background of the
emergence of the Compact and the formalization of CP. The surveys
employed probability sampling; 702 employees responded to the first
survey, giving a response rate of 73 per cent, and 664 responded to the 1995
survey, giving a response rate of 66 per cent. In the analysis that follows,
data from both surveys have been pooled, unless otherwise specified.
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The 1988 and 1995 surveys contain data on actual levels of participation
and involvement in Aer Rianta, as perceived by employees, and on levels of
interest in more extensive participation. Using pooled data from both
surveys, indicators were constructed of the scale of disparities between actual
and preferred levels of participation with respect to aspects of task-level or
work participation. For each aspect of participation covered, five categories
are defined. These are labelled ‘a good deal too little say’, ‘too little say’,
‘correct amount of say’, ‘too much say’ and ‘a good deal too much say’. As
can be seen from Table 8.1, employees in general reported that they were
interested in significantly higher levels of influence with respect to work
tasks than available to them in the period prior to the formalization of
partnership in Aer Rianta. Substantial proportions of the Aer Rianta work-
force responded in a manner that indicated that they enjoyed too little, or a
great deal too little say in task-based decision-making. Slightly fewer than
one in four to one in three suggested that they enjoyed levels of influence
commensurate with their wishes, and only small minorities reported having
too much influence over aspects of their day-to-day work.
Pooled data from the 1988 and 1995 surveys also provide an indication of
employees’ views as to the levels of information obtained from a series of
decision-making forums in the company. The kind of ‘communicative
involvement’ at issue here is ‘downward communication’, but the results are
broadly consistent with those on task-based participation. Table 8.2 explores
the scale of the disparities or gaps reported by employees with respect to the
actual information available to them relative to their levels of interest in
obtaining information with respect to activities at different levels of the
company. It is again clear that a substantial majority of employees obtained
too little or a good deal too little information from the levels of decision-
making examined in the surveys, and broadly in equal measure across the
various levels.
The answer to the first part of question 1 above, therefore, is that signific-
ant underlying levels of interest in greater scope for participation at
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Table 8.1 Disparities between actual and preferred levels of task participation
Planning Improving Setting Organizing
work work methods targets workloads
(%) (%) (%) (%)
A good deal too little say 13.9 23.1 30.5 25.3
Too little say 38.9 46.1 42.9 39.4
Correct amount of say 32.8 26.5 22.5 30.8
Too much say 4.5 4.3 3.7 4.5
A good deal too much say 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0
N 1,359 1,357 1,350 1,352
Source: Pooled Aer Rianta Surveys 1988 and 1995.
multiple levels existed in Aer Rianta prior to the implementation of CP. In
this context it is also of interest to examine the distribution of the demand
for higher participation across categories of staff and locations. Data from
the 1988 and 1995 surveys are less than ideal for analysing differential levels
of interest in more participation across grades because only about 50 per
cent of respondents identified their grades in the surveys. Nevertheless, from
the data available it is possible to distinguish the postures of middle and
supervisory management and other employees and to compare these to
senior and executive management. Table 8.3 indicates that interest in
greater scope for task-based participation and in communicative involve-
ment is hierarchically ordered: middle managers and supervisors showing
greater levels of interest than senior and executive managers and non-man-
agerial, non-supervisory employees showing the highest levels of interest in
all aspects of participation and involvement. Levels of interest in scope for
further participation appear to be have been lower overall in Cork and
Shannon than in Dublin, though the scale of the differences across locations
are very modest, as compared with those across grades.
In summary, the 1988 and 1995 survey results were focused on attitudes
towards participation in work tasks, wider aspects of supervision and control
and downward-information provision. The results indicated high levels of
interest among employees in extending the scope available to them for influ-
ence on the job, as well as in obtaining more information on the delibera-
tions of decision-making forums than available to them. Comparatively few
expressed themselves to be satisfied with the status quo with respect to par-
ticipation in either area. Those least satisfied with the status quo and
showing the highest level of interest in further participation were employees
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Table 8.2 Disparities between actual and preferred levels of communicative partici-
pation in Aer Rianta
Board Corporate senior Airport senior Local
meetings management management departmental
(%) meetings meetings meetings
(%) (%) (%)
A good deal too little 
information 27.8 29.6 34.0 34.3
Too little information 50.3 51.1 48.1 45.6
Correct amount of 
information 17.0 15.4 14.4 16.5
Too much information 4.9 3.7 3.4 3.3
A good deal too much 
information 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
N 1,362 1,361 1,361 1,361

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































located at the base of the organizational hierarchy. While underlying levels
of interest in more scope for participation and involvement appeared lower
in Cork and Shannon than in Dublin, differences across airports were modest
compared with differences across grades. In these respects, the historical
evidence on the climate among employees towards participation in Aer
Rianta prior to the formalization and roll-out of partnership showed it to
have been positive, especially among those enjoying least participation
within the prevailing decision-making regime.
CP, attitudes and behaviour
As is clear from earlier chapters, the level of activity associated with work-
place partnership in Aer Rianta rose substantially from 1995, when formal
agreement was reached on the Compact and participative arrangements were
rolled out consistent with the mechanisms agreed in the Requisite Arrange-
ments. The circumstances of the period from 1995 to 1999 were also differ-
ent in that employees were now being invited to engage with a more or less
well-articulated model of participation, characterized by a distinct set of
arrangements designed to foster direct and indirect participation at a series
of levels and across a range of issues. Up to the mid 1990s, participation had
been espoused by supporters in the company; and alternative approaches to
participation had been debated within management and unions. Now a
particular model focused action and debate on the issue in Aer Rianta. The
CP model became the focus, in particular, of differences of view among
senior managers, as outlined in Chapters 4 to 6. As the pace of participative
activity increased, disputes surrounding CP also arose, in particular the
dispute with the middle managers’ union, IAESA. The period 1998–99
marked a further intensification of activity, as CP engaged key issues like
the loss of duty-free sales and the future of the company. Against this back-
drop, this section examines levels of involvement in CP; attitudes towards
CP; and the effects of participative activities on work-related attitudes and
behaviour.
Levels of involvement in CP
By 1998–99, awareness of CP was almost ubiquitous in Aer Rianta: sub-
stantial majorities of over 90 per cent across all categories said that they
were either ‘very aware’ or ‘somewhat aware’ of the initiative. Table 8.4 pre-
sents data on levels of formal membership or involvement in the various
organs of CP. Between 20 and 30 per cent of staff stated that they were
members of a ‘regular work group’. Because, as outlined in Chapter 3,
regular work groups, as provided for under CP, had only been established to
any major extent in the maintenance department and to a more limited
extent in finance, survey responses appear to have exaggerated the incidence
of RWG membership – a common problem in surveys dealing with the
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incidence of group and teamwork initiatives. Membership of ‘departmental
steering or work groups’, ranged from between 13 to 24 per cent, and that
of ‘departmental strategy groups’ ranged between 11 and 32 per cent.
‘Significant issues’ groups involved between 7 per cent (supervisors) and 55
per cent (senior managers) of staff, while 15 to 34 per cent acted as
‘observers’ at any of the aforementioned groups. Substantially smaller
numbers acted as ‘participation mentors’ within departments, or as ‘partici-
pation office facilitators’. What stands out from Table 8.4 is that not insub-
stantial minorities of staff played some role in the formal organs of CP. For
categories other than senior managers, some of these roles involved staff
selected in effect as representatives of their respective grades. However in
line with the canons of CP, those involved in formal participative structures
were viewed, and were expected to view themselves, as contributors to a
pooling of expertise rather than as representatives in the strict sense or
defenders of the interests of their specific grades or categories. The table also
reveals the relatively high demands placed by CP on senior managers. Table
8.5 examines the incidence of involvement in multiple organs of CP.
Bearing in mind that there may have been some measurement error with
respect to the incidence of RWG membership, up to 33 per cent of the
workforce as a whole are revealed to have occupied one or more roles in the
main formal groups and committees associated with CP. An estimated 24
per cent of these occupied from one to three roles in CP.
Respondents were also asked to indicate whether they had engaged ‘fre-
quently’, ‘occasionally’ or ‘never’ with a series of broader aspects of CP and
related activity. Activities like attendance at departmental and union meet-
ings at which CP was discussed, the reading of newsletters, attendance at
staff seminars and the receipt of feedback on CP from colleagues, are also
forms of involvement in or, as they will here be described, ‘engagement’
with CP. These responses were combined in Chapter 7 into a scale measur-
ing engagement with CP (see Appendix Table A1 for details of scale con-
struction). What emerges from the more detailed examination of different
facets of engagement with CP, presented in Table 8.6, is that a substantial
majority of staff across all categories had deliberated on CP through their
attendance at departmental meetings at which it had been discussed;
through discussing CP with colleagues; through receiving feedback from
colleagues involved in formal organs of CP; through reading newsletters
dealing with CP; and through attending seminars devoted to the subject.
Attendance at union meetings covering CP involved only minorities across
all categories, as did attendance at exhibitions and use of the CP library.
There is no clear-cut evidence in these tables concerning the extent of
middle management alienation from CP. However, some indicators point to
a lower level of middle management engagement than might be expected
given these managers’ central role in operational-level management. For
example, a significant gradient in levels of membership of formal structures
usually separated senior managers from all other categories, with middle































































































































































































































































































































managers showing a profile of involvement or non-involvement more similar
to other categories than senior managers. The same holds for aspects of
wider engagement with CP (Table 8.6), especially with respect to activities
that involve, so to speak, ‘visible engagement’. Thus sharp gradients separ-
ate senior and middle management involvement with respect to attendance
at departmental meetings at which CP was discussed; attendance at staff
seminars focused on the area; and the receipt of feedback from colleagues
involved in CP. At the same time, consistent with the evidence reported in
Chapter 6, actual levels of involvement by middle managers indicate that
the dispute with the middle managers’ union, IAESA, by no means wholly
precluded middle management engagement, however reluctant, ambiguous
or cautious that engagement might sometimes have been in practice.
A multivariate analysis of membership of CP groups and committees and
occupancy of CP roles revealed no significant differences across airports. A
similar analysis of levels of engagement with broader aspects of CP revealed
significantly lower levels of engagement in Cork across a range of areas,
including attendance at CP seminars organized by the JUCG, attendance at
union meetings where CP was discussed and discussions with colleagues
about CP. This pattern no doubt reflects the effects of Cork’s near secession
from CP prior to the retirement of its former general manager, and possibly
also the continuing rumblings of the dispute at Cork over the appointment
of facilitators. Reflecting the discussion in Chapter 3 of the uneven penetra-
tion of CP across departments, statistical analysis revealed that the members
of the maintenance trades were most likely to be formally involved in CP
groups and committees in general, followed by people working in retailing
and cleaning. Levels of engagement in CP also followed this pattern, with
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Table 8.5 Multiple membership of groups and committees and occupancy of
support roles established under constructive participation
(%) N
Membership of groups and committees and 











Data relate to the seven committees, groups and roles listed in Table 8.4.
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Table 8.6 Levels of engagement with constructive participation
Senior managers Middle managers Supervisors Other workers
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Attendance at departmental meetings or training sessions at which constructive
participation was discussed:
Frequently 29.5 9.7 16.9 13.0
Occasionally 59.1 51.9 38.5 47.9
Never 11.4 38.3 44.6 39.1
Read departmental newsletters on constructive participation:
Frequently 54.5 20.9 24.5 19.9
Occasionally 29.5 51.0 50.3 51.5
Never 15.9 28.1 25.2 28.6
Read company/union newsletters on constructive participation:
Frequently 55.3 27.0 23.5 22.5
Occasionally 36.2 60.4 59.1 53.3
Never 8.5 12.6 17.4 24.2
Attendance at any staff seminars on constructive participation arranged by the Joint
Union Company Group:
Frequently 25.0 10.8 12.2 13.3
Occasionally 47.7 53.8 43.5 45.6
Never 27.3 35.4 44.2 41.1
Attendance at exhibitions on constructive participation arranged by the Joint Union
Company Group:
Frequently 15.6 5.8 5.6 4.6
Occasionally 40.0 23.7 25.4 21.3
Never 44.4 70.5 69.0 74.1
Attendance at union meetings where constructive participation was discussed:
Frequently 10.8 3.8 7.0 9.6
Occasionally 13.5 33.3 21.8 24.3
Never 75.7 62.8 71.1 66.1
Use of constructive participation library:
Frequently 8.9 1.9 3.4 2.1
Occasionally 17.6 7.0 6.9 6.0
Never 73.3 91.1 89.7 91.8
Discussed constructive participation with colleagues:
Frequently 40.4 27.0 23.5 25.5
Occasionally 48.9 53.5 55.7 58.0
Never 10.6 19.5 20.8 16.5
Received feedback from colleagues involved in constructive participation:
Frequently 23.9 20.8 18.1 23.2
Occasionally 63.0 37.7 45.0 44.3
Never 13.0 41.5 36.9 32.5
Note
Based on unweighted samples in each staff category.
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trades very substantially more likely than any other category to have
engaged with CP.
Assessments of CP
In examining question 2 above concerning the effects of CP on attitudes and
behaviour, it is relevant to consider assessments of CP and its effects by Aer
Rianta staff. Table 8.7 presents the data from a series of questions in which
survey respondents were asked the degree to which they either agreed or dis-
agreed with a series of statements concerning the effects of CP. What
emerges here is that substantial numbers of employees were negative in their
assessments of the achievements or effects of CP. The proportions of
employees expressing positive attitudes towards the effects of CP across a
range of areas were by no means negligible. However, the only instances in
which a majority within any of the four categories expressed clear-cut posit-
ive attitudes concerned senior managers’ views on the effects of CP on the
representation of employees’ interests and on trust and better understanding
between management and employees. Otherwise, at best only minorities
across all categories delivered a clear-cut positive endorsement of the effects
of CP and often this was more than counterbalanced by the proportions of
staff expressing negative views with varying degrees of vehemence. Negative
assessments predominated with respect to middle managers’, supervisors’
and other workers’ views on whether more was known about what was going
on because of CP, and with respect to whether work decisions were accepted
more easily because of CP. Negative attitudes, while held by minorities,
were more common than positive attitudes across these same staff categories
with respect to views on whether the quality of decisions was improved;
views as to whether CP slowed down decision-making; and views as to
whether understanding and trust resulted from CP. In the case of views as to
whether employee interests were better represented by CP, the picture was
more positive with 70 per cent of senior managers endorsing CP and sub-
stantial numbers, approaching 50 per cent, in most other categories also
agreeing. A majority of senior managers alone was of the opinion that CP
slowed down decision-making (57 per cent), one in five senior managers dis-
agreeing that this was the case.
Clear-cut indications of a distinctive pattern of middle management
alienation from CP also emerged from the data in Table 8.7. Middle man-
agers were less commonly positive than other categories with respect to all
the effects of CP other than its effects in creating better understanding and
more trust between management and employees. They were also more com-
monly negative than any other category with respect to attitudes across the
range of effects. Moreover, among those middle managers expressing posit-
ive attitudes, fewer relative to other categories of staff expressed ‘strong
agreement’ across all items, other than to endorse the ease with which
decisions were accepted due to CP, and the fact that interests were better
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Table 8.7 Attitudes to constructive participation
Attitudes to CP Senior managers Middle managers Supervisors Other workers
(%) (%) (%) (%)
I know more about what is going on because of constructive participation:
Strongly agree 10.6 3.1 5.4 4.5
Agree 21.3 14.5 22.1 27.5
Can’t decide 21.3 15.1 20.1 15.6
Disagree 40.4 49.7 43.0 43.9
Strongly disagree 6.4 17.6 9.4 8.6
I accept work decisions more easily because of constructive participation:
Strongly agree 6.5 1.3 0.7 2.5
Agree 15.2 10.1 14.9 22.7
Can’t decide 32.6 14.6 19.6 22.3
Disagree 41.3 55.7 56.8 44.6
Strongly disagree 4.3 18.4 8.1 7.9
The quality of decisions is improved by constructive participation:
Strongly agree 8.7 3.2 4.8 3.7
Agree 26.1 17.8 17.7 21.2
Can’t decide 37.0 25.5 29.3 30.6
Disagree 26.1 33.1 37.4 34.7
Strongly disagree 2.2 20.4 10.9 9.8
Employee interests are better represented by constructive participation:
Strongly agree 25.5 6.3 9.5 8.3
Agree 44.7 38.0 38.5 38.4
Can’t decide 19.1 31.0 25.7 26.0
Disagree 10.6 15.2 22.3 21.5
Strongly disagree 0.0 9.5 4.1 5.8
Decision-making is made slower by constructive participation:
Strongly agree 4.3 17.8 6.1 4.9
Agree 53.2 27.4 23.6 29.2
Can’t decide 21.3 38.2 45.9 39.9
Disagree 19.1 14.6 22.3 22.6
Strongly disagree 2.1 1.9 2.0 3.3
Better understanding and trust exist between management and employees as a
result of constructive participation:
Strongly agree 17.4 3.1 2.7 3.7
Agree 37.0 25.2 24.5 19.3
Can’t decide 28.3 28.9 32.7 32.9
Disagree 13.0 32.7 32.7 35.0
Strongly disagree 4.3 10.1 7.5 9.1
Note
Data based on unweighted samples of each staff category.
represented by CP. More middle managers consistently expressed ‘strong
disagreement’ across all items than members of the other three categories of
staff examined. In short, middle managers emerged as distinctive both in
less commonly expressing positive attitudes towards the effects of CP than
any other category and in more commonly expressing negative attitudes.
Those middle managers who did express positive attitudes were also usually
less positive in their endorsement of CP than other categories and those
expressing negative attitudes were more vehement in their views.
In the light of the findings reported above that levels of engagement with
CP were lower in Cork than Shannon and Dublin, an analysis was under-
taken examining whether attitudes to the effects of CP also differed by loca-
tion. No systematic pattern of variation by location was found, with
Shannon rather than Cork showing less favourable attitudes with respect to
the effectiveness of CP in representing worker interests and in fostering
better understanding and trust between management and employees.
In summary, on the whole staff at Aer Rianta in 1998–99 were disposed
to judge the effects of CP in negative terms. The pattern of attitudes
towards CP reflected a context with a number of salient features. As was seen
from the analysis of surveys conducted in the late 1980s and mid 1990s,
most employees wished for higher levels of participation than those available
to them in Aer Rianta. Latent in such preferences in all probability were
high expectations of what CP might deliver – expectations in turn probably
intensified by the roll-out and development of CP over the period since the
mid 1990s. As reported in earlier chapters, the roll-out itself had to confront
divided senior management opinion and for a time, in formal terms at least,
the effective secession of the middle managers’ union – factors that had
affected both the pace of change and the extent to which the principles of
the Compact took root in the routine operations of the company. While
policy changes designed to reinforce CP were under joint deliberation
through the work of significant issues groups, no major changes in areas like
reward systems had occurred. The determination of many groups to tele-
scope the stages of the CP approach, by proceeding direct to problem-
solving activity, had also strained the resources of facilitators and their
capacity to support the participative initiatives underway. Finally, CP had
been in being for only a period of several years at the time of the survey, and
it might be reasonable to suppose that new arrangements might take longer
to affect attitudes and behaviour in a major way. Against the backdrop of
these factors, successes chalked up by CP, such as the handling of the duty-
free problem and the strategic review, appear to have had insufficient impact
on staff attitudes in general to outweigh the effects of the heightened expec-
tations, as well as of the strains and problems encountered by the new
approach.
Given the uneven roll-out of CP, it is also of relevance in answering ques-
tion 2 to examine whether attitudes towards CP varied with levels of
involvement in different aspects of the process. Table 8.8 presents the results
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when attitudes to CP are regressed on scales measuring different aspects of
involvement with the process. Membership of CP groups and committees,
levels of engagement with CP, communicative involvement and work par-
ticipation are measured as outlined in Chapter 7 (for details of scales and
scale reliability statistics see Appendix Table A1). With regard to work par-
ticipation, the caveats introduced when the scale was introduced in Chapter
7 should again be borne in mind. Given that little formal work reorganiza-
tion occurred in practice under CP, particularly through the establishment
of regular work groups, this scale in part measures the effects of whatever
work reorganization had occurred under the influence of CP principles. But
it may also have picked up the effects of pre-existing variations in job auto-
nomy, whether instituted by managers or carved out by employees them-
selves. The dependent variables were scaled in accordance with the response
categories presented in Table 8.7, with values ranging from ‘strongly dis-
agree’ (=1) to strongly agree (=5).
The results show that attitudes towards CP and assessments of its effects
were indeed in general more positive the more employees have been
involved in the process, whether through higher levels of work participation,
membership of formal groups, committees and occupancy of CP roles, or
through various forms of broader engagement. The results presented provide
further and more rigorous evidence that middle managers were significantly
less convinced of the benefits of CP, irrespective of their levels of participa-
tion, involvement in or engagement with the process. Given the problem of
measurement error with respect to the regular work group facet of the CP
‘groups, committees and roles’ scale, the regressions were also undertaken
with a version of this scale that excluded the RWG item. The results were
materially unaffected.
Attitudinal and behavioural effects of CP
We move now to examine the effects of a range of aspects of participation
and involvement under the CP regime on attitudes to work and work-
related behaviour. As it might be expected that the attitudes and behaviour
to be examined will be influenced by staff category – higher categories
expressing more positive attitudes towards the company and recording more
company-oriented behaviour – all regressions contain control variables for
staff category, as well as the other controls identified beneath each of the
tables. Table 8.9 examines the effects of participation and involvement on a
series of facets of attitudes towards management. These items are commonly
viewed collectively as indicators of the ‘climate’ of industrial relations. All
items are scaled on a 1–5 scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly
agree’. The results show that work participation or autonomy was consis-
tently associated with substantively important positive effects on employees’
attitudes to management. The more scope available to employees to
participate in task-level decision-making and the greater their level of task













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































autonomy, the more positively they assessed management attitudes and
behaviour. The results also show that the more information employees
obtained about the deliberations of formal decision-making bodies, the more
favourable their attitudes to management, though communicative involve-
ment had weaker and somewhat less consistent effects on attitudes to man-
agement. Engagement with CP, through feedback, discussion, training and
information exchange, had no statistically significant effect on attitudes to
management, although the coefficients within the sample were negatively
signed.
Membership of formal groups and committees and occupancy of support
roles were negatively associated with assessments of management in the case
of three out of the four items examined: in other words, membership of
formal partnership structures and occupancy of support roles were associated
with a more critical posture towards management. As noted above, the scale
used to measure this aspect of CP may have incorporated significant mea-
surement error in respect of the incidence of regular work group member-
ship. To test whether the effect of membership of formal CP groups and
committees remained robust when direct account is taken of this problem,
the regressions reported in Table 8.9 were re-estimated, first by entering a
modified version of the scale which omitted the regular work group dimen-
sion; and second by entering a control (dummy) variable for staff in the
maintenance department. As outlined above and in Chapter 3, regular work
groups were established in the main in maintenance. The dummy variable
was thus included to allow for the possibility that any effect that might
otherwise arise from the regular work group component of the overall scale
could mask the posture of members of the maintenance trades, organized by
strong and independent craft unions, towards the employer. Neither method
of re-estimating the regressions led to materially different results, suggest-
ing that the effects of membership of formal CP committees and groups, as
reported in Table 8.9, were robust and not significantly affected by measure-
ment error with respect to regular work group membership.
The finding that those more actively involved in CP structures held more
critical or negative attitudes towards the employer probably reflected the
higher expectations of CP held by those involved in these forums and roles
and their commensurately greater level of frustration with the scale of
progress actually achieved by 1998–99. An alternative explanation for this
finding is that the causal link ran in the other direction: that is, people more
critical of management became more highly involved in CP. Some manage-
ment critics of CP, as discussed in previous chapters, were disposed to argue
that it was ‘pro-union’ and attracted union activists. There was no evidence
to support this viewpoint in the survey. The average level of commitment to
unions among those with higher than average levels of membership in CP
groups and committees was no higher than the average for the sample as a
whole. It seems that those more highly involved in CP groups, committees
and roles had adopted a more ‘radical’ posture with respect to desired change




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in decision-making and management behaviour in the company and that
this accounted for their attitudes to management, as revealed in Table 8.9.
We move next to consider whether the various activities associated with
CP affected levels of organizational commitment within Aer Rianta. Organi-
zational commitment was measured using the scale developed by Porter et
al. (1974). Full details of the scale and of scale statistics are outlined in
Table A4 in the Appendix. The complete scale provides a composite
measure of variations in employees’ commitment to the organization. It has
been argued in the literature that the Porter Organizational Commitment
Scale contains sets of items measuring discrete dimensions or facets of
commitment which need to be distinguished and are worthy of study in
their own right (cf. O’Reilly and Chatman 1986; Meyer and Allen 1997;
Gallie et al. 1998: ch. 9).
Here we follow Gallie et al. (1998: 237–9) in distinguishing between
‘effort commitment’, ‘flexibility commitment’ and ‘value commitment’.
Effort commitment denotes the degree to which employees are willing to
show commitment by putting in effort over and above normal expectations
and by delivering exemplary performance. Flexibility commitment denotes a
willingness to accept any assignment to keep working for the organization.
Value commitment denotes a feeling of pride and loyalty towards the
organization and a willingness to identify with its values. Though the con-
cepts are derived from Gallie et al., the items used to measure them here are
sometimes different to those adopted by Gallie and his colleagues and
similar items are slightly differently worded (cf. Gallie et al. 1998: 237–9).
Gallie et al. further note (1998: 237) that a number of items commonly used
in commitment scales measure a rather passive or inertial dimension of
commitment, involving a ‘passive attachment or low capacity to leave the
organization’. This dimension of commitment is similar to what Meyer and
Allen (1997), in a well-known formulation of organizational commitment,
describe as ‘continuance commitment’. Meyer and Allen, however, associate
this concept as much or more with an awareness of the costs of leaving the
organization as with simple inertia or passivity (cf. Meyer and Allen 1997:
11–13). Here we will examine influences on continuance commitment, but
understood and measured more in the sense of Gallie and his colleagues than
Meyer and Allen. While this dimension of commitment might be viewed as
of lesser importance for shaping employee performance, in an economic
context such as that at Aer Rianta in the late 1990s, where the recruitment
and retention of staff had become a major concern, it is of interest to deter-
mine whether involvement in CP may have affected employees’ intentions to
remain in the company.
In examining the effects of involvement with different aspects of CP on
organizational commitment and its sub-components, it is necessary to take
account of the commonly reported finding that ‘industrial relations climate’
may also be an antecedent of organizational commitment (Angle and Perry
1986; Magenau et al. 1988; Deery et al. 1994; Snape and Chan 2000). As
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outlined above, the items included in Table 8.9 are often regarded as indic-
ators of industrial relations climate, and they are also found in this study to
scale well (Alpha=0.84). Reflecting the findings reported in Table 8.9, per-
ceptions of the overall climate of industrial relations in Aer Rianta were pos-
itively influenced by work participation and communicative involvement
and negatively influenced by membership of CP groups and committees and
occupancy of CP roles.
Reflecting international research findings, perceptions of the climate of
industrial relations were confirmed as an important antecedent of organi-
zational commitment, as shown in Table 8.10. As such, it can be concluded
that work participation and communicative involvement indirectly and posi-
tively influenced organizational commitment in Aer Rianta, while member-
ship of CP groups and committees indirectly and negatively influenced
organizational commitment: each exerting an influence through their effects
on perceptions of the industrial relations climate. However, Table 8.10 also
reveals that over and above such indirect effects, no aspect of involvement in
CP had a robust direct effect on organizational commitment in its entirety –
engagement in CP just about attaining significance at the 0.10 level.
The pattern with respect to the different types of commitment differs some-
what, however, where work participation is found to have exerted a direct
influence on ‘effort commitment’ and ‘value commitment’ over and
above the indirect effects operating through perceptions of the climate of
industrial relations.
Finally, the survey data allow for an examination of whether a series of
work practices were directly affected by involvement in different aspects of
CP. Employees were asked to indicate how their work had changed in the
three years preceding the survey as compared with before. Substantial
majorities reported working harder, more productively and more co-
operatively, said they had been willing to take on extra duties and had
become more concerned to work for the benefit of the company. Taking
account of this pattern, the effects of CP were assessed by examining the
influence of different aspects of CP on the odds that employees reported
positive changes in the work practices covered as distinct from reporting
either no change (‘the same’) or change involving them working ‘less’ hard,
less productively or less co-operatively. The results in Table 8.11 suggest
that levels of involvement in CP activities in general had not directly influ-
enced the working practices examined. Table 8.12 presents employees’ views
on the importance of a series of factors shaping the manner in which they
had worked in the three years preceding the survey. What emerges is that
changes brought about by CP had relatively little effect when compared
with commercial pressures, concern about job security, management pres-
sure or personal willingness to do a good job.
In summary and in answer to question 2 posed above, CP positively
affected attitudes to management, primarily through changes that allowed
more scope for participation in work-related decision-making and also






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































through the provision of more information on activities within the
company. Formal involvement in CP, through groups, committees and
related roles negatively affected attitudes, probably by radicalizing those
involved and increasing their frustration with the level and pace of change
that prevailed. CP also indirectly influenced organizational commitment both
positively and negatively through the effects of industrial relations climate
on commitment to Aer Rianta. Certain aspects of organizational commit-
ment, however, namely ‘effort commitment’ and ‘value commitment’ were
also influenced directly by CP, through its effects in spreading more scope for
work-related participation in the company. It appears that CP did not
significantly affect a series of changes in work practices, those changes
reflecting influences of a more conventional character.
Teamwork
Some 81 per cent of survey respondents indicated that they worked in
teams, most (55 per cent) stating that their teams had been formally estab-
lished by management. In interpreting these findings, it has to be borne in
mind that Aer Rianta had not organized work on a formal teamwork basis,
and that respondents, in the main, may have been describing a work context
that involved people on shifts or in departments working with other
employees. As outlined in Chapter 3, CP had, however, made provision for
instituting formal teamwork throughout the organization, through the cre-
ation of ‘regular work groups’. While the Requisite Arrangements document
suggested that RWGs would engage in significant task-level decision-
making, no detailed blueprint for the operation of CP teams had been
developed. Furthermore, little progress was made in establishing regular
work groups, and formal teams of this kind were confined to skilled trades
in maintenance, as well as some areas of finance at Shannon. As a significant
proportion of people working in trades were involved in regular work
groups (75 per cent), we can examine the effects of RWG membership in
trades on levels of work participation and autonomy and also on attitudes
and behaviour.
The results reported in the first row of Table 8.13 indicate that members
of regular work groups in trades had not experienced more scope for task-
level participation than other employees in Aer Rianta. It is not surprising,
therefore, to discover from the other findings reported in the table that
regular work group membership in the department with the greatest level
and depth of CP-initiated team activity had no significant effects on atti-
tudes and behaviour more generally.
With respect to the formal work teams linked to partnership in Aer
Rianta, it has to be concluded that their effects on autonomy, attitudes and
behaviour were neutral. CP-linked teams neither confirmed the optimistic
accounts of advocates, nor the pessimistic accounts of critics. What stands
out in the case of Aer Rianta was the limited progress recorded in establishing




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































formal work teams, guided by the philosophy of the Compact and, in answer
to question 3 above, the limited impact of the teams that were formally
established on patterns of working, attitudes and behaviour.
Effects of involvement in multiple CP channels
Partnership commonly involves the creation of multiple channels or forums
for employee and union involvement in decision-making, each channel pro-
viding scope for involvement in a different area or at a different level, and all
channels expected to influence attitudes to the employer, as well as employee
satisfaction and morale in a positive way. In this section we turn to an exam-
ination of questions 4 and 5 above, concerning the discrete and combined
effects of different aspects of CP on attitudes and behaviour. The analysis of
earlier sections provide an answer to question 4. Consistent with inter-
national research findings on involvement and participation in general, they
suggest that task-level involvement had the most significant and consistent
effects on a range of work-related attitudes and behaviour (but at the same
time failed to influence a range of work practices). Other channels appear to
have had more selective effects on attitudes and behaviour. For example,
communicative involvement appears to have positively affected perceptions
of the climate of industrial relations, while membership of CP groups and
committees and occupancy of CP roles appears to have engendered frustra-
tion and negatively affected perceptions of the industrial relations climate.
CP-linked formal teamwork, of limited scale or incidence in the company,
had no significant effects.
In the case of Aer Rianta, therefore, most of the CP channels in operation
had selective effects on attitudes and behaviour, in ways not clearly envis-
aged by the partnership literature. The latter seems to operate on the basis of
the premise that ‘more voice’, in the sense of more voice channels, is better
with respect to a range of valued outcomes. Judging by the findings in Aer
Rianta, this premise appears problematic and different partnership channels
can have highly specific and sometimes contrary effects.
The answer to question 5, concerning whether simultaneous involvement
in multiple channels exerts a specific effect on attitudes and behaviour over
and above the discrete effects of involvement in individual channels, requires
further analysis. As outlined in Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, this
‘vertical integration’ premise underpins important contributions to the
partnership literature, such as Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Verma’s (1994)
theoretical argument that a combination of direct/task-level and
indirect/representative involvement exerts the greatest level of influence on
outcomes valued by firms and employees, and Guest and Peccei’s (2001)
research finding that partnership firms combining direct and indirect
involvement achieve superior performance outcomes.
Two approaches were adopted to examine whether involvement in mul-
tiple aspects of CP and multiple channels, incorporating both direct and
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indirect forms of involvement, affected attitudes and behaviour. The first
was to identify (using cluster analysis) those who were relatively highly
involved across the main areas of CP examined in this chapter. Consistent
with the ‘vertical integration’ premise in the literature, this group might
have been affected in a specific manner through their relatively high level of
involvement across multiple partnership channels. To test whether this was
the case, a dummy variable representing this cluster was entered in combi-
nation with the other CP variables already examined in a series of regressions
in which the various aspects of attitudes and behaviour examined in previous
sections were denoted as dependent variables. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 8.14. For the sake of economy, only the results on the
dummy variable representing the high CP involvement cluster are shown in
the table. Only in the case of organizational commitment are the findings
consistent with the premise that involvement in direct and indirect/
representative partnership channels positively affected attitudes and behavi-
our more than involvement in either of these types of channels alone.
A second approach was adopted which tested for the effects of paired
combinations of different direct and indirect CP areas and channels (by
including interaction terms for such effects in regressions). Based on theory,
the potentially important effects here are those between scope for involve-
ment in task-level decision-making, as indexed by the work participation
scale (minus the unreliable RWG membership item), and either the scales
measuring membership of CP groups, committees and occupancy of CP
roles (minus the RWG membership item), or engagement in CP. The latter
represents a somewhat diluted form of indirect participation, but merits
consideration nonetheless, given its influence on some aspects of attitudes
and behaviour. Other pairs of partnership channels were also examined,
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Table 8.14 High constructive participation involvement, attitudes and behaviour
Independent variable Dependent variables
(Regression coefficients/odds ratio)
Industrial Organizational Changing
relations climate commitment work practices
High CP involvement cluster 0.26 2.85** 1.05
Notes
The High CP Involvement Cluster group, comprising 20 per cent of the sample, emerged in
a three cluster solution, employing K Means cluster analysis.
Controls entered for membership of CP groups, committees and occupancy of CP support
roles, engagement in CP, communicative involvement, work participation, industrial rela-
tions climate (organizational commitment regression only), location, gender, age-group and
staff category.
The dependent variable for the changing work practices regression was defined as outlined in
the note at the foot of Table 8.13. The coefficient reported is the odds ratio obtained from a
logistic regression. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.
although less well grounded in theory. To facilitate interpretation, all the
areas and channels of CP examined were transformed into binary variables in
which values of more than one standard deviation above the means of each
CP scale were coded as 1 and other values as 0. Interaction terms were based
on pair-wise combinations of the CP variables transformed in this way. All
the main dimensions of attitudes and behaviour considered above were
examined in regressions that included the interaction terms.
The interaction terms were unsuccessful in demonstrating that high
levels of involvement in specific combinations of direct and indirect channels
or areas shape attitudes and behaviour. In answer to question 5 above, the
overall pattern of evidence for AR with respect to the effects of combinations
of partnership channels on attitudes and behaviour appears unimpressive.
However, well-understood statistical problems that arise in estimating mul-
tiple interaction effects need also to be borne in mind. Also, this conclusion
does not indicate that combinations of direct and indirect partnership chan-
nels have no effects on partnership outcomes, only that they appear in the
case of Aer Rianta to have had no systematic or robust direct effects on the
dimensions of individual-level attitudes and behaviour examined here.
Mutual gains?
The final research question posed earlier in the chapter concerns whether any
positive effects of CP on attitudes and behaviour reflected beneficial effects
for both the company and employees. This is important both in the light of
the mutual gains premise that underlies the theoretical and prescriptive
literature on partnership, and in the light of research in the UK and US
which concluded that in practice the expected or actual outcomes from
partnership may be skewed towards employers (Osterman 1999; Guest and
Peccei 2001; Kelly 2004). A number of facets of attitudes and behaviour,
examined above, incorporate areas of relevance to both Aer Rianta and
employees: in particular items measuring perceptions of the climate of
industrial relations and some items measuring organizational commitment.
It is helpful, nonetheless, in considering the degree to which mutual gains
accrued from CP at the level of individual attitudes and behaviour, to focus
more directly on specific areas of concern to employees. Two items from the
organizational commitment scale provide an index of work satisfaction: ‘I
am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for, over others I
was considering at the time I joined’ and ‘for me this is the best of all pos-
sible organizations for which to work’. These items combined result in a
work satisfaction scale with an alpha coefficient of 0.73. Two items used to
measure the climate of industrial relations can also be combined to form a
scale of perceived ‘fairness’ with respect to management’s treatment of
employees: ‘in general, I find that management in Aer Rianta treats workers
fairly’ and ‘in Aer Rianta, management looks after workers’. These items
combined register an alpha coefficient of 0. 80. One item from the set
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measuring assessments of CP provides a direct indicator of how employees
assess the effects of partnership on their interests: ‘employees interests are
better represented by Constructive Participation’ (scaled from ‘strongly
agree’=5 to ‘strongly disagree’=1). Finally, while there is no direct indica-
tor in the survey of employees’ sense of employment security, an item asking
employees to assess potential influences on the way they had worked in the
three years preceding the survey provides an indirect indicator of perceptions
of job security. Respondents were asked to assess whether concerns about job
security had influenced the way they had worked, and replies were scaled
from ‘of very great importance’=4 to ‘of no importance’=1.
The results obtained when these scales and items were regressed on the
standard variables measuring different aspects of involvement in partnership
are outlined in Table 8.15. They reveal that involvement in CP had mixed
but generally positive effects on areas of particular concern to employees.
Work satisfaction was positively related to work participation. Perceived
fairness was also positively related to work participation and also to the
extent of communicative involvement. Employees perceived their interests
better served by CP the higher their level of work participation and the
higher their level of engagement with CP. Those with higher levels of work
participation were less influenced by concerns about job security but those
with higher levels of engagement with CP were more influenced by concerns
about job security. It appears that different aspects of CP thus had contrast-
ing effects: employees with higher levels of work participation feeling less
concerned about job security, while those involved in CP groups, commit-
tees and roles developed a heightened concern, based perhaps on their assess-
ments of the prospects for Aer Rianta in formal CP forums, like SIGs and
strategy groups.
In answer to question 6 posed above, the pattern of the findings overall con-
firms that mutual gains resulted from CP in the sense that involvement in dif-
ferent aspects of CP positively affected attitudes to the company and its
relations with staff, as well as areas of specific concern to employees, such as
work satisfaction, fairness and effectiveness in representing their interests. Also
relevant are the findings from the two earlier Aer Rianta surveys, that
employees wished for higher levels of involvement and participation in the
company and that CP provided many of them with opportunities for higher
levels of involvement at different levels. At the same time, it also emerged that
CP appeared to have had no effect on changes in a variety of specific work
practices that might have benefited the company, and that those most heavily
involved in formal CP groups, committees and roles were most critical of the
company’s relations with staff and most concerned about job security.
Conclusion
The surveys undertaken in Aer Rianta in 1988 and 1995 indicated 
that employees were in general interested in substantially higher levels of

















































































































































































































































































































































































participation and involvement than then available to them. This was
particularly so among those at the base of the occupational and grading
structures in the company. By the time of the 1998–99 survey, CP had
gained momentum and had led to the establishment of a series of structures,
committees and support roles, as well as to a series of channels for informa-
tion exchange, discussion and feedback concerning the workings and effects
of participative initiatives. The level of advocacy in support of partnership of
various kinds had also increased, as had the vehemence and coherence with
which participation and involvement was advocated. CP was by now the
formal policy of Aer Rianta. The build-up of momentum and the establish-
ment of formal structures, arrangements and channels, in all probability led
to expectations with respect to involvement and participation increasing
commensurately. Sizeable numbers of employees soon participated in
groups, committees and support roles established under the CP regime.
Many more engaged the process through a range of channels for discussion,
communication and feedback. CP was now expected to inform the routine
conduct of work; to shape communication and decision-making at various
levels; and to shape problem-solving initiatives focused on a series of com-
mercial challenges and significant issues facing the company. The evidence
suggests that employees in general were negative in their assessments of the
effects of CP on decision-making and interest representation. This can prob-
ably be accounted for by rising expectations and doubts as to the scale of
concrete achievements under CP. Awareness of senior management divisions
on the issue and experience of middle management resistance could also
have coloured employees’ assessment of CP. Also significant was the uneven
penetration of CP across departments and categories, and, albeit to a lesser
degree, across the airports, and the ‘top-heavy’ nature of the partnership that
was realized.
But the various channels for participation and involvement set in train
under CP had effects on attitudes to work. The higher the degree of work
participation experienced by employees, and the higher their more general
engagement with CP, the better their assessment of CP and the more posit-
ive their assessment of its effects across a range of areas. Membership of CP
groups and committees and occupancy of CP roles had positive effects in
fewer areas: the ease with which decisions were made and the quality of
decision-making. The higher the degree of work participation experienced
by employees, the more positive were their assessments of the climate of
industrial relations and the higher their level of organizational commitment.
The effect of work participation on organizational commitment overall was
mediated by its effect on perceptions of the climate of industrial relations.
The more extensive people’s involvement in groups, committees and support
roles, on the other hand, the less favourable were their assessments of the
climate of industrial relations – a finding that can best be accounted for by
the radicalism of many of those most heavily involved and their concomitant
impatience with the management ambivalence and opposition and the bar-
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riers and obstacles encountered. Though more critical of management, they
were no more ‘pro-union’ in their attitudes than employees generally and no
less committed to the organization.
No robust evidence could be found that CP increased the odds that
employees had worked harder, more productively, flexibly or co-operatively
in the three years preceding the survey. Large majorities of employees
claimed that they had been working in more onerous, productive, flexible
and co-operative ways in recent years, and they were emphatic that their
work over this period was influenced primarily by an awareness of commer-
cial pressures, concern about job security and their personal willingness to
do a good job. Compared with these forces, CP was seen to have had only a
modest impact. Evidently, external and internal pressures of a more conven-
tional nature were seen by employees as the decisive forces influencing the
way they had been working rather than participative principles, practices
and arrangements.
The establishment of regular work groups on a widespread basis in the
maintenance trades appeared to have had no specific effects on either levels
of work participation or on the attitudes and behaviour of work group
participants. The chapter also failed to identify compelling and consistent
results supporting the argument that simultaneous involvement in direct
and indirect partnership channels influenced attitudes and behaviour
particularly strongly. However, a better case can be made on the basis of the
findings that CP resulted in gains for both the company and employees in
respect of significant aspects of attitudes and behaviour. At the same time, a
series of work practices that might have benefited the company appeared not
to have been affected by CP, while formal involvement in CP groups and
forums had made employees more critical of management and more con-
cerned about job security.
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9 Dual commitment
Chapters 7 and 8 revealed that partnership in Aer Rianta was associated
neither with widespread opinion that unions were effective, nor with general
approbation with respect to the consequences of CP for decision-making or
understanding and trust between management and employees. These chap-
ters also revealed, however, that experiences of aspects of CP in the main had
positive effects on perceptions of the climate of industrial relations and on
commitment to both unions and the company. This chapter examines
whether significant numbers of employees were committed to both the
company and the union: characterized, in other words, by ‘dual commit-
ment’. The chapter begins by considering why dual commitment might be
found in organizations with formal partnership arrangements, and by report-
ing international research on dual commitment and industrial relations
practices. It then examines conceptual issues and problems that arise in the
study of dual commitment. The chapter’s main research findings are then
reported and interpreted in the concluding section in the context of the dis-
cussion of the introduction of CP in Aer Rianta in Chapters 3–6.
Dual commitment and partnership
As outlined in Chapter 1, dual commitment is a long-established concern of
US industrial relations research, where it arose originally around a concern
that unions might detract from commitment to the corporation (Deery et al.
1994). During the past two decades, the concept has become more closely
tied in the international research literature to the attitudinal and behav-
ioural effects of ‘new industrial relations’ reforms of various kinds, promot-
ing management–union co-operation (see Guest and Dewe 1991; Deery et
al. 1994; Guest 1995).
The relevance of dual commitment to voluntary partnership is clear. New
industrial relations initiatives in general and partnership initiatives specifi-
cally, seek to promote commitment to the company by involving employees
in decision-making both directly and through their trade unions. If commit-
ment to the company comes at the expense of commitment to trade unions,
serious short-term or long-term organizational problems might arise for
unions from their involvement in new industrial relations and partnership
arrangements. If, on the other hand, unions could actually strengthen their
members’ commitment by involving themselves in organizational gover-
nance, by engaging management around new agendas beyond adversarial
collective bargaining, by representing members in new and co-operative
ways, and by encouraging members to engage in various forms of direct par-
ticipation, they too stand to benefit organizationally from partnership
(Freeman and Rogers 1999; Kochan 2000). If such benefits can accrue to
trade unions, it follows that they can promote partnership in the confidence
that any advantages arising for the company, as well as for their members as
employees, will not be at their organizational expense and could, on the con-
trary, strengthen unions’ capacity to represent and mobilize their members.
Research findings
The international research literature suggests that the proposition that
partnership-type arrangements might foster dual commitment is neither
fanciful nor universally supported. US research has most commonly reported
the existence of dual commitment and has found links between dual
commitment, task participation, co-operative industrial relations pro-
grammes and positive industrial relations climates. It has also commonly
marshalled these results to support arguments that both employers and
unions can benefit from new industrial relations and partnership. Angle and
Perry (1986), for example, found that employees in municipal bus com-
panies were more committed to their companies and trade unions, the more
co-operative they perceived industrial relations to be in their workplaces.
Magenau et al. (1988) also found that job satisfaction and perceptions of a
positive climate of management–union relations were related to company
and union commitment among a sample of union members in a branch in
the US midwest.
Studies in other countries have produced more uneven or negative find-
ings. Deery et al. (1994), for example, found no evidence of dual commit-
ment among a sample of Australian white-collar workers. Positive
perceptions of the industrial relations climate were shown to be positively
associated with commitment to the company but negatively associated with
commitment to the union. The implication of this finding for Deery and his
colleagues was that union involvement in co-operative programmes might
damage members’ involvement in trade union affairs (Deery et al. 1994:
592–4). In the case of the UK, Guest and Dewe (1991) found that the level
of dual commitment was low among a sample of employees in the electron-
ics and electrical consumer industries. More prevalent was a pattern involv-
ing weak commitment to both company and union. Dually committed
employees, however, were more satisfied with the scope for involvement in
the workplace, including involvement in communication and personal
development (Guest and Dewe 1991: 91–4). The same study also reported
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data from a comparative survey suggesting that dual commitment was more
common in countries such as Germany, Sweden and Japan, where participa-
tive mechanisms – of different types – promoted ‘integrative bargaining’
and a greater sense of shared identity between organizations and their
employees.
By way of a summary of existing findings and their implications, the
following conclusions seem reasonable. Many aspects of partnership, like co-
operative industrial relations arrangements, job influence or autonomy,
positive relations with supervisors, a positive industrial relations climate and
perceived union effectiveness, have been shown to be positively associated
with organizational commitment or union commitment, or sometimes with
both types of commitment. But, on the whole, the pattern of research find-
ings, certainly outside the US, suggests that organizational commitment
and union commitment may commonly be rooted in distinctive sets of
antecedents. Research also suggests that some antecedents of commitment to
employing organizations, for example, perceptions of the climate of indus-
trial relations, could sometimes be negatively associated with commitment
to trade unions. It is thus an open and, it would seem, a highly pertinent
question whether context may matter, in the sense that positive effects on
organizational and union commitment – and thus significant levels of dual
commitment – might be more likely to be found where formal partnerships,
agreed between management and unions, result in the ‘bundling’ of many
partnership-type arrangements together in the context of joint governance
structures, supported by compatible competitive strategies and supportive
sets of HR and industrial relations practices (employment security, training
and development policies, etc.). Arguably, this may be the major question
regarding the possible link between partnership and dual commitment, and
it is this question that will be examined empirically in this chapter. First,
however, it is necessary to examine conceptual concerns that arise in the
study of dual commitment.
Conceptualizing and measuring dual commitment
To some extent, the contrasting research results, discussed above, may also
reflect differences in approaches to conceptualizing and measuring dual
commitment. While, as noted earlier, scholars broadly agree as to the nature
of commitment to the organization and commitment to the union, the same
is not true with respect to dual commitment. Gordon and Ladd (1990) go to
the heart of the most important difference of approach arising here in their
distinction between ‘dimensional’ and ‘taxonomic’ approaches to the study
of dual commitment. The dimensional approach involves separately measur-
ing organizational and union commitment and defining dual commitment
as a positive association or correlation between employees’ scores on scales
measuring each construct. Dual commitment is said to exist in instances
where a strong positive correlation is found that cannot be attributed to
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chance or sampling error. A problem with this approach is that a positive
correlation between variables measuring the constructs only shows that the
two measures co-vary but not the extent of high levels of commitment
simultaneously to unions and their employing organization (see Gordon and
Ladd 1990: 51; Guest and Dewe 1991: 83; Sverke and Sjoberg 1994:
536–7).
The taxonomic approach, on the other hand, identifies the extent of
dual commitment in terms of the attributes of individuals by locating
them within types or classes of commitment (e.g. dual commitment, union
commitment, company commitment and dual non-commitment). This is
usually done on the basis of their scores on separate scales of company and
union commitment. Critical here is the choice of the scale cut-off points
that determine how individuals are allocated to such categories.
Researchers have chosen scale cut-off points in various ways. One approach
uses absolute scale values to classify individuals. For example, those on
average selecting response options expressing ‘very high’ or ‘high’ levels of
commitment across the items on both the union and company commit-
ment scales might be identified as showing dual commitment. Alterna-
tively, those scoring on average at or above the mid points on both scales are
sometimes said to show dual commitment. An objection to this approach
is that the choice of cut-off points often appears theoretically arbitrary. If
the cut-off point chosen is modest (e.g. scale values representing such
response categories as ‘agree’ or ‘neutral’), individuals might be classified
as showing dual commitment to union and company, when, in reality,
they may be largely indifferent or, at best, moderately positively inclined
towards both the company and unions.
A second variant of the taxonomic approach uses the sample distributions of
commitment levels – usually mean or median levels within the sample – to
determine cut-off points to use in allocating individuals to commitment
classes. The objection here is that individuals expressing modest overall
levels of commitment to union and company might be classified as showing
dual commitment simply because their levels of commitment to both insti-
tutions are above average relative to the sample under study. A third variant
uses cluster analysis to reveal whether a series of classes of individuals with
distinct commitment profiles may be ‘latent’ within the sample and, where
this is shown to be the case, whether some of the latent classes thus identi-
fied are characterized by their high scores on company and union commit-
ment scales.
What should be kept in mind, above all, we would suggest is the ulti-
mate substantive concern of recent research on dual commitment in the
context of partnership and new industrial relations practices more generally:
that is to examine whether such arrangements can engender high levels of
commitment to both company and union among a significant proportion of
employees and union members. This principle will guide our analysis below
of commitment to the company and unions in Aer Rianta.
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In search of dual commitment in Aer Rianta
In this study, as outlined in Chapter 7, union commitment is measured
using the 12-item version of the scale developed by Gordon et al. (1980).
Scale details and associated scale statistics are outlined in Table A2 in the
Appendix. Organizational commitment is measured using the 15-item scale
developed by Porter et al. (1974). Details of scale items, descriptive statistics
and scale reliability statistics are outlined in Appendix Table A4. As dis-
cussed above, the dimensional approach identifies dual commitment in
terms of a strong positive association between commitment to the organi-
zation and to the union. Dual commitment is said to exist where there is a
tendency for levels of commitment to the union and organization to co-vary:
those with low commitment to the union displaying low commitment to
the organization, those with moderate commitment to the union being
moderately committed to the organization and those with high commit-
ment to the union also being highly committed to the organization.
Figure 9.1 presents a scatterplot showing the relationship between union
and organizational commitment and displays the correlation coefficient
between the variables. The scatterplot suggests that little in the way of a
linear relationship exists between the two types of commitment, and this is
confirmed by the low and insignificant correlation coefficient (r=0.028;
p=0.26). If anything, the scatterplot suggests a ‘swarm’ of points around the
middle of both commitment scales, pointing towards an underlying pattern
in which a large proportion of people in Aer Rianta were characterized by
moderate or neutral levels of commitment towards both the company and
their unions.
The taxonomic approach, discussed above, arguably conceives of dual
commitment in an intuitively and theoretically more compelling way by
examining whether a significant proportion of employees demonstrate high
levels of commitment to both union and organization, irrespective of any
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Figure 9.1 Scatterplot of union and organizational commitment.
pattern of association that may exist between the variables across their entire
range of values – the focus of the dimensional approach. The critical issue
here though is how ‘high’ is to be defined. A problem with using median or
mean values on each scale to split the sample into four quadrants – ‘dual
committed’ (equal to or above the means or medians on both scales); ‘union
committed’ (equal to or above the mean or median on the union scale only);
‘company committed’ (equal to or above the mean or median on the organi-
zational commitment scale only); and ‘dual non-committed’ (below the
means or medians on both scales) – emerges from inspecting the scatterplot
in Figure 9.1. While medians or means can be used to split the sample into
four quadrants, most of the actual values in the sample, as discussed above,
appear to cluster around the mid points of both scales, suggesting moderate
levels of commitment to both unions and the company. The use of median
or mean splits, therefore, creates commitment categories by forcing much of
the scatter of points around the mid values of both variables into neat but
rather artificial quadrants.
It seems preferable to use the scale options presented to those responding
to the survey as a basis for identifying ‘high’ commitment to both unions
and the company. This amounts to relying on the actual responses of those
surveyed rather than statistically defined distributions within the sample.
For each item on the union and company commitment scales, outlined in
Tables A2 and A4, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which
they either agreed or disagreed with a statement. The response options,
coded 1–5, were ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘unsure’, ‘agree’ and ‘strongly
agree’. Using the pattern of responses to the 15 company commitment items
and 12 union commitment items, it is possible to identify as ‘highly com-
mitted’ those whose composite scores on each scale are consistent with an
average overall pattern of response within the ‘agree’ to ‘strongly agree’
range; to identify as non-committed those with composite scores falling on
average within the ‘disagree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ range, and to identify as
‘neutral’ those whose average scores fall between these two intervals. Follow-
ing this approach and cross-tabulating total points scores on each of the
commitment scales, we derive the nine (3 3) descriptive categories of
commitment outlined in Table 9.1. What emerges from this analysis is that
the underlying level of dual commitment in Aer Rianta – here defined as the
proportion affirming positive overall attitudes to the items on each scale –
was very modest indeed. What emerges is that the bulk of the sample was
concentrated in and around the category of neutral towards both the union
and management or neutral towards one and committed to the other – a
finding also suggested by the scatterplot in Figure 9.1.
To cross-validate these findings, standard cluster analysis was undertaken
on the union and organizational commitment scales. The objective was to
determine whether distinct groups of cases could be identified and, if they
could, to consider what the nature of these groups might be with respect to
their profiles on the commitment scales. Four- and nine-cluster solutions
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were specified a priori. The first solution was examined following the
premise guiding taxonomic approaches using median and mean scale cut-off
levels that four commitment groups might be identifiable: ‘dual commit-
ted’, ‘union committed’, ‘company committed’ and ‘dual non-committed’.
The second solution was examined in line with the nine categories identified
in Table 9.1. The results are shown in Table 9.2. It emerges that irrespective
of whether a four- or nine-cluster solution is assessed, most clusters group
cases around the ‘neutral’ values ranges on the union and organizational
commitment scales.
Finally, a series of latent class models was fitted to the union and
company commitment scales. The results are presented in Table 9.3. A
model testing the hypothesis that only one class exists in the data provides a
baseline by formalizing the hypothesis that the two commitment variables
are mutually independent and provide no basis on which to assign people to
separate classes or clusters. The L2 for this baseline model indicates that the
one class model is supported.
Although Chapters 7 and 8 revealed that aspects of CP inclined
employees positively towards the organization and union members towards
their unions, the analysis presented in this chapter shows that dual commit-
ment was not a feature of the workforce in AR. This emerges whether a
dimensional approach or a taxonomic approach of a defensible kind is
adopted towards the study of dual commitment.
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Table 9.1 Categories of commitment to the union and the company
(%)
High union and high company commitment (dual commitment) 1.6
High union and neutral company commitment 7.3
High union and low company commitment (union commitment) 0.4
Neutral union and high company commitment 15.5
Neutral union and neutral company commitment 72.4
Neutral union and low company commitment 1.2
Low union and high company commitment (company commitment) 10.0
Low union and neutral company commitment 1.4
Low union and low company commitment (dual non-commitment) 0.2
Notes
High union commitment=score from 48 to 60 on the 12-item union commitment scale;
neutral commitment=score from 25–47 on the scale; low commitment=score from 12–24
on scale.
High company commitment=score of 60 to 75 on the 15-item organizational commit-
ment scale; neutral commitment=score of 16 to 59 on the scale; low commitment=score
from 15 to 13 on scale.
Results based on weighted sample data.
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Table 9.2 Cluster analysis of union and organizational commitment scales
Cluster centroids




Cluster 1 34.45 46.64 23.5
Cluster 2 41.73 38.30 11.6
Cluster 3 44.62 55.55 38.2
Cluster 4 33.08 58.45 26.9
N (weighted)* (510)
Nine-cluster solution:
Cluster 1 33.47 63.37 9.3
Cluster 2 29.03 42.28 6.2
Cluster 3 37.87 47.47 17.7
Cluster 4 34.60 45.23 3.4
Cluster 5 45.23 38.83 5.4
Cluster 6 46.58 61.88 8.1
Cluster 7 47.31 51.62 14.7
Cluster 8 39.95 55.79 23.4
Cluster 9 29.95 54.91 12.1
N (weighted)* (504)
Notes
Cluster analysis based on the K-Means algorithm. * Percentages are subject to rounding
errors.
Table 9.3 Latent class cluster models fitted to union and company commitment
scales
Latent class models L2 Df. P Value BIC
One class 1,079 1,680 1.00 9,395
Two classes 1,073 1,677 1.00 9,384
Three classes 1,074 1,674 1.00 9,364
Four classes 1,074 1,671 1.00 9,345
Note
The two-class model was ‘unidentifiable’, indicating that no unique computational solution
could be found for model parameters.
Conclusion
The literature on new industrial relations and workplace partnership has
suggested that the involvement of employees and unions in organizational
decision-making at various levels might engender high levels of commit-
ment both to the employer and to the union. The results reported here show
that workplace partnership in Irish airports, although multi-stranded and
multi-level in ambition and format, did not engender dual commitment in
any meaningful or robust sense among a significant proportion of the work-
force. Most employees and union members appear to have adopted a broadly
neutral posture towards unions and the company.
That dual commitment has not emerged in any robust or widespread
sense we attribute to the obstacles faced by CP and to the nature of the
mutual gains achieved. It may be that only deeply institutionalized partner-
ship arrangements can transform attitudes and behaviour to the degree
required to foster dual commitment. In the absence of multi-level arrange-
ments for shared decision-making at all levels, operating consistently and in
depth over time, it may be that dual commitment is likely to remain a
feature of a very modest number of employees. As outlined in Chapter 3 and
further revealed in Chapters 4–8, the spread of CP across the company had
been uneven and contested at the time of the survey, notwithstanding the
fact that partnership had also become the declared official policy of both
management and unions, and involved a joint compact, an agreed set of
arrangements and supportive HR and industrial relations policies. Some
supports to partnership, such as reward systems based on gain-sharing and
financial participation, were subject to deliberation through partnership
structures but had yet to materialize. The same was true of plans to revise
industrial relations structures and procedures. Moreover, in seeking to estab-
lish partnership, half measures may have unintended consequences, as
reflected in Aer Rianta by the negative effects on attitudes of involvement in
CP groups and committees and occupancy of CP support roles.
The most concrete and tangible areas where CP had affected organi-
zational decision-making to a significant degree concerned the handling of
the duty-free crisis and the development of proposals on the future of the
company. Important though these achievements may have been, they were
salient mainly to senior union officials and managers, conscious of what
might have happened had partnership not provided a channel for the han-
dling of such critical issues. For employees and union members more gener-
ally, what probably shaped attitudes to a greater degree and extent were
day-to-day features of partnership in the company and, at this more
mundane level, the effects of partnership were constrained by such things as
the uneven diffusion of partnership principles, structures and practices; the
opposition encountered from managers; the difficulty of identifying clear,
systematic tangible benefits, and the modest progress recoded in such areas
as instituting reward systems based on mutual gains principles. Because
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efforts to institute partnership arrangements remained focused, in the main,
around a small elite group of management and union champions; pivoted
mainly around exercises in strategy formulation at the apex of the company;
and remained in practice ‘contested terrain’, it was not perhaps surprising
that high commitment to the company and the unions was engendered to
such a limited extent. In the circumstances that prevailed in Aer Rianta,
maybe indifference and neutral attitudes to unions and the company were
predictable outcomes after all.
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10 The breakdown of partnership
To this point, the analysis has examined the emergence of workplace
partnership in Aer Rianta, its development and roll-out and its con-
sequences for management, employees and trade unions. The discussion
revealed how all parties – management, unions and workers – though crit-
ical of some or even many aspects of CP, were able nevertheless to point to
benefits and achievements that flowed from the initiative at some stages or
levels in the process. The survey of employees’ views in Chapter 8, which
involved over 600 respondents across the three airports, revealed that, the
more intimately involved employees were with CP activities and the greater
their level of job autonomy, the more positive their attitudes to partnership;
the more positively they viewed employee relations; and the higher their
level of commitment to both their jobs in Aer Rianta and to their unions.
Partnership also engaged constructively with the two major commercial
challenges which the company faced in the late 1990s – the loss of intra-EU
duty-free sales and the strategic review of the company – to the degree that
traditional managerial decision-making processes and industrial relations
channels were subsumed. The Compact also set down clear parameters for the
company’s business strategies which committed management and unions to
working cooperatively to ensure that the future success of the company was
based on prioritizing quality and customer service over labour costs and flex-
ibility.
Notwithstanding these and other achievements, CP confronted signific-
ant difficulties and tensions, as reported in Chapters 3 to 7. Critically,
support within management was divided across different levels of manage-
ment and among groups of managers at different levels. Senior management
postures, in particular, were perceived as being ambiguous. Middle manage-
ment at the outset felt marginalized by CP and had considerable misgivings
and fears as to the likely consequences of increased employee autonomy and
participation for their roles and positions. Perceptions of management divi-
sion fed union scepticism of partnership and its prospects, and divisions also
existed within the unions regarding the operation of the Compact. Worker
directors in the main remained detached from the process, and the issue of
whether they had been active in advancing the case for partnership at board
level remained highly contentious among champions of CP. The day-to-day
operation of CP came to depend on the energy and support of a small
number of individuals in management and in the unions. To the degree that
the Compact became associated with these ‘champions’ and lacked wider and
deeper support among senior management, in particular, it became easy –
justifiably, or for the convenience of sceptics and opponents – to label CP as
having become an independent and self-serving institution.
But it would have been a major surprise to witness an initiative of this
scale and significance, certainly when viewed against international
experience with management–union partnerships, advancing in a smooth
and progressive path. This is especially the case where partnership was intro-
duced in a site, as in Aer Rianta, of long-established industrial relations
practices and traditional managerial processes. In short, change of the depth
and extent envisaged by CP is difficult, faces multiple barriers and thus CP
in Aer Rianta was never likely to develop in a linear, easy manner.
Yet the challenges and setbacks through the mid to the late 1990s were
not sufficient to derail CP. But shortly thereafter, the conditions which had
been conducive to the growth and development of partnership were to
change fundamentally. In broad terms, two sources of change can be identi-
fied. First, the already defined tensions associated with CP, particularly those
at the interface between partnership and industrial relations, became more
pronounced. Second, the governance, political and commercial contexts
altered significantly. This chapter considers the significance and con-
sequences of these two sets of challenges to partnership from the end of
1999 up to 2004. They will be treated in turn.
The analysis presented in this chapter draws on a series of in-depth inter-
views with senior management and union and worker representatives in Aer
Rianta, conducted between November and December 2002, and also draws
on various documentary sources.
The discussion begins with a brief review of why partnership arrange-
ments may fail. The issues identified will provide the context for the
chapter’s examination of the demise of CP in Aer Rianta.
Accounting for the breakdown of partnership
arrangements
The principal reason identified in the literature as to why voluntary partner-
ship arrangements are likely to falter and perhaps eventually break down is
their vulnerability in the absence of strong, robust institutional supports, as
discussed in Chapter 1. Both critics and advocates of partnership are equally
awake to this difficulty. For Streeck (1992: 323–6; 1995: 330), to reiterate,
without the ‘hard’ institutional constraints of the kind buttressing statutory
works councils in Germany, voluntary partnership arrangements are inher-
ently unstable as they remain exposed to the pressures of short-term exigen-
cies, fluctuations in the balance of power and opportunistic defection by
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employers. Essentially, workplace co-operation is at risk because it is
dependent, Streeck argues, on the goodwill or enlightened self-interest of
employers, and principally whether it is seen to continue to serve particular
economic or competitive functions. In something of the same vein, Kochan,
one of the principal advocates of partnership, has together with Rubinstein
argued that, in the absence of changes in labour law and significant shifts in
power and ideologies within companies and unions, partnership experiments
of the kind witnessed in GM’s Saturn plant are unlikely to diffuse and
prosper (Kochan and Rubinstein 2000: 382).
Reasons outlined in the literature as to why the parties to voluntary
workplace partnership arrangements might be compelled to defect, or think
it advantageous or convenient, vary. First, defection might be seen to be the
most advantageous strategy for either party once partnership is seen to have
delivered all that it can possibly offer. In this scenario, management’s and
unions’ commitment to partnership arrangements is seen to be tactical: the
partnership is exploited for its possible benefits, but once these have been
exhausted, or key features of the organizational context have changed, other
avenues for managing workplace change and regulating the employment
relationship are pursued. In our review of the existing literature in Chapter
1, we saw how turbulent markets and shifting organizational boundaries
may imperil partnership agreements, even in instances where they seem to
be capable of delivering significant gains. As firms seek to respond to differ-
ent competitive threats, so too may they feel constrained or choose to alter
their approach to union–management relations. Relatedly, continued man-
agement support for partnership arrangements is seen to depend on ostensi-
ble contributions to the economic performance of the organization
(Rubinstein and Heckscher 2003: 195).
Edwards et al. (2002a: 5) place less store however on the vagaries of
competitive conditions as an explanation and instead emphasize that co-
operative relations between employers and workers eventually work through
to make the former feel insecure. ‘(I)f it is possible to work with labour,
then’, Edwards et al. ask, ‘who needs the apparatus of supervision and then
who needs the capitalist at all?’ Citing the case of Saturn, they suggest that
this managerial insecurity was the reason why the lessons derived from that
partnership initiative were kept tightly insulated and not generalized to the
rest of General Motors, in spite of the explicit objective that Saturn was to
serve as a laboratory for experimentation and learning for the rest of the cor-
poration. In a similar vein, Hammer and Stern (1986) argue that employers
withdraw from partnership arrangements when their prerogatives and
powers are challenged, and return to a partnership approach when the threat
subsides. The view that employers’ strategies might move between such
positions is well documented in the wider employment relations literature.
The ‘cycles of control’ model, as it is often referred to, is associated in
particular with the classic work of Friedman (1977) and Ramsay (1977).
(For a critical review of this theory’s usefulness in explaining the diffusion of
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participative work structures in the 1980s and 1990s, see Edwards et al.
2002b.)
In the same way, a union’s calculus of the benefits of remaining within a
partnership arrangement may alter over time, particularly where the poten-
tial gains are seen to be greater by making a tactical return to the adoption
of adversarial postures. Hammer and Stern’s (1986) insightful analysis of
union participation in management decision-making liken these shifting
postures to a ‘yo-yo’ model of co-operation. Their starting point is that
partnership arrangements are inherently unstable and that, where unions
enter into such arrangements, they are likely to alternate between co-
operative and adversarial behaviours. This instability is premised first on the
classical pluralist assumption of a conflict of interest between unions and
employers. For Stern and Hammer, partnership arrangements are thus cast
within a guarded mould from the outset: fundamental differences of interest
are set aside on a temporary basis in favour of common interest goals, and
engagement in joint problem-solving activities will be ensured for as long as
co-operation benefits the union and its members or is seen not to affect them
adversely. Second, there is, as Stern and Hammer see it, the on-going
requirement of union leaders to maintain control over the rank and file in an
effort to maintain their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of manage-
ment. Their confidence and continued support for collaborative structures is,
in turn, contingent on a number of factors. These include a formal vote
among the membership to endorse union participation in the partnership
initiative; an assurance that partnership activities will not threaten the
leadership’s control over union members; and finally, that the union remains
intact as a cohesive organization and avoids fragmenting into competing
factions.
The influences identified as moving a union in and out of a partnership
relationship with management are a combination of the strength of the
incentive to co-operate, the risks and costs of continued co-operation, and
managerial actions or events that decrease the costs to an acceptable level.
But with each successive return, or attempt to revive the partnership initi-
ative, unions’ commitment will, Stern and Hammer argue, be progressively
diminished and, especially, where both parties maintain their traditional
roles and partnership and collective bargaining are expected to exist as paral-
lel, non-overlapping structures. Such an outcome can be avoided however,
the authors argue, when both parties derive benefits, gradually change their
attitudes and roles, and move towards what is now referred to as integrative
or mutual gains bargaining.
Second, defection is seen to be a consequence of tensions generated within
unions, as decision-making processes become centralized with the establish-
ment and operation of partnership arrangements (Heckscher 1988: 127;
Kelly 1999; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001; Terry 2001; 2003b). We referred
to this syndrome as the ‘displaced activist thesis’ (Geary and Roche 2003)
and it is examined in detail in Chapter 7. In brief, as the union’s leadership
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becomes isolated from the membership, the consequences are seen to include
rank-and-file alienation leading to resistance and to the eventual abandon-
ment of partnership. For critics such as Kelly (1999), partnership leads to
the co-optation of the union leadership with the promise of an increased say
in management decision-making. In turn, FTOs are seen to assume the
‘managerial’ task of demobilizing rank-and-file resistance. In effect, union
organization becomes centralized around a small privileged group. The
thrust of the critics’ case – echoing earlier debates in the academic literature
on union organization and representation (see, for example, Hyman 1975
and Offe and Wiesenthall 1980) – is that not only is control centralized, but
that senior union representatives are also seen to act as a managerial police
force, exercising control ‘over’ rather than control ‘for’ union members. The
outcomes are seen to be fractious and conflict-ridden union organizations
which threaten the sustainability of partnership arrangements. Advocates of
partnership are also cognizant of these risks, as they see them, for trade
unions. But they stress that such difficulties can be overcome and that
unions’ representative capacity and cohesion can be ensured where the
union’s leadership pays sufficient attention to the promotion and mainte-
nance of internal union democracy (Kochan and Rubinstein 2000). Conflict,
however, was observed in the paradigm case of Saturn over whether union
appointees to partnership positions should be selected jointly by manage-
ment and the union or whether rank-and-file members should elect these
individuals (Rubinstein 2001). The method of selection, the presence or
otherwise of a mandate and representatives’ accountability to the member-
ship were thus key concerns at Saturn.
Third, the relationship between workplace partnership and collective bar-
gaining is also identified in the literature as an important factor in explain-
ing whether partnership arrangements survive or fail, as outlined in Chapter
1. The question, however, of whether each individual process should be kept
separate, and confined to parallel realms, or whether they should, as sug-
gested by Stern and Hammer, be allowed to merge organically in a manner
where partnership subsumes adversarial bargaining processes, remains the
subject of some discussion and debate in the literature. The latter view, as
often expounded by proponents of partnership, is premised on the view that
the tenor of collective bargaining may be recast as the trust engendered by
partnership spills over, or that more and more issues are resolved ‘in partner-
ship’. As discussed in Chapter 1, the possibility that spillover effects may
flow in the opposite direction, leading to the ‘capture’ of partnership
arrangements by adversarial processes, has been discussed less frequently in
the literature. In the event that this does indeed occur, one could fairly
assume that the continued survival of a partnership initiative would be seri-
ously endangered.
Closely related is the issue of conflict management and dispute resolution.
For Kochan and Rubinstein (2000: 377–8), this is identified as one of the
most important organizational processes affecting the durability of partner-
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ship arrangements. Their starting point is that partnership structures allow
for conflicts to be more readily aired in comparison to traditional organi-
zations, where conflicts are either suppressed because of an imbalance in
power, or are limited in their expression through hierarchical or functional
specialization. In this context, Kochan and Rubinstein focus on two issues
which they see as being important if partnership is to remain viable. First, as
conflict surfaces, it needs to be addressed and resolved effectively. Second,
established dispute resolution procedures, informed as they are by adversar-
ial postures, will need to be replaced by alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, which are better aligned with partnership, involvement and
progressive employment practices.
The other important issue here highlighted by Kochan and Rubinstein
(2000) is that the structure of conflict may alter under partnership arrange-
ments. Simple management versus worker differences and conflicts may
remain, but in addition new coalitions and cleavages may emerge where, for
example, the local union organization may adopt different positions and
interests to its national organization, and in multi-site companies so too
might local management interests come to diverge from corporate manage-
ment. How these tensions are resolved then becomes critical for the future
sustainability of partnership, particularly as Kochan and Rubinstein (2000:
379–80) recognize where the parties split into pro- and anti-partnership
camps. When identities and interests thus diverge around partnership, this
is then seen as a pivotal moment: will an executive decision be taken by
senior management and/or national union officers to press on with the initi-
ative in the face of such division, or will such division become the justifica-
tion for abandoning partnership?
The final reason highlighted in the literature as to why partnership
arrangements fail to prosper in the long term is because their champions
retire or move on to new positions and their replacements lack the same
interest or resolve in pressing ahead. This brings us back to the crux of
Streeck’s critique: in the absence of institutional constraints, new manage-
ment and union leaders have considerable freedom in choosing whether to
support or abandon voluntary partnership arrangements. But as the advo-
cates also recognize, where HRM practices remain unaltered the latter seems
a more likely scenario. To avoid such a scenario and to foment the institu-
tionalization of partnership, Kochan and Rubinstein (2000: 380), for
example, argue that senior management appointments should be agreed
amongst the parties and the incentive structures under which management
operate should likewise reflect the multiple interests of the different parties.
The changed industrial relations and management
context in Aer Rianta
In Chapter 4 we examined in detail the manner in which CP engaged with
strategic issues facing Aer Rianta, such as the loss of duty-free sales and the
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strategic review of the company’s future. In a number of departments, major
issues of restructuring and reorganization were also addressed under the
rubric of the Compact. This was not, however, conceived by the JUCG as a
programme of systematic change. Rather, there were different drivers and
pressures in different areas of the company. For example, in the cleaning
department there was the long-established concern with costs and the possi-
bility that some or all of its services might be outsourced to sub-contract
providers. The maintenance department was preoccupied with adjusting to
skill shortages in the local labour market and with the retention of its key
skill groupings in the face of intense competition for skilled workers. In the
retailing department, employees and management were endeavouring to
come to terms with the loss of duty-free sales, the reorganization of shop-
ping outlets and the introduction of, and payment for, new shift rosters. In
the Airport Police and Fire Service there were renewed concerns 
about security provision following the terrorist attacks of September 11th,
2001. As indicated in Chapter 3, groups were free to decide for themselves
whether they wished to pursue change through CP or through traditional
industrial relations channels. Where they chose the former, they could enlist
the support and advice of the JUCG and facilitators, as they thought
appropriate.
In contrast to the successes attained by partnership at the strategic
level of the company, as recounted in Chapter 4, at the operational level,
where individual departments opted to engage major issues of restructur-
ing and reorganization, the outcomes were considerably more variable. In
particular, serious problems arose with respect to CP’s relationship to pre-
vailing managerial and industrial relations processes and structures. Many
of these problems had already been evident in the mid to late 1990s but
they were to gain significant new ground from 2000 onwards. Principally,
these included opposition to proposals associated with the Compact from
worker directors, confusion as to whether agreements could be concluded
under the Compact, management indifference and opposition, and union
apathy and resistance. These problems were exacerbated when the key
champions of the Compact retired, or moved to new positions within the
company.
Contrasting fortunes of CP at department level
The breakdown of partnership in Aer Rianta did not happen overnight.
During the early 2000s, some occupational groups continued to adhere to
the principles enshrined in the Compact and came to agree significant
changes in working practices, pay and conditions of employment through
that route. By contrast, other groups who had initially tried to address the
restructuring of their departments and work organization through partner-
ship, opted subsequently to revert back and conclude agreements through
traditional industrial relations processes. The former included the mainte-
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nance department, principally in Dublin Airport but also at Shannon
Airport, and the cleaning department in Dublin. The latter groups included
the Airport Police and Fire Service (APFS), the finance department and
retailing. Of those employee categories who had initially agreed to work
under the principles of the Compact in the late 1990s, the APFS and retailing
constituted the largest proportion. So while these occupational groups
appear to have lost faith in partnership from about 1999/2000 onwards,
others – although a minority in overall terms – remained committed to its
principles, believing it was more appropriate than conventional distributive
bargaining to advance their interests.
We will begin by providing a brief account of those groups – cleaning
and maintenance in Dublin – which made the most progress under the
Compact. We will then provide an account of two other groups – Dublin
Airport’s retailing department and the Airport Police and Fire Service –
which grew disenchanted with CP and returned to handling workplace
change through traditional bargaining channels. The discussion will then
offer an explanation for why the Compact proved sufficiently robust and gar-
nered enough support from staff, their representatives and management, to
succeed in some departments, but not in others.
The cleaning department and the maintenance department
The cleaning department was one of the first departments to address the
restructuring of its operations under the Compact. It was perhaps the most
vulnerable of all departments within Aer Rianta to outside competition.
Revenues generated from duty-free sales in the past had, by common
consent, created a managerial benevolence towards the continued delivery of
such services from within the company. The ending of duty-free sales,
however, provoked a new commercial awareness throughout the company
which, in turn, compelled local management and shop stewards, in the
words of the full-time union official, ‘to do something pro-active and get
involved in restructuring and to look at costs, (because otherwise) they
would cease to exist’.
Following two years of research and deliberation, which included bench-
marking the costs of resourcing the current in-house cleaning department
against external contract providers, it was agreed to reorganize shift rotas;
withdraw from so-called third-party cleaning (cleaning airport premises
which were not owned by Aer Rianta); reduce staff numbers; introduce and
recruit a new staff category to work exclusively at weekends; reorganize
supervisory structures; introduce an incentive attendance scheme; and reduce
working hours to match employees’ preferences. Critically, too, wage rates
and pay scales were jointly determined, and a once-off bonus payment was
made on foot of savings of a million punts (C1.27 million). It was agreed
not to reduce wage rates to the contract industry norm. One union official
commented:
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We weren’t going into the thing [partnership] to cut our pay. The deal
was to make ourselves more efficient and costs, of course, were going to
be an issue. But they [employees] didn’t go for pay increases because
they realized that if they did they’d price themselves out of it. But we
increased the starting rate on the scale and reduced the length of the
scale (so that) they got to the top earlier.
The union official continued, ‘the members accepted it despite the ubiqui-
tous campaign to undermine it at a very sensitive stage. It was 60/40 in
favour. It didn’t just scrape through’.
One senior manager, anxious to emphasize the success of the partnership
process, commented:
It all came through the Compact. The whole approach was we would do
it on a mutual gains basis . . . It wasn’t a matter of taking what we had
achieved in the process outside and having negotiation. That didn’t
happen.
The agreement was subsequently endorsed by both the company and the
union.
The maintenance departments in Dublin and Shannon Airports were
among the few sections within Aer Rianta where regular work groups
developed in the late 1990s. In the early 2000s, these groups – organized
around trade groups and sections, i.e. carpenters, plumbers, electricians and
lift maintenance – came together to form a strategy group to prepare busi-
ness plans under the auspices of the Compact. A variety of issues was exam-
ined, including job structures, flexibility, employee recruitment and
retention, pay levels and scales, and gain-sharing plans. The two unions
involved, the TEEU and AEEU, supported the workers’ initiative. Their
business plans with proposals for revised entry wage rates and a wage
increase of 10.8 per cent were subsequently endorsed by the two unions’ offi-
cials and by management.
One senior manager, who was closely involved with the maintenance
group, commented:
We did a lot of work benchmarking what industry pay rates were. We
looked at the threats and the need for us to be competitive. We were actu-
ally operating in my view at a very high level. It wasn’t normal, it wasn’t
negotiation at all. There was a discussion about what would be the right
rate of pay, we agreed effective dates, we agreed retrospection in relation
to that and we talked about the added value. We were saying that in
terms of trying to identify what those savings would be we could actually
produce an amount of money that could be used as a bonus scheme. That
deal was carried unanimously I believe. So that was actually a very sound
process in that it went from start to finish [under the Compact].
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A senior union official involved concurred: ‘On the craft side the pay levels
are very competitive and there was nearly a unanimous decision on the pay –
all done under the Compact’.
Thus, under CP, partnership or interest-based bargaining came to super-
sede traditional adversarial bargaining in the two departments of cleaning
and maintenance. The process garnered considerable support from among
employees, union representatives and line management, and proved suffi-
ciently strong to address major restructuring issues from beginning to end.
In two other departments, retailing and the Airport Police and Fire Service,
the early mood and signs had also been propitious but, following significant
early progress, partnership was subsequently displaced in preference to tradi-
tional adversarial bargaining.
Retailing and the Airport Police and Fire Service (APFS)
As outlined in earlier chapters, one of the principal success stories of CP
was the jointly agreed report on how Aer Rianta might prepare the ground
for the loss of revenues following the suspension of intra-EU duty-free
sales. This report was prepared by a significant issue group (SIG) which
drew on expertise from management, unions and employees across the
three airports and across departments, and became the basis on which
management and unions subsequently addressed post-duty-free retailing at
the airports. In parallel, a strategy group (SG) examined the future of the
retailing department in Dublin Airport and how retailing might adapt to
the loss of duty-free sales. The SG’s deliberations focused on issues of cost,
viability, efficiency and work organization. A report was prepared and
agreement reached on a wide range of issues such as a ‘cushioning’
payment to absorb the sudden loss of commission payments with the
ending of duty-free sales; the layout of shops; the restructuring of supervi-
sion; the introduction of teamworking; the restructuring of the pay system
as well as agreement on wage increases. While these items were being
addressed under the remit of the Compact, another issue, which had been
something of a hoary chestnut for management and union representatives
for some years, that of a premium payment for Sunday working, was being
pursued through traditional industrial relations avenues. It eventually
went before the established, state-provided, third-party dispute resolution
services (the Labour Relations Commission) which found against the
union. Relations between management and staff became very embittered
as a consequence. A small but significant vocal element within the depart-
ment called for the workforce to withdraw from the Compact and to press
for strike action in the dispute over Sunday working. They engaged in a
sit-in; a ballot followed and strike action was sanctioned. A union official
involved commented: ‘The staff went ballistic about the fact we had lost,
to put it mildly and I was under pressure to ballot for industrial action’.
Any chance of resolving to completion the broader restructuring of pay
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and work organization within the department under the Compact had now
effectively been lost.
The company was successful in having the case heard before the Labour
Relations Commission (LRC) before the strike action was to take effect.
Under the auspices of the LRC, an agreement was reached whereby staff
were awarded 15 per cent above the terms of the national wage agreement,
the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness. Under the offer, the majority of the
staff who agreed to work a new, extended roster system were put on a new
consolidated scale which paid IR£30,000 (C38,100) per year. It was
reported that this settlement made Aer Rianta retailing staff among the
highest paid sales employees in the country with a maximum hourly rate of
IR£15 (C19) per hour (IRN 2001). The new pay scale combined and ratio-
nalized a number of additional payments, bonuses and commission pay-
ments into one consolidated rate. It also provided for a ‘cushioning’ payment
to compensate for loss of earnings following the abolition of duty-free sales.
The deal allowed for the introduction of new work structures, new roster
arrangements, a reduction of overtime, a standard working week of 38.5
hours, the elimination of supervisory positions, and 30 voluntary redundan-
cies. New managerial and sales-support staff positions were also created. It
was also agreed to establish a joint forum to devise and install a new incen-
tive-based rewards system.
An important consequence of the involvement of the state’s dispute reso-
lution agency and the settlement that flowed therefrom was that the success-
ful outcome was attributed to adversarial industrial relations processes and
their champions. To paraphrase one union representative, success was now
attributed to those who brought the case before the LRC. The same official
continued:
What we had been doing under constructive participation, the review of
pay, rewards and rosters, had been run away with. It was now under the
heading of industrial relations and the LRC. It was the LRC that deliv-
ered it and the IR officers of the union, and not (the people who had
espoused constructive participation). History will probably show that it
came out of the LRC. It won’t show the four years of work that went
before it.
The Airport Police and Fire Service (APFS) had agreed to work under the
Compact in 1999. Significant progress was made and agreement reached on
such issues as splitting its workforce into separate service groups, a police
unit and a fire department; staffing levels and cost structures; skill and train-
ing requirements; the provision of new equipment; and the establishment of
a new unit, the Airport Search Unit. The wage rates which applied to the
various categories of employment within the ranks of the APFS, as well as
that which might pertain to the new search unit – which it was agreed
would have a lower entry wage rate – were also ‘benchmarked’ against com-
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parable occupational groups outside the company. This led significantly to
an agreement – under the rubric of CP – on new rates of pay. However,
following this agreement there was an interregnum during which the joint
APFS forum considered how ‘the agreement’ might be presented to and
agreed upon by management, union representatives and employees. It was at
this point that the agreement ran into difficulties. A ballot was called not on
whether the agreement should or should not be ratified by the employees per
se, but rather on whether the APFS should continue its discussions with
management under the aegis of the Compact. The result of the ballot was
overwhelming: 80 per cent of the staff voted to withdraw from working in
partnership with management. All joint discussion groups were suspended
immediately in favour of traditional industrial relations postures and
processes. Collective bargaining commenced with the full panoply of tradi-
tional supports, including threatened strike action. Towards the end of 2001
a new agreement was reached which gave the APFS a pay increase which on
average – like that in retailing – was 15 per cent above the basic terms of
the national agreement. As well as making provision for the various ele-
ments which had already been ‘agreed’ under partnership, as outlined above,
the collective bargaining agreement contained a number of additional or
modified elements: a reduction in incremental scales from 27 points to 18, a
new composite rate of pay, a new supervisory position, a voluntary redun-
dancy package for up to 30 staff offering four weeks’ pay per year of service
for the first ten years and six weeks for the balance of service. The agreement
also provided the APFS with a ‘direct link’ to the remuneration of the
Gardai (Irish police force) and Dublin Fire Brigade. The external facilitator
who brokered the deal was reported as stating that the wage increases were
‘very considerable’ and that ‘they lean in favour of the union rather than the
company’ (IRN 2001).
It is clear from the example of the four departments illustrated above that
there was considerable variation in the extent to which partnership took root
and flourished at departmental level within Aer Rianta in the early 2000s.
In the cleaning and maintenance departments, partnership was strongly
endorsed by committed management and union representatives and pros-
pered thereby. It encountered significant challenges not too dissimiliar from
that experienced in retailing and the APFS, but in these areas it was suffi-
ciently well rooted and supported by all parties to fend off opposition and to
resolve difficulties as they arose. In these instances, CP entailed the almost
complete encoding of partnership into mainstream departmental structures
and into decision-making processes.
In contrast, worker representatives and staff in retailing and in the APFS
were more divided as to the merits of CP from the outset. These divisions
were magnified when complex issues around work organization, changes in
conditions of employment and pay came to be addressed under the prin-
ciples of the Compact. Thus, the penetration and the success of partnership in
these areas came to be uneven, limited, and in the end its progress was
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reversed and supplanted by traditional industrial relations postures and
processes.
In the next section we turn to examine in more depth the reasons for the
variable successes of CP in the four departments reviewed above. The negat-
ive consequences engendered by the failure of partnership in retailing and
the APFS – two large and significant departments – were detrimental and
ultimately contributed significantly to drawing the partnership process to a
halt across most of the company. Other factors, like management and union
succession, the position adopted by worker directors, and – outside the
company – the altered postures of the minister and of some Aer Rianta
unions, were also important contributors to the eventual decline and break-
down of partnership across the company as a whole. These broader or
‘summit-level’ influences will also be examined and their import for the
demise of CP assessed. We begin, however, with an assessment of the more
immediate factors which generated tensions surrounding the operation of
partnership, notably the lack of clarity and ambiguity surrounding the
interface between conventional collective bargaining and partnership, and
particularly the manner in which representative roles and decision-making
authority were conceived within CP. While our account of the demise of CP
is organized around this distinction between operational-level and summit-
level influences, it is important to recognize that the problems generated at
both these levels interacted and together they constitute the principal
reasons in our explanation as to why CP ultimately broke down in Aer
Rianta.
Problems at the interface between partnership and
industrial relations
One of the principal factors leading to the derailment of CP was its awkward
cohabitation with industrial relations. A significant challenge to confront the
parties to CP was inevitably how to manage the interface between partner-
ship and industrial relations. Four fault lines came to fracture the pre-
defined relationship between the two processes. First, in spite of the best
efforts of the Compact’s architects to devise a constitution in which decision-
making processes and authority were defined, considerable confusion arose
around this issue. Second, some of the principal actors charged with moni-
toring the day-to-day interface between industrial relations and CP, the
facilitators, became isolated and their activities much criticized. Third, the
question of whether the parties working under the rubric of CP possessed a
legitimate mandate to speak and act on behalf of workers and union
members came to be very contentious. Finally, the resolution of conflicts
within traditional forums and agencies had the effect of tipping relations
between management and employees towards traditional postures, and, in
retailing at least, undermining CP. Each of these issues will be examined in
turn.
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Unclear decision-making processes
From the outset, the architects of CP handled the interface between indus-
trial relations and CP in a largely conventional way by seeking to distin-
guish between partnership processes and industrial relations processes, and,
provided that proposals that emerged from within CP, or any accords
reached therein, were ratified by the JUCG and the parties in the industrial
relations arena, they could then be given effect. A general mandate thus
appeared to exist for reaching agreements within partnership that might
subsequently be presented for ratification by management and unions as
parties to industrial relations.
In some circumstances, as in maintenance and cleaning, employees’ atti-
tudes to partnership were sufficiently positive, and the commitment and
support of management and union representatives sufficiently robust, to
allow the parties to conclude agreements entirely within partnership chan-
nels. In these two departments, CP became the main means of conducting
employment relations.
In most other areas, however, where the parties ventured to work under
the principles of the Compact, as in the APFS and retailing, the formal
understanding that had been reached as regards the interface between
partnership and industrial relations broke down, or differences of under-
standing emerged as the parties sought to deal on a partnership basis with
major issues of reorganization that had important implications for pay and
conditions. Thus, in practice, the formal distinctions and interface between
partnership and industrial relations became unclear and the processes
became somewhat awkwardly intertwined. There were a number of points of
confusion and contestation which, in turn, gave rise to tensions and to com-
peting claims as to the merits or otherwise of pursuing significant reorgani-
zation issues to completion under the rubric of CP. The first was whether
joint groups had actually been empowered to make firm recommendations
to management and unions, or whether they were merely permitted to
present possible options in terms of future courses of action. Second, in
instances where joint groups had opted to make recommendations in their
reports, they faced the charge that they did not possess a mandate from staff
and unions to act in such a capacity.
In interviews with management and union activists, it was claimed that
there was much confusion among participants in joint groups as to whether
proposals could be progressed or agreements could be concluded through
CP. Indeed many felt that, from the beginning it was never intended or at
least required of the parties working in partnership to agree a common posi-
tion. Rather, they were encouraged by facilitators and members of the
JUCG to canvass all parties for suggestions and to deliberate on all possible
solutions to a given problem. The objective and principal emphasis of CP, as
many interviewees experienced it, was to encourage staff to become involved
and to participate so that divergent and strongly held views could be heard
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in an open debate; comparatively less stress was placed on identifying one
course of action or the realization of ‘bottom-line’ objectives. The fact that
timelines were often loose and that CP group membership was not fixed –
members could come and go or be replaced as thought appropriate or conve-
nient – added to this understanding. Ultimately, it was seen that the issue
of whether an item could be resolved to finality under partnership rested not
with the participants in joint groups but with the JUCG and more particu-
larly with unions and managers and whether they would agree to any pro-
posals put forward.
The evidence from interviews with management and union representa-
tives was that this modus operandi often gave rise to a ‘long-winded process’
which generated considerable impatience on both sides – referred to by one
manager as generating ‘analysis paralysis’ – and which, when it came up
against major issues of restructuring, was found to be wanting.
The Compact I think suffered from the fact that nobody around the table ever
really believed they were going to take a decision. In my view there was no
decision-making mechanism. It was a contradiction, because the company
was saying this is the way we want to do business, through the Compact.
(senior line manager)
We were always publishing interim reports, making presentations until
we were blue in the face. It was very good for staff development, there’s
no doubt about that, but at the end of the day you keep going around in
circles and people say what’s this all about? Where’s it going? [At one
site meeting I was told by a middle manager], ‘we’re not here to make
proposals’, and I said, ‘for [expletive deleted] sake we’ve been here for
the last day and a half and you are going to tell me we can’t make rec-
ommendations’.
(full-time union official)
I sat at the JUCG where they decided the process wasn’t kosher: ‘no, no
that wasn’t proper participation. Sorry, no, take that away’. And people
were enraged with this. At the end of the day it was up to management
to say well this is a good idea or not. And the union could equally say at
that point, we don’t agree. I think there’s an inherent contradiction
here. At the end, people were much more likely to see the inconsisten-
cies and contradictions in the process than they would have been in the
beginning.
(senior line manager)
The role of facilitators
On the ground, stewardship of the interface between CP and industrial rela-
tions came to rest in significant part with the facilitators. They were
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appointed to guide the roll-out and operation of Compact principles and
processes. Much of their time was taken up with training participants to
work in joint groups and helping them in the preparation of their discussion
documents. They worked full time in their positions and were usually
selected from among non-managerial employees. They were provided with
secretarial support and were paid salaries. However, they soon suffered isola-
tion and became the focus for much criticism. There was criticism that they
lacked the necessary skills to perform their roles. Staff occupying traditional
hierarchical and representative roles feared that they might come to be mar-
ginalized by the role and status accorded facilitators under partnership.
One senior national officer in SIPTU said that the perceived threat was
represented to him thus: ‘These people had no mandate. They weren’t the
elected representatives of the workers and they were somehow trying to
usurp the traditional trade union role’. Yet others saw some facilitators as
aspirants to management positions.
Their position was compounded further when a JUCG proposal to regu-
larize their role and conditions of employment was rejected by senior man-
agement and funding for their training withdrawn. Many resigned their
positions as facilitators. Thus as their cohesion as a group began to fragment,
CP lost one of its key props on the ground. By early 2000, there was only
one remaining facilitator in Dublin Airport.
Ambiguous mandates
Parties seeking to make progress on organizational restructuring under the
Compact were often faced with charges that they possessed no mandate to nego-
tiate or conclude agreements in the areas involved. A number of objections
were raised: first, whether individual unions had acquired a mandate from their
union executive to work in partnership with Aer Rianta management; second,
whether FTOs, union activists or employees appointed to joint discussion
groups could claim legitimately to speak for or represent the employees in their
departments or work groups; and finally, whether any specific proposals eman-
ating from these joint groups could be progressed and resolved to finality
through CP. These items proved to be highly contentious and ambiguous as
CP began to engage major issues, but they came to a head, in particular, as
groups came to address significant issues around organizational change. The
following observations from both union representatives and members of man-
agement highlight the very different outcomes in the presence and absence of a
mandate from the rank and file and the national union executive, as well as the
fragility of informal understandings, especially following the retirement of
influential union advocates of partnership:
There was some ambivalence towards the Compact at a high level (within
the union). They (the union branch) probably made mistakes out at the
airport by not getting a mandate. They did in the cleaning section.
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They looked for a mandate and got a mandate, that’s where the success
was. They were always kind of confident. They also got a very high level
of participation from the ordinary rank-and-file members in this
working group. But the union didn’t do that [in every section] from the
start. What they should have done was look for a mandate to get
involved.
Get people involved in the process and people will come up with the
right solution, because they are engaged. But I think that all worked
because you had a non-threatening environment. But having solved it,
once they came back to the wider group I think that’s where the thing
took off in the wrong direction, because (they were challenged), ‘hold
on, hold on a sec. Who are you to put this solution, you don’t represent
anybody’. And that was the problem, they didn’t! I think in many ways
the issue came down to the fact that they didn’t have a mandate. It
eventually became a major blockage.
(senior line manager)
The contrasting fortunes of partnership in the four departments reviewed
above is also instructive here. In the two departments – maintenance and
cleaning – where significant change agreements were completed, including
changes to pay and conditions of employment, from beginning to end under
the principles of the Compact, a formal mandate had been sought and
obtained from union members. Elsewhere, as in the APFS and in retailing,
the absence of a mandate proved to be a significant stumbling block. Often
when a mandate was requested, as in the case of the APFS, it was too late –
the group having already fractured into competing pro- and anti-Compact
factions.
Thus in these circumstances, employees and union representatives partici-
pating in joint forums came to be discredited and isolated within their
respective constituencies, and the claim that they possessed no mandate to
negotiate or conclude agreements was pivotal in the derailing of CP and in
the restoration of traditional industrial relations processes.
In yet other cases, the shift from partnership to industrial relations –
facilitated by the absence of mandates – was seen to be tactical and oppor-
tunistic, as one or both parties perceived the other to have been acting in
poor faith and to have intentionally defected from partnership in order to
exploit a perceived advantage in pursuing an issue through adversarial bar-
gaining. One senior union official put it thus: ‘Some groups cherry picked.
They were pretty cynical about it. They brought the Compact up as far as it
could take it and then they jumped off and then they dragged another
couple of inches’.
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Dispute resolution
We discussed above how the formal demarcation between partnership and
industrial relations processes often became blurred and confusing for
participants in CP, ultimately to the detriment of the partnership initiative.
In yet other instances, where the division between the two channels was
clearly defined and policed, as in the case of Sunday premium payments in
retailing above, negative spillover effects were still clearly evident. In this
important case, partnership came to be ‘sacrificed’ to collective bargaining in
circumstances where employees and their representatives wanted to register
their dissatisfaction not only with Aer Rianta management, but also with
the findings of the state’s mediation services. In this instance, the advance-
ment of sectional demands through collective bargaining and subsequently
through the state’s public dispute agencies embittered relations between the
parties which in turn came to contaminate otherwise good relations between
the same parties in the partnership arena. In sum, there were two problems
or difficulties here. First, CP failed or was unable to insulate itself from a
conflict overspill in other forums. Second, the state’s dispute resolution
agencies mediated between the parties in adversarial mode, forcing them to
lay out their positions in arguing the merits of their respective cases. There
was, therefore, little complementarity between the parties’ attempts to
develop collaborative relations within the enterprise and the processes
deployed by dispute resolution agencies.
Management and unions in retailing would seem to have learnt from this
experience, and later established in-house dispute resolution mechanisms
better aligned with the ethos of partnership and which involved an outside
mediator. Following the intervention of the LRC and the subsequent agree-
ment on a restructuring package, management and union representatives
agreed to establish a small joint working group to oversee the agreement’s
implementation. It was agreed to retain key elements of the erstwhile
partnership process, principally that a problem-solving approach would be
retained and that every effort would be made to arrive at a consensual solu-
tion. The terms CP or Compact were not to be used again, however. In the
words of one union representative, they had become ‘dirty words’. There
were some other important differences. Strict timelines were established,
group membership was fixed, and critically in the area of dispute resolution,
as indicated, an outside facilitator was recruited to help the group resolve
contentious issues. Considerable progress was made.
So [the external facilitator] came in and we started the process which
ended up with an agreement on a totally new pay structure, totally new
work structure, totally new roster. The whole package was put on the
table and we agreed everything. So we literally restructured Retailing,
which was the original objective of the Compact process. You had some
pro-Compact people and some from the anti-Compact group. I think the
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value of the Compact process came through: how to work out the figures,
if you do this what’s the cost, and how does it impact on the business.
So I am convinced the Compact process helped a lot. But there were one
or two fundamental differences: the union said we are going in to agree
something by a fixed deadline, there was no membership rotation, and
we had an external facilitator.
(senior manager)
Elsewhere, however, plans to re-align the dispute resolution process in
accordance with the principles of CP never came to fruition.
In summary, one of the principal reasons why significant sections of the
Aer Rianta workforce withdrew from partnership in favour of traditional
industrial relations postures, lay with the manner in which CP was
designed. The essential design flaw, as it came to be perceived by some, was
that the Compact did not prescribe a process for mutual gains bargaining and
that, once the parties had finalized their reports, there was no delineated
path for concluding an agreement to finality on pay and conditions of
employment under CP. As outlined, this demarcation was deliberate. From
the outset, it was recommended by the architects of the Compact that
partnership and collective bargaining be kept separate and occupy different
realms. The intention, paradoxically, was to vaccinate the Compact against
any possible charge that CP was designed to incorporate unions and displace
collective bargaining. In practice, therefore, once a discussion document was
completed, the ‘default option’ was for it to be handed over to the parties
and brought back to traditional industrial relations and collective bargain-
ing channels for final agreement. In most instances, this is indeed what hap-
pened, save for in maintenance and cleaning where there was sufficient union
and management support – including, as indicated, a mandate – for pro-
gressing with partnership through to the end. But in most other cases,
partnership was tipped into adversarialism, when in difficult circumstances
and dealing with major issues, the parties were faced with claims that they
had no mandate to negotiate or conclude agreements. And as confusion
abounded as to participants’ roles and mandates, together with a general
lack of expertise as to how to chart a pathway into mutual gains bargaining,
the space was created for some worker representatives to mobilize around
employees’ fears and reservations about partnership. The ambivalence of
senior management and national union officers towards partnership further
emboldened some union representatives and created the requisite space for
them to canvass support for their own positions. In these circumstances,
attitudes towards partnership in most areas of Aer Rianta were coloured in a
highly negative manner. This division and confusion as to the merits of
partnership ultimately forced the parties to retreat back onto a terrain where
they were more sure-footed and where ground-rules and mandates seemed
more clearly defined and better understood. In this way, CP was disengaged
and traditional industrial relations postures and processes were reinstated.
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The summit politics of partnership and the demise of CP
The breakdown of CP can also be attributed to a series of influences at the
summit level and their interaction with the problems already identified at
the operational level of partnership. The following factors exerted the great-
est influence: the postures and reservations of worker directors; changes in
the commercial and political environment which endangered the mutual
dependence between Aer Rianta’s commercial strategy and CP; and finally,
management and union succession.
The postures of worker directors
As outlined in Chapters 3 and 7, the worker directors had been excluded
from the design, implementation and operation of CP. This was a deliberate
decision by those who spearheaded the partnership initiative and who were
critical from the outset of what they saw as the limitations of established
representative participation arrangements. Not surprisingly, some worker
directors felt marginalized. Until the late 1990s, worker directors’ reserva-
tions and opposition to the Compact were seen by advocates of CP to have
lacked wider support among employees and union representatives. Some
senior union representatives were highly critical of worker directors. The
clearest reprimand came in a letter from the chairman of the Group of
Unions to the chairman of Aer Rianta in early 2000, in which worker dir-
ectors’ ‘direct opposition’ to unions’ support for the Compact was castigated
and any mandate they may have perceived themselves to hold to speak on
behalf of the Group of Unions on any policy issue questioned; any views
which they expressed at board level were determined instead by the Group
of Unions as ‘personal views’.
Shortly thereafter, however, some worker directors became more vocal in
expressing their concerns and fears with recommendations emanating from
various joint groups convened under CP. Initially, some worker directors
endeavoured to seek national-level union support for their opposition to the
privatization of Aer Rianta and subsequently they sought to forge alliances
with alienated shop stewards.
As outlined in Chapter 4, the Corporate Strategy Group’s shared vision
for the future of Aer Rianta and its recommendation that the company
pursue a partial privatization strategy, which received the endorsement of
the board, management and the Group of Unions, was a major triumph for
CP. It was a pivotal moment, which demonstrated how partnership could
be harnessed to address fundamental business issues and to win support
from virtually all quarters. Some worker directors, however, were ill at
ease with this position. The focus of their opposition now switched to the
objection that Aer Rianta would be privatized and that CP was the vehicle
that had delivered this state of affairs. One worker director expressed the
following misgivings:
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I had concerns about an IPO and I expressed them. It did not reflect
staff views. I also questioned the logic of an IPO. There seemed to be no
shortage of money. For example, the cap [on borrowing for investment]
could have been raised so that we could have borrowed more money.
Another worker director had similar concerns: ‘The workers were not asked
for their views. This should have been done. When I questioned why their
views weren’t sought and when I argued they didn’t want an IPO, I was seen
as a pain’.
Some worker directors also sought support for their criticism from among
senior SIPTU national officers. Around this period, SIPTU support for the
privatization of state-owned companies had become discernibly lukewarm,
following the debacle surrounding the privatization of the state-owned
telecommunications company, Telecom Eireann, and reservations in respect
of similar proposals for other state companies (see Hastings 2003). One of
the Compact’s principal champions believed the worker directors achieved
considerable success in calling into question what had been regarded as an
agreed union position.
Thereafter, it seemed far from clear whether all the unions were at one
with the position as agreed under the Compact in the Corporate Strategy
Group’s report. It was alleged by supporters of CP that these divisions
allowed worker directors to advance the charge that partnership had not
properly reflected the very different views among union activists and
members as to the desirability or otherwise of privatizing the company. By
this means, some worker directors laid the claim that the Compact had frag-
mented unions within Aer Rianta and that a minority view had come to
predominate, which claimed to speak for the company’s employees.
The other focus of one worker director’s challenge to partnership was to
give voice, as he saw it, to employees’ dissatisfaction with CP and to focus
dissent among shop stewards and the rank and file on the shopfloor. As
partnership came to engage with complex issues surrounding restructuring
of shift rotas and work organization, and as workers’ fears were raised and
heightened by the unpredictability and uncertainty of change, some
worker directors were effective in expressing workers’ concerns, and also in
forming alliances with shop stewards who were critical of CP. This was
particularly evident in retailing and the APFS, the two departments in
which partnership came to be displaced by traditional industrial relations
processes.
One worker director expressed his views of CP thus:
I did not object to the aspirations behind CP. I supported it. Any
process that gives workers a say before management make a decision has
to be welcomed. I had doubts, however, and I was sceptical. In particu-
lar, would management make the necessary commitments for example
by way of attendance – the financial resources seemed to be there – and
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would they change their style of management which had not encour-
aged worker participation in the past? This overnight transformation
had me suspicious and skeptical. From the outset middle management
did not become involved. It couldn’t work without them. I then began
to question CP when management were not true to their word as I sus-
pected. Changes were introduced without consultation and by stealth –
immediately confirming all our suspicions. It appeared that some of the
joint groups did not have a mandate to speak for staff. I didn’t oppose it
for the sake of it, as I was accused. I was representing the views of
people who had real concerns. That’s my job.
As far as one worker director was concerned, to have permitted CP to
subsume collective bargaining would have imperilled shop stewards’ and
unions’ influence. Moreover, he claimed, assurances had been pledged by the
architects of the Compact that negotiations in respect of pay levels would
remain within the preserve of collective bargaining: ‘I supported CP at the
beginning on the basis that CP would not encroach on collective bargaining.
When pay drifted into CP, I objected. CP was now undermining the unions’
role’.
Worker directors’ postures would also seem to have become entangled
with inter-union rivalries in regard to the merits or otherwise of advancing
workers’ interests through partnership arrangements or traditional collective
bargaining processes. These tensions in turn posed significant difficulties for
senior union officers. One such officer observed:
We did get dragged into various rows between the different parties and
we tried to broker some settlement, but we certainly didn’t ever go out
and make a declaration, like you know we’ve decided we’re sticking
with this participation project regardless and we want to see it through.
We were not in a position to do that, because at that stage it seemed to
us that it was very fractured. It got to the stage where people were mut-
tering about leaving the union [SIPTU].
The import of these developments and perceptions from the perspective
of the champions of the Compact is clear. First, senior management and
senior national union officers’ orientations to partnership had become
puzzling, confusing, ambivalent and disheartening to those advocating
CP. Second, some worker directors’ activities were significant in mar-
shalling resistance to proposals and positions associated with partnership
among the rank-and-file and union activists, particularly as CP moved to
resolve complex issues around pay and conditions in various departments.
Their opposition also appears to have amplified intra- and inter-union
tensions both in respect of partnership and competitive recruitment.
Finally, their opposition affected the Compact’s standing at national level
within the unions.
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Changing tides: new commercial parameters and new faces
As outlined in Chapter 4, the shared commitment to position Aer Rianta to
compete on the basis of quality and to remain committed to the values and
principles laid down in the Compact was honoured in spite of, or perhaps
more because of, the very difficult commercial environment which the
company encountered in the late 1990s. The resulting formulation of busi-
ness strategy was of course dependent on a number of important factors.
Chief among these was the appointment of a new CEO in 1998, just as CP
was being implemented, who determined to link decision-making processes
around the formulation of the company’s strategy with the Compact. He was
pivotal in galvanizing sufficient managerial and union support to tilt the
balance in favour of engagement with the partnership process. On the
ground, he actively encouraged his senior and middle management to
engage with CP. Second, the wider political context was favourable. Support
for the Compact was in large part underwritten by the postures set down by
the government for the structures governing airport management, regula-
tion and ownership. And the active support and sponsorship of the minister
and her officials also had an important bearing on senior management pos-
tures towards partnership.
At the same time, as discussed, the development, roll-out and operation
of CP had become closely associated with and dependent upon a small
number of key individuals drawn from management and the unions, while
support among the wider management grouping, particularly those occupy-
ing line management positions, was seen to be discernibly muted and
ambivalent, and only a minority of senior managers actively supported the
initiative. These, too, were important realities. But the combined support of
the CEO and the minister for the Compact, and subsequently their shared
position in respect of the privatization of the company, granted the
company’s management considerable control over the manner in which the
company might be directed, at least in the short to medium term, and
created the space within which the company’s business strategies might be
further integrated with the partnership process.
Central to the problems encountered by partnership on the ground from
the late 1990s onwards was the unravelling of this support, endangering the
integration of business strategy formulation with the principles underpin-
ning the Compact. A number of significant influences now began to work
against the equilibrium underpinning the mutual dependence between
partnership and commercial strategy.
First, the governance of Aer Rianta changed with the enactment of new
legislation. This permitted the company’s management to extend their
influence over CP. This was further facilitated with the retirement of the key
management and union champions of the Compact. Second, the commercial
and political contexts changed fundamentally from 2000 onwards. Both ele-
ments became closely intertwined and contrived to expose the company to
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ever-increasing pressures for greater cost reductions and efficiencies; at the
same time, it had to cater for increasing passenger numbers in the face of
newly defined strictures on its ability to raise finance and increase landing
charges. The political tide also turned with the appointment of a new minis-
ter who set about radically altering the structures governing airport manage-
ment and regulation. CP was thus cast into a more inimical environment
than it had experienced heretofore. In this context, the possibility of restor-
ing its flagging fortunes at departmental level, as portrayed above, became
increasingly remote. We will now trace these developments in turn.
New governance arrangements
The governance arrangements of Aer Rianta changed with the passing into
legislation of the Air Navigation and Transport (Amendment) Bill (1997).
With the enactment of this legislation, Aer Rianta’s status changed from
being an ‘agent’ of the minister, and control over the company’s assets
moved from resting with the minister to being held by the company. When
the status of the company changed, Aer Rianta management acquired full
control over the company’s revenues and profits. This had two important
consequences for CP. First, the proponents of CP lost their principal sponsor
and ally and they could no longer lay claim, as had earlier been the case, to
the Compact being a government-sponsored initiative. Second, and perhaps
more critically, senior management in Aer Rianta came to acquire a greater
level of influence over the direction and implementation of partnership than
they had enjoyed heretofore; the decision as to whether the partnership
process would continue to receive financial support came to rest with them.
Thus the funds that had pumped and primed the Compact and which were
earmarked for this purpose by the minister could now be withdrawn, or
directed as management might wish. As one of the Compact’s champions
explained: ‘It [the Air Navigation and Transport (Amendment) Bill]
changed the whole governance issue. So now we had a difficulty because
people were now using the new [structures of] governance as a mechanism of
control.’
A pivotal moment in this regard was seen to be when the contract of the
union official seconded to work full time on CP expired in 2001. Requests
to have his contract extended were not granted. It was perceived by some of
those interviewed that he was ‘encouraged’ to take early retirement. The
position he vacated was not advertised or assumed by anyone else.
The new commercial and political environment
The wider commercial and political contexts within which Aer Rianta oper-
ated were also changing radically and in a way which had detrimental con-
sequences for CP. Both influences, as will become apparent, were closely
intertwined.
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Following the ending of intra-EU duty-free sales in 1999, the commercial
pressures bearing on Aer Rianta intensified further. First, passenger numbers
continued to grow. In 1999, 16 million people passed through the
company’s three airports and year on year increases since then have averaged
20 per cent or more. Second, while the revenues from passenger growth, as
well as those generated from increasing car-parking fees and the addition of
new shopping outlets, allowed employment levels to be retained, profits
were not sufficient to meet the enormous capital requirements facing the
company. These were put at IR£520 million (C660 million) for
1999–2000. The government-imposed borrowing limit of IR£250 million
(C315 million) remained in place and the prospect of raising further rev-
enues from increasing airline landing charges seemed uncertain, as the
company awaited the appointment and determination of an independent
aviation regulator. The principal task of the regulator was to fix airport
charges and thereby extricate airport management from the political arena.
Hitherto, there was a potential conflict of interest arising from the minister’s
dual role as both Aer Rianta’s sole shareholder and the person responsible for
setting the charges its customer airlines paid. The regulator’s subsequent
determination ruled against Aer Rianta’s investment plans and associated
efforts to raise additional revenues through increased landing fees and service
charges. The regulator’s ruling criticized the company for providing ineffi-
cient services that did not meet the requirements of airport users, focusing,
in particular, on what was described as Aer Rianta’s ‘gold-plated investment
programme’. It also castigated management’s cost–benefit analyses and jus-
tification for new capital projects and, while acknowledging that Dublin’s
‘landing fee revenues per workload unit were lower than its peers’, it ruled
that there was still room for improving efficiencies. Although the determi-
nation ruled that charges per passenger could be raised at Cork and Shannon
airports, charges at Dublin Airport would have to be reduced.
The appointment of the regulator had thus introduced an independent
player mediating between Aer Rianta’s commercial strategy and its market,
and applying principles that appeared to call into question aspects of the
quality-focused commercial strategy underlying CP, endorsed by the
company and its unions, and ultimately providing the overriding commer-
cial rationale for partnership.
Third, the privatization of the company in the form of an initial public
offering (IPO), as agreed jointly by management and unions, and which had
seemed to both parties to provide the only possible avenue for securing
significant funds to support the company’s business plans, became increas-
ingly unlikely. This had also been the favoured strategy of the then minister.
Within and outside the cabinet, however, there was considerable political
opposition to such a move. Employees in the hotel-arm of the company –
the Great Southern Hotels – also opposed the privatization strategy favoured
by the unions and management and lobbied local independent parliament-
ary representatives upon whom the minority coalition government were
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dependent to carry a majority in parliament. The Progressive Democrats, the
junior coalition partner, favoured breaking the company up into three inde-
pendently managed airports, fearing that the privatization, part or other-
wise, of Aer Rianta, would simply result in a state-owned monopoly being
replaced by a privately owned monopoly. The unions in Aer Rianta set
themselves steadfastly against such a move. Shannon management was also
concerned that splitting the company into three autonomous airports might
result in it losing the mandatory stop-over provision requiring a proportion
of transatlantic flights to land at the airport. In the face of such opposition,
and in spite of the incipient momentum which had gathered behind the IPO
strategy in 1999, and the minister’s desire to bring just such a proposal to
cabinet, a political decision on whether to float the company was put on
hold. In the background, too, was the 1999 privatization of the state-owned
telecommunications company, Telecom Eireann, which, following one of the
most widely distributed share offers in Europe (more than 575,000 share
applications were made), went sour as equity markets collapsed shortly after-
wards. There was little political appetite for another privatization of a state-
owned company after such a debacle.
Fourth, the pressure on the government from airlines using Aer Rianta
airports, principally Ryanair, to provide independently owned and/or oper-
ated terminal buildings, was unrelenting. Aer Rianta’s own plans to build
and manage new terminals, particularly at Dublin Airport, were criticized as
being over-elaborate and grossly overpriced. The prospect of inter-terminal
competition, feared by champions of the Compact as potentially undermining
the agreed parameters of the company’s business strategy, now seemed more
likely with the appointment in 2002 of a new Minister for Transport, under
whose authority responsibility for airport management now rested. Ryanair’s
proposal for a ‘low-cost’ terminal, if successful, would eventually, it was sug-
gested, be followed by requests from competing airlines for similar facilities
with similar price structures. Any hope of maintaining high-quality services
with well-paid and secure employment would thus, it was argued, be fatally
undermined. Aer Rianta resisted any such move, arguing that attempts else-
where to pit terminals in competition with one another had failed. Govern-
ment-appointed consultants, also counselled against such a move in 2000,
and pointed out that, in any case, Aer Rianta was obliged by EU legislation
to provide a non-discriminatory price regime. However, following the Sep-
tember 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent fall-off in
air traffic and tourist visitors to Ireland, government pressure on Aer Rianta
to develop a ‘low-cost facility for low-cost carriers’ at Dublin Airport
intensified.
The new minister moved to press ahead with seeking ‘expressions of
interest’ for building a separate terminal, independent of Aer Rianta, at
Dublin Airport. He subsequently moved to give Shannon and Cork airports
independent boards to stimulate competition with Dublin Airport. Both
proposals were resisted by the trade unions, culminating in successful ballots
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for strike action. With respect to the provision of an independent terminal
at Dublin Airport, the unions reiterated their position that they did not
object to a second terminal being built at Dublin Airport, and nor did 
they object to private financial involvement in its construction. Their point
of objection was to competition between terminals. There was, the unions
argued, ‘no appropriate working model elsewhere in the world that could be
drawn upon to support the idea’, and that the problems with competing ter-
minals were ‘legion’. These included the division of airside and roadside
assets and responsibilities which, they argued, would be exacerbated at a
time of increasing insecurity in aviation, and the division of responsibility
for passenger safety and security, which ‘would be a major headache with a
private competing terminal’ (Begg 2004). The unions also backed their
argument with the findings of four independent reports into the provision of
a privately operated terminal at Dublin Airport, none of which advanced the
case for it: ‘(o)n the contrary, all have said that landing charges would
increase’ (Begg 2004). The unions at Aer Rianta also levied the charge that
the minister’s preference for market-based solutions was ideologically driven
and that his approach to handling change was unilateralist and showed little
understanding of a partnership approach.
Management and union succession
Finally, there was the important issue of management and union succession.
Just as a new cadre of management and union appointments had been
instrumental in the development and establishment of CP, so their retire-
ments came to check its advance and accelerate its demise. While these indi-
viduals remained with the company, partnership was widely perceived to
have possessed a fair chance of being diffused and becoming institutional-
ized. In their absence, however, partnership was seen to be without its
champions and vulnerable to indifference or to hostile opinion. In this
context, one supporter of the Compact among senior managers was critical
that, ‘There was no in-built succession process that ensured that whoever
came along saw this process in broadly the same way’.
To a considerable degree the indifference shown towards partnership by
some new and existing managers was facilitated by the company’s failure to
adapt its HRM practices. As outlined in Chapter 3, the intention had been
to reconfigure reward systems, selection processes and other human resource
practices to underpin partnership, but progress in this area was uneven and
slow. As a consequence, underlying HR policies and practices remained
wedded in the main to traditional organizational principles and forms of
motivation.
The more some members of the new management team were seen to be
sceptical and ambivalent towards partnership, the more supporters of the
Compact felt obliged to advance its case in opposition. As one of the key per-
sonalities behind the Compact explained: ‘We were becoming more and more
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protagonists in a major battle that was going on and that probably did more
damage to us in the long run. Participation had become controversial’.
Another manager observed: ‘we were now under siege defending this (the
Compact)’.
A key turning point was reached. From the perspective of the most senior
members of management, CP had now come to represent a point of division
and acrimony within the company. This is indeed how it was read by many
of our interviewees, on both the management and union side: partnership
had split management and union activists into pro- and anti-Compact camps.
The likelihood that management and union activists could be brought to
work together under the rubric of CP came to be seen by both management
and senior union officers as increasingly remote. One senior national union
official explained:
It got to the point where if somebody with a partnership hat said, ‘good
morning’, the other side felt obliged to suggest the weather was about
to change. It just got crazy. I mean what we had to do was try and grad-
ually restore a bit of unity out there.
Some senior managers now looked upon Aer Rianta as possessing a
contradictory decision-making and industrial relations framework: a patch-
work quilt of partnership, adversarial industrial relations and obstinate resis-
tance to partnership among significant sections of management and worker
representatives. Their confidence in being able to manage their colleagues
and staff under the principles of CP was now shaken fundamentally. Their
intent was to bring order to an otherwise chaotic scene, as they perceived it.
To restore unity and cohesion, significant sections of management thought
it better to abandon the remnants of CP. All hope of proceeding through
partnership was not forsaken, however. The authors were invited by senior
management and senior union representatives to conduct a review of the
status of CP and to consider whether a way might yet be found to resurrect
and recast partnership in Aer Rianta. In the event, these tentative delibera-
tions were cut short when the minister moved to break the company up into
three separate independent entities. With the bypassing of CP institutions,
management and unions responded by reverting to traditional strategies of
lobbying government and threatening work stoppages.
Conclusion
The commercial context within which Aer Rianta operated grew increas-
ingly difficult and complex following the loss of its most profitable revenue
stream from intra-EU duty-free sales. Its ability to raise capital to meet new
demands placed upon it was severely constrained. Yet, as outlined in
Chapter 4, CP had managed to develop and prosper, helping management
and staff to confront difficult challenges in this new environment.
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The development and operation of CP was however ‘top-heavy’. Greatest
effort and resources were directed towards ‘strategic’ and representative
initiatives of various types and commensurately less effort devoted to day-to-
day employee involvement, the promotion of teamworking and new forms of
work organization. This meant that for many workers partnership was a
distant activity, engaged in by an elite group located somewhere else above
them. CP was thus ‘long’ and ‘thin’: long in the sense of operating at a
variety of levels within the organization; thin because it had little real con-
sequence for workers’ daily routines. There was little employee involvement
or teamworking of any consequence. As a result, CP, even at its high-water
mark, was a peripheral initiative for employees. The result was that
employees’ attitudes to CP, the company, work and unions were not influ-
enced on any widespread or significant basis by the process.
At departmental level, its fortunes varied significantly; in some instances,
partnership was capable of attracting sufficient support and generating
enough confidence to handle complex issues surrounding work reorganiza-
tion and adjustments to pay levels. In other cases, while partnership did
marshal considerable support and was responsible for overseeing joint
research and deliberation, it was not sufficiently robust to handle complex
issues through to completion. The absence of mandates, an uneasy co-
existence with traditional industrial relations processes and structures, and
resistance from some worker directors and shop stewards were critical factors.
Above the level of the workplace, however, where partnership was
strongest and had delivered the most significant benefits, support for and
confidence in CP was being steadily eroded. Proponents of CP were con-
cerned that new members of management were less likely to endorse and
make the case for partnership. In their view, management’s delimiting of
the resources available to fund the activities of partnership, principally
through their failure to adequately train and support facilitators, or to
extend the contracts of those championing CP, or to have them replaced
with people as committed to its principles, confirmed their fears and con-
cerns. Later, with the appointment of a new minister, the signals became
increasingly mixed and confusing. A shared and agreed vision of the
company’s future was unilaterally revoked and replaced by an imposed – and
contested – strategy. Together with the appointment of a regulator, restric-
tions on the company’s freedom to raise capital or raise landing charges, the
company’s management lost control, in significant part, over the future
direction of the business and the formulation of its business strategy. The
prospect of competing terminals, in particular, endangered the company’s
pledge to compete on the basis of service quality and workforce skill rather
than on the basis of cost minimization and low pay. In these ways, CP came
to be uncoupled from the management of the company. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, workers’ existing reservations as to the viability and tenacity of
partnership at departmental level were aggravated further by the feelings of
vulnerability and uncertainty engendered by what was perceived as waning
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senior management support for the Compact and by the altered postures of
the new minister.
In respect of the literature and its theoretical claims as to why partnership
arrangements might break down, the arguments as proposed by the advo-
cates would seem to provide the greatest purchase on explaining events in
Aer Rianta. In the absence of legislative supports for partnership, advocates
have laid great stress on the need for other institutional supports to be
present if partnership is to survive. Many of these supports were weak or
absent in Aer Rianta. CP was poorly institutionalized; it was, to reiterate,
‘top-heavy’, ‘long’, and ‘thin’. Critically, it suffered from poor ‘vertical align-
ment’. Aer Rianta’s human resource management and industrial relations
policies had not been aligned with CP activities. For example, performance
management systems and dispute resolution processes remained substan-
tially unaltered and, in the main, affixed to traditional forms of motivation,
principles and postures. Other institutional supports identified by advocates,
such as devising appropriate mechanisms for involving middle managers,
planning for management and union succession and, critically, managing
the interface between partnership and conventional collective bargaining
processes, were also weak or absent. These weaknesses were accentuated
further when the regulatory and political environment within which the
company operated changed fundamentally, putting at risk the company’s
commitment to compete on the basis of service quality, good wages and
conditions of employment. In large part, then, the reasons we identify for
the breakdown in CP accord closely to the absence or weak institutionaliza-
tion of the factors identified by advocates as being necessary preconditions
for the sustainability of voluntary partnership arrangements.
The critics’ argument, as exemplified by Streeck, that partnership
arrangements are weakened by an inherent asymmetry of power whereupon
unions are less trustful of management’s intentions and thus cannot commit
wholeheartedly to working in partnership with management, does not ade-
quately capture the complexity of the dynamics of the Aer Rianta case.
Senior union representatives did trust management’s motives and believed
they were acting in good faith. Significant and effective co-operation did
occur between the parties. That these co-operative relations subsequently
broke down had more to do with unanticipated difficulties in the design and
implementation of CP, particularly the weak institutional supports identi-
fied above. This is not to ignore the fact that management support was vari-
able and ambivalent, or that there was opposition from worker
representatives, especially from among the worker directors, but these
factors are very different in nature to a chronic trust deficit as identified by
Streeck. It also bears emphasis that the disconnection that subsequently
emerged between the company’s business strategy and its avowed employ-
ment relations policies was not of senior management’s making, but was in
large part beyond their powers and offices to determine; these were changes
imposed on the company by outside agencies.
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Similarly, there is little evidence in the Aer Rianta case to support the
theoretical claims of Kelly. CP did not disadvantage workers. Neither did
partnership privilege the role of full-time union officers to the detriment
and displacement of shopfloor activists. The inter- and intra-union tensions
witnessed in Aer Rianta were very different to those anticipated by critics of
partnership. Where partnership broke down in specific departments, it was
against a background of inter-union rivalries over membership recruitment
and representation, the postures of worker directors, and ambiguities and
confusion surrounding CP’s relationship with conventional industrial rela-
tions processes and structures. With the resulting uncertainty, workers’ con-
fidence in CP’s ability to address workplace restructuring was lost. Union
representatives, including both lay activists and full-time officers, were
equally unnerved, but in addition feared that to proceed with CP would
have endangered union cohesion and security. Thus the collapse of CP is
attributed to a complex variety of operational problems. These difficulties
interacted with summit-level problems and the combined impact of both
sets of problems led to the breakdown of partnership in Aer Rianta.
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11 Advocates, critics and
partnership
The partnership arrangements agreed between management and unions in
Aer Rianta in the mid 1990s were among the most radical of their kind in
providing for union and staff involvement in all aspects of company
decision-making. Less than ten years later, these arrangements had broken
down and relations between the parties had returned to a more conventional
pattern. Between the genesis and breakdown of partnership, the parties had
experimented with new forms of decision-making and a new approach to
industrial relations. At the high tide of partnership in the late 1990s, CP
had provided a basis for a joint response to major commercial challenges
such as the disappearance of duty-free sales and a review of the future status
of the company. In these areas, partnership had effectively displaced tradi-
tional modes of decision-making and established industrial relations
arrangements. Later, partnership had provided the basis for reaching agree-
ment on changes in work practices and pay systems in two departments,
cleaning and maintenance.
It was clear from the survey reported in Chapters 8 and 9 that CP had not
transformed attitudes or behaviour in Aer Rianta and that employees in
general remained sceptical or critical of partnership and its effects. Pervasive
dual commitment had not arisen from the joint operation of CP in the
company. The survey also revealed that the more involved staff had become
in various facets of partnership, the more positive their assessments of the
processes and arrangements entailed and the more positive their attitudes
towards both trade unions and the company. Partnership eventually broke
down through the interaction of operational-level problems in several
departments, especially retailing and the Airport Police and Fire Service,
and summit-level difficulties in such areas as government and national union
policy towards privatization, opposition from worker directors, changes in
regulatory arrangements, problems of succession within CP itself and ulti-
mately senior management disillusionment. Such in outline is the story told
in the book. In this concluding chapter the major themes examined in the
book’s core chapters are summarized in analytical context and a series of
comments are addressed to the debate between advocates and critics of
workplace partnership.
Influences on the mainstreaming of partnership
Workplace partnership in Aer Rianta had its origins in the extension to the
company of legislative arrangements for the election of worker directors to
the board and for the creation of sub-board participative structures. Vision-
ary senior managers and trade union officials in the company formed the
view that the conventional model of worker directors and related channels
for industrial democracy were of limited effectiveness for both the companies
affected and for trade unions. Their shared alternative vision envisaged more
radical proposals that would involve shared decision-making at all levels of
the company, with no pre-defined limits to the areas or issues that might be
subject to joint decision-making. From this emerged ‘constructive participa-
tion’, which was given expression in two major formal documents, the
Compact and Requisite Arrangements. Radical though the arrangements were,
the champions of CP felt it necessary to steer a course through prevailing
industrial relations arrangements by formally separating partnership and
collective bargaining, allowing the parties to collective bargaining to veto or
endorse proposals developed in partnership forums. Senior managers also
remained ambivalent and divided in their postures towards CP, and middle
managers were formally disconnected from the initiative, through their
union’s demand for formal representation on the JUCG and estrangement
from partnership when this demand was denied.
Against such a background, CP initially had little major effect on decision-
making in Aer Rianta and came to occupy what was in effect a shadow and sub-
sidiary decision-making channel. This changed when the external commercial
circumstances of the company were transformed by burgeoning airport traffic,
the imminent disappearance of duty-free sales and evolving government policy
on state companies. At this critical juncture for the company, a new chief exec-
utive, who had previously been a supporter of CP, was appointed to lead the
company. He sought to elevate CP to a key channel through which the
company and its unions might respond to the series of acute pressures facing
the company. The new management regime that he instituted also led to
changes in senior-level personnel and reporting arrangements, which were seen
by champions of CP to have bolstered partnership substantially.
The conjuncture of a new CEO, discontinuous and acute commercial
pressures, change in government policy and some pre-existing features that
included visionary managers and senior union officials, made for a ‘configu-
ration’ of influences that brought CP into alignment with mainstream
decision-making in Aer Rianta at a strategic level. For a time, arising from
this conjuncture, joint governance effectively occurred with respect to
significant commercial and staff concerns and conventional collective bar-
gaining was displaced. The Aer Rianta case thus illustrates how configura-
tions of influences may become the antecedents shifting partnership
arrangements from the status of formal agreements to significant decision-
making forums.
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Influences shaping the dynamics of partnership
The dynamics of partnership were shaped by a series of influences examined
in the body of the book. CP was aligned with a commercial strategy that
sought to compete on the basis of quality and that disavowed low pay and
poor working conditions. For much of the period covered, the viability of
this strategy was unconstrained by market pressures or regulatory arrange-
ments, although some senior managers were sceptical about the long-term
sustainability of quality-based differentiation in the light of industry trends.
The board of Aer Rianta had also formally endorsed CP, as had the
company’s parent state department. Though these factors were significant in
building support for CP within the company, partnership nevertheless
remained ‘loosely coupled’ with commercial and strategic decision-making,
because, as reported by senior managers interviewed, the board essentially
viewed CP as a ‘sub-board’ concern.
An important consequence of the fusion of CP and mainstream decision-
making around major commercial challenges was that partnership became
characterized by poor ‘vertical alignment’. CP soon came to be ‘top-heavy’,
with most activity focused on problems affecting business units and the
company as a whole. Relatively little attention was devoted to departmental
arrangements, and less still to the creation of ‘regular work groups’. That
regular work groups became the ‘Cinderella of CP’ was inconsistent with the
original plan that had envisaged teamwork as the main vehicle for higher
levels of employee participation in day-to-day work. This unevenness and
top-heaviness was to have important implications for staff experiences and
perceptions of CP.
Senior management’s attitudes and postures also played a critical role in
shaping the dynamics of CP. While CP had become formal company policy
and was supported from the outset by the CEO, most senior managers
remained sceptical of partnership. It is significant that CP had arisen not
from line management-led responses to commercial or operational pressures,
but from the vision and foresight of a small number of management and
union champions, and in largely benign commercial conditions. Champions
of CP were a minority and they tended to occupy staff or support roles in the
company rather than key line management roles. Outright critics were also a
minority, but some occupied key roles in the airports, and their early
opposition was tolerated.
While corporate values in Aer Rianta had long been ‘progressive’ with
respect to staff issues, a strong current of paternalism also underpinned the
company’s ethos. This affected the development of CP in three ways. First,
the personnel department had traditionally enjoyed a virtual monopoly over
people management but conventionally operated on the basis of an approach
that attributed priority to the management of industrial relations and
administrative personnel concerns. Little priority had thus been accorded to
the type of initiatives involved in CP. From such a background the
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personnel department had not been in the vanguard of the process of innova-
tion that led to CP. Second, by tradition many line managers had not acted
as proactive people managers, and effective human resource management
was not viewed as integral to successful management practice. Third, as out-
lined in Chapter 4, at the apex of the company, personnel-related issues were
perceived as sub-strategy-level concerns rather than as fundamental attrib-
utes of competitive strategy and business success. The values and commit-
ments represented by CP thus involved a sharp discontinuity with
traditional management values and postures in Aer Rianta concerning the
role of personnel and industrial relations issues in management and business
decision-making.
Of the three groups of senior managers identified in Chapter 5, ‘sup-
porters’ were convinced that CP provided the most effective way of running
the company and that it would ultimately succeed in transforming decision-
making and industrial relations in Aer Rianta. ‘Opponents’ saw little value
in CP and took the view that it was attractive mainly to union activists.
‘Sceptics’ had more complicated attitudes to partnership. They generally
recognized ‘process advantages’ and some even pointed to ‘bottom-line
advantages’ and achievements. But they also showed a strong awareness of
costs and of both process and bottom-line disadvantages.
Senior management ambiguity and division with respect to CP interacted
with prolonged middle management opposition. Middle managers had not
been centrally involved in the genesis or development of CP and remained
outside the JUCG due to a dispute over the prospective status of IAESA nomi-
nees. These experiences fed the concern and anxiety of middle managers regard-
ing the implications of partnership for their work, status and job security. The
attitudes and postures of middle managers were also conditioned by prevailing
organizational systems and related human resource practices. Few formal
changes had been made in organizational systems, such as objective setting, or
in such HR areas as performance and rewards management, that might have
fostered middle management support for CP. In spite of being expected to
manage on the basis of the principles set down in the Compact, middle managers
continued to be held accountable for the achievement of traditional business
objectives. Inevitably, ‘hard’, bottom-line results continued to be seen as what
really counted with respect to performance and prospects. Finding themselves
in an invidious position between the policy of their union, which enjoined
them to boycott CP, and official management policy that enjoined them to
engage with partnership, some middle managers appear to have co-operated on
a covert basis. Many managers, however, appear to have remained aloof from
the process. Perceptions of senior management ambivalence and opposition also
contributed to middle managers’ lack of enthusiasm for CP. With the advent of
a new CEO and the merger of the middle managers’ union, middle managers
abandoned their formal opposition to CP.
The consequences of union involvement in partnership have been the
subject of a deep division of views in the academic literature, with advocates
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and critics adopting sharply contrasting positions. Union involvement in CP
was seen by many union officials and activists to have been beneficial in
terms of making for more effective representation and extending the frontier
of union influence into company decision-making. The issue of potential or
actual union incorporation scarcely arose as a concern for those who had been
instrumental in the development and operation of CP. Yet most union offi-
cials, activists and worker directors remained sceptical with regard to the
sustainability of CP. Their scepticism appeared to have been fed mainly by
their perception of management division and ambivalence. Opposition to
proposals emanating from partnership and to the application of partnership
to areas hitherto covered by collective bargaining came from among elected
worker directors, who, like middle managers, had been effectively excluded
from CP.
The widely reported phenomenon of the ‘displaced activist’ was not
evident in Aer Rianta. This was so in spite of the centralized arrangements
instituted by CP – as evidenced by the level of control exercised by the
JUCG over partnership-related initiatives – and the widely shared percep-
tion that a small group of management and union figures held most influ-
ence over all aspects of the process. Little of the intra-union conflict and
factionalism reported in the partnership literature was manifest in Aer
Rianta. Nor, the survey data revealed, were shop stewards and activists an
alienated or disaffected group within the ranks of union membership. The
non-displacement of activists in Aer Rianta was attributed in Chapter 7 to
the origin of CP in joint commitment to build a new form of organization
and a new style of industrial relations. There had been little formal realign-
ment of the roles of shop stewards or activists and no rolling back of the
traditional activities of lay representatives had occurred. The involvement of
shop stewards and activists in training for CP had also diluted resistance.
The architecture of CP was also influential in allowing shop stewards and
activists scope to represent their members within conventional industrial
relations channels if these were preferred over partnership channels. The
main line of intra-union tension during the roll-out of CP was between
worker directors, a group at the apex of governance and decision-making in
Aer Rianta, and champions of CP within the unions. Differences between
union officials and some worker directors were later to find expression in
conflict over reorganization in several departments, but differences of
perspective and posture had little effect on the early development or opera-
tion of CP, or on union engagement in major strategic initiatives. National
union organizations endorsed the activities of their Aer Rianta branches and
had supported partnership – a posture symbolized by the appointment of
the General Secretary of the ICTU as a ‘sponsor’ of CP. This too was to
change later.
While officials and activists were willing to identify advantages that had
arisen from operating through partnership and while little alienation or dis-
affection had resulted, union members in general were divided concerning
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the effectiveness and influence of their unions and relatively few reported
that union influence had increased over the period during which partnership
had developed to its fullest extent. Survey data also revealed that the more
scope union members had enjoyed for participation and autonomy in their
work – a major objective of CP – the more positively they assessed union
effectiveness and changes in union influence over the period covered by CP.
The survey also revealed that the more union members had engaged with CP
– that is, the greater their knowledge of CP initiatives and the more they
had discussed these in union and other forums – the higher their level of
union commitment. If CP delivered positive spin-offs for unions among
those of their members who had enjoyed substantial scope for participation
in their jobs and who had engaged with CP activities, the middle managers’
union appeared to have garnered little commitment from their members as a
result of their alienation from CP.
A major objective of introducing partnership arrangements, as outlined
in Chapters 1 and 8, is that they are expected to reshape attitudes to work
and employment, and thereby to unlock latent sources of motivation and
commitment, unattainable on the basis of more traditional work arrange-
ments and forms of industrial relations. This postulate has long provided the
theoretical bridge between the work and decision-making innovations asso-
ciated with involvement, participation and partnership and organizational
outcomes and performance. The literature on involvement and participation
has also long reported strong employee interest in new forms of participative
work organization. The literature on teamwork as one specific innovation in
work organization is more divided, as outlined in Chapter 8. Some
commentators have associated teams with more scope for participation,
higher levels of autonomy and positive work attitudes; others have equated
teams with work intensification and more complex and variable patterns of
attitudes and behaviour. While much of the more recent literature on
partnership has concentrated on organizational outcomes and performance
effects, without focusing directly on employees’ attitudes and behaviour,
positive effects on attitudes and behaviour are commonly inferred from man-
agement reports of employees’ responses or are assumed to underlie partner-
ship-based innovations. The literature on partnership has nevertheless
introduced several new themes. One such theme concerns the possible effects
on work-related attitudes and behaviour of different channels for involve-
ment and participation. Another addresses the effects of simultaneous
involvement in direct and indirect partnership channels. A third theme con-
cerns whether attitudes and behaviour are positively affected in areas of
likely benefit to the company (organizational commitment and productivity)
as well as in areas of more immediate importance for employees (job satisfac-
tion, fairness and well-being).
Attitude surveys conducted in Aer Rianta prior to the advent of CP
revealed high levels of interest among staff in greater scope for involvement
and participation than enjoyed under prevailing arrangements in the
250 Advocates, critics and partnership
company. Latent in the attitudes revealed, in all probability, were high
expectations with respect to CP and its consequences for employees. The
survey conducted in conjunction with this study revealed that staff in
general assessed CP in negative terms. Only minorities expressed positive or
strongly positive attitudes towards the achievements and effects of partner-
ship. Initial high expectations, uneven penetration, the ‘top-heavy’ nature of
CP initiatives and perceptions of management divisions and resistance help
explain the underlying pattern of attitudes revealed. A more positive assess-
ment of CP emerged when an analysis was undertaken of the effects on atti-
tudes of levels of involvement and participation in different aspects of CP.
This revealed that the more job autonomy employees enjoyed and the
greater their level of overall engagement with CP, the more positive their
assessments of the effects of partnership. Levels of job autonomy also influ-
enced perceptions of the climate of industrial relations and thereby posi-
tively affected levels of organizational commitment. But higher levels of
participation in formal CP groups and committees and occupancy of CP
support roles negatively influenced perceptions of the climate of industrial
relations and, thereby, levels of organizational commitment. This probably
occurred because those with higher levels of formal involvement felt frustra-
tion with the pace and scale of change associated with CP. The survey analy-
sis found that CP had no significant effect on changes in a range of work
practices – these occurring mainly as a result of conventional pressures.
The establishment of regular work groups among skilled employees in
the maintenance department was also shown to have had no distinctive
effects on the attitudes and behaviour of those involved. This must count as
a significant failure for the CP initiative, given the underlying objective of
bringing about major changes in day-to-day working practices and work
experiences through the creation of a new form of teamwork. Different CP
channels appeared to influence attitudes in a specific or selective manner, in
ways not envisaged by the partnership literature: ‘more was not better’ in
the sense that the different CP channels created had not exerted discrete
positive effects across a range of attitudes to work. High levels of involve-
ment in multiple CP channels, direct and indirect, also exerted no robust
positive effects on the attitudes and behaviour examined. Whatever may be
the significance of ‘vertical integration’ with respect to the behaviour of
institutional actors, like management and unions, or with respect to their
joint activities, simultaneous involvement in, or engagement with, direct
and indirect participation, was revealed not to have affected attitudes and
behaviour on an individual level in Aer Rianta. The higher the level of
involvement of staff in CP channels, however, the more pronounced the
positive attitudinal effects for both the company and for employees them-
selves. In other words, ‘mutual gains’ were in this sense apparent at the level
of individual attitudes and behaviour.
Developing on a long-running theme in the ‘pre-partnership’ literature,
workplace partnership has also been associated by some writers with high
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levels of commitment towards organizations and trade unions: so-called
‘dual commitment’. Dual commitment was shown not to have been a perva-
sive feature of the attitudes of employees and trade union members in Aer
Rianta. This was accounted for by the limited, uneven, top-heavy and con-
tested penetration of CP across the company, even at the high-water mark of
partnership. Perhaps only highly institutionalized and systemic partnership
arrangements can be expected to transform attitudes in a manner that results
in dual commitment. CP never reached such a level of institutionalization in
Aer Rianta.
The breakdown of partnership
The weak level of institutionalization of CP, even at its high-water mark,
reflected the interplay of the forces outlined above on the dynamics of
partnership. Partnership arrangements in the company broke down over a
period of two to three years, as some of these forces were further affected by
changes in the internal and external context of CP in Aer Rianta. In Chapter
10, the breakdown of partnership was attributed to the interaction of opera-
tional-level and summit-level problems, and their joint interaction in turn
with blurred boundaries between CP and conventional collective bargaining
arrangements.
At the summit level, prolonged indecision and inaction by government
regarding the future of Aer Rianta and a failure to implement the strategy
formulated by the company and its unions introduced a damaging hiatus
into relations between the parties to partnership, raising questions regarding
the value of CP. One of the supreme achievements of CP, the joint proposals
on the company’s future, now appeared to those involved to have led
nowhere. At national level, one of the key unions, SIPTU, was also reported
by some champions of CP to have had second thoughts regarding the partial
privatization recommendation at the core of the joint proposals. The union’s
posture, in turn, reinforced the opposition of worker directors to privatiza-
tion and to CP as a channel for privatization. A history of inter-union ten-
sions at Dublin Airport, resulting in fears regarding further possible
defections of members, hardened the resolve of union head offices against
any activities on the ground that might put union security in jeopardy.
Though of less direct impact, the deliberations of the newly appointed
aviation regulator appeared to raise questions with respect to one of the key
commercial parameters of the Compact. Criticism of Aer Rianta’s ‘gold-
plated investment programme’ appeared especially ominous for a company
that had pledged itself to compete on the basis of service quality and that
had offered major human resource pledges consistent with such a posture.
Proposals to build a second, privately operated terminal at Dublin Airport,
Aer Rianta’s most profitable location, avidly backed by the low-cost carrier
Ryanair, also called into question the long-term sustainability of the
competitive posture underlying the Compact.
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It is conceivable that CP might have weathered even these storms had
serious problems not simultaneously arisen at an operational or day-to-day
level. Shortly after the parties had agreed a common position on the
company’s future and on the loss of duty-free sales, the pace of CP activity at
departmental level increased considerably as management and unions sought
to tackle on a partnership basis significant changes that affected work prac-
tices, pay and conditions. There were some significant achievements in two
departments, cleaning and maintenance, but partnership effectively col-
lapsed in two other major departments, Retailing and the Airport Police and
Fire Service, amid much bitterness and recrimination. Opposition by worker
directors to the use of CP to address areas hitherto covered by collective bar-
gaining and background inter-union tensions interacted with difficulties
encountered in finding agreement at departmental level and both sets of
factors exposed ambiguities and uncertainties at the interface between
partnership and collective bargaining. The resulting volatility displaced CP
and discredited partnership among staff and union representatives in two
major Aer Rianta departments. Active support on the part of remaining
senior management champions also abated, as CP came to be viewed as divi-
sive and ineffective. While these forces were being played out, the succession
crisis engendered by the retirement of the major champions of CP on the
management and union sides rendered CP highly vulnerable at a time when
partnership confronted challenges of extreme and unprecedented magnitude.
The cumulative effect of summit- and operational-level problems and
their interaction with ambiguities and uncertainties at the interface between
collective bargaining and partnership was to bring about the collapse of
partnership in Aer Rianta. The collapse of CP left a bitter heritage for many
who had laboured to develop partnership in the company, and for union rep-
resentatives and staff in major departments. All that remained among senior
managers and trade union officials was a willingness to consider whether
some way forward might still be found through partnership. The tentative
explorations arising from residual goodwill towards the process were subse-
quently derailed by the announcement of proposals to break Aer Rianta into
independently managed airport management companies. Management and
the Aer Rianta unions now confronted the most serious crisis in the
company’s history through conventional modes of lobbying, decision-
making and through traditional industrial relations postures.
Advocates, critics and the case of Aer Rianta
As outlined in Chapter 1 and at various points in the body of the book, aca-
demic opinion concerning workplace partnership has been polarized between
advocates and critics. We will conclude the book with some comments on
the import of the study’s findings for this debate. First, it might be noted
that the Aer Rianta case is significant in theoretical terms because the
parties set out to adopt partnership as a basis for radical organizational
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change based on staff and union involvement and participation at multiple
levels. In this regard Aer Rianta has few peers in the international literature
and provides a rich context in which to examine the antecedents, dynamics
and effects of voluntary partnership. In assessing the import of the findings
for the debate between advocates and critics, it will be helpful to address
separately the themes of the outcomes and sustainability of partnership.
Outcomes
Advocates of partnership point to a series of positive outcomes for all stake-
holders, employers, employees and trade unions. Critics of partnership either
argue that the benefits for employers grossly outweigh those for employees
and unions, or that partnership, due to its essentially voluntary nature,
delivers few significant benefits for any party.
In the case of Aer Rianta, the company and the unions could point to a
series of benefits seen to have accrued from partnership, albeit that most of the
benefits identified in the intensive interviews related to ‘process’ as distinct
from ‘bottom-line’ advantages. The major achievements of CP, as presented in
this book, were the joint strategy for the future status of the company and the
joint strategic response to the loss of duty-free sales. Without partnership, as
the parties involved made clear, each of these issues would have provoked
major division and, in all probability, would have sparked acute industrial dis-
order. That the joint strategy for the future of Aer Rianta came to nought and
that the joint strategic response to the loss of duty-free revenues failed to carry
over into successful joint action across all the issues involved in the reorganiza-
tion of retailing in the airports qualifies the extent of the successes achieved in
these areas, but cannot erase them from the record.
Other outcomes identified by the advocates such as significant gains in
productivity or quality, or reductions in labour costs, rooted in new work
practices, better industrial relations and more committed staff, were not
reported in Aer Rianta, though the changes introduced into some depart-
ments through partnership, as outlined in Chapter 10, were deemed signific-
ant by the parties involved on both sides. It is also relevant in assessing
outcomes that attitudes towards, as well as commitment to, the company
increased commensurate with employees’ involvement in CP, and their
opportunity to work in a manner consistent with the principles of the
Compact. The exception here was the effect of membership of CP groups,
committees and occupancy of support roles, which made for more negative
assessments of industrial relations and thereby for lower levels of organi-
zational commitment. Unions were also assessed more positively and
enjoyed higher levels of commitment commensurate with their members’
involvement in CP. These findings, allied with the finding that attitudes on
the whole were positively affected in areas of relevance to the company, as
well as areas of concern to employees, indicate that significant positive out-
comes had accrued through CP.
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That significant outcomes resulted with respect to the parties’ response to
strategic challenges, with respect to the changes introduced in some depart-
ments and with respect to the attitudes of at least some highly involved
employees and union members, supports the position of the advocates and
counts against the position of critics, such as Streeck, who see voluntary
partnership as incapable of delivering significant gains for any party. The
pattern of outcomes also seems inconsistent with the views of critics like
Kelly, who claim that the outcomes of partnership are grossly asymmetrical,
favouring employers significantly more than employees or trade unions. No
claims consistent with perceptions of asymmetric outcomes were encoun-
tered in our interviews, save for some managers who felt that partnership
had worked mainly to the advantage of trade unions. Also the pattern of
outcomes with respect to strategic initiatives, departmental initiatives and
attitudes pointed towards benefits for all parties. Certainly the kind of out-
comes identified by Kelly (2004), involving reduced or indeterminate union
influence, setbacks in work practices and relatively limited advances in pay
and conditions were not evident in Aer Rianta, perhaps because CP, what-
ever its difficulties, occupied the ‘labour-parity’ end of Kelly’s continuum.
Sustainability
Whatever its advantages for the parties, the Aer Rianta partnership broke
down, and this also has a bearing on the arguments of advocates and critics.
While Kelly’s work contains no explicit theory of how partnerships might
break down, implicit in his view of outcomes is the possibility that break-
down might occur as an outcome of asymmetrical gains, perhaps when
unions are emboldened by improvements in the labour market or in their
bargaining power. In the Aer Rianta case, gross disparities in the outcomes
of partnership never became an issue for the parties, and so no such dynamic
took effect. We are left then with two further theories of breakdown. One of
these is at the core of the writings of advocates, where, as discussed, a series
of influences is identified as important in shaping the functioning of
partnership and ultimately the sustainability of partnership arrangements.
The second is to be found in the contention of Wolfgang Streeck that volun-
tary partnership arrangements are capable only of engendering weak and
unstable co-operation, and ultimately result in one side or other defecting,
either opportunistically or strategically, where market or other forces are
seen by them to warrant the withdrawal of support. As discussed in Chapter
1, Streeck’s later work (1995) moves closer to the position of the advocates
in its recognition that institutional supports might buttress voluntary co-
operation and counteract the tendency to withhold earnest co-operation. The
same supports might also counteract any tendency towards defection from
partnership.
It is clear from the analysis presented in the book that strong and secure
organization enabled the Aer Rianta unions to enter partnership with little
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fear concerning incorporation or loss of commitment from members. At the
same time, it was also clear that the sustainability of partnership was limited
by the weakness of other institutional supports identified by the advocates,
principally compatible HR and industrial relations practices in critical areas
such as rewards, performance management and conflict resolution. CP envis-
aged changes in these areas but failed to deliver those changes, with serious
implications for the sustainability of voluntary co-operation. Other institu-
tional supports identified by the advocates related to the overall ‘archi-
tecture’ of partnership itself: senior management support, a modus for
involving middle managers, planning for management and union succession,
the effective handling of the interface with collective bargaining, strategic
integration and vertical alignment. In all these areas, the analysis presented
in the core of the book also identified significant weaknesses that limited the
effectiveness and ultimately the sustainability of partnership in Aer Rianta.
In major respects, therefore, we can understand the breakdown of partner-
ship in terms of the absence or weakness of the kinds of institutional sup-
ports identified by advocates. Moreover, the dynamics of the breakdown of
CP do not appear consistent with the position outlined by Streeck. CP did
not collapse because it had been debilitated by chronically weak co-
operation on either side. The level of co-operation proffered with respect to
joint strategic initiatives was significant. Persistent union and worker-
director scepticism regarding the sustainability of partnership arose less
from perceptions of management bad faith or underhandedness in partner-
ship processes than from perceptions of divided and ambivalent manage-
ment opinion and support. The breakdown of partnership, when it
eventually came about, arose less from the dynamic identified by Streeck
than from a different dynamic set in train by the summit-level and opera-
tional problems examined in Chapter 10. Arguably, these reflected not so
much chronically weak and ineffective co-operation than overreach, excessive
ambition and concurrent extreme pressures at multiple levels.
Assuredly, a point was reached when some of the union representatives
and line managers responsible for change negotiations involving several cat-
egories of staff defected from CP in favour of collective bargaining, and
when senior managers and union officials withdrew support from partner-
ship in the light of operational and summit-level problems that had now
come to appear intractable. But the dynamic involved here was both differ-
ent to and more complex than that posited in Streeck’s critique of voluntary
partnership and his emphasis on the chronic ‘co-operation deficit’ inherent
in forms of partnership without the ‘hard’ institutional supports provided by
legislation.
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Appendix
Table A1 Scales of involvement and engagement with constructive participation
1 Membership of constructive participation groups Mean S.D.
and committees and occupancy of support roles
7-item scale; each item scored: 1=yes; no/don’t know=0.
Scale range: 0–7. 0.64
Member of a regular work group 0.26
Member of a departmental steering or work group 0.14
Member of a departmental strategy group 0.13
Member of a significant issues group 0.11
Observer of any of the above groups 0.17
Participation mentor with a department 0.06
Participation office facilitator 0.00
Cronbach Alpha=0.7225.
2 Engagement with constructive participation
9-item scale; each item scored: 2= frequently; 1=occasionally; 
0=never.
Scale range: 0–18. 6.28 4.00
Have you ever attended departmental meetings or training 
sessions at which constructive participation was discussed? 0.76 0.68
Have you read departmental newsletters on constructive 
participation? 0.94 0.71
Have you read company/union newsletters on constructive 
participation? 1.04 0.68
Have you attended any staff seminars on constructive 
participation arranged by the Joint Union Company 
Group? 0.75 0.69
Have you attended any exhibitions on constructive 
participation arranged by the Joint Union Company 
Group? 0.35 0.59
Have you attended union meetings where constructive 
participation was discussed? 0.42 0.64
Have you used the constructive-participation library? 0.13 0.42
Have you discussed constructive participation with 
colleagues? 1.09 0.65
Have you received feedback from colleagues who are 




4-item scale; each item scored: 3=a great deal; 2=a moderate 
amount; 1=only a little; 0=none.
Scale range: 0–12. 3.5 3.0
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Table A1 continued
How much information do you usually get about what is 
going on at each of the following?
Board meetings 0.77 0.82
Corporate senior management meetings 0.58 0.81
Airport senior management meetings 0.80 0.90
Local departmental meetings 1.38 1.06
Cronbach Alpha=0.8351.
4 Work participation
9-item scale: 4 task participation items and 5 items relating to 
management/supervisory style as experienced by employees. 
The task participation items are scored: 3=a great deal; 2=a 
moderate amount; 1=a little; 0=none.
The management/supervisory style items are scored 2= frequently; 
1=occasionally; 0=never.
To allow all items to exert equal influence on respondents’ 
overall scale scores, the scale scores for the management/
supervisory scale items were adjusted by multiplying the 
raw scores by 1.5.
Scale range=0–27. 15.85 7.92
Task participation
Thinking about your work, can you indicate the degree to which 
you have a say in the following activities?
Planning your work 1.85 1.16
Improving work methods 1.76 1.12
Setting work targets 1.53 1.23
Organizing workload 1.59 1.23
Management/supervisory style
We would like to ask about your experiences of decision-making 
and communication in Aer Rianta.
How often are you consulted before decisions are taken that 
affect your work? 0.99* 0.73*
If changes in your work occur, how often are you given the 
reason why? 1.15* 0.69*
Are you given the opportunity to make work decisions on 
your own? 1.15* 0.76*
If you have an opinion different from your supervisor, can 
you say so? 1.44* 0.65*
If you can say so, is any attention paid to it? 1.04* 0.7*
Cronbach Alpha=0.9273.
* Scale means and standard deviations calculated based on unadjusted scale scores
(0–2).
Note
All means, proportions and statistics presented in respect of the weighted sample.
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Table A2 Union commitment scale and sub-scales
Composite union commitment scale Mean S.D.
A 12-item scale, each item scored: 1= strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree. Items marked with an asterisk are reverse 
coded for consistency, from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly 
disagree. 39.0 6.9
1 I feel a sense of pride at being part of the union or staff 
association. 3.0 1.1
2 The record of my union or staff association is a good 
example of what dedicated people can get done. 3.0 1.0
3 My loyalty is to my work and not to my union or staff 
association.* 2.4 1.0
4 It’s every union or staff association member’s responsibility 
to see that management lives up to the terms of the
‘Awards and Agreements’. 3.9 0.8
5 As long as I’m doing the kind of work that I enjoy, it 
does not matter if I belong to a union or staff association.* 3.3 1.1
6 I am willing to put a great deal of effort in beyond that 
normally expected of me in order to make the union or 
staff association successful. 3.0 1.0
7 It’s every member’s duty to support or help another 
worker with his or her grievances. 3.9 0.8
8 There’s a lot to be gained from joining the union or staff 
association. 3.4 0.9
9 I would not do special work to help the union or staff 
association.* 3.3 1.0
10 If asked, I would serve on a committee for the union or 
staff association. 3.1 1.0
11 Every union or staff association member must be prepared 
to take the time and risk of making a complaint. 3.8 0.8
12 I could just as well work in another organization where 
there was no union or staff association, as long as the type 
of work was similar.* 3.0 1.2
Cronbach Alpha=0.8381.
Sub-scales measuring different dimensions of union commitment
1 Union loyalty (Items 1, 2 and 8 above). 9.5 2.5
2 Belief in union (Items 3, 5 and 12 above). 8.7 2.5
3 Responsibility to union (Items 4, 7 and 11 above). 11.5 1.8
4 Willingness to work for union (Items 6, 9 and 10 above). 9.4 2.3
Notes
Asterisked items are reverse-coded. Descriptive and scale statistics are based on weighted
sample data.
260 Appendix
Table A3 Attitudes to constructive participation: scale and sub-scales
Attitudes to constructive participation Mean S.D.
5-item scale; each item scored: 1= strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 
3=can’t decide; 4=agree; 5= strongly agree. 13.9 4.3
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements:
I know more about what is going on because of constructive 
participation. 2.68 1.09
I accept work decisions more easily because of constructive 
participation. 2.56 0.98
The quality of decisions is improved by constructive participation. 2.68 1.04
Employee interests are better served by constructive participation. 3.21 1.01
Better understanding and trust exist between management and 
employees as a result of constructive participation. 2.75 1.0
Cronbach Alpha=0.8839.
Note
All means, proportions and statistics presented in respect of the weighted sample.
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Table A4 Organizational commitment: composite scale and sub-scales
Composite organizational commitment scale Mean S.D.
A 15-item scale, each item scored: 1= strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree. Items marked with an asterisk are reverse 
coded for consistency, from 5=strongly disagree to 1=strongly 
agree. 52.6 8.0
1 I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that 
normally expected in order to help this organization to 
be successful. 4.1 0.7
2 I talk up this organization to my friends as a great 
organization to work for. 3.7 1.0
3 I feel very little loyalty to this organization.* 3.8 1.0
4 I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order 
to keep working for this organization. 2.5 1.0
5 I find that my values and the organization’s values are very 
similar. 3.3 0.9
6 I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization. 3.9 0.7
7 I could just as well be working for a different organization 
as long as the type of work was similar.* 3.0 1.0
8 This organization really inspires the very best in me in the 
way of job performance. 3.0 1.1
9 It would take very little change in my present circumstances 
to cause me to leave this organization.* 3.5 1.0
10 I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work 
for over others I was considering at the time I joined. 3.7 0.9
11 There’s not much to be gained by sticking with this 
organization indefinitely.* 3.5 1.0
12 Often I find it difficult to agree with this organization’s 
policies on important matters relating to its employees.* 2.9 1.0
13 I really care about the fate of this organization. 4.1 0.8
14 For me this is the best of all possible organizations for 
which to work. 3.3 1.0
15 Deciding to work for this organization was a definite 
mistake on my part.* 4.2 0.7
Cronbach Alpha=0.8567.
Sub-scales measuring different dimensions of organizational 
commitment
1 Effort commitment (Items 1 and 8 above). 7.1 1.4
2 Flexibility commitment (Item 4 above). 2.5 1.0
3 Value commitment (Items 3, 5 and 6 above). 11.0 2.0
4 Continuance commitment (Items 7, 9 and 11 above). 10.0 2.3
Note
Summary and scale statistics based on weighted sample data.
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